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ABSTRACT
Religion is a central feature of human behaviour and thought that carries some unique properties
that are of relevance to psychological inquiry, and has effects on the psychosocial world of the individual
that are distinct, highly significant, and in certain areas considerably consistent.
A number ofoverlapping approaches have been put forward in an attempt to describe and define
religion. I argued that a definition should be testable, differentiating, wide enough, not ethnocentric, and
unbiased, while at the same time meaningful within the context for which it was developed. For this thesis,
religion was seen as the belief structures of the major formal systems of faith and the way these structures
are used by the believers at both the personal and the collective level. The capacity ofthe individual to utilise
these structures was termed religiosity or religiousness.
The foundations of the psychology of religion were reviewed along with the main challenges the
field has faced through the years leading to its present status. A literature review revealed that most
psychological studies on religion seem to have serious methodological limitations, such as inappropriate
sample types, little or no control over certain religious, psychological, or sociodemographic variables,
simplistic at times implementation of statistical techniques, and almost a total neglect of qualitative
methodologies. These limitations could have artificially reduced the strength of the association between
religion and the psychological variables, and inflated the levels of bias in the findings.
The presented investigation assessed the relationship between aspects ofChristian faith and three
major psychological constructs, viz. personality, identity, and attachment. More specifically, the variables
ofprimary focus were: (1) religious orientation, and (2) schizotypal personality traits as defined by the DSM-
IV. Secondary variables that were treated as mediators were: (3) general personality traits, (4) aspects of
identity, and (5) adult attachment styles. Additionally, variables included were: Religious practices relating
to (6) church attendance and (7) prayer, (8) Christian denominations, (9) age, (10) gender, (11) social
desirability, and (12) sociodemographic characteristics. The relationship between mainly the primary and
secondary variables, with the central focus being on religiosity versus the rest, was considered from both
a theoretical and an empirical perspective. The result helped formulate the predictions to be tested, and
design of an integrated model to account for those relationships.
In the first quantitative questionnaire study, 161 adult Christians, all British residents, took part.
A non-probability purposive sampling was used. Participants were recruited from the undergraduate
programs of the University of Edinburgh, the psychology department volunteer panel, and through
individuals who served as intermediate contacts. Alongside descriptive questions, seven standardised
psychometric questionnaires were used measuring religiosity (I/E-R and RLI), personality (EPQ-R-S),
schizotypal traits (SPQ), identity (AIQ-IIIx), attachment (ECR), and desirable responding (BIDR-6).
Religiosity had a unique and complex effect on schizotypy that was as strong as that ofmainstream
psychological variables. The direction of this effect seemed to be determined by the interplay between the
religious and the psychological profiles of the individual. The psychological one was of a relatively
maladjusted individual, while the religious one was ofan ordinary believer. The religious profile appeared
to decrease the intensity of schizotypal traits; the psychological one did the opposite. This result suggested
that religiosity on its own and in its "natural" state seems to enhance the well-being of the individual. It is
only through its interplay with certain kinds and degrees of other psychological elements that
psychopathology is born.
The second study used qualitative interviews to focus on the identification of conceptual themes
through the participants' religious discourse that directly related to the findings of the first study and the
general thesis aims. This study utilised semi-structured, open-ended, telephone interviews with a sample of
eight participants who had taken part in the first study, and selected through a process of theoretical
sampling. Fifteen main interview-items were developed that addressed issues of religious life, upbringing,
meaning, and practices. Interview transcripts were analysed through thematic analysis.
The findings suggested that the main elements of a mental health-enhancing religion revolve
around issues of a personal relationship with God, the degree in which religion is embedded in and provides
meaning to one's life, the levels and nature ofexistential questioning, and the distinction between religious
choice and inevitability.
Religion is a complex, multidimensional concept; psychologists need to be more informed about
its interactions with the individual's psychosocial world. For that to be possible, focussed and sophisticated
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"As for the books [of the Great library ofAlexandria]
you mention, here is my reply:
If their contents be in accordance with the Book ofAllah,
we may do without them,
for in that case the Book ofAllah more than suffices.
If, on the other hand, they contain matter
not in accordance with the Book of Allah,
there can be no need to preserve them.
Proceed, then, and destroy them."
(Ibn al-Kifti's "History of Wise Men"
cited in Canfora, 1989, p. 105)
Chapter aims & organisation
This has been a long journey. The beginning of the end was somewhere here, with the
author torturing an already tired computer keyboard, being tortured back by the
knowledge of an army of research papers and academic books, marching through his
limited mind. He wrote in search of the truth, sometimes subjective as a poem and others
objective as a number, but always true to himself. And as he became I in the passages
that follow, in the end I was privileged to have an impression of the truth I sought. But




In this chapter a general introduction to the thesis is presented. First the thesis's aims and
objectives are stated, followed by the reasons that attracted the author to this area and
an outline of the specific psychological components used. Finally the structure of the
thesis is laid out and briefly described alongside the author's predisposition.
Thesis aims & objectives
The general aim of this PhD thesis was to investigate the relationship between faith and
psychological well-being. The circumstances under which institutional religious faith
can have a positive or negative association with mental health were explored. More
specifically, the relationship between degrees and kinds ofChristian religious orientation
and schizotypal personality traits (psychosis-proneness) was assessed, while taking into
account the effects of general personality traits, as well as social, and developmental
psychological elements, primarily identity aspects and attachment styles.
The thesis had four specific obj ectives: (a) the testing ofexistingmethodologies, through
the application ofmore rigorous controls over the studied variables; (b) the replication
and extension ofprevious findings in the area; (c) the identification, through the use of
primarily advanced statistical techniques and secondarily qualitative methodologies, of
conceptual and empirical areas that may require additional attention; and (d) the
determination ofplausible structural models that can provide an adequate, coherent, and
concise explanation of the relationships among the study variables.
Benefits of the thesis findings
Five groupsmay directly benefit from knowledge gained by this thesis: (a)psychologists
ofreligion may use it to reassess and enrich current methodologies and findings in the
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area; (b)psychologists in general may be helped to realise that religion is a fundamental,
yet rather complex, aspect of the psychosocial world of the individual that deserves the
attention of mainstream psychological research and thought; (c) mental health
practitioners may use it to reexamine the aetiology ofmental disorders, and to redefine
diagnoses and existing treatments; (d) religious individuals withmental health problems
may gain increasing trust in the health services and some direct self-insight; and finally
(e) pastoral counsellors may become more beneficial and central to religious
individuals, by providing an alternative or additional service where appropriate.
The background of the thesis
For the best part ofmy life I have had a personal interest in religious matters. Having
been born in a country where national and religious identities are twin sisters, where,
being Greek, one is expected through the constitution to be a Christian Orthodox, where
the Church ismore powerful than and untouchable by any "earthly" governing body, and
where everyday reality is coloured by an almost innate belief in the supernatural and the
paranormal, religion was a "scent" on every person's being. So when the opportunity
arose through this PhD thesis, religion was one of the obvious research choices.
In the fall of 1999,1 entered the field, secure in the belief I was entering an unchartered
area ofpsychological investigation, only to discover to my surprise that psychology had
been "flirting" with religion formore than a century. As I found out, and as I will further
elaborate in chapter III, there is a long and winding story behind the psychology-religion
affair.
From its cradle days of existence, modern Western psychology was interested in
religion, and began to explore and assess its significance to the individual's psychosocial
world. The relationship between psychology and religion, however, appears to have been
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for most of its part problematic, and at times hostile (Emmons & Paloutzian, 2003;
Gorsuch, 1988). Scholars argued that psychology was dangerously challenging the
individual's religious beliefs with a negative and harmful attitude that could potentially
lead to disastrous consequences (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993). In fact,
psychologists were warned to keep away from religious affairs (e.g. Jourard, 1968;
Kirkpatrick, 1999; Van Til, 1935/1972). Despite a ferocious at times criticism, the
psychology of religion survived through the years and evolved to its present status,
gradually becoming a promising area of psychology.
Acquiring knowledge of the above affair, however, instead ofmaking my work easier,
made me question the meaning, function, and purpose of the inquiry upon which I was
about to embark. The following were my three main considerations: (a) why should I,
as a psychologist, be interested in religion, a topic that seems to be of greater relevance
to philosophy, sociology, or anthropology? (b) what may be the contribution of such
study to the psychological knowledge? and finally (c) what can psychology offer to
religion? At the ultimate conceptual level this thesis attempts implicitly to address these
issues.
In putting my intended investigation in religion into a psychological framework, I
needed to identify an area ofpsychology where religious matters could be pre-eminent.
I was spoiled for choice. In fact, as discussed in chapters III and IV, research had found
links between religion, as expressed mainly through Christianity, and most major
psychological areas that have filled volumes of literature and could fill as many more.
My choice ofmental health - a favourite topic of research in the psychology of religion
(Fontana, 2003; Grzymala-Moszczynska & Beit-Hallahmi, 1996; Foskett, Marriott, &
Wilson-Rudd, 2004; Koenig, 1998) - was again initially due to personal interest. I find
deviance a very stimulating topic of investigation - and a look at what tends to make
news headlines suggests that I am not alone in this preference - primarily because it
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scares and saddens me. I find the deviance of the mind even more frightening and thus
even more interesting, because although its categorisation requires a sociocultural
system, its manifestation is within the self.
From the variety ofmental health issues, this thesis focusses on one of the most dramatic
forms ofmental disorder, namely psychoses in general, because of the cataclysmic effect
they can have on the individual's perception of reality and thereforemost ifnot all of the
individual's actions, thoughts, and coping strategies. As my personal interest in the
relationship between religion and mental health was taking shape, it acquired global
status when terror in the name of God flew out of the sky one September morning in
2001.
Flaving settled on the two main components of this investigation, their specific aspects,
as well as the rest of the variables of this thesis fell into place mainly through evidence
from empirical research, as discussed in chapter IV. In brief, Christian religious
orientation was used as an "honest" empirical measurement of the degree of the
individual's motivations toward religious beliefs, practices, and behaviour. In regard to
mental health, this investigation focussed on schizotypal personality traits because (a)
of the apparent similarity of some of their underlying factors (such as magical ideation
or unusual perceptual experiences) to certain religious orientation components (Diduca
& Joseph, 1997; Maltby et ah, 2000; Wilson, 1998); and (b) of their major importance
in the development of serious mental illnesses, such as general psychoses and
schizophrenia related disorders (Claridge et ah, 1996;Millon, 1996). General personality
traits were selected because of the vast body of research linking them with both
psychotic personalities (Claridge & Davis, 2003) and religion orientation (Emmons,
1998,2003). Aspects of identity were used because ofthe relationship between religious
orientation and the sense ofmembership or belonging, and the potential relevance ofthis
relationship to mental health (Dobratz, 2001; Sernett, 1978). Finally, attachment styles
were chosen because of their relevance to the religious development of the individual
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(Granqvist & Hagekull, 2000; Kirkpatrick, 1998).
The decision, however, on the focus of this thesis and the specific variables to use, still
does not answer a very important question: Why trouble oneself running this
investigation?What are the unresolved issues that require another study in this area? A
simple answer to this is that to my knowledge no one has attempted to combine the
selected psychological and religious components into a single unified model. More
dramatically, the thesis's edifice is a large, yet inconclusive, body of empirical and
theoretical literature in the psychology ofreligion. For example, religion has been shown
to promote psychological well-being by (a) reducing existential anxiety, (b) providing
a sense of control over life, (c) supplying a focussed identity, and (d) giving moral
guidance. Flowever, many are the studies that argue for the contrary by showing that
religion may also upon occasion (a) nurture dependency, (b) increase prejudice, (c)
promote high levels of anxiety and fear, and (d) generate unrealistic expectations about
life (for a general discussion of all the above issues see Argyle, 2000; Beit-Hallahmi, &
Argyle, 1997, ch. 10; Brown, 1988; Dittes, 1969; Gorsuch, 1988; Loewenthal, 2000).
Though the above sets of effects are not mutually exclusive, theory and research so far
appear to be somewhat contradictory and inconclusive. There are several explanations
for this, including ill-defined concepts, inconsistency and incomparability of
measurements, inappropriate choices of samples, and lack of control for confounding
variables and covariates (for a discussion see Gartner, Larson, & Allen, 1991;
Pargament, 2002; Sloan, Bagiella, & Powell, 1999).
Although all the above problems may simply be characteristics of the evolving study of





In chapter II, I present an operational definition of religion for use in this thesis, by
showing, through a critical description of some of the main social sciences approaches
to religion, why generating a widely acceptable definition of the concept has been
difficult. Chapter III discusses a number of psychological theories of religion, and it
addresses, though a historical review of the psychology of religion, the main problems
the psychological study of religion has faced through the years, as well as the various
ways these problems have been interpreted and to an extent resolved. Overall, these
problems seem to relate mainly to (a) the attitudes of a large number of psychologists,
who because of their convictions may not view religion as an important area of study;
and (b) to the lack ofagreement over fundamental theoretical andmethodological issues.
In chapter IV, I discuss the reasons why religion, as an aspect of human behaviour and
thought, is well-worth psychological investigation, through the presentation ofempirical
evidence that describes certain aspects of the relationship between religion and the
various psychological components presented earlier. In brief, it is shown that religion,
and specifically Christianity, is relevant to psychology (a) because it carries some unique
properties that are of major importance to psychological inquiry; and (b) because
empirical evidence suggests that its effects on the psychosocial world of the individual
are distinct, considerably consistent in certain areas, and highly significant. Finally, in
this chapter specific predictions and research questions are presented and justified.
Chapter V contains the methodology of the first empirical study of this thesis, which is
based on quantitative questionnaires, while chapterVI presents and discusses the results
of this study. In chapter VII, the methodology and rationale of the second study of this
thesis, which is based on qualitative interviews, is presented. The interviews served to
gather further information about the participants' representation of religion, religious
life, and their thoughts on the acquisition and development of their religious practices
and commitment. The analysis and discussion of the findings are presented in chapter




During the philosophy classes I took while at school back in Greece, I was repeatedly
reminded that in Classical Greece, any academic discourse was expected to possess the
following three characteristics: arguments based on formal logic (Aoyo<;), an ethical
approach (fjOog), and a passion in the ideas (ndOog). Nowadays, we go to great lengths
to ensure our academic ideas are logical and ethical. However, we tend to steer away
from passionate discourse, perhaps fearing that our passions may lead to subjective, and
thus "nonscientific", judgement. In fact, in ancient Greece the word Tta0og was indeed
used to refer to both passion and subjectivity indiscriminately.
Claiming that this research (and perhaps all research) is not to an extent subjective
would be naive. I have already declaredmy biases through the initial reasons that led me
choose this area for my thesis. I would like therefore to clarify right from the start that
although I do not consider myself a religious individual, I am sympathetic towards
religion. I do believe that religion, and by that I refer to the organised and recognised
institutions of faith (see chapter II), is a system of good, a fine collection of the purest
of moral codes, evolved and still evolving to benefit at multiple levels individuals and
societies alike. It is the human animal that frightens me. I believe it is the human
interpretation of the divine, at either or both the personal and the collective/institutional
level, that allows, promotes, or causes religious harm. Should this be the case, then any
religious problem moves from the divine, sacred, and otherworldly domain to the
earthly, human sphere and thus it becomes manageable and largely solvable. Therefore,
the deepest motive for writing this theses was to utilise the capacity ofmy scientific,
"objective" self in the hope ofdeveloping or simply proposing a possible segment ofthat
solution.
Having revealed my predispositions, I do not imply in any sense that the value of this
thesis is either jeopardised or degraded. Quite the contrary. Besides the ancient Greeks,
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I quote William James (1896/1979) on this who said:
Science would be less far advanced than she is if the passionate desires
of individuals to get their own faiths confirmed had been kept out of the
picture [...]. Ifyou want an absolute duffer in an investigation you must
[...] take a man who has no interest whatever in its results. He is the
warranted incapable, the positive fool. Themost useful investigator [...]
is always he whose eager interest in one side of the question is balanced
by an equally keen nervousness lest he become deceived (p. 21).
Chapter synopsis
The main purpose of this thesis was to assess the relationship between aspects of
Christian faith and schizotypal personalities (psychosis-proneness) by taking into
account mainly three major psychological constructs, viz. general personality, identity,
and attachment. Besides the author's personal interest in the area, theoretical and
empirical evidence suggests that further research is needed in order for conceptual and
practical models to be developed that will allow mainstream psychological elements to
be incorporated in more pluralistic and holistic ways. Besides this general introduction
chapter, the thesis is arranged into two theoretical chapters (chapters II and III), a
research literature review chapter (chapter IV), four chapters that present the two
empirical studies carried out - a questionnaire and an interview study - (chapters V to




"Reality is merely an illusion, albeit a very persistent one"
(attributed to Albert Einstein)
Chapter aims & organisation
The aim of this chapter is to construct a definition of religion to be used in this thesis,
and to discuss critically the main issues that make such an endeavour a frustratingly
difficult task. Initially the etymology of the word is considered. This is followed by a
discussion of the main approaches adopted since the 19th century in the social sciences
towards a definition of the term. The author's ideas of what elements an adequate
definition should possess are explained, followed by the author's definition of religion
and its justification. Finally the concept of spirituality is briefly discussed.
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The riddle of religion
Religion has been one of the main driving forces behind the affairs of individuals,
nations, and cultures, at least since the dawn of written history. It has given humanity
many of its highest moments; it has amazed us with magnificent architecture and
transcendental music and arts; it has inspired us to think beyond the here and now, to
develop powerful moral codes and to philosophise about the self and the purpose of life;
it has gifted us with people like Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and Mother
Teresa, people whose religious philosophies have produced unique goodness and have
influenced great social changes. Religion has also plagued us with our darkest times. In
the name of God we have speechlessly witnessed the crusades, Holy wars, the
Inquisition, the Ku Klux Klan, ethnic cleansing and genocides, mass suicides, and
terrorism.
Before one begins to discuss and study religion and religious matters, one needs to
define what it is that is being discussed or studied. So what is religion?
The notion of religion, having puzzled philosophers and social scientists for decades, is
still resisting a widely accepted, clear-cut, essentialistic definition (Beit-Hallahmi &
Argyle, 1997; Guthrie, 1996; Loewenthal, 2000). However, religion seems to be one of
those concepts, like intelligence or mental health, that although scholars find great
difficulty in defining it, most of us would have an intuitive sense ofwhat it is when we
see it. Still, what is so difficult about the concept of religion that makes it such a
nebulous concept, leading social scientists like Edward Evans-Pritchard (1965, p.121)
to declare it undefinable?
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The origin of the word
The problem begins already with the etymology of the word. There does not seem to be
a consensus regarding the origins of the word religion. Cicero (c. 106 -43 BC) (trans.
1933) suggested that the word derives from the verb relegere meaning "to treat
carefully" or within the context of religion "to handle carefully spiritual matters". For
Lactantius (c. 240-320) (trans. 1871) the word comes from religare, which means "to
bind" and as an extension "to bind oneselfwith the Divine". To make things even more
complicated, St. Augustine (c. 345 - 430) (trans. 1948) derives religion from religere
meaning "to recover", i.e. "to recover the Divine in oneself'. According to David
Fontana (2003) the term religio, which can be a derivative of all three of the above
verbs, appears to have been used in cultic traditions of the early Roman times to refer
to the responsibility, or perhaps the ethical duty, the individual had in doing certain
things. Those things were related to family values, oaths, spiritual ceremonies and the
like. In that sense, religion was used as an adjective rather than a noun to mean
something holy, sacred, or even taboo.
At this point it is worth briefly mentioning the etymology of the Greek word for religion
(dpr/a/ceia). The word, though not necessarily its meaning or use, has remained
unchanged throughout the centuries, and it can be found in the same form in ancient
Greek manuscripts to current Greek literature. According to Isihios, one of the major
Greek lexicographers of the 5th century AC, the word possibly originates from either the
verb dprjoKCO, whichmeans "to understand", or the verb dpccoKei v(to remind oneself),
or even the verb evdpeivmeaning "to safeguard", while he also suspected a connection
with the noun 6pavo<; (throne) (MTtapTCiviooTriq, 2002). The above etymology,
although it shares some parallels with aspects of the Latin-based word, especially those
proposed by St. Augustine, it still has its own unique origins. Let us keep this in mind
for when I discuss the different approaches to defining religion later.
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Going back to the Latin-based term, and sometime during the early Middle Ages, its
meaning became more exclusive and shifted to signify a personal relation to a deity, a
bond with the Divine (thus closely resembling Lactantius' early etymology of the term).
This shiftmay have been caused by the widespread and established presence in the West
ofChristianity and Islam, their catalytic influences on state matters, and their exclusive,
monopoly-like, privileges with access to and generation of knowledge. In the
Renaissance and later during the Enlightenment, the term became more complex and
began conveying the idea ofa systematic entity, a doctrine (Smith, 1978). Consequently,
religio became a noun with certain values and properties of its own right. From then on,
people not only could be labelled as religious and nonreligious, but also they could
identify themselves as members of certain organised "faith" systems (e.g. the Christian
religion) thus differentiating one group's religion or religiones from another's (Asad,
1993).
The concept of religion as a distinctive entity developed during the 18th and 19th
centuries, when it was used to characterise objective abstract systems of ideas as real
things in themselves (Smith, 1978). This process of reification and abstractification of
religion has led to the term religion evolving to refer to a complex variety of religious
phenomena, without necessarily having any unity. Its usage can now refer to personal
piety or to an overt theological and historical system of, for example, beliefs or practices,
which has an extension in time and is connected to a particular community. On the one
hand, it can still be used as a singular systematic notion, for example the religion of the
Greeks, while on the other hand, it can have a plural meaning, signifying the sum of all
objective and abstract "religious" systems, separating them from other aspects of life like
arts or science.
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Approaches to defining religion
Reductive vs. nonreductive approaches
This briefhistory of the term may suggest that the problem ofdefining religion is not as
difficult as it seems. The notion of religion has evolved to mean whatever it does at
present. However, this is not as simple as itmay sound. The above "evolution" is largely
based on the Western tradition, and as such it may be only applicable to Western (i.e.
monotheistic) religions (cf. the etymology of the Greek word).
It should be apparent then, the nonreductive approach claims, that inevitably, the idea
of religion not only appears to be culturally bound, but as Clifford Geertz (1973, pp. 23,
90) posits, is also largely defined and shaped by historical and discursive processes.
Although symbolic systems that could be classified as religions appear to be present in
every society, the ways people seem to understand and express these systems are related
to the ways they view life and their purpose and function in it. Therefore, to agree on a
definition of religion, a consensus has to be achieved on the above matters as well, and
that consensus is not possible since these matters appear to be at times dramatically
different between cultures and eras. Similarly, Evans-Pritchard (1956) argues that our
understanding of religion is biased and distorted, and attempting to apply the notion of
religion to social systems outside aWestern context is inappropriate, ifnotmeaningless,
since in many of those societies the concept of religion as an abstract objective system
appears to be absent. Subsequently, should wewish to understand religionwe should see
it in its own terms.
For example, Evans-Pritchard in his book "Nuer Religion" (1956) claims that the Nuer
people are not aware they are living religiously, and to a Westerner it would appear that
they indeed do not possess a religion - at least as we in the West understand it. They
seem not to have a formal dogma, organised rituals and worships, nor even a theistic-
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kind ofmythology. However, Evans-Pritchard argues further that the Nuer people do
possess all these things in their richness, but they are so tightly fused with their culture
that they are practically invisible to the Western eye. Since the Nuer "religion" appears
not to distinguish between a natural and a supernatural world, the notion seems to be
greatly incompatible with the way we view it in the West.
Several thinkers object to the localistic approach to religion as being constructed on
epiphenomenal cultural characteristics that tend to distract from the universal essence
of religion. Emile Durkheim (1915/1976) and Sigmund Freud (1913/1955) are two of
those theorists who claim that even though belief and practices may vary, at times
dramatically, between and within societies, their underlying integrative functions are
present in all social groups. As such, they can be "universalistically" explained through
scientific investigation, since according to scientific laws the same cause results in the
same behaviour (Freud is a central figure in the psychology of religion and his ideas are
discussed extensively in chapter III). What these scholars acknowledge is that religion
cannot be rational in a scientific sense, and therefore one needs to look beyond the actual
belief to explain it. This is, however, a reductive approach, in the sense that it attempts
to explain religion away and reduce it to something nonreligious, namely to a single or
very few psychosocial functions.
I do not favour the reductive approach to religion. Although I do not dispute its
theoretical soundness and value, I do question its empirical usefulness. The attribution
ofreligion to some sort ofarchaic symbolic psychosocial functions seems too vague, and
the generalisations it claims too speculative to allow for the development oftestable and
operational constructs. At the same time I do not entirely subscribe to the hermeneutic,
nonreductive approach either. By explaining religion through a culturally-specific
meaning and the way groups or individuals construct this meaning in order to make
unique sense of their world, this approach tends to be too time and place limited that it
once again seems to lack a great degree of broad empirical power.
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I would not suggest that a general definition of religion is impossible, but rather that
when defining the notion, one needs to consider to a great extent the interaction between
the global and the local, and in doing so, one has to be aware of the potential restrictions
and limitations of the generated definition. Sincemostmodern psychological ideas have
been generated under Western systems of thought, it would make sense, when
attempting to investigate religion psychologically, to use it in itsWestern construct. That
said, one has to be aware that our definitions may consequently perhaps only be
applicable to Western societies, and thus it may be safer to restrict research based on
such premises to the West.
Substantive vs. functional approaches
Anotherway in which scholars have attempted to explain religion is by focussing on two
distinct aspects, namely its substance or its function (Berger, 1974). This approach forms
a new independent dimension of what religion is and thus it can be viewed in parallel
with reductive-nonreductive explanatory models.
Substantive approaches attempt to define religion through its content. According to
these approaches religions possess sets of fundamental, essential features that structure
their philosophical makeup. This assertion allows certain belief-systems to count as
religions and others not. Those that do, might, for example, involve beliefs in God or
gods, or beliefs in spirits or the supernatural, i.e. elements and forces that science cannot
explain.
Religion is viewed as a system of utmost importance, because it leads to a better
understanding of the world. The main aim of religion is seen as providing meaning by
constructing a (true) model of reality. According to the substantive (also known as the
intellectual) approach, religion possesses two central elements. The first is faith. This
requires a belief in a transcendent reality; a reality that is beyond the sphere of ordinary
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life; a belief in "something that gives meaning to all that passes, and yet eludes
apprehension" (Whitehead, 1926b, p. 191). The second substance of religion is the
sacred or the holy. Two of the main proponents of this dimension are Rudolf Otto
(1917/1936) and MirceaEliade (1959). They advocate that religious people separate the
world into the sacred and the profane, and religion is concerned with the former. While
with the sacred (the superlative of "precious") they refer to superior, greatly respected
large concerns and the collective, they characterise the profane with features like the
inferior, everyday life, and the individual. The sacred, according to the substantive
approach, is the only reality, the ultimate reality, and it forms an intuitive part ofhuman
thought and activity. This being so, religion is needed to create encounters with the holy
through numinous, i.e. spiritual experiences. In other words, the substantive approach
sees faith in the holy as the fundamental component of religion, through which humans
make sense of their reality (e.g. James, 1902/2002).
The functionalist camp attempts to define religion by focussing on what religion does.
According to the functionalists, a beliefsystem can only count as a religion if it performs
particular and unique operations in the psychosocial world. Socially religion functions
as a bonding at best or restraining at worst mechanism. Through certain taboos and
practices, such as rituals and rites of passage, it provides the necessary ingredients for
the formation of identity, stability, roles and social control, and moral order. Within the
realm of psychology, religious operations function positively or negatively on the
emotional and intellectual state ofthe individual, throughmeans ofcomfort, consolation,
coping strategies, life meaning-giving, or moral codes, but also through guilt, distress,
or pervasive mental illness (Schmidt, 1988). Therefore, for the functionalists (also
known as symbolists), religion operates directly on human needs and it has a necessary,
though for most not essential, role in human survival. Both Durkheim's and Freud's
approaches mentioned above can be classified as functional.
Although both substantive and functional approaches offer an insight into the meaning
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of religion, by focussing on certain aspects ofreligion, they can be criticised for actually
missing the point altogether. Both tend to neglect each other's valuable contributions;
religion cannot only have functions and not substance and vice versa. The sets of
features they use to define religion tend to be vague and general thus allowing for a
variety of belief systems (e.g. communism) or social institutions (e.g. the scouts) to be
classified as religions. Therefore, a general criticism of these approaches could be that
they appear to fail to identify the distinct components that make religion a unique entity
(for a more detailed critique see Stark, 2001).
Nomothetic vs. polythetic approaches
The nomothetic-polythetic polarity categorises the final pair of approaches towards a
definition of religion. The former attempts to define religion either on the basis of one
or a few essential features, or within a narrow and limiting framework. I will not linger
on this formulation since every approach I have discussed thus far can be classified as
nomothetic and thus the same descriptions and considerations apply here. Instead I
would like to focus on the polythetic classification of religion.
For the last thirty-five years or so, scholars at least within psychology appear to have
abandoned the idea of trying to formulate an essentialistic definition of religion,
probably because they seem to acknowledge that this enterprise can be a rather difficult,
frustrating, and to an extent futile process with ambiguous results of little or no
empirical use. Instead, they shifted their focus to identifying sets ofprototypical features
or super-ordinate dimensions that a belief-system should possess to a greater or lesser
extent in order to be classified as a religious one.
This approach stems conceptually from Ludwig Wittgenstein's ideas of family
resemblance (1953). The most famous illustration of these ideas is Wittgenstein's
discussion on what defines a "game" (1953, aphorisms 65-71). He claims that since not
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all games share exactly the same features, a single definition of the concept of a game
would be inappropriate and misleading. However, he observes that there exist degrees
of resemblances that allow for all of those activities to be classified as games. These
resemblances, which are neither necessary nor sufficient conditions for class inclusion,
are founded on a prototypical concept of a game, and the degree to which they are
present in any activity makes such activity a more or less distinct exemplar of the family
of games.
Using Wittgenstein's ideas as the basis of a classification system, psychologists and
social scientists have attempted to identify such family resemblances in the case of
religion. The more of those features a system has, and the more prominent their position
is in that system, the more the system resembles a religion. So far, several models have
been proposed, involving two (Schmidt, 1988), three (Fontana, 2003), four (Loewenthal,
1995), five (Brown, 1973), seven (Smart, 1989), and even twelve (Nielsen et ah, 1993),
entitlement features.
Kate Loewenthal (1995) for example, proposes that the common features of religion
involve a belief in a spiritual reality, a tendency towards a harmony of life, spiritual
moral directives, and a system of social organisation and communication. Ninian Smart
in his book "The World's Religions" (1989) offers a finer partition of the dimensions
of religion by adding the domain of rituals and sacramental practices, the presence of
myths and sacred narratives, and the material dimension ofsacred landmarks and human
creations ofworship. Others like Niels Nielsen and his colleagues (1993) add belief in
afterlife, and the desire to proselytize in the list of features. David Fontana (2003),
observes that polythetic models appear to have three super-ordinate dimensions in
common, viz. spiritual beliefs, spiritual rituals, and spiritual ethos - he is using the term
"spiritual" to refer to a nonmaterial dimension of being that can be reached through
mystical experiences and the afterlife. Finally, Roger Schmidt (1988) claims that religion
can be characterised by just two highest dimensions, viz. the conceptual, and the
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performative / social one.
The polythetic approach has some major advantages over the others discussed here. By
avoiding the potential trap of dictating what religion is or is not, and concentrating on
what religion should be, it is flexible and adaptable. It does not treat religion as a
categorical concept, but instead it places it into a multidimensional space where it is
allowed to manifest itself in degrees of hue. In doing so, it considers a multitude of
characteristics, potentially important ifnot unique to religion, as opposed to limiting its
focus on a subset of, at times, misleading micro-aspects.
That said, the approach can be criticised for being over-flexible, and thus blurring the
boundaries of religious and nonreligious systems. The nature as well as the amount of
features, a system should possess in order to begin to be considered as a religion, tend
to be to an extent arbitrarily defined. Therefore, it could be argued that although this
approach tends to have a more pluralistic nature, it may not help us understand what
religion is any more that any of the other approaches discussed in this chapter.
Having reviewed the various approaches, Kenneth Pargament (2002) expresses
frustration on the realisation that any attempt to define religion appears to do nothing
more than reduce it to a set of expressions of basic processes, without for example
normatively taking into account elements of supernatural revelation. As a result, he
claims that the distinctiveness of the phenomenon of religion evaporates. Although he
is convinced, in a "religious" way, that religion is unique, he is compelled to
acknowledge that "the jury is still out" with regard to the best approach.
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Principles of an adequate definition
So far, I have not yet presented a single definition of religion. This is not because they
are few or scarce. On the contrary. By 1912 James Leuba in his book "A Psychological
Study of Religion" was able to cite forty-eight definitions; in reviewing the literature I
have come across at least another 150. My intention at this point was to discuss the
various approaches through which definitions were generated, in order to illustrate the
complexity of the issue. Henceforth, I will present a few definitions within the context
of stating the main characteristics such definitions should, in my view, possess in order
to be considered adequate and workable, beyond any of the approaches I have discussed.
These characteristics are as follows:
1) Primarily an adequate definition of religion needs to be empirically testable through
scientific investigation. For example, Durkheim's functional definition of religion as a
"unified system ofbeliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set
apart and forbidden" (1915/1976, p. 47) appears too abstract to be ofmuch practical use.
2) An adequate definition of religion should be capable of discriminating between the
religious and the nonreligious. The philosopher Albert Whitehead defines religion as
"what the individual does with his solitariness" (1926a, p. 47), while Daniel Batson and
his colleagues claim that religion is "whatever we as individuals do to come to grips
personally with the questions that confront us because we are aware that we and others
like us are alive and that we will die" (1993, p.8). According to these definitions,
religion is primarily seen as a personal matter, present in different forms in all human
beings. Thus in that sense, and perhaps to the dismay of at least some of the atheists, all
humans are religious.
3) Following the previous point, an adequate definition ofreligion should be neither too
inclusive nor too exclusive. Edward Tylor's substantive definition states that religion is
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a "belief in spiritual beings" (1871/1958, p. 424). This is a rather minimalistic and
exclusive approach to religion. It counts as religions only traditions that involve beliefs
in a deity (the theistic or polytheistic traditions), and excludes any nontheistic belief
systems such as some of the traditional forms of Buddhism.
4) Finally, an adequate definition of religion should not be ethnocentric or biased.
Stewart Guthrie (1996) claims that most anthropological definitions of religion are
ethnocentric since they tend to be based on the Abrahamic tradition and thus they tend
to define as religion systems of faith that involve beliefs in a god. At the same time, Karl
Marx's view of religion as "the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of the heartless
world, and the soul of soulless conditions. It is the opium of the people" (1975, pp. 43-
44) appears to possess an obvious disapproving bias, by neglecting or rejecting any
positive, mature, and conscious aspects of religion.
A DEFINITION OFRELIGION FOR THIS THESIS
It should be apparent by now that constructing a totally adequate, all-purpose, well-
rounded definition of religionmay not be possible. This realisation alone may have been
enough to frustrate many scholars and lead them to abandon any attempts to define
religion, declaring it an idea with so many meanings that it has none; declaring it
undefinable.
Religion is indeed an abstract, complex, and latent concept (according to universalists),
or construct (according to postmodernists) that encompasses a plethora of phenomena,
functions, meanings, structures, and features. Then again, so are many other abstract
concepts, like freedom or God, and most psychosocial latent constructs, like mental
health, poverty, or intelligence. On this basis I do not view religion as being any
different.
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Although an all-encompassing definition of religion may not be possible, at the same
time it may not be necessary. After all a total model of the world, in which such an idea
could meaningfully fit does not as yet exist, and it may never do so. I would argue that
it does not matter what religion really is - if there can ever be an ecumenical truth about
it. What should matter is how we perceive it and how we justify our perception of it
when attempting to apply it to various settings. It seems to me that it is more fruitful to
think ofwhat religion is or can be only within a given framework of thought or action.
Therefore, I propose a shift of focus from what it is to be defined to what a definition of
such idea attempts to accomplish. At this level of treatment, religion can indeed be
meaningfully defined. In fact, many of the definitions I mention in this chapter can be
adequate and workable when viewed within the theoretical context or research paradigm
they were created and employed.
Religion
Following this critical review of the various problems of definition, I would like to
present my own adequate and workable definition of religion. Within the context of this
thesis, religion is used to refer to the belief structures of the major, formal, and living
"faith organisations" (as classified in Webster's "Encyclopedia of World Religions"
[Doniger, 1999], and recorded in the Central Intelligence Agency "World Factbook",
2002) - such as Buddhism, Christianity, Hinduism, Judaism, Islam, Sikhism, and so
forth - and their subdivisions (such as Rastafarianism, Sunni, Vaishna, etc.), and the
manifestation, reception, interpretation, and use of those structures by individuals and
groups.
This definition is adequate because (a) it is testable since the belief structures of the
above traditions can in principle be accessed through their scriptures and teachings, and
explained by their scholars, while their use can to an extent be empirically observed and
measured; (b) it differentiates between people who adhere to these faiths and those who
do not; (c) it strikes a fair balance between inclusiveness and exclusiveness since,
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although it excludes cults and new religious movements (e.g. Satanism, Paganism,
Scientology, and so forth), any dead belief structures (e.g. the ancient Greek
Dodecatheon), and minor faiths or the faith systems of indigenous people, official
statistics suggests that approximately 72% (4.5 billion) of the world population can be
grouped under these main faith traditions (Central Intelligence Agency, 2002); (d) it
avoids being ethnocentric since it incorporates both western and eastern forms of faith;
and (e) it does not appear to be biased since it does not attribute any degree of approval
or disapproval to those faiths. Finally, it could be said that the definition loosely follows
the polythetic approach, with unstated resemblance features implicitly embedded in it.
Religiosity
Deriving from the above definition of religion, the notion of religiosity or religiousness
or religious orientation is used in this thesis to refer to the religious capacity of
individuals or groups, i.e. to the ways people view, understand, receive, communicate,
implement, and practise religion.
Spirituality
At this point, although the centre of focus of this thesis is on religion, a short mention
needs to be made on the issue of spirituality. Even though spirituality has been and at
times is still being used as meaning the same thing as religiosity, the general tendency
is to differentiate it from the latter (Fontana, 2003; Saroglou, 2003; Zinnbauer et ah,
1997). It is beyond the scope of this thesis to discuss the various approaches to
spirituality, a task that would have probably required another chapter as long as this. It
would suffice to say that spirituality tends to be seen as a broader and far more abstract
concept than religiosity that refers to the "degree of involvement or state of awareness
or devotion to a higher being or life philosophy" (Walker, 1991, p. 208), and it can be
present in religious and nonreligious individuals alike. As David Elkins (1999)
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graphically writes, spirituality "is the ability to see the sacred in the ordinary, to feel the
poignancy of life, to know the passion of existence and to give ourselves over to that
which is greater than ourselves" (p. 45). Spirituality can involve a variety of beliefs in
metaphysical and supernatural phenomena, such as life after death, mystical or
parapsychological experiences, possessions, and so forth, or it can simply be a way of
life (Lukoff et ah, 1998).
Although spirituality and religiosity overlap considerably, they do appear to occupy their
own unique niches. As Robert Emmons (2003) puts it "religion is a (more or less)
organized search for the spiritual" (p. 5, parentheses in the original). Indeed, there seems
to be an understanding among psychologists that spirituality is an independent and wider
concept than religion that can at times have rather distinct effects on psychology. Elkins
(1999) for example, suggests that spirituality promotes good physical and mental health,
whereas other studies argue that people who are involved in spiritual activities (such as
mysticism, cults, and the like) are more likely than religious ones to be delusional
(Peters et ah, 1999) or even psychotic (Bullough, 1993; Greenberg et ah, 1992), yet
others failed to find any association between psychological well-being and spirituality,
but not religiosity (Crawford, 2003). Finally, several researchers suggest that both beliefs
may equally affect a number of important psychological problems (Lukoff et ah, 1998;
Seybold & Hill, 2001), and in fact, the DSM-IV does give equal weight to religious and
spiritual problems (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
Since the purpose of this thesis is to address specific issues in the psychology ofreligion,
and since spirituality is a far greater and more complex topic that is not exclusively
studied by psychologists in this field, I will not ruminate about it further and I will refer
to it only in the context of specific research findings.
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Chapter synopsis
Religion, because of its complex and abstract nature and origin, is a rather elusive term
to qualify. A number of overlapping approaches have been put forward in an attempt to
describe and define religion. The nonreductive approach claims that religion is
irreducible and it needs to be explained on its own terms within the specific cultural and
time frames it develops and functions. The reductive approach advocates that religion
possesses universal elements that can be quantified, qualified, and subsequently
measured through scientific enquiry. In a parallel fashion, substantive approaches
attempt to explain religion through itsmeaning, while the functionalist approach focuses
on the function of religion for the believer. The above approaches could also be
classified as nomothetic since they tend to limit religion into a narrow framework.
Finally, the polythetic approach, which appears to be currently favoured, attempts to
identify sets of characteristics that a system should possess to a greater or lesser extent
in order to resemble a religion.
Despite the approach one follows, I argue that a definition, in order to be adequate and
workable, should be testable, differentiating, wide enough, not ethnocentric, and
unbiased, while at the same time it should be meaningful, perhaps only or at least, within
the context in which it was developed. For the purpose of this thesis, I view religion as
the belief structures of themajor formal systems of faith and the way these structures are
used by the believers at both the personal and the collective level. The capacity of the
individual to utilise these structures is termed religiosity or religiousness or religious
orientation. Finally, spirituality is viewed as being largely independent from religion,
and as such it is of no central interest to this thesis.
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CHAPTER III
THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION:
A HISTORICAL REVIEW
"Mine is a long and a sad tale!" said the Mouse,
turning to Alice, and sighing.
"It IS a long tail, certainly," said Alice,
looking down with wonder at the Mouse's tail
"but why do you call it sad?"
(Alice's adventures in Wonderland; Carroll, 1865/1995, p. 19)
Chapter aims & organisation
The aims of this chapter are to present a historical review of the psychology of religion,
and to discuss the theoretical foundations of the field, by critically focussing on the
approaches of key figures in the area. Additionally, through this peripatetic journey the
reasons why the relationship between psychology and religion appears to have been an
uneasy and often unhappy one are discussed while placed in a historical context.
Based on the events described in this chapter, the history of the field is conceptually
broken down into four periods: the birth of psychology as a modern science (1879-
1901), the establishment of the psychology of religion as a unique field within
psychology (1902-1927), the dormant period of the field (1930-1949), and the revival
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of the field to current developments (1950-present).
While several psychological theories of religion are presented, the discussion focusses
on those of James, Freud, and Allport, since they are perceived by scholars in the field
as themost important and influential ones, shaping the field's course, scope, and present
state.
As this chapter addresses the theoretical development of the psychology of religion by
placing it into a historical perspective, empirical evidence and research findings are not
discussed. These are extensively presented in the next chapter.
EN APXHN EIN 0 AOFOE (trans. In the beginning was the Mind)
THE EARLY DAYS OF THEAFFAIR
From its cradle days, modern, scientific psychology had its eyes on religion. This was
far from a serendipitous act of curiosity. As Hendrika Vande Kemp (1986) comments,
psychology' s forefathers of the 19th century grew out from traditional psychology, which
had its roots inpneumatology (i.e. the study of the spirits), just like natural theology and
the renaissance studies of demons and angels (demonology or angelography). Those
early pioneers appear to have felt the need, ifnot the obligation, to show at least to their
predecessors that the "new psychology" - a term by which scientific psychology was
initially referred to (Hall, 1901) - had on the one hand something fresh and valuable to
offer, and on the other that it had not forsaken its principles and abandoned its heritage
(Pickren, 2000). In other words, by retaining the traditional moral codes and qualities,
"new psychologists" wanted to demonstrate that throughmodern scientific investigation
- which was capable of bringing "the touch of reality in the life of the soul" (Dewey,
1884, p. 288) - they could do the same job even better. Therefore, by focussing on
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religious and spiritual matters, not only did they allow for a continuation of the field's
tradition, but also for direct comparisons between the outcomes of the "old" and the
"new", and thus a demonstration of the advantages of the latter over the former
approach. As Stanley Hall (1901) put it, the "new psychology" offers a "microscope for
the soul", while showing that "the brain is the mouthpiece of God" (p. 731).
Although it is a German intellectual, Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt (1832-1920) (a son
of a Christian minister himself) who is considered the father of the "new", scientific
psychology, by far the greatest levels of religion-related activity at that early period can
be almost exclusively traced to the United States (it should be noted that in Britain
Francis Galton, 1872, had made some isolated attempts to study the efficacy ofprayer;
however, these were framed outside the field of psychology). One of those American
pioneers was Granville Stanley Hall (1844 - 1924).
Hall, who was trained as a religious minister, was the first PhD in scientific psychology,
and the first president of the "American Psychological Association"; in 1888 he also
founded and chaired the first school in religious psychology at Clark University
(Worcester, MA) (Connolly, 1999). Hall was not primarily interested in religion as an
abstract system - for him the function of religion was to adjust the human realm - but
rather his focus was on applied matters related to religious conversion and specifically
the religious and moral education of children. He believed that "even in education and
religion, the strongholds ofconservatism, there are new and better ideals and efforts, and
these are less exceptional and are growing in power and influence and are represented
by more and better men" (1904/1968, p. 199).
Although Hall did not address the general scope of the field of the psychology of
religion, two ofhis students did: The first truly psychological research article on religion
was published by James Leuba, in 1896 in the "American Journal of Psychology" - the
first journal ofmodern psychology, founded by Hall in 1887 - while the first book on
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the subject was Edwin Starbuck's "Psychology of Religion" in 1899.
Both Leuba and Starbuck were primarily interested in religious conversion. While the
latter was a religious psychologist who believed that psychology could offer valuable
and positive knowledge lo religious individuals and educators, the foimet was sceptical
of the whole affair and held that whatever religion can offer to the individual,
psychology can offermore. Ofthe two, it was primarily Starbuck's attitude and research
thatwere influenced by another great personality in modern psychology: William James.
WilliamJames (1842- 1910)
James, the son ofa theologian and the brother ofnovelist Henry James, studied medicine
at the Harvard School of Medicine, but never practised it as he was attracted to
psychology and subsequently philosophy. He was appointed professor ofpsychology at
Harvard University in 1889, and from 1897 also held the chair ofphilosophy at the same
university until his retirement in 1907. He is considered by many the father ofmodern
psychology, since he was the first to set up a course on physiological psychology in
1876, three years before Wundt's psychological laboratory in Leipzig (unfortunately for
James, he misses official primacy because unlike Wundt, his work was not conducted
in a psychology department). Perhaps James is not the official father ofpsychology, but
through his magnum opus "The Principles of Psychology" of 1890 (1981) (a two-
volume piece of work spanning 1400 pages and twelve years in the making), he
definitely deserves, inmy opinion, the title of the godfather of the field. In psychological
circles the phrase "if you want a new idea look in the past" when referred to James is
paraphrased to "if you still want to believe that your ideas are new, do not read James"
- the reader should keep this last phrase in mind, as its validity is demonstrated
repeatedly in the following chapters.
James wrote extensively about psychology and philosophy, but he only wrote explicitly
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about religion in four publications. The most influential work in the whole history of the
psychology of religion is arguably his book "Varieties of Religious Experience"
(1902/2002). The book was based on a series of twenty lectures he gave at the University
ofEdinburgh in 1901 and 1902, collectively known as the "Gifford Lectures onNatural
Religion".
In this book, James presents his views on religion - and more specifically religious
experience - as a part ofhuman nature, by drawing on various philosophical theories and
empirical evidence based on expert accounts and life histories. He defines religion in
Lecture 2 as "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their solitude, so
far as they apprehend themselves to stand in relation to whatever they may consider the
divine" (p. 29-30). He then moves on to distinguish between institutional and personal
religion. He argues that the former, which he associates with religious practices directly
related to religious organisations, plays an important role in the cultural development of
a society - today this form of religion is in part a subject of study for sociology (Berger,
1973; Ellison & Sherkat, 1995; McGuire, 1994; Northcott, 1999). He then turns his
focus on the personal "branch", which he finds more relevant to psychology and a more
fundamental aspect ofreligion, since he claims all institutional religions were born from
the personal religions of their founders.
He suggests (in Lecture 1) that in order to understand the deep impact of religion on the
individual, psychologists should study exemplars ofextreme cases ofpersonal religion,
the ones he calls the religious geniuses, since the religion of the ordinary believer has
been given to them by others and thus they tend to practise it through imitation or habit.
According to James, religious geniuses, because of their excessive "emotional
sensitivity", commonly exhibit characteristics, e.g. hearing voices, seeing visions,
classified as psychopathological (I return to this issue in the next chapter). However, it
is these same characteristics that provide such persons with their authority and religious
influence. James suggests that psychologists need to study these pathological aspects of
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religion and attempt to understand them. However, he warns scientists not to fall into
the trap of reducing religious experiences and expressions to mental abnormality (an
approach he calls medical materialism), since as he says, the knowledge of the origins
or conditions of religious phenomena provides insufficient basis forjudging their value.
He subdivides personal religion into healthy-mindedness and the sick soul, and he
suggests that both are fundamental and authentic aspects of religion. Healthy-
mindedness (Lectures 4 and 5) is a natural, innate state, which can at times manifest
itself in a variety of willful forms - the ideas of Liberal Christians for example can be
viewed as exemplars of such a state. Healthy-minded individuals - one of whom is,
according to James, Walt Whitman - have a crystal-clear "goodness of life" and their
soul is like a "sky-blue tint". The sick souls (Lectures 6 and 7), on the other hand, appear
to be preoccupied by the presence of evil in everything, and therefore they tend to have
a profound pessimism, be "melancholic" and fail to find or appreciate the pleasures of
life - he uses Goethe as an example. Whenever a sick soul falls into a deep turmoil
(Lecture 8) - a state of pathological depression - it can be healed through a process of
deliverance and, according to James, become twice-born. This state he calls "the
completest form of religion" and he cites Buddhism and Christianity as examples.
He continues his presentation by focussing on conversion (Lectures 9 and 10), which he
views as the transition one experiences when peripheral religious ideas become central.
This transition is usually triggered by explosive emotions and it is a characteristic of the
process that leads to the "completest religion". The best fruits of conversion can be
observed in a saintly individual (Lectures 11 to 15), i.e. a person for whom "spiritual
emotions are the habitual centre of the personal energy" (p. 212). These individuals
possess ultimate levels of "inner tranquillity" and harmony, an unrestrained feeling of
universal love, and a sense ofthe presence ofa higher power. He so much admires these
individuals (he calls them "immediate successes") and their contribution to the welfare
of the world that he closes Lecture 15 by saying "let us all be saints, then, if we can,
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whether or not we succeed visibly and temporarily" (p. 292).
In Lectures 16 and 17 he claims that religious people experience religion through various
degrees of "mystical states of consciousness". These states cannot be described with
words (ineffable), possess elements of insightful knowledge (noetic), usually last for a
short period (transient), and are not controllable by the individual who experiences them
(passive). Through mystical religious experiences - differentiating these from drug-
induced ones - an individual is connected with the "Absolute" and feels the presence of
the divine. James acknowledges that these experiences are very subjective, and by nature
unquantifiable and uncontrollable. However, it is their existence that makes us consider
the possibility of a supernatural world.
The relationship between philosophical theology and personal religion is the focus of
Lecture 18. He views philosophy as a secondary product of religious experience.
Philosophical theology has either no practical value to a religious person or it is
incapable ofproving anything. He instead proposes the development ofa critical science
of religion that can empirically investigate the best in religion. This science should be
able to "command as general a public adhesion as is commanded by a physical science"
(p. 352).
In the following Lecture James describes some additional characteristics of personal
religion, two of which are most central. The first is prayer, which he defines as "every
kind of inward communion or conversation with the power recognized as divine" (p.
358). He views prayer as a fundamental component of religion, through which spiritual
energy is transferred from the divine to the natural world. The second important
characteristic ofpersonal religion is its close relationship with the subconscious (which
he calls the "fountain-head of much that feeds our religion" [p. 374]), which could
explain the variety of revelations of mystical experiences, and the differences in
religious experiences between individuals, since the subliminal field and its accessibility
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are unique to each individual.
In the last Lecture, James summarises his thesis. He portrays religious experiences as
being "amongst themost important biological functions ofmankind" (p. 391), since they
are the only experiences capable of connecting us with a greater reality that is not
accessible through any of our normal cognitive relations with the world. In addition, he
gives directions to future researchers by, for example, suggesting that the personality of
the religious individual may play a central role in their religious orientation and
experience. Finally - without perhaps ever realising how prophetic his words were - he
presents the problems with such research. Mainly, he suggests that psychologists should
attempt to evaluate religion in an objective "scientific" manner. However, by following
that approach, they should be aware that they may wrongly fail to see meaning and
purpose in religion. Since, as he says " knowledge about a thing is not the thing itself."
(p. 378), the science of religion may not be the same as the living religion that
encompasses both objective and subjective or unobservable elements. Finally, he warns
psychologists, most ofwhom he sees as being biased against religion, not to allow their
personal predispositions to affect their scientific enquiries.
Critique on James
James, as the first psychologist to attempt to understand, justify, and classify religion in
its entirety through scientific logic and empirical evidence, while at the same time
promote a critical science of religion, by removing dogmatic beliefs that are
incompatible with science, should be regarded as the father of the psychology of
religion. He paved the way with provocative at times ideas that seemed far beyond his
time, and which are as contemporary and fresh now as they were then. In fact, it would
not be far from true to claim that ever since most of the psychological research and
theory on religion seem to have been based on his views, by (a) systematically
describing the varieties of religious phenomena, such as practices and ideations; (b)
developing theories to explain the meaning and origin of religion; and (c) as in this
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thesis, investigating religion's personal and social correlates.
James's ideas can, however, be criticised on at least three different levels. First, by
ignoring the beliefs ofordinary people, who form the majority of religious believers, he
does not allow for his ideas to be generalised to religion as a whole. It is worth briefly
mentioning James Pratt at this point. Pratt, who was a student of James, distanced
himself from his mentor and studied exactly those aspects above that James had either
ignored or dismissed. By placing religion in a social context he found that the religious
experiences of the ordinary believer were as rich and at least of equal value as those of
the extreme cases (Pratt, 1908). Indeed, as this thesis unfolds, it should become clear
that James's ideas can equally be applied to the ordinary believer.
Even James's selection of religious geniuses, since it was based on personal,
nonscientific criteria- a move that can be partially explained by his philosophical biases
regarding apragmatic approach to truth - does not provide any concrete evidence that
the selected instances could be a representative sample, and thus not only renders any
quantitative analysis on them pointless, but also casts a doubt ofwhether his claims are
applicable even within the geniuses' population.
Second, linking with the previous chapter on the definition of religion, James appears
to follow a reductive substantive approach to religion. Given that, the same critique
applies to his approach. It places religion outside a cultural or historical context
(although James does attempt to an extent to avoid it, but only as far as his descriptions
of the religious geniuses are concerned). It also neglects religious functional elements,
which can be normatively found in its institutional character. In fact, James explicitly
disregarded the social and cultural aspects ofreligion as awhole, as bearing no relevance
to psychological enquiry. As I will discuss later in my presentation ofGordon Allport's
theory, personal religion appears to both affect and at the same time be shaped by the
sociocultural environment in which the individual dwells.
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Finally, the inclusion of psychopathology as a prerequisite of higher levels of
religiousness, although being one of the seeds that led to this thesis, seems paradoxical.
Although I discuss this issue in the next chapter, where I present the empirical evidence
between psychopathy and religiousness, allowme to make some general comments here.
First the idea seems to go against the aims of religion, which are arguably the promotion
and enhancement of happiness, stability, and normalcy in the believer. Second, recent
studies suggest, in a highly consistent fashion, that mainstream religious leaders tend to
be more healthy-minded than the average population (Francis, 1992b; Francis & Rodger,
1994; Francis & Thomas, 1996; Musson, 1998; Pargament et al., 2001; Robbins et al.,
2001) - a finding that is diametrically opposite to James's observations. That said,
psychopathic (charismatic) leaders have been found to be common among sects, and
especially cults and new religious movements (Argyle, 2000; O'Connor et al., 1995).
Flowever, this disposition of theirs, rather than being a positive influence, tends to have
catastrophic consequences for the followers and themselves (e.g. mass suicides).
Despite the inevitable shortcomings, James's book appears to have had a great impact
on the psychological community, and it was not long after its publication that the
"American Journal ofReligious Psychology & Education" (also known as the "Journal
ofReligious Psychology") was established in 1904 by none other than Stanley Hall, and
major academic activity took place, as scholars like Theodore Flournoy, Edward Ames,
and George Coe offered their minds to the cause. On the research front, the focus was
almost exclusively experimental and on rather broadly defined religious aspects (Wulff,
1997, chap.5), most ofwhich, like meditation and yoga, nowadays would have probably
been indexed under spirituality. That seemed to be the era ofa "happy" relation between
religion and psychology. Itwould be abruptly ended though, partly because of the words
of one of the "loudest voices" of that time: Sigismund Schlomo Freud (Vitz, 1993).
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Sigmund Freud (1856-1939)
In 1909, Hall invited several distinguished scientists to give short lectures at Clark
University. One of them was James; another was Freud. Sigmund Freud was born at
Freiberg in Moravia to Jewish parents, but the family soon after his birth moved to
Vienna, where Freud lived for most ofhis life except his last two years, which he spent
in London to avoid persecution from the Nazis. He studied medicine at the University
ofVienna, and later specialised in neuropathology and subsequently in psychopathology
- strictly speaking therefore, Freud was a psychiatrist and not a psychologist.
According to Ernest Jones (1957), an acquaintance of Freud and his biographer, Freud
was an atheist. However, he was attracted to religion because he found similarities in
religious thinking and the psychopathology ofhis patients. Since for Freud God did not
exist, any claims that religious ideas stemmed from God had to be false. He therefore
discarded religion as nothing more that superstition and irrational thinking. This being
so though, begged a very important question: Why do the majority of people tend to be
religious? Freud of course, being who he was, claimed he had the answer in his
psychoanalytic ideas. And so he went to prove it.
Freud devoted three of his books entirely in analysing and developing his ideas about
religion. Two of these books are discussed here, since they are the ones in which he
presents his two theories of religion, while the third book ("Moses & Monotheism",
1939/1964), in which he attempts to trace the origins of Judaism through the
psychoanalytic perspective, is not considered in this thesis.
His first "attack" however, was in an article he wrote in 1907 (1959) with the title
"Obsessive Actions & Religious Practices" (original title: "Zwangshandlungen &
Religioniibungen") which was published in German in the first issue of the journal
"Zeitschrift furReligionspsychologie". In this article, Freud presents his initial thoughts
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about the association between religion and neurosis. He observes that the obsessive
behaviour ofhis neurotic patients resembles religious practices. They are both persistent
and ritualistic, and if they are not followed to perfection they can generate considerable
levels of guilt and distress to the individual. For Freud both types of behaviour are the
results of the repression of basic instincts, and as such both should be classified as
psychopathological.
His full-blown assault, however, begins with the publication of the book "Totem &
Taboo" (1913/1955), where he presents his phylogenetic theory of the origins of
religion. This theory, which seems to have been greatly influenced by Darwin's theory
and the work of contemporary anthropologists, especially Tylor, portrays religion as a
primitive superstition that through collective imprinting was passed on to future
generations. He observes that tribal belief systems all have in common the ideas of the
totem, which is a sacred animal that the tribe identifies with, and the taboo, which refers
to a person or thing that is forbidden. He claims that tribal belief systems are somewhat
more primitive, less evolved stages of religion, while Christianity, Judaism etc., are the
most evolved forms. He focusses on tribal religions because by being closer to the
origins of religion they can provide clearer clues about what caused the phenomenon.
Freud interprets the anthropological evidence as suggesting that religion began as an act
of the Oedipus Complex, i.e. the envy of the father and the desire of the mother. In
prehistoric protohuman societies that according to Freud resembled the then known
social structures ofapes, hordes were led by an alpha-male (the father), who had a harem
offemales (the mothers). The sons through their desires for the mothers killed the father,
and "cannibal savages as they were, it goes without saying that they devoured [him]" (p.
142). However, soon they were filled with guilt and remorse, which led them to make
the father their totem, and by begging for his forgiveness and asking for his strength they
attributed to him supernatural powers, while at the same time by worshipping him
through ceremonies they slowly through generations made him into a god. The mother
became a taboo so that the same act ofkilling would not be repeated and thus the social
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structure would be maintained. In modern religions all these motives have been
repressed into the unconscious and are now represented through rather symbolic forms
of practice and worship (e.g. the taboo is now expressed through the Biblical
commandments). Freud summarises his theory by saying:
Totemic religion arose from the filial sense of guilt, in an attempt to allay
that feeling and to appease the father by deferred obedience to him. All
later religions are seen to be attempts at solving the same problem. They
vary according to the stage ofcivilization atwhich they arise and according
to the methods which they adopt; but all have the same end in view and are
reactions to the same great events with which civilization began and
which, since it occurred, has not allowedmankind amoment's rest. (p. 145)
Although his book caused an outrage to almost everybody outside the psychoanalytic
circles and was perceived as an insult by Christian critics (Pals, 1996), Freud did not
stop there. His assault on religion continues in his later work "The Future ofan Illusion"
(1927/1961). In this short fifty-one-page book, Freud presents his ontogenetic theory of
religion, by trying to understand why individuals in today's world turn to religion. The
script is at times playfully presented as a dialogue between the author and an imaginary
proreligious critic. It begins in positive tones - which make one wonder whether Freud
has actually taken on board the negative criticism his previous book had received - by
claiming that the development of civilization and the establishment of religion provide
for the individual a sense of security and safety against the unpredictability of the forces
of the natural world. However, this is where the positive attitude of the book ends. Freud
calls religion an illusion since it is based on irrational beliefs and wishful, yet erroneous,
thinking. At the same time religious truths are meaningless concepts that should not be
taken seriously, since they cannot be assessed through scientific inquiry. He
acknowledges that once upon a time religion may have been necessary to guide and
organise the primitive societies, just like certain rules are necessary for the proper
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upbringing ofchildren. However, the human race has evolved and matured and by doing
so it has mastered and developed reason and the intellect, which are far superior qualities
to blind faith and superstition. Modern humans should use reason to guide them and
support them through life. In doing so they will find that religion is no longer either
necessary or influential. And just like a grown individual who insists on behaving like
a child is perceived as having some sort of amental problem, the persistence of religion
in the modern world should be viewed as pathological, "the universal obsessional
neurosis of humanity" (p.43).
Critique on Freud
Despite Freud's negative stance towards religion, his ideas are ofgreat value to the field
- interestingly Freud did not expect to be ofmajor influence when he says "what I have
written is quite harmless in one respect. No believer will let himself be led astray from
his faith by these or any similar arguments" (1927/1961 p. 40). Freud was the first to
direct the attention ofpsychologists and religious thinkers towards the role inner forces
of personality play to religion. Although James touched on this in his discussion about
the relationship between religious experiences and the subliminal, he was generally
interested in the ways these experiences manifest their effects on the individual. Freud
however, was mainly concerned with this unconscious relationship, and the ways the
psyche creates and shapes religion and in return is shaped by it.
Surprisingly perhaps, some scholars have managed to interpret Freud's ideas and present
them as providing a positive contribution to the believer (e.g. Black, 2000; Jones, 1991;
Reuben, 1996; see also Capps, 2001). Roy Lee (1948), for example, was an Anglican
minister who did not view Freud's theories as hostile to religion. On the contrary, he
believed that by using these ideas, religious leaders and believers would be able to
distinguish between healthy and unhealthy forms of faith, "thus providing religion with
sound knowledge on which to shape its ideals, its judgements, and its interpretation of
man's place in the universe" (p. 15).
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Given the provocative and challenging nature of his ideas, unsurprisingly Freud's work
has been extensively criticised (e.g. Bobgan & Bobgan, 1990; Gay, 1987; Kerr, 1993;
Kung, 1990; Oehlschlegel, 1943; Robinson, 1993; Trilling, 1955;Wittels, 1924).Hehas
been called "the prophet of psychoheresy", "a Godless Jew" and much worse.
Sympathies aside, there are still a number of logical critical points that can be made
about his ideas.
The first and perhaps most obvious one is that Freud was biased. Although as I wrote
right from the onset of this thesis, a degree of subjectivity in scientific thought is
acceptable and desirable, when it occupies such a prominent role in the discourse, as it
does in Freud's writings, it becomes problematic. Indeed, even though Freud wants to
present himself as an exemplar of a modern scientist, his ideas are so absolute that in
nature they regress back to the dogmatic systems of thought he is so vigorously
attacking. For Freud religion would appear to be pathological full-stop. There is no room
for conditional clauses; religion is that and that only. I am afraid this is not a scientific
argument but rather a political statement. If this were the case, religion would cause
discomfort, pain, and psychological suffering to the believer as a norm. If religion were
equal to neurosis, the world not only would be mainly populated by maladaptive
individuals, but also their condition would be clearly identifiable and distinguishable
from healthy states of being. However, this does not seem to be the case.
One can sympathise with Freud's position though, by looking at his life. Although he
was an atheist, he could not escape his Jewish background, since for Judaism, as with
many other religions, social and religious identities appear to be tautological. So Freud,
because of this background, was discriminated against and at times intimidated
throughout his life, to a degree that eventually he was forced to flee his country - while
his books were publicly burned -to avoid persecution from the Nazis (Jones, 1957). For
Freud therefore, religion must have been a burden, a system of suffering he could not
escape from (for a more detailed argument see Rizzuto, 1998).
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Another criticism of Freud's ideas, which is directly related to the first point I made, is
that his methods were not strictly speaking scientific. His theory in "Totem & Taboo"
is largely based on assumptions that cannot be tested or verified. There is no evidence
(as yet) that suggests that the events he describes actually took place in any society at
any given point in time. Even specific claims, like for example that naturally the sons
would eat their dead father, appear totally unsubstantiated.
The next point relates to his argument from analogy. In "Obsessive Actions & Religious
Practices" and "The Future of an Illusion", Freud claims that religious practices
resemble the neurotic behaviour ofhis patients, therefore since the latter is pathological
the former should be pathological by analogy. At the same time he asserts that since
neurotic behaviour is caused (according to the psychoanalytic theory at least, see also
Freud, 1896/1962) by repressed basic instincts, so must also be religious behaviour. Two
are the issues here. First, arguments from analogy are not conclusive by nature (see
Hume, 1779/1990). Only an accumulation of empirical evidence can lead to the
acceptance of the argument's conclusions. However, as I pointed out earlier, religious
individuals do not appear to be normatively distressed because of their faith. At the same
time, the resemblance between religious and neurotic repetitive acts appears to be rather
superficial. For example, the repetitive and ritualistic practice ofprayer in the Christian
Orthodox tradition, namely the movement of the right hand to form the symbol of the
cross thrice with four reference points arranged in the following sequence: forehead,
abdomen, chest (left side), chest (right side), is a normal practice for the believer and not
a pathological state. There is no compulsion involved, and indeed the believer can
choose when or even whether he or she wishes to perform the practice. At the same time,
the act is meaningful (at least within certain cultures) and not senseless or foolish, and
it carries a highly symbolic meaning. All these elements appear to be absent in neurotic
behaviour.
As for Freud's argument that the same causes are responsible for these two kinds of
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behaviour, it appears to me to be a deductive fallacy. The cause (viz. the suppression of
basic instincts) is the antecedent (p) of the argument, where the result (viz. the
pathological behaviour) is the consequent (q). Simplified, Freud's argument therefore
takes the form:
This form of reasoning is a logical fallacy called affirming the consequent (see Hughes,
1996, pp. 189-190). I believe that critics have neglected this fallacy, because they have
been focussing on refuting the initial premises of Freud's argument, viz. that
pathological behaviour is a result of instinct suppression. If the premises were found
wrong, there would be no need to look at the rest of the argument.
The final point of criticism I would like to make, addresses the generality of Freud's
phylogenetic theory to religion. Freud in "Totem & Taboo" talks about the father who
was killed and subsequently was made into God. That could be applicable to
Monotheistic religions. But how about religions that have more than one god or involve
the worship of female gods, like Hinduism? Or those that have no gods, like some
traditional branches of Buddhism? Freud's theory cannot explain their origins any way
one would want to stretch his imagination. Freud did not speak of multiple fathers, or
the murder of the mother, and of course one is at a loss when no parents (no gods) are
involved. However, Freud claims that his theory explains the universal origins of
religion and its evolution through human history - not through "some" human's history.
Therefore, one is compelled to accept either that only monotheistic systems are true
religions (which brings us back to the issue of the definition of the concept), or that
Freud's theory is false.
1
Thereforep
Ifp then q (If basic instincts are suppressed, they result to
pathological behaviour)
(Religious acts are forms of pathological behaviour)
(Therefore they are caused by instinct suppression)
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The end of the beginning
Freud's ideas seem to have caused such a stir in the psychological and broader circles
that all research on religion virtually ceased for almost two decades (Beit-Hallahmi,
1974; Koenig & Larson, 2001). After Freud, any attempts to rescue the affair were
doomed to failure. One of those brave scholars was another one of Hall's 1909 guest
lecturers, the Swiss psychiatrist Carl Gustav Jung (1875 - 1961).
Jung (a son ofa parson) was the star pupil ofFreud's. He parted with his master though,
as he strongly disagreed with the idea that sexuality was the origin of everything,
especially God (seemore about their disagreement in Palmer, 1997). Jung, unlike Freud,
studied eastern religious traditions and attempted to provide an explanation that would
account for both eastern and western systems of faith. For Jung, there is a deeper
unconscious he calls the collective unconscious, which is shared by all humans and is
passed on through tradition or heritage (1933/1961; 1938). The structural elements of
this unconscious he calls archetypes, which are concepts or images expressed in various
ways through different cultures. The concept ofthe divine is one ofthose archetypes (the
archetype of wholeness), and as such it is an inherited part of every human being.
Psychic balance and self-realization (individuation) can only be achieved, according to
Jung, if one accepts and integrates these archetypes - as they are understood and
expressed in their culture - in their consciousness. Religion is a fundamental aspect of
the psyche that guides humans through this process of realization (the hero's quest)
towards psychological wholeness, either by directly connecting them with the collective
unconscious (e.g. through visions) or through symbolic representations of it (e.g. rituals).
Therefore, for Jung religion is an expression ofunconscious feelings and states essential
for a healthy humanity.
Unfortunately, Jung's ideas did not have a strong impact then and could not undo the
harm that had already been caused by Freud. And anyway, the divorce process between
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psychology and religion had already begun. Hall's journal was one ofthe first casualties,
which stopped being published in 19141. Meadow & Kahoe (1984) claim that in the
period between 1930 and 1950 only a single book was published in the US in this area
in 1945 by pastoral psychologist Paul Johnson compared to more than twenty books
published between 1900 and 1930. To be fair though to Freud, although his work may
have been a catalyst in the split between psychology and religion, there were deeper
reasons to be accounted responsible for that.
One of them is that psychologists appear to have traditionally been some of the least
likely scientists to be religious. A survey by Leuba (1934) shows that in 1914 only 13%
of leading American psychologists believed in a "prayer-listening God", compared with
34% of physical scientists, and that percentage fell to 9% in the former case for beliefs
in the afterlife, whereas in the case ofphysical scientists it increased to 40%. In a recent
American survey among psychotherapists (Bergin & Jensen, 1990), 31% of clinical
psychologists reported themselves as nonreligious, compared to an average of9% ofthe
general public. In fact, ironically, even the father of the psychology of religion does not
appear to be religious himself. In his personal communications (1926), James
acknowledges his belief in a supernatural being he calls God, but at the same time he
categorically states that he never had a religious experience, that he considers prayer a
"foolish and artificial" act (which totally contradicts what he says in the Varieties), and
that he views the Bible to be "so human a book that I don't see how belief in its divine
authorship can survive the reading of it" (p. 215).
Here it is interesting to mention that as Hall's journal was closing down, in Nuremberg,
Germany, the International Association for the Psychology of Religion was being founded
(Belzen, 2002). The name of this association is misleading though, since none of its members
were psychologists and none had been trained in scientific research. In fact, everyone in the
association was either a theologian or a minister ofChristian faith. Coincidence or does Freud
once again have something to do with it?
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It is not clear why all this is so. It may be that people who are attracted to psychology
already tend to be less religious - a view entertained by some (e.g. Eagle & Marcos,
1980) - or that psychological knowledge has a catalytic effect on the individuals'
religious beliefs - a position that has also been put forward (Batson et al., 1993, chap.
1). Whatever the reason, it seems a paradoxical irony that the people who study the
"soul" do not actually believe in it.
However, should this be the case, one can see how a lack of religious commitment may
lead to a lack of interest in religious research. If one does not perceive religion as
relevant to one's own life, itmay easily be assumed that it is not relevant to others' lives
either, and thus not a subject worthy of study. Indeed, it seems that psychologists were
(and at large still are) considering religion as marginal, ifnot irrelevant, to psychological
investigation, and tended to distance themselves from approaching scientifically any
form of religious phenomena (Wulff, 1998). At those early times of modernisation,
materialistic industrialisation, and radical social and political ideologies, it appears that
religion was seen - as reflected in Freud's work - as a dying system of no significance
to the individual. Ifreligionwere ameaningless false assessment ofreality, consequently
its study would become meaningless. This attitude appears to have coincided with or
even contributed to the rise ofBehaviourism, and its dominance in psychology formost
of the first half of the twentieth century (Wulff, 2001).
The second reason relates to the issue of the identity of psychology as a true science.
Until the mid nineteenth century, as mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, Western
psychology was part of philosophy and seemed to be closely related to monotheistic
theologies in the sense that it saw humans as the centre of the universe (Gross, 1995,
chap. 11). However, contemporary thought, laid on the foundations of the
enlightenment, empiricism, and the Cartesian system, advocated that scientific
knowledge is the only valid knowledge since it deals with objectively verifiable facts
(Graham, 1986). In that Zeitgeist, modern or scientific Western psychology arose in the
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late nineteenth century. Although initially psychology concentrated its inquiry on its
traditional subject areas, the tide turned and psychologists did everything to dissociate
themselves from their philosophical past, and prove themselves to be true scientists
(Gorsuch, 1988). In their striving, they adopted an empirical, positivistic approach in
their inquiry, they used experimental methods and statistical techniques as their main,
and for a while exclusive, research tools, and consequently they tried to regulate their
focus of investigation. It appears that it was not long until religious matters, because of
their philosophical connotation, were dismissed as areas of study. In addition, any
residual interest would have gradually been extinguished, as psychologists were realising
that the psychological theories offered to them by James, Freud, Jung, and others to help
with their inquiries in the first place, were frustratingly non-testable with empirical
means. Eventually, psychology shifted from a study of the "soul" or the mind, to a study
of behaviour.
The final reason responsible for the decline of interest in religious research seems to
relate to external pressures and the way psychological thought was perceived by
religious individuals and institutions. Western religious leaders, especially Roman
Catholics, did not welcome the idea of modern psychology investigating religious
matters (Sexton, 1986; Van Til, 1935/1972). They saw psychology as an intruder in their
affairs - even psychologists like Allport (1950) acknowledged that this was indeed the
case. However, because of the relation between traditional psychology and religion, this
intrusion seemed to be largely tolerated, and was viewed as being good-willed and
"harmless". For example, the French theologian Georges Berguer (1923) viewed
psychology as offering valuable tools that could help the believer reinvent and deepen
their faith. When Freud's ideas became public, they appear to have been perceived,
especially by Christian leaders, as representative of those of the whole psychological
community (despite Freud's being a psychiatrist), bringing an end to their tolerance. As
Truman Esau (1998) remarks, psychology (an "idolatrous adulation") was put on the
church's blacklist and it was declared an enemy of faith. The psychology of religion was
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now termed "the psychology of atheism" (Vitz, 1985). It was seen as being capable of
causing irreparable harm to the believer. This hostile image made it hard for
psychologists to recruit religious subjects and publish their findings. Consequently, the
last few interested in this area of research, were, to an extent, forced to turn to more
welcoming pastures.
This course of events should come as no surprise as it is a typical consequence of the
polarity between classical science and religion (I remind the reader that I am focussing
on Western, European thought) (Ferngren, 2002; cf. Jones, 1994). The gradual
development of scientific thought from, say, Copernicus through the enlightenment to
the modern times, constantly challenged the cosmological truths of religion, either by
pointing out their implausibility or falsehood, or by offering alternative, at times simpler,
more natural explanations. By using the intellect that Freud was shouting about, humans
could now make sense of their world without the need of a spiritual domain.
New ideas, however, that challenge the established frame of thought, are "never"
accepted with open arms. Even within the religious domain, new ideas have been
traditionally received as heretic and schismatic (e.g. Lutheranism orCalvinism), leading
at times to dramatic social unrest - the same of course can be said to a degree for
science; for example the paradigm-shift of the seventies that led to the division between
qualitativists and quantitativists. Moreover, when these ideas stem from an external
system (as is the case with science vs. religion), not only do they tend to be seen as
dangerous, but also as illegitimate.
I do not believe that all this resistence is caused by an inherited narrow-mindedness of
the human species. I can, however, identify three main possible reasons for such an
attitude. First, a well-established, broadly-accepted system tends to provide stability and
safety, even at the artificial level of habit or custom. I do not consider, however, these
properties sufficient to generate such levels of resistance or hostility to anything new.
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After all, the ordinary believer or the naive scientist appear to be more easily swayed
than an established theologian or an academic professor.
The second reason could be that the proponents of the old system may truly believe that
it is the right system to adopt. For example, the Christian doctrine is based on principal
moral codes that arguably enhance the well-being of the believer and regulate a social
order of harmonious coexistence. Should this be the case, I can see why one would be
at least reluctant to accept anything else.
The final reason of friction could relate to the notion of power. As religion was losing
the argument with science on many fronts (see for example the famous 1860 Huxley-
Wilberforce debate over the theory of evolution - Brooke, 1991 - also of interest is
Andrew White's 1896 [1993] book on the "warfare" between science and Christianity),
it was losing its influence over the people or the state, or in other words, it was losing
its long-established power (and potentially its wealth and influence). Religious leaders
were therefore left with two viable options: either endorse the scientific ideas (as appears
to be the course followed by mainstream Protestantism - Argyle, 2000) by declaring
them compatible with religion, or to fight them ferociously and dismiss them as
dangerous and false (as was initially the case with Catholicism and is still the case with
some fundamental Christian sects - Harris, 2002; Noll, 2002; Numbers, 2002). Either
approach allows for the potential of the "old" system to maintain or re-establish its
power.
I have sidetracked somewhat from my initial argument, so I would like to return to it
now. Science therefore tended to challenge the religious order of things. As psychology
moved more and more into the scientific domain, it had to adopt a scientific philosophy
towards life. It seems inevitable to me that this move would gradually increase the
tension between the discipline and religion, thus eventually leading to the consequences
I describe above. That said, I would suggest that this course of events was a necessary
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one. Psychology would have had at one point or the other to renounce its past in order
to allow itself to be reborn to a new identity and establish itself as a true scientific
enterprise.
Interim synopsis
The psychology of religion began its life as a promising area of psychological inquiry
as it blended the traditional scope of psychology with modern scientific methodology.
Early thinkers, like Hall and James, presented the theoretical and the empirical
foundations of this new science and motivated researchers to enter the field. As interest
increased so did the pluralism in thought. Freud's theories delivered a catalytic blow to
the area and contributed to its decline.
Undoubtedly, during the first half of the twentieth century, the relationship between
psychology and religion has had a rough ride. This appears to have been caused mainly
by the attitudes of the psychologists, who (a) because of their convictions did not view
religion as an important area of study; (b) in their attempt to establish scientific status,
dissociated themselves with anything that resembled philosophy; and (c) through their
views, had created a negative image ofpsychology in religious circles. Although these
reasons are presented here in the era when they first became most noticeable, it has to
be said that to a certain extent and in certain sets they may still be valid today.
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The "new" psychology of religion
The la ter years of theaffair
Between 1930 and 1950 research in religion was virtually extinct. However, a change
was about to take place. In the fifties, after almost eighty years of life, modern
psychology had come of age (Gross, 1995). The burden ofproving itselfappears to have
been lifted from the shoulders of the new recruits, and psychology now generally tended
to be seen as a true science. Although Behaviourism still held strong, its influence was
rapidly declining as psychologists began reacting to its dehumanising and mechanistic
portrayal of the individual (Graham, 1986; Leahey, 1987). Political and social
phenomena, like the Holocaust, the Cold War, and the American civil rights movement,
as well as scientific advances, ranging from linguistics to electronics, became food for
thought for the young psychologists, and it was not long until new paradigms, like
cognitive, humanistic, and social psychology, emerged (Connolly, 1999). Free from the
ghosts of the past and with new horizons to explore, many psychologists shifted from
the saturated, anachronistic study of behaviour back to the study of the mind (Wulff,
2001). Consequently, religion became once again an interesting topic. If I were to
identify a single individual that promoted this shift of interest back to religious matters,
it would probably have to answer to the name ofGordon Allport.
Gordon WillardAllport (1897-1967)
Allport - considered by many the founder ofhumanistic psychology (Nicholson, 1997)
- was born in Indiana (US) and studied philosophy and economics at Harvard. However,
it was his encounter with Freud that motivated him to obtain a PhD in psychology
(Allport, 1966). Besides his personal interest in religion - he considered himself a
deeply religious person and he was an active member of the Episcopal Church - his
academic interest was in part fuelled by the man whom he succeeded in the chair of
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psychology at Harvard University, none other than William James. Allport was greatly
influenced by his predecessor's ideas about religion. Although his main interest was in
personality, religious issues appear in a number of his publications, as he viewed
religious sentiment as a core component of personality. Evidence of his psychological
interest in religion is found in the themes of his annual sermons at Harvard Appleton
Chapel (given between 193 2 and 1966), which included topics in the psychological roots
of religion, the psychology ofprayer, religious doubt, and so forth (Vande Kemp, 2000).
It was, however, the publication of his book "The Individual & his Religion" in 1950 -
which was based on his 1947 Lowell Lectures at Boston University, and the 1949
Merrick Lectures at Ohio Wesleyan University - that signified the beginning of a new
era in psychological religious research.
Allporf s iiiteiesl lies in understanding the way religion integrates with personality and
how this integration affects the psyche of the individual. In his words:
I am seeking to trace the full course of religious development in the
normally mature and productive personality. I am dealing with the
psychology, not with the psychopathology of religion [...] Many
personalities attain a religious view of life without suffering arrested
development and without self-deception. (1950, p. viii)
Like James he too believes that the personal or subjective aspects of religion are the
most important to the individual, since as he says, although religion may indeed be a
function of social stability, he doubts anyone is religious for such reason. He accepts in
principle James's definition of (personal) religion and he uses it as the basis to build up
his ideas about religious development, which he calls the religious quest. Unlike James
who viewed religious development as essentially a random process that may or may not
occur in the life of the individual, Allport sees it as a process that is in part biologically
determined, and as such always happens to every person. By exhibiting this
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characteristic, religion is a fundamental "department of personality" with a pervasive
structure capable of giving to the individual "meaning and peace in the face of the
tragedy and confusion of life" (p. 159).
For Allport, there are five major forces, which collectively he calls the religious
sentiment, that shape the religion and its development in each person. The first is
organic (viscerogenic) desires, by which he means the need for safety, sex, rest,
nourishment, etc. For example, he sees prayer as an expression of desire. He also
suggests that when desire is at its most intense stage, which is usually the case during
times of crisis, people tend to become (more) religious or express themselves in more
religious ways.
The second force is temperament. This is what was traditionally understood that
personality was (for example a person could have a melancholic, sanguine, outgoing,
etc., temperament). The notion of this factor also incorporates the characteristics James
had assigned to his two basic types of religious individuals. The kind of temperament
one possesses as well as the way it prevails in them, biases, according to Allport, their
religious preferences, i.e. what kind of religion they are more likely to adhere to and in
which way they will practise it.
The next factor involves thephylogenic desires ofthe individual. These are higher order
needs, or as he says, spiritual values, like the need for good and right, for beauty, for
truth, and so forth. These values gradually develop as the person matures and their
direction depends on the sociocultural environment and the educational levels of the
individual, and at the same time on the development of their personality and sense of the
self. Allport claims that "all religion [is] motivated by the individual's desire to conserve
[these values]" (p. 17), with God being "the final value required to explain and to
conserve all other values of selfhood" (pp. 16-17).
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Pursuit ofmeaning is the next force that shapes religion. Humans have the innate need
to make sense of their world. Religion, says Allport, satisfies this need by providing
explanations that have "logical simplicity and serenemajesty" (p. 19). However, because
humans possess different levels of intellect and reasoning, they tend to either absorb part
of that system of thought, or interpret it in ways that make sense to them.
The final force is conformity to culture. Religion and culture are two highly interwoven
systems. No culture exists without a form of religious system, with its own myths and
rituals, and any change in the latter will cause an alteration of the former. Members of
any given culture need to conform to its religious practices, not only so that they can
maintain their status in that system but also for the culture to be sustained. Nevertheless
culture, and thus religion, evolve, because this conformity is not absolute, an exact
replica of the previous generation's practices, but is rather adjusted so it can provide
significance to the life of each individual.
From the above it becomes apparent that although religious sentiment consists of these
five specific components, according to Allport, the development and interplay of these
forces vary between individuals, and as a result religious sentiment varies too. Therefore,
the religious quest of each individual is unique. However, since this sentiment is partly
biologically-bound, with the use of psychological knowledge, we are able to suggest
general phases it will pass through during the different stages of life. For example, an
infant, that does not possess a concept of the self (according to Allport), is not expected
to have developed any spiritual values, which are more likely to become salient during
early adulthood, especially if the individual is exposed to a higher education
environment. As an extension, religious quest passes through different phases as it
matures within the life of the individual. So, for example, a child is more likely to fear
punishment from God, and see Him as a projection oftheir father (which appears to echo
Freud's words), rather than the ultimate source of good and moral values.
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This childlike religion, which Allport calls immature (and later extrinsic), serves as the
means to self-serving goals towards self-comfort, self-interest, and self-justification, and
it is characterised by narrow-mindedness, and superstition. As religious sentiment
develops it is involved with different stages of reasoning and doubt that lead to amature
(,intrinsic) orientation of the religious quest. At that state, the quest is critically
conceived and articulated, and it becomes the end in itself, a direct approach to God. It
is no longer the servant to one's needs, but rather the master of them, pulling them
towards the future and using them to search for meaning and self-actualisation beyond
mere self-interest. Mature religion therefore is the ultimate motive, and the more mature
a person becomes the more their life and behaviour will be guided by their religion.
There is a twist in the above story though. Since, according to Allport, the religious
quest of each individual is unique, not everybody ends up with a mature religion, either
because they do not wish to (as the immature form serves their needs well enough) or
because they are not capable of doing so (because their religious sentiment does not
reach the necessary stage of development). Some people remain childlike and so does
their religion. Allport, however, is not judgmental, as he says that "how the individual
justifies his faith is a variable matter, and the certitude he achieves is his alone" (p. 159).
He concludes his book with the remark that what one needs to remember is that religion
is an individual's "ultimate attempt to enlarge and to complete his own personality by
finding the supreme context in which he rightly belongs" (p. 159).
Critique onAllport
Allport's theory has had a unique contribution to the psychology of religion. He was the
first to propose that religion originates from the interplay between feeling and reason.
One constantly strives to make sense of the crises in one's life, and in doing so one
shapes one's religion. Also unlike James's general yet static approach, and Freud's or
Jung's abstract interpretations, Allport's theory was the first to have very specific
components that are well integrated with modern psychological discourse and practice.
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This makes his ideas easily operationalised and empirically testable. And that was
exactly what the psychology of religion needed up to that point to be able to begin
producing "proper" scientific research en masse (Argyle, 1958). As I will discuss in the
next chapter, psychologists did capitalise on this opportunity resulting in a great
proportion of psychological research on religion (including this thesis) being based on
questionnaire measurements that derived from Allport's ideas.
Allport, however, in my view was a romantic. He did not see anything bad in religion.
Even the immature forms of religion served their valuable purpose of providing the
individual with the essential motives he or she needs to live their life the best way it
makes sense to them. Not long after he had published these ideas, Allport was faced with
a set of evidence he could not comprehend. Allport was puzzled by findings that
suggested that very religious people tended to exhibit rather negative social attitudes,
namely regarding prejudice and discrimination (e.g. Adorno et ah, 1950; Allport, 1955).
In the next chapter, I will discuss how he went about operationalising his theory,
primarily in an attempt to study this relationship.
Furthermore, according to Allport's theory, all humans are religious. No person exists
without religion, as no person exists without personality. Atheists, agnostics and
Humanists are nothingmore that "reactive doubters", with deeply religious concerns. As
he says they are "reacting against the intellectual slavery of an idea" and their
"negativism often pertains to specific content rather than to basic values" (p. 117). This
argumentmakes perfect sensewithin the premises ofhis theory, but when it is addressed
through studies it becomes problematic. As I will show in the next chapter, researchers
have usedmeasurements from this theory indiscriminately on their subjects, while others
(including me) have pointed out that this is a fallacious practice that produces non-
comparable results; yet others suggested amending the scales to broaden their
applicability.
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The psychology of religion is reborn
Since the publication ofAllport's book, research in religion has been following a steady
yet accelerating growth (Belzen, 1997; Dein & Loewenthal, 1998; Paloutzian, 1996;
Spilka & Mcintosh, 1996). I am not certain whether Allport through his ideas was an
instant catalyst to that renewed interest - although evidence suggests that he was
definitely at least a considerable influence - or whether he was simply the first to
express that interest publicly. Whichever the case, his book marks the rebirth of the
psychology of religion. As a result, in 1959 the "Review ofReligious Research" journal
was established, and in 1961 the "Journal for the Scientific Study ofReligion" was born
(Gorsuch, 1988). Slowly, psychologists (and at the same time other social scientists)
started putting religion back into their discourse.
Rollo May (1957), for example, suggests that religion functions at two different levels
on the individual. At one level it fosters weakness and dependency through blind
obedience to a supernatural power, while at another level, by promoting self-realisation,
it is a source of strength. Abraham Maslow (1964) incorporates religion into his
humanistic theory of personality through the satisfaction of hierarchical needs. At the
top ofMaslow's hierarchy lie the self-actualised individuals, thepeakers, who among
other things tend to have peak religious experiences, which they use to enhance their
personal growth (his ideas heavily draw from James's concept of religious geniuses).
This renewed relationship between psychology and religion was not free of problems.
The shift of interest back to religious issues brought with it new criticism, this time
around theoretical and methodological problems. The fact that the individual's religious
beliefs have a personal, subjective, largely unobservable, "otherworldly" character
(Batson et ah, 1993), seems to suggest that they are intrinsically incompatible with
empirical research. Indeed, theologians, notably Karl Barth (1961), claimed that since
God is totally "other", neither God nor religious behaviour can ever be valid objects of
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empirical observation.
In order to resolve this problem, psychologists proposed that either we have to accept
that religion can be reduced to empirical observations, or that, at least an aspect of
religion (viz. religious experience) is not testable, and thus we should ignore it and focus
on religious behaviour instead (Idinopoulos & Wilson, 1998; review by King, 1991;
King & Hunt, 1990; Warren, 1993). This problem plagued psychologists interested in
the study of religion mainly in the years between 1950 and 1970, and seems to have
created serious theoretical friction between the two camps.
The former school of thought was laughed at by the empiricists who argued that what
they were doing was not science and since they were claiming to measure elements that
were unobservable, and thus empirically unmeasurable, their findings were neither
scientifically interesting nor valid. On the other hand, the empirical approach was
challenged by the phenomenologists, in part through the argument that by only
measuring the observable character of religion and ignoring important and complex
religious aspects, they were not measuring religion at all, and once again their findings
were viewed as meaningless (for more on this debate see Hanford, 1975; Reich, 1993a;
1993b; Warren, 1993). This unsettled anomaly seems to have dissuaded psychologists
from entering the field, and for a long time kept research in religion outside the
mainstream psychological circles.
In the mid seventies, and after more than twenty years of bitter dispute, the problem
seems to have been finally resolved. This was possible because of a radical paradigm
shift that had occurred in science. Through new scientific discoveries, especially in
physics, in the atmosphere of the postmodern philosophies of Foucault, Bourdieu and
the rest, and the ideas of Kuhn and Popper, science redefined itself and its view of the
world (Clayton, 1997). Psychologists, like other scientists, realised that although
unobservable entities are not empirically verifiable, their impact on society or the
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individual is. Therefore, by measuring their expressions or their symptoms,
psychologists, with a certain degree of error, could infer to the existence and the
properties of those entities, and generate theories about them (Hood et al., 1996). As
Karl Popper comments "theories are our own inventions; they are not forced upon us"
(1965, p.117).
These new ideas were an epiphany for the psychological world, and not only boosted
research in religion, but also helped other areas, like social psychology, reinvent
themselves (see also Carrette, 2001; O'Connor, 2001). Psychology of religion was now
becoming a stable, promising, and significant field. Consequently, in the mid seventies
the American Psychological Association formed Division 36 in order to promote
psychological research in religion and spirituality. During this period two new
international journals were established, viz. the "Journal ofPsychology & Theology" in
1973, and the "Journal of Psychology & Christianity" in 1982. Finally, in 1994 the
fourth edition ofthe Diagnostic & StatisticalManual ofMental Health Disorders (DSM-
IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994) included for the first lime a code (v62.89)
addressing religious and spiritual problems, while in Britain the Royal College of
Psychiatrists (2002) set up in 1999 the "Spirituality & Psychiatry Group" to explore such
issues and their relevance to clinical practice.
The nineties saw a real explosion of published material in the psychology of religion,
and an average publication rate of fifty-five articles in international psychology journals
per year (Dein & Loewenthal, 1998). In 1991 the "International Journal for the
Psychology of Religion" was established in order to promote psychological studies of
religious processes and phenomena in all religious traditions, and it has received articles
not only from psychologists, but also from theologians, religious leaders, and even
neuroscientists. Finally, in 1998, three of the leading British psychologists in religious
research (Simon Dein, Kate Loewenthal, and Christopher Lewis) founded the journal of
"Mental Health, Religion, & Culture" in order to provide a "point of reference for the
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growing number of professionals and academics working in the expanding field of
mental health and religion" (Mental Health, Religion, & Culture, n.d.).
Contemporary psychological theories of religion
Before I conclude this chapter, which is dangerously becoming an everlasting story, a
thesis in its own right, I would like briefly to present two of the latest psychological
theories in the area.
The firstwas developed byMichael Persinger, a Canadian psychologist (1987). With the
use of brain-scans, Persinger realised that religious experiences, both visual and
auditory, tend to activate the same areas in the temporal lobes of the brain. By
experimentally reversing the process, he found out that the activation of these areas,
through external electric stimulations, tended to produce subjective experiences of a
profound religious character. He went on to identify the natural ways through which
such activation can occur. Indeed, he did find that lack of oxygen, yogic breathing,
fasting, and various stresses, like anxiety and intense emotional states, were more likely
to activate these regions of the brain and thus produce religious experiences. He
concludes that religious experiences can be explained as unconscious responses to
conscious processes stimulated by neurophysiological factors.
The second theory was proposed in 1995 by John Schumaker, an Australian clinical
psychologist. According to Schumaker, religion is a consequence of the evolution of
human high cognitive abilities. He claims that at one point in our evolution "we became
capable of recognising, and being negatively affected by, disorder" (p. 35). In order to
cope with such capacity, the brain developed the ability to process selectively and store
information into more acceptable and meaningful data. Thus, for the first time a species
evolved capable of regulating its own reality. At the individual level this ability of
reality distortion is manifested through psychopathology. At the collective level,
however, it is expressed through religion. Religion therefore is an evolved system of
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reality-distorting ideas and practices that serves as the ultimate regulator of normality.
The outlines of new paradigms, ideas, and findings are coming out in the field in a
steady flow. During the last two years, my ScienceDirect™ database-alert has been
revealing an average of twenty or so international publications per month in the
psychology of religion. After a century ofturmoil, denial, rejection, and luminous ideas,
the psychology of religion has emerged strong and richer, and is now establishing its
prominent and promising place among the mainstream areas of psychology. If it
succeeds in playing its constructive role well, it may provide a unique and valuable
contribution to psychological science by leading it, as Lewis Andrews (1995) puts it, "to
apply eternal wisdom to the problems of emotional distress and create a culture that
considers universal and transcendent truths as a must for the refinement of genuine
personal growth and independence" (p. 79).
Chapter synopsis
In this chapter, I have presented, alongside a rather simplified historical review, the
theoretical foundations of the psychology of religion, the main challenges the field has
faced through the years, and the ways they seem to have been resolved, leading to its
present status.
When modern psychology was born, religion appeared to be a legitimate area of inquiry.
Between 1879 and 1902, psychologists, especially in the US, like Hall, Starbuck, and
Leuba initiated the interest in religion. In 1902, James set the foundations of the field,
and the influx of new ideas began. Freud's theories, with their provocative and
antireligious sentiment, marked the end of the first historical period of the field
sometime in 1930, leading to a dormant phase which lasted approximately for twenty
years. Scientific and sociocultural developments led to the rebirth of the field marked
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by the publication ofAllport's theory in 1950. As interest in the area grew once again,
new issues arose around the legitimacy of the scientific study of religion. They were
finally resolved partly with the aid of postmodern thought. The psychology of religion
continues to grow and expand, with a now-burgeoning literature, slowly becoming a





"In God we trust, all others must give data"
(anon.)
Chapter aims & organisation
So far I have almost exclusively discussed theoretical approaches to the psychological
study of religion. It is one thing, however, to establish a viable basis for a relationship
between psychology and religion, and entirely another to justify the need for research
into that relationship. Hereinafter, by presenting some ofthe fundamental psychological
aspects of religion and surveying the research literature, I am exploring the
psychological importance of religion. Specifically, the chapter focusses on the four
psychological areas upon which this thesis attempts to address the importance of
religion. These areas are: (a) general personality, primarily through Eysenck's traits
theory; (b) mental health, in particular schizotypal personalities, which form the main
psychological correlates of religion in this thesis; (c) aspects of identity; and (d)
Bowlby's attachment theory ofhuman bonding. For each of them, initially an overview
of the concepts they involve is presented, followed by their relationship with each other
and particularly with religious orientation - expressed through Allport's theory - as it
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has been measured and identified through empirical research findings. Furthermore,
based on these findings, I establish the predictions of the thesis (presented in boxes
throughout the text), which were tested by the questionnaire study, and in part shaped
the focus of the interview study discussed in the following chapters. At the end of the
chapter, three possible unified models are presented that combine religiosity, variables
from all the four areas above, plus additional sociodemographic measurements.
Before I home in on all this though, I discuss two things. First, I briefly introduce the
reader to the reasons why religion should be seen as an important psychological variable,
in the hope that these reasons will become apparent as the chapter develops. Second, I
discuss the two empirical approaches to religiosity - both of which were based on
Allporf s theory - used in the questionnaire study of this thesis, and served as the
conceptual basis of the interview study protocol.
Religion as an important psychological variable
Religion, besides its obvious historical association with humanity, appears to have at
least three distinct psychological features: uniqueness, complexity, and diversity (Batson
et al., 1993). As these authors suggest, religion is unique, because it involves beliefs and
experiences that can dramatically affect the individual's views of themselves and of the
purpose and meaning of their life. In other words, religion is perhaps the only human
concern that addresses and potentially transforms the core spiritual and existential
components of one's life. Religion is also a complex psychological variable. It seems
to involve and utilise an intricate web of emotions, beliefs, values, activities, and
psychosocial constructs. However, it goes beyond this; by fusing all those psychological
components it can provide the individual with a sense ofmeaning, integrity, and identity.
Finally, religion is diverse. At the institutional level, religious traditions exhibit such a
variety of features that at times identifying any commonality between them seems
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impossible. In the same sense, personal beliefs also seem to differ between people often,
as Allport advocates, immensely.
These armchair theoretical issues do suggest that religion plays a sui generis, composite,
and diverse role in the psychosocial world of the individual. At the empirical level,
however, for religion to be considered an important variable, it would have not only to
demonstrate the above characteristics unambiguously, but also to exhibit a distinct,
consistent, and noticeable psychological effect. Although there is no doubt in my mind
that this is so, by discussing in this chapter the research topics that are of interest to this
thesis and the main findings that have emerged from them, I let the reader decide for
themselves.
Dimensionality & orientations to religion
Allport's empirical approach
Religious orientation has been a focal point in the psychology ofreligion for almost forty
years. Although Peter Hill and Ralph Hood (1999) present no less than 129
measurements of religiosity, by far the most frequently used one is arguably Allport's
Religious Orientation Scale (Allport & Ross, 1967), most commonly known as
Internal/External Scale (I/E). The scale is conceptually based on Allport's theory of
religion, which was discussed in the previous chapter. As such, it attempts to measure
the two components ofAllport's religious piety, viz. the intrinsic and the extrinsic one,
through a self-report questionnaire measurement (detailed descriptions of the scale and
its psychometric properties are given in the next chapter).
Page 65
Chapter IV: Psychological correlates of religion
Critique on Allport's approach
Despite its common use, the scale has been repeatedly criticised for not being much of
a clear, flawless measurement (Hunsberger, 1995; Kirkpatrick, 1989; Kirkpatrick &
Hood, 1990, 1991). Researchers have disagreed on empirical grounds with the way
Allport operationalised and measured his variables. The idea of religious orientation
being a unidimensional concept with extrinsic-intrinsic as its polar points, as it was
initially conceptualised, had been abandoned already by Allport, initially in favour of a
two-dimensional model. However, more recently large-A studies suggest that Allport's
model behaves better as a three-dimensional one with extrinsic orientation consisting
of two separate factors, subsequently termed social extrinsic and personal extrinsic
orientations (Genia, 1993; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1989). Although
this was good news for some researchers (e.g. Masters, 1991), others saw it as evidence
against the validity of Allport's model. For instance, Kirkpatrick and Hood (1990)
argued that the appearance ofa new factor, which was not predicted by the initial model,
suggests "a psychometric deficiency of the scale, not [...] a substantive research finding"
(p. 448).
I do not entirely subscribe to this last view. It is true that Allport's model did not predict
a third orientation, but at the same time it did not exclude the possibility of the existence
of such orientation. Where the model appears weak is not in the way it was
conceptualised, but rather in the way it was initially and until the eighties empirically
tested, i.e. through simple correlational studies. Indeed, with the use of more
sophisticated statistical techniques (such as Factor Analysis), researchers have
subsequently managed to show that the three-dimensional model possesses sound
psychometric properties (e.g. Maltby, 1999a; Maltby & Lewis, 1996). However, I would
agree with Kirkpatrick and Hood that in order to capture the richness of the dimensions
of religious orientation, psychological research should attempt, by steering away from
correlational or simplified regression-based methodologies, to develop more
theoretically and psychometrically sophisticated models - I am revisiting these issues
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later in this chapter.
Another criticism stems from Allport's theoretical supposition that all humans are
religious in one form or another. Allport himself was the first to realise through his
studies that there were individuals whom he was unable to classify as having either an
intrinsic or an extrinsic orientation towards religion - he termed these people
indiscriminately nonreligious (Allport & Ross, 1967). This led him to caution future
researchers by pointing out that one cannot be religiously orientated unless one sees
oneself as being religious in the first place (see also Donahue, 1985). This warning was
recently reiterated by David Wulff (1997) when he said in a simple statement that "these
scales can be used meaningfully only with religious subjects" (p. 236). Surprisingly,
many ifnot most studies are still using Allport's scales indiscriminately on religious and
nonreligious participants. Their underlying assumption is that religious orientation runs
on a continuum from nonreligious to highly religious individuals (e.g. Kirkpatrick &
Hood, 1990) - a point that relates back to the discussion on how one defines religion and
its products.
Accepting for the moment that indeed religious orientation covers religious and
nonreligious people alike, then a major problem arises since the questionnaire
measurements these studies tend to utilise were not developed for use on nonreligious
individuals. In fact, there are items in those measurements that appear to be totally
inappropriate for nonreligious people, e.g. "I go to church mostly to spend time with my
friends" [item 11 ] or "I praymainly to gain relief and protection" [item 6]. Moreover the
scales were not only developed to be applicable to religious people, but be applicable
specifically to Christians. Indiscriminate use of these scales runs the risk of them being
used on adherents ofother religious faiths, which not only seems meaningless, but could
also be insulting in some cases. Consequently, all this continuous misuse of Allport's
scales may have led to grossly distorted or misleading results in the psychology of
religion.
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Despite the criticism, Allport's approach has to be acknowledged for its usefulness in
helping psychologists understand the association of religion with some other aspects of
behaviour and thought. As Allport and Ross (1967) state: " to know that a person is in
some sense 'religious' is not as important as to know the role religion plays in the
economy of his life" (p. 442).
In this thesis, an attempt was made to investigate to what extent Allport's dimensions
could be recovered from the data.2
Ba tson 's empirical approach
Daniel Batson is an American psychologist, currently at the University of Kansas in
Lawrence, with a PhD in theology and psychology, who is considered by many the
leader of the experimental method in the psychology of religion. In an attempt to
validate Allport's scales conceptually, Batson realised that those scales had neglected
fundamental aspects ofAllport's theory (Batson, 1976). Allport constantly referred to
the individual's religious development as a quest (cf. Jung's hero's quest discussed in
the previous chapter). It is this readiness to doubt and self criticism that leads to the
mature form of religiousness. As Allport himselfputs it: "the mature religious sentiment
is ordinarily fashioned in the workshop of doubt" (p. 83). However, Batson noticed that
nowhere in Allport's scales was this idea ofdoubt communicated. With that in mind, he
proposed a new empirical arrangement ofAllport's theoretical constructs.
Initially, he preserved extrinsic orientation, although he renamed it external or means
to stretch its use by the believer towards self-serving goals. However, subsequent
empirical evidence made him realise that his external dimension was not measuring
In this chapter, the predictions, hypotheses, or exploratory goals of the questionnaire study of
this thesis will be presented in this format.
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extrinsic religiousness, but rather an aspect of intrinsic religion, that of the social
influences on the development of a mature religion. He then broke down the intrinsic
orientation into two unrelated components: one he called internal or ends orientation
(similar to the intrinsic one), which refers to "the degree to which an individual's
religion is a result of internal needs for certainty, strength, and direction" (Batson et ah,
1993, p. 169), and another one he termed the quest dimension to address those
theoretical issues above that Allport had failed to incorporate in his measurement.
Batson defines the quest orientation as "the degree to which an individual's religion
involves an open-ended, responsive dialogue with existential questions raised by the
contradictions and tragedies of life" (Batson et ah, 1993, p. 169). He claims that
individuals who are high on the quest dimension, possess the ultimate, mostmature form
of religion, a form that can lead to "universal compassion" (Batson et ah, 2001).
Batson's Religious Life Inventory (RLI) (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b) is
arguably the second most commonly used measurement of religious orientation.
Kenneth Pargament (1997) looked at Allport's and Batson's constructs and realised that
the means and ends components seemed independent from the primary dimensions of
religious orientations (Table 4.1). According to his categorisation the two approaches
above address different, yet overlapping elements of orientation. So for example,
Batson's external religion taps mainly into the intrinsic-means and partly the extrinsic-
ends categories, and that is why it tends to relate more to the intrinsic rather than the
extrinsic orientation.
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Critique on Batson's approach
As perhaps it was expected, Batson's approach was criticised, mainly by the advocates
of Allport's scales. Consequently, the focus of the criticism has been on the quest
dimension. Michael Donahue (1985) argued that although doubt was indeed an element
of Allport's religious sentiment, it was conceived as part of a transitional phase of
religious development. Doubt will gradually fade and eventually it will lead to the
mature form of religiosity, i.e. the intrinsic orientation, or for that matter the internal
one. Therefore, the quest dimension should be seen as a stage ofreligious sentiment (not
as religious maturity), through which an individual needs to pass in order to acquire a
mature orientation. There is some empirical evidence supporting this claim showing that
in Christian samples the intrinsic orientation tends to increase with age, while quest
tends to decrease (Hood & Morris, 1985; Watson et ah, 1988). However, Batson et al.
(1993) in defence of their scale present studies that have actually shown that mean
scores in the quest orientation tend to be similar between young and old Christian adults
(late teens to 60 year olds), or in certain instances be even higher in the latter group.
At the same time if Donahue's thesis is correct, one expects quest and intrinsic to have
a relatively high inverse correlation. However, although the inverse nature of this
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association is shown in almost every published study that compares the two scales, the
magnitude of this relationship has been very low to nonexistent (for an overview of
results see Batson et ah, 1993), and possibly curvilinear in nature (Burris, 1994).
In fact, quest tends not to have an important (linear at least) relationship with any of the
rest of the religious orientation scales discussed here. Although this is good news to
Batson's ears, as he takes it to suggest that quest is an independent component of
religiosity, for others it is evidence that the quest scale does not measure anything
exclusively religious, but a general tendency to questioning, or "sophomoric doubt", or
even agnosticism (Burris et al., 1996; Donahue, 1985). Naturally, Batson and his
followers addressed this criticism in a series of studies (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a;
Batson & Ventis, 1985; Maltby & Day, 1998), through which they showed that although
they could not exclude the possibility of the above claim, their evidence suggests that
there is a significant difference in the quest behaviour between not only religious and
nonreligious people, but also in Christians between charismatic and mainstream
denominations - with the former in both instances having higher scores on the scale.
Although, or perhaps because, the issue is far from being resolved, and as Wulffwrites
"clarifying and assessing the quest orientation is surely one of the psychology of
religion's most urgent tasks" (1997, p. 243), it is common among researchers who are
not "politically" affiliated to any of the two opposing camps to use both approaches
when studying correlates of religious orientation.
It was predicted in this thesis that Batson's and Allport's measurements would show
an obvious relationship. Specifically, intrinsic orientationwould relate to both internal
and external, extrinsic would only show a low association with external, while the
quest orientation would be largely independent from all the rest, showing a negative
low association with intrinsic. The presence of nonlinear relationships among the
scales was also explored.
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Psychological correlates of religion
Religion & General Personality
Personality: An Overview
Personality psychology has its focus on individual differences and attempts to
understand the person "as deeply, completely, and precisely as possible" (Shoba &
Mischel, 1996, p. 425). The concept of personality is one of those elusive terms, like
religion, that can have a plethora of meanings depending on the context it is used. For
ease of communication I will adopt Lawrence Pervin's (1993) operational definition,
according to which "personality represents those characteristics of the person that
account for consistent patterns of behavior" (p. 3).
Naturally what follows a pluralism in personality definitions is a pluralism in personality
theories. Indeed, since the ancient Greek times a variety of approaches to personality
have been put forward. Within the context of this thesis, I will dwell only in the realms
of the traits approach, since according to Gerald Matthews and Ian Deary (1998) - who
basically articulate what one notices through a literature review in the field - it is the
approach that represents the current state of personality research. Primarily this is so,
because unlike other approaches to personality, like the psychodynamic approach, or the
humanistic approach, this one appears to have the highest empirical value, as it allows
for the development ofpsychometric measurements that can readily assess its premises
through empirical research.
Traits can be seen as the basic units of personality, the fundamental dispositions a
person possesses that increase the likelihood of the manifestation of certain kinds of
behaviour, for example being outgoing, impulsive, sociable and so forth. Once again
within the traits approach, several theories have been proposed, notably those ofAllport,
Cattell, Costa and McCrae, Cloninger, Eysenck, and Zuckerman (for an overview see
Page 72
Chapter IV: Psychological correlates of religion
Claridge & Davis, 2003, ch. 3; Matthews & Deary, 1998, ch. 1). In this thesis, I am
focussing on Eysenck's theory, because my literature review indicates that it is one of
the most commonly used ones in the psychology of religion.
Eysenck's traits theory of personality
Hans Eysenck was born in Germany in 1916, but lived all ofhis adult life in Britain (he
died in 1997). He held a PhD in psychology from the University of London, where he
taught until his retirement. Eysenck developed part of his personality theory (Eysenck,
1964; 1967; 1970) while working with psychiatric patients at the Institute ofPsychiatry
in Maudsley Hospital, London. According to this theory, personality is the sum of
potential or actual behavioural patterns (acts or dispositions) underpinned by a biological
foundation - primarily based on neurophysiological functioning - and subsequently
shaped by the environment. As such, personality develops through the interplay between
cognition, character, temperament, and constitution or physiology.
These dispositions of personality, Eysenck claims, have a hierarchical arrangement
based on levels ofgenerality and stability. At the lowest, most specific, and least stable
level he places specific responses to internal or external stimuli that can vary between
and within each individual according to several factors such as the given situation, one's
state ofmind, the intensity and nature of the stimulus, and so forth. Specific responses
can group into recurrent acts that form the next level of personality, occupied by what
he calls habitual responses. As one moves to a higher level, acts and dispositions
become more salient, more stable patterns start forming, and related collections of
habitual responses give rise to personality traits (e.g. suggestibility, creativity and so
forth). At the highest, most stable and most general level of Eysenck's personality
hierarchy lie the super-traits or types or dimensions, which are broader dimensions of
personality, composed by a specific combination of traits. It needs to be made clear that
these dimensions ofpersonality are assumed to be largely independent from each other
and present in various degrees in each individual.
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Initially Eysenck had identified two personality dimensions he called neuroticism and
extraversion. Neuroticism indicates levels of emotional stability. It places people on a
continuum from fairly calm, even-tempered, and stable to fairly emotionally unstable,
moody, and anxious. Eysenck (1967) placed the biological basis of the neuroticism
dimension on the responsiveness of the sympathetic nervous system. He claimed that
individuals that score high on this dimension have a "sympathetic hyperactivity" that at
extreme cases leads to a vicious circle, a positive feedback ofnervous activity, through
which a stimulus activates a sympathetic response, which in a highly neurotic person
increases their susceptibility to further stimulation, which in turn activates the system
even further and so forth. In other words, a neurotic person tends to respond to his or her
own disposition toward panic or stress, rather than the cause that stimulates this
disposition.
The extraversion personality dimension encompasses aspects of sociability, reliability,
and liveliness. People are placed on this dimension on a continuum from quiet, calm and
passive (introverts) to active, outgoing and impulsive (extraverts). Eysenck (1967)
hypothesised that the biological basis of this dimension lie in the brain's capacity to
inhibit (i.e. calm down) or excite (i.e. alert or wake up) itself as a response to a stimulus.
In introverts, for example, this capacity tends to be of a low-inhibition, low-excitement
nature, and as a result, when faced, say, with an embarrassing situation, introverts will
not overreact but at the same time they will tend to remember it for much longer, and
consequently learn to behave in a reserved, careful manner. The situation is reversed for
extraverts. Recently there has been some evidence from EEG (electroencephalogram)
studies that supports Eysenck's extraversion hypothesis (Knyazev et al., 2003).
Eysenck realised through his work in the psychiatric wards that a third dimension was
necessary to explain the personality characteristics some of the patients he encountered
exhibited (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1976). He termed this new dimensionpsychoticism to
refer to an individual's disposition toward psychiatric anomalies. So a person high on
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psychoticism tends to be insensitive, aggressive, and have odd manners, while on the
other end of the spectrum one finds people who are soft-minded, prosocial, and
empathic. Eysenck himself did not attempt to identify the biological bases of
psychoticism, as he probably realised it would have been as a momentous a task as the
identification of the origins of psychopathy - he cited however (Eysenck & Eysenck,
1976; 1991) a series of studies by third parties who offered a variety of explanations.
Personality & Religion
Although it may not come as obvious at first, the psychology of religion is well
embedded within the psychology of personality. In 1969, James Dittes wrote a chapter
in "The Handbook ofSocial Psychology" titled "Psychology ofReligion", which to date
is still highly respected. In it, Dittes presented the state of the psychology of religion at
that time, expanding on both theoretical and mainly empirical approaches. In his
discussion on religion and personality he states that "particular personality and
motivational variables are implied by any theory or problem in the understanding of
religion" (p. 636). If one were to pause and think for a while about at least the main
theories of the psychology of religion, one would inevitably come to the same
conclusion.
James talks about personality as having a prominent role in the person's religious
experiences. For example, he says that his religious geniuses possessed what he calls a
"heterogeneous personality", i.e. they exhibited rather diverse and intense personality
characteristics, while the twice-born had also to experience apersonality change for their
new direction of religiosity to take effect. Freud's theory (or shall I say "theories") of
religion also develops entirely within his personality theory, while for Allport, as
discussed earlier in this and in the previous chapter, religiousness is a fundamental
component of one's personality makeup.
Having clarified that religion and personality are expected to be related, the next perhaps
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more intriguing question is of course in what way they are related. For Freud the answer
is obvious: Religion is a universal neurosis, therefore it is bound to relate to neurotic
personalities. Flowever, in 1975 Flans Eysenck factor-analysed responses from a quota
London-based sample of 368 adult participants on a number of questions covering
social, economic, and political attitudes. His results indicated the presence of three
higher-order oblique, yet highly independent factors. He termed these factors: general
conservatism vs. radical ideology, socioeconomic conservatism vs. socialism, and tough-
mindedness vs. tender-mindedness. The main items on the third factor included all his
questions on religious attitudes, most questions related to permissiveness, and many
questions addressing racism and reactionary individualism. According to Eysenck's
model of social attitudes, individuals who are tender-minded (e.g. altruistic, non-
prejudiced, compassionate and so forth) tend to be highly concerned with religious and
ethical ideas. These ideas not only guide and shape their social attitudes, but also tend
to act as barriers against the expression of sexual and aggressive impulses, which
characterise tough-minded individuals. Another, yet compatible to the above, way this
association has been interpreted is through the idea that tender-minded individuals may
bemore religious because of their tendency to be easily (socially) conditioned (Eysenck,
1998; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1985; Francis, 1992a).
It is worth mentioning here that in 1908 (1968), James had already suggested that a
tender-minded individual would consider himself to be religious so long as he is "what
is called a man of feeling", while a tough-minded individual would tend to be
"irreligious" if he "prides himself on being hard-headed" (all quotes from p. 216). As
tough-mindedness or for that matter tender-mindedness are the main building blocks of
Eysenck's psychoticism dimension, it does not take a big mental leap to conclude that
religiousness appears to be related to psychoticism. So what is what?
A large body of research has attempted to answer this question, and a representative
sample of this kind of studies is shown in Table 4.2 (for a detailed overview see Francis,
1992c; Francis & Jackson, 2003; Saroglou & Jaspard, 2000). These studies suggest that
both psychoticism and neuroticism may relate to religion. Similar results were obtained
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with the use of the NEO Personality Inventory3 (Kosek, 1999; Piedmont, 1999;
Saroglou, 2002; Saroglou & Jaspard, 2000; Saroglou & Jaspard, 2003; Taylor, Douglas,
& MacDonald, 1999; also of interest is Saroglou & Fiasse, 2003), or with the use of
Eysenck's dimensions with Jewish (Katz & Francis, 1995) and Moslem (Wilde &
Joseph, 1997) samples.
In addition, the work of the British psychologist Reverend Leslie Francis with clergy
from various Christian denominations, reveals that they tend to have both lower
psychoticism and neuroticism levels than the general public (Francis, 2002; Francis &
Kay, 1995; Robbins, Francis, & Rutledge, 1997; Robbins et ah, 2001). For Francis
(1992a), however, the answer to the question I asked above is simple: "Psychoticism
[and not neuroticism] is a dimension ofpersonality fundamental to religiosity" (p. 645).
Not everybody though seems to agree with him (see Berman, 1993; Ochs, 1995; Pfeifer,
1993). One ofthe latest examples comes from Michael Dunne and his colleagues (1997)
who ran an eight-year follow-up longitudinal study in Australia with 6463 (at 77) and
4993 (at T2) Christian twins and found that although psychoticism was indeed an
important dimension of religiosity, it was neuroticism that influenced the stability of
religious practices over time.
This is another commonly used inventory (developed by Costa and McCrae, 1992) based on
the traits approach to personality.
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Table 4.2. Summary of research on the relationship between religiosity and personality*









P vs. prayer (-. 17)
P vs. church (-.26)
Hills et al„ 2004 400 university
students
internal/external/quest





N vs. Ex (.22)
N vs. Q (.26)
P vs. In (-.23)
P vs. Ex (-.17)
P vs. Q (-.21)
P vs. Prayer (-.24)





internal/external/quest EPQ N vs. Q (.25)
P vs. In (-.17)




164 adults Francis Scale ofAttitude
Towards Christianity (FSAC)
EPQ revised P vs. FSAC (-.34)
Maltby, 1999b 1,040 adults intrinsic/extrinsic, freq. of
prayer, freq. of church
attendance
EPQ-R-S P vs. In (-.26)
P vs. prayer (-.23)
N vs. Ex (.13)
Maltby, 1999c 331 university
students
intrinsic/extrinsic EPQ-R-S P vs. In (avg. -.26)
Maltby, 1995 92 university
female students
freq. of prayer, freq. of
church attendance
EPQ-R-S P vs. Prayer (-.33)
P vs church (-.37)




intrinsic/extrinsic EPQ-R-S P (-.66) negatively
loaded on the same








intrinsic/extrinsic, FSAC EPQ-R-S P (-.66) negatively
loaded on the same
factor as FSAC (.90)
and In (.88)
Robinson, 1990 194 university
students
intrinsic/extrinsic EPQ-R-S P vs. Ex (.25)
N vs. Ex (.12)
Smith, 1996 191 pupils freq. of prayer, freq. of
church attendance
junior EPQ P vs. Prayer (-.19)
P vs church (-.20)
White et ah, 1995 183 adults FSAC EPQ P (-.73) negatively
loaded on the same
factor as FSAC (.73)
Notes:
* Only studies that used Eysenck's dimensions are presented. Only measurements or results relevant to this
discussion are shown.
** Results are in values of Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients (r); only coefficients above 1.10| are
shown; E = Extraversion, Ex = Extrinsic / External, In = Intrinsic / Internal, N = Neuroticism, P = Psychoticism,
Q = Quest.
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With all this evidence in mind it was predicted that neuroticism would tend to have
a positive and psychoticism a negative, low to moderate, relationship with certain
aspects of religiosity; psychoticism would be inversely related to frequency ofprayer
and church attendance.
Religion& Schizotypy
An overview of the classification of disorders
The main reference for diagnostic criteria of mental disorders is the Diagnostic &
Statistical Manual (DSM-IV) (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), currently in its
fourth edition4. In this manual, disorders are classified into five high-order axes. To
allow for a broad and detailed classification of a condition, a person is rated on
information in all five axes (multiaxial classification).
Axis I contains all symptom based mental disorders (religious and spiritual problems are
coded here); personality disorders and mental retardation are classified on Axis II. This
distinction was deemed necessary to allow for any long-term disorders to be taken into
account alongside the presence of any current conditions. Axis III contains general
medical conditions, which again can be used to inform the pathogenesis and the
treatment ofmental disorders. In Axis IV psychosocial and environmental problems are
listed. These include negative life events, various stressors, educational problems, lack
of social support or personal resources, and so forth. Finally, on Axis V the person's
global adaptive functioning is coded. Areas included here are occupational functioning,
social relationships, leisure activities, and so forth.
Another manual that is also widely used is the International Classification ofDiseases
The latest incarnation ofDSM appeared in 2000 and it is called DSM-IV-TR, in which only the
writing style was revised while the content remained identical to the fourth edition.
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& Related Health Problems (ICD), published by the Word Health Organisation (1992)
and currently in its tenth revision. It was designed as a manual to facilitate systematic
collection ofmortality and morbidity data and to allow for geographical and temporal
comparisons. Because the ICD was designed for comparisons at the population level, it
tends not to provide the detailed information needed for a clinical assessment at the level
of the individual. This manual has a similar structure to the DSM, for example it is also
multiaxial, covers essentially the same number and type ofmental disorders, although
it may group them in different ways and refer to some of them with different names -
for example the obsessive-compulsive personality disorder of the DSM is termed
anankastic in the ICD. It also puts a greater focus on physical illnesses.
Generally, the two manuals differ very little in respect to their diagnostic criteria. For
example, Ekselius and her colleagues (2001) assessed the prevalence of personality
disorders in a random sample of 557 adults from the general population in Sweden, by
using the classification criteria of both DSM-IV and ICD-10. They found that the two
manuals had a very high degree of concordance (average Cohen's Kappa = .97), both
putting the prevalence ofpersonality disorders at 11 %. These results suggest that the two
manuals are highly compatible, and the decision on whether to use one or the other
mainly rests on whether the interest is in micro-assessment (i.e. at the individual or
small-scale level) or in macro-assessment (i.e. at the population level). Since the mental
health measurement used in this thesis, as well as almost all other related measurements
in the reviewed literature, are primarily based on the DSM classification, the ICD is not
considered in any greater detail than above.
Personality disorders of the DSM-IV
According to the DSM-IV, personality disorders (PDs) are a heterogenous group of
disorders characterised by patterns of behaviour and inner experiences manifested
through at least a number ofcognitive, affective, impulsive, or interpersonal functioning
areas, in ways that deviate from the expectations of the person's cultural system. PDs
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are long-standing, relatively invariant and pervasive through a person's life, and usually
lead to significant stress and impairment of functioning. Their onset is usually during
adolescence or early adulthood. Finally, they tend to have a distinctive pathogenesis that
is not a result of Axis I mental disorders, medical conditions, or substance abuse.
The DSM-IV specifies ten personality disorders on Axis II grouped into three clusters.
Cluster A is called the odd/eccentric cluster (or the mad cluster), because it is comprised
ofPDs (viz. paranoid, schizoid, and schizotypal) with symptoms that are similar to those
of the schizophrenia spectrum disorders on Axis I, albeit less severe. Cluster B is the
dramatic/erratic one (or the bad cluster) and it involves the borderline, histrionic,
antisocial, and narcissistic personality disorders, while finally, Cluster C, the
anxious/fearful (or sad cluster), comprises the avoidant, dependent, and obsessive-
compulsive personality disorders. There is also a code for PDs not otherwise specified
to accommodate the discovery of new types of PDs such as passive-aggressive, or
depressive personality disorders.
It needs to be said that PDs are frequently comorbid with disorders on Axis I. When this
is the case, PDs tend to shape the intensity, direction, manifestation, and treatment of
Axis I mental disorders (Blackburn & Coid, 1998; Millon, 1996). Taking an example
from Davison and Neale (1997, p. 335), when a person is diagnosed with an anxiety
disorder (Axis I) and a histrionic personality disorder (Axis II) he or she will tend to
make their anxiety rather visible, while if he or she is diagnosed with an avoidant
personality disorder on Axis II they will tend to hide their anxiety and withdraw to
themselves. As Theodore Millon (1996) puts it in his definitive manual of the DSM-IV
personality disorders: "clinicians should be oriented to the 'context ofpersonality' when
they deal with [...] all forms of psychiatric disorders" (p. vii). Millon's theorising that
PDs form a broad yet fundamental index of psychopathology was one of the main
reasons I chose to focus on the area ofPDs when I was attempting to identify the mental
health correlate of religiosity for this thesis.
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In addition, clinical evidence also suggests a great degree of comorbidity between PDs
(Claridge & Davis, 2003; Krueger, McGue, & Iacono, 2001). For example, Millon
(1996, pp. 629-630) showed that schizotypal personalities most frequently covary with
a "constellation of traits" such as avoidant, paranoid, and schizoid personalities. Morey
(as cited in Davison & Neale, 1997, p. 337) presented the estimated figures of the above
overlap, which place 59% of the people with schizotypal personalities also meeting the
criteria for avoidant personalities, 59% for paranoid personalities, and 44% for schizoid
personality disorders, while in another study by Widiger, Frances and Trull (as cited in
Davison & Neale, 1997, p. 336) 55% of their sample of patients with borderline
personality disorder were also classified as having a schizotypal personality disorder.
These issues, which incidentally also apply to the disorders on Axis I, suggest a
deficiency of the DSM system to provide an accurate differential classification of the
disorders. Consequently, this lack of sensitivity may have serious effects on the
appropriateness or effectiveness of diagnoses and treatments. Clinicians, psychologists
and psychotherapists are well aware of this problem (Farmer, 2000; First et al., 2002;
Nathan & Langenbucher, 1999; Widiger & Clark, 2000; Zerssen, 2002), and various
solutions have been proposed in the hope that they can be addressed or at least
considered in the next edition of the DSM - one of the most favourable ones being the
move towards a dimensional classification system, which is discussed shortly.
Schizotypal Personality disorder (SPD) & Schizotypy
SPD (also known as psychosis-proneness) is a personality disorder of Cluster A (code
301.22 in the DSM-IV) characterised by prominent and persistent patterns of eccentric
thought, behaviour, and perception (Millon, 1996). When such patterns are clearly
present in a "normal" individual, but are not prominent enough to manifest into
pathological states, they tend to characterise the so called benign forms of SPD, which
are grouped under the terms schizotypal personality traits or (healthy) schizotypy
(Claridge & Davis, 2003). Therefore, the description of SPD that follows, although it
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refers to pathological conditions, directly applies to schizotypy (Joseph & Peters, 1995;
Rossi & Daneluzzo, 2001; Verdoux & Os, 2002). The only difference is that in the latter
case symptoms are less intense, non-persistent, and non-dysfunctional. That said, a
person with a schizotypal personality is highly vulnerable to developing SPD, especially
if the relevant symptomatology becomes salient and problematic (Claridge, 1997).
The history of schizotypy is well documented by Millon (1996, pp. 614-623) and
Claridge (1997, ch. 1) from both ofwhom I draw the briefpresentation that follows. The
term schizotypal (in the form ofschizotype) was introduced in the early 1950s by Sandor
Rado to indicate a specific phenotypic organisation ofpersonality that has an underlying
genetic predisposition toward schizophrenia - in fact, the term schizotype is an
abbreviation for schizophrenic genotype. Rado saw schizotypal personalities as
developmental processes that can have up to four stages among which the person
potentially can move back and forth. In the compensatory stage, schizotypy gives no
distress to the individual, allows for full normal functioning, and it can last for life (this
is the benign form of the trait). If, however, emotional overloads break down the
behavioural control of the person, the personality becomes unstable, and the person
enters the decompensated stage (a covert schizophrenia stage), where he or she starts
manifesting overreactive behaviour. In the disintegrated stage that may follow, the
person enters a condition of an overt schizophrenic psychosis, in which serious
disturbances in thought as well as behaviour are prominent. If this stage worsens, the
person enters the deterioration phase in which a full-blown personality disorder occurs.
In the 1960s clinical psychologist Paul Meehl elaborated on Rado's thesis, by suggesting
that a genetically determined defect, he termed schizotaxia (Meehl, 1962), is a necessary
but not adequate explanation of Rado's four stages of schizotypy. A catalytic role is
played, according to Meehl, by the social history of the schizotypal person, and the
progress of the four stages is largely determined by the person's exposure to a
dysfunctional environment, starting from his or her familial regime. He added that since
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the difference between schizotaxia, schizotypy, and schizophrenia is only their class
inclusion -with schizotaxia being the most and schizophrenia the least inclusive - only
people with a schizotaxic genetic makeup are in danger of developing any of the other
two disorders.
Meehl's thesis was subsequently largely confirmed through adoption studies ofchildren
with schizophrenic or schizotypal biological parents, which led Seymour Kety and his
colleagues to coin the term schizotypalpersonality disorder in 1973. From then on the
race began to establish the diagnostic criteria of the disorder, which were finally
formulated in 1979 by Sitzer, Endicott, and Gibbon, and as a result SPD appeared for
the first time as an official personality disorder in the third edition ofDSM in 1980. In
1987 DSM-III-R (revised) some ofthese diagnostic criteria weremodified based on new
clinical evidence, and this revised version of the disorder was passed on unchanged to
DSM-IV.
It is worth mentioning that the ICD does not classify SPD as a personality disorder
(although it does so for both paranoid and schizoid disorders). Instead, it treats it as a
special case of the broader schizophrenia spectrum disorders, under the termSchizotypal
Disorder (code F21). However, the definition of the disorder as well as the diagnostic
criteria it uses are almost identical to those used by the DSM, which are presented
below.
DSM-IV defines SPD as follows:
A pervasive pattern of social and interpersonal deficits marked by acute
discomfort with, and reduced capacity for, close relationships as well as
by cognitive or perceptual distortions and eccentricities of behavior,
beginning by early adulthood and present in a variety ofcontexts, (p. 645)
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For a person to be diagnosed with SPD he has to possess at least five of the following
DSM criteria:
1. Ideas of reference. This refers to the interpretation of everyday events as signs of
special and unusual meaning to the bearer. For example, one may believe that there is
a hidden message for them in the news.
2. Odd (aberrant) beliefs or magical ideation. This criterion includes beliefs in the
supernatural, telepathy, clairvoyance, the "sixth sense", superstition, bizarre fantasies,
and a general tendency of the person to blur reality and fantasy.
3. Unusual (aberrant) perceptual experiences. Visual or auditory illusions, such as
seeing oneself change in front of a mirror, seeing visions, having out-of-body
experiences, or hearing voices.
4. Suspiciousness. General paranoid tendencies (e.g. "people are talking about me all of
the time"), and excessive levels of suspiciousness.
5. Odd or eccentric behaviour. Having bizarre, aberrant manners, ritualistic behaviour,
and eccentric appearance.
6. Odd thinking and speech. This refers to speech or thought that is disorganised and
vague in expression, and articulated in unusual, sometimes metaphorical, other times
stereotypical manner.
These first six criteria are sometimes referred to as positive schizotypy, while the
following three are also called negative schizotypy (Dinn et al., 2002; Moritz et al., in
press; Raine & Green, 2002; Rust, 1989; Vollema et al., 2002). The positive symptoms
have been further broken down into psychotic (symptoms 1, 2, 3, and 4) and
Page 85
Chapter IV: Psychological correlates of religion
disorganised (symptoms 5 and 6) (Andreasen et al., 1995; Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000).
7. Constricted or inappropriate affect. Inability to express emotions, being aloof, with
poor nonverbal communication skills.
8. Lack ofclose friends or confidants. Inability to form close relationships.
9. Social anxiety (asociality). Not comfortable and excessively apprehensive in social
settings, preferring isolation and privacy.
As indicated earlier, SPD has a high comorbidity with other PDs especially with
paranoid and schizoid personalities (Millon, 1996). With reference to Axis I, although
individuals with SPD may also be diagnosed with anxiety, somatoform, or dissociative
disorders, by far the most common co-occurrence, as it should be obvious by now, is
with the schizophrenia spectrum disorders (Andreasen, 1995; Cadenhead& Braff, 2002;
Claridge & Davis, 2003; Gruzelier, 2003; Millon, 1996; Rust, 1989; Tsuang et al.,
2002). It is this fundamental relation that schizotypy has with schizophrenia and general
psychoses that attracted me to the former, and sealed the decision to use it in this thesis
as a representative and crucial dimension ofmental health.
Personality & Personality Disorders
The multiaxial classification of the DSM places disorders in distinct categories, which
have an "on/off' value. So while one may be diagnosed of "having" more than one
disorder, they will either "have" them or not. Commonly used personality clinical
assessment instruments are based on the notion that personality traits (normal or
disordered) are discrete entities.
In the last thirty years, however, psychologists have begun criticising this approach.
Besides the problem of comorbidity among PDs and between PDs and Axis I disorders,
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an issue that rises from the categorical approach to personality disorders relates to the
reliability of the constructs (i.e. the levels of random error in the observed variability of
a measurement's results). Deary et al. (1998, p. 651) found that the internal reliability
(i.e. the degree ofconsistency of related components of a measurement) ofcertain items
of the Structured Clinical Interview (SCID-II; Spitzer et al., 1990) (namely schizotypal,
dependent, obsessive-compulsive, and schizoid personalities) was low to unacceptable
(Cronbach's a-coefficient was at times as low as .29; studies by Blais et al., 1998, and
Zimmerman, 1994, produced similar results).
With these objections in mind, several psychologists proposed a dimensional approach
to personality assessment, which has its theoretical roots in part in the work of Bleuler
(1911/1950), Kretschmer (1925), and Meehl (1962), all of whom hypothesised the
existence ofan association between aspects ofabnormal and normal personalities. Thus
this dimensional classification places personality traits in a quantitative continuum (or
continua), and by doing so not only bridges the gap between normal and abnormal, but
also allows personality traits to relate in various degrees to each other (British
Psychological Society, 2000; Ekselius et al., 2001; Haslam, 2003; Hulbert, Jackson, &
McGorry, 1996; Johns & Os, 2001). This approach is also flexible since it allows for the
generation of a threshold between normality and abnormality that can be adjusted to fit
in various sociocultural settings - an issue, I have to admit, with which the latest DSM
edition has become sensitive.
Returning to Eysenck and his traits theory, he was swift to clarify that neither
neuroticism nor psychoticism should be seen as indicating levels of abnormality
(Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991). So for example, an individual scoring high on the
psychoticism dimension will not necessarily develop a psychotic disorder. However, a
clinically psychotic person will score high on the psychosis dimension (Eysenck &
Eysenck report studies that have demonstrated an association between psychoticism and
delusional and hallucinatory tendencies). In the same line of thought, a highly neurotic
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individual is only more likely to develop a neurosis under extreme conditions of stress.
In addition, Eysenck suggested that the extraversion dimension acted as a mediator to
the effect of each of the other two dimensions on the individual's mental health. So for
example, a person would have higher chances of developing a psychotic disorder, if she
or he scored high on psychoticism and low on extraversion (i.e. they were introverted-
psychotic types), while a high score on both psychoticism and extraversion would make
it more likely for a person to develop a mood disorder but not a psychotic one.
How this relationship develops can be explained through the diathesis-stress model
(Claridge, 1997; Claridge & Davis, 2003). The model assumes that personality traits
serve as predispositions to psychopathology, and only those individuals, whose liability
to develop the disorder exceeds a certain threshold, manifest the illness. However, since
these traits are assumed to be relatively fixed and stable over time, they are not expected
to cross that threshold themselves. Instead their states may do so. States indicate the
expression and manifestation of traits on the individual at any given point in time
(Chaplin, John, & Goldberg, 1988). So for example, anxiety is usually seen as a
component of the neuroticism dimension and at the same time an element of anxiety
disorders. A person high on trait anxiety is more likely, when exposed to high levels of
stress, to become highly anxious (state anxiety). If state anxiety is high enough, the
person is more likely to develop phobias, panic disorder and so forth.
However, in order for the model to be accepted or even considered by clinicians,
psychologists had to produce empirical evidence in its favour. Indeed, studies upon
studies show that not only personality disorders tend to fall into a continuum, but also
that all personality traits (normal and disordered) may be plotted under three
(neuroticism, psychoticism, and anxiety), four (neuroticism, agreeableness, extraversion,
and conscientiousness) or even five high-order personalities (Austin & Deary, 2000;
Jang, Livesley & Vernon, 1999; Larstone et al., 2002; O' Boyle & Holzer, 1992; for an
overview see Claridge & Davis, 2003, and Matthews & Deary, 1998). In fact, Elizabeth
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Austin, alongside several other researchers in the field, speculates that there may even
be a general personality factor, called "psychological distress", that governs all
personalities and can explain the presence ofmultiple diagnoses and construct overlap
(personal communication, March, 2000).
Focussing on schizotypy, a picture compatible with the above paradigm has emerged.
In 1989 Raine and Allbutt administered a battery of questionnaires, including the
psychoticism scale of the Eysenck's Personality Questionnaire (EPQ) (Eysenck &
Eysenck, 1991) and the Claridge and Broks (1984) SchizotypalPersonalityScale (STA)
to 114 undergraduate students and factor-analysed the responses. Their solution
identified two principal highly orthogonal factors, explaining 68.8% of the total
variance. Surprisingly, schizotypy had the highest loading on the first factor (.91), while
psychoticism loaded on the second factor (.83). The two constructs had a positive yet
rather low correlation (r=. 15), suggesting that they are largely unrelated. Joseph, Smith
and Diduca (2002), used all of Eysenck's dimensions against the STA in a community
sample of 180 participants, and still found a low correlation between psychoticism and
schizotypy (r = .28), and a rather high one between neuroticism and schizotypy (r = .58),
while extraversion exhibited a near zero negative relationship (r = -.07). Wuthrich and
Bates (2001), while focussing on the association between schizotypy (using Raine's,
1991, Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire, SPQ) and auditory latent inhibition, still
acquired measurements ofEysenck's psychoticism and the NEO Personality Inventory.
The results that are of relevance to this thesis suggest that schizotypy correlated with
neuroticism (r = .47), extraversion (r = -.36) and psychoticism (r = .22) respectively (N
= 54). Finally, a similar picture emerged from Deary et al.'s (1998) study with 400
undergraduate participants in Britain. Schizotypy (measured through the questionnaire
form of the SCID-II) correlated with EPQ-neuroticism (r = .47), EPQ-extraversion (r =
.02), and EPQ-psychoticism (r = .11).
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Therefore, in this thesis it was predicted that schizotypy would have a positive and
moderate relationship with neuroticism, a very low or negative one with extraversion,
and a positive low relationship with psychoticism.
Although these studies have convinced me that the dimensional approach has a lot to
offer in our understanding of psychopathology, it is worth mentioning here that the
above evidence has not been received by clinicians with the levels of enthusiasm
psychologists would have probably expected. Several nosologists fought back and
presented their own findings in favour of the categorical model. For example, Williams
et al. (1992) performed a test-retest reliability analysis on DSM-III-R diagnoses and
found that for most of them the value was highly acceptable.
Clinicians also argue against the applicability of a dimensional model in clinical
assessment (Davison & Neale, 1997, pp. 65-70). First, they suggest that some disorders,
like anxiety or stress-related disorders (like hypertension), seem to manifest themselves
as pathological at only certain levels of intensity, i.e. they seem to follow the on/off idea
of the categorical model. Second, disorders with a high genetic component, like
schizotypy, may indeed be categorical, in the sense that they are not expected to occur
to someone who does not carry the "deviant" genotype. Third, clinicians argue that the
dimensional approach complicates the application of the existent standardised medical
treatments, since their development has been based on the categorical model. For
example, currently there is no standardised way of medically treating a person who
would be classified on the dimensional model as being, say, .85 neurotic, -.32 psychotic
and .54 extraverted (figures are for illustrative purposes). Finally, there is a consideration
regarding the methodology psychologists use to test this model. Factor analysis is an
umbrella term that covers rather complex statistical techniques that require relatively
high levels of statistical competence and a great degree of intuitive decisions. It is
therefore rather easy for a "novice psychologist" to construct, run, and consequently
interpret the whole design in inappropriate or unrealistic ways.
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Mental Health & Religion
Since the eighties, research on psychopathology has been one of the central topics in the
psychology of religion, while for the last ten years psychotic disorders have been
receiving special attention. Before I discuss in detail the specific area of research in
religion and schizotypy allow me a short presentation of the general findings in the
religion-mental health relationship, from which I also draw a number of predictions.
The DSM-IV through its classification of religious and spiritual problems (V62.89)
assumes the existence of mental problems that are directly and perhaps exclusively
related to religion (and spirituality). These problems may relate to loss or questioning
of faith, conversion, or doubt of spiritual values and morals, and they may or may not
be related to organised religious institutions (for more see Greenberg, Witzum &
Buchbinder, 1992; Gundersen, 2000; Kroll, 1995; Koenig & Larson, 2001; Lukoff, Lu
& Turner, 1992,1995,1998; Neumann & Leppien, 1997; Scott etal., 2003; Shafranske,
1996; Sims, 1999; Turbott, 1996).
That said, studies across countries, religious and ethnic backgrounds, age, and social
status, suggest a positive relationship between religious practices, such as church
attendance or prayer, and mental health (for an overview see Batson et al., 1993, eh. 8;
Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997, pp. 184-197; Grzymala-Moszczynska & Beit-Hallahmi,
1996, ch. 2; Koenig, 1997; cf. Schumaker, 1992; also for meta-analyses see Hackney &
Sanders, 2003; Koenig & Larson, 2001; Larson et al., 1992). These findings have been
generally explained by the social or psychological support and effective coping
mechanisms religious communities and practices can provide to their members (Ellison,
1998; Koenig, McCullough, & Larson, 2001; Larson, 1995; Nooney& Woodrum, 2002;
Pargament et al., 2001; Seybold & Hill, 2001; Siegrist, 1996). Additionally, Ellison
(1991), by using a mediated multiple regression model of analysis, suggested the
existence of a causal path relationship between the above variables, with religious
involvement causing certain types of beliefs, which in turn promote mental health and
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well-being. Moreover, some evidence indicates that the relationship could be to an
extent curvilinear, with the healthiest people being the highly nonreligious and highly
religious ones (see also Allport & Ross, 1967; Ross, 1990; Schumaker, 1998; Wulff,
1997).
Although my intention is not to diminish in any sense the direction of those results, I
have identified some problems with these investigations. Most of this kind of studies
appear to be suffering from inadequate control for covariates and confounding variables.
For example, religious people may tend to present themselves as mentally healthier, but
that may well be - as Batson et al. (1993) and Eysenck (1998) have separately
demonstrated - a tendency to present themselves in a desirable fashion, i.e. "I truly
believe in God, therefore I have to show I'm healthy". However, almost none of the
above studies controlled for social desirability (see also Lewis, 1999, 2000; Watson et
al., 1986). Also studies that suggest that churchgoers are healthier than nonchurchgoers,
have failed to acknowledge that religious people with poor physical ormental health are
indeed less likely to go to church frequently - this has been called the functional
capacity covariate (Sloan, Bagiella & Power, 1999). Once again, I am not suggesting
that these results are wrong; I am only stressing that researchers, in order to avoid such
criticism, should be very careful when constructing and conducting their studies,
especially on a topic as sensitive as religion.
From the above, it was predicted in the present study that frequency of church
attendance and prayer will have an inverse relationship with mental health
(schizotypal) symptomatology (the prediction for social desirability was reserved for
my discussion on schizotypy that follows).
There is some evidence that suggests the existence of an explicit association between
religious affiliation and psychological illnesses. For example, MacDonald and Luckett
(1983) mapped the psychiatric profiles of7050 psychiatric Christian patients in the US,
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based on DSM-II diagnostic criteria, and they found that neuroses were two of the most
common illnesses present in Catholics and non-mainline Protestants; mainline
Protestants tended to have personality disorders, while Christian sects, like Jehovah's
Witnesses, did not tend to manifest any of these disorders; however, psychoses tended
to be more prevalent. These results although important, should only be seen as
indicative, since the diagnostic criteria used are somewhat dated.
With that in mind, in this thesis, the variation in the intensity of schizotypal
symptomatology between different Christian denominations was explored.
In respect to religious orientation, it is generally accepted that mature or moderate
religiosity enhances mental health, especially in areas such as anxiety and depression
(Donahue, 1985; Maltby, 1997, 1998; Maltby & Day, 2000; Miller et al., 1997;
Schumaker, 1993a, 1993b; Wright, Frost & Wisecarver, 1993), whereas strong,
maladaptive, immature religiosity can be very harmful and has been frequently
associated with neurotic or psychotic disorders (Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Ellis,
1995; Genia& Shaw, 1991; Ventis, 1995).
Batson et al. (1993, chap. 8) reviewed sixty-one studies that had used Allport's religious
orientation formulation or Batson's adaptation, and found that extrinsic orientation
tended to exhibit a positive association with various aspects ofpsychopathology in 60%
of the cases, the intrinsic one tended to show a reverse pattern 53% of the time, while
for the quest orientation the results tended to show somewhat an unclear relationship,
with 50% or the studies showing no association (all reported frequencies are modal
frequencies).
Schizotypy & Religion
Homing in on schizotypy, it appears to be of a relatively recent, yet rather particular
interest to the psychology of religion. It was James in the Varieties who first suggested
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the general link by pointing out, as discussed in the previous chapter, that highly
religious individuals appeared to him to exhibit psychopathic tendencies. In my view,
what James seems to have noticed were actually symptoms from some of the diagnostic
criteria of SPD and partly schizophrenia, namely, delusional ideas, magical thinking,
illusions and visions, glossolalia (speaking in tongues, which can be mapped onto odd
speech), and at times eccentric behaviour.
One can certainly see some parallels between these symptoms and many religious
practices and experiences. Should this be the case though, it could be hypothesised that
religious individuals may tend to possess elements of schizotypal personalities and that
these elements may tend to vary with the intensity and orientation of the individual's
religiosity. This is potentially a serious issue, because if religiosity is found to be closely
related to or even able to predict levels ofschizotypy, then, as Diduca and Joseph (1997)
speculated, religiosity could also be a correlate or a predictor of schizophrenia, and I
would add of course SPD.
Wulff (1997) reasoned along the lines of James, and suggested that schizotypal or
schizophrenic people may become religious (or more religious) as religion (because of
the presence of the parallel symptoms, such as the ones mentioned above) can provide
them with "overwhelming sensory stimulation". Thus according to this hypothesis (let
us call it in this thesis the excitement hypothesis), a positive relationship between
schizotypy and religiosity is expected.
Maltby and Day (2002) on the other hand hypothesised, broadly along the lines of
Schumaker's (1995) theory, which was briefly discussed in the previous chapter, that
religious practices, experiences, and orientations may be attractive to schizotypal
individuals, because the former can give meaning to the latter's behaviour and
experiences, thus helping those people reduce delusional fears and irrational sensory
stimulation, and consequently safeguarding them from developing a disorder. Therefore,
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from this hypothesis (I call it the prevention hypothesis) one would predict a negative
association between schizotypy and religiosity (see also Jackson, 1997, for a similar
discussion between spirituality and schizophrenia).
Moreover, it is also possible, as Day and Peters (1999) speculated, that certain kinds of
religious experiences, practices, and orientations may influence the development of
schizotypy, thus leading to either a positive or negative relationship between the two
variables (the causal hypothesis).
Finally, a number of theorists (Joiner, Perez & Walker, 2002; Levin & Chatters, 1998;
Pargament, 2002) have suggested that the structural elements of schizotypy and
religiosity possess superficial, phenotypic, or epiphenomenal similarities and thus are
not related in any deeper sense - the phenotype hypothesis. In other words, their
relationship is spurious, totally or largely determined by some other factors. Incidentally,
this last hypothesis can be integrated with all three of the previous ones. So what does
the evidence so far suggest?
At this point some additional background information may be useful. The following
findings, although not explicitly or necessarily directly related to the psychology of
religion, have been used as the basis and the initial justification for research in the
relationship between religion and schizotypy.
First, studies in paranormal beliefs (e.g. extrasensory perception, telepathy, and so forth),
beliefs in psychic phenomena and abilities (e.g. belief in the ability to communicate with
spirits or in the ability to predict the future), and mystical experiences (e.g. out-of-body
experiences, visions, etc.) have shown rather consistently a positive relationship between
those beliefs and aspects of schizotypal symptomatology. Overwhelmingly, evidence
suggests that people who score high on the above beliefs (the so-called sheep in
parapsychological terminology) tend to score high on certain schizotypal traits, namely
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the cognitive-perceptual ones, i.e. magical ideation, ideas of reference, and unusual
experiences (e.g. Chequers, Joseph, & Diduca, 1997; Eckblad & Chapman, 1983;
Houran, Irwin, & Lange, 2001; Houran et ah, 2002; Jackson, 1997; McCreery &
Claridge, 2002; Thalbourne, 1994; Thalbourne & Delin, 1994; Tobacyk & Wilkinson,
1990; Wolfradt et ah, 1999).
At the same time, more medically orientated research suggests that Christians who have
been diagnosed with a psychotic disorder, such as the schizophrenia spectrum disorders
or SPD, tend to bemore delusional than nonreligious psychotic individuals (Getz, Fleck,
& Strakowski, 2001; Heinrich, 1997; Holm & Jarvinen, 1996), and tend to believe that
they have been possessed by demons or spirits, especially if they are members of
charismatic churches (Pfeifer, 1994; Whitwell & Barker, 1980). However, when Peters
and her colleagues (1999) compared delusional symptomatology between psychotic
patients (no control over their religious background) and individuals from the "normal"
population that fell into the groups ofmainstream Christians, nonreligious (atheists), and
members of new religious movements (NRM) (Hare Krishnas and neo-pagans), they
found that althoughNRM had on average a similar score to the psychotic patients on the
delusional measurements, both Christians and nonreligious scored rather low on those
scales, with the latter having the lowest scores.
The first published study directly addressing the relationship between religiosity and
schizotypy appeared in 1995 and was conducted by White, Joseph and Neil - that the
date is so recent it should come to no surprise, when one considers that the clinical
definition of SPD was finalised, as mentioned earlier, in 1987. Given the then existing
literature on the association between various aspects of schizotypy and paranormal
beliefs, and that of religiosity and delusions, they predicted that religiosity would relate
positively to some aspects of schizotypy (such as aberrant beliefs and experiences) and
negatively to some others (such as asociality). They administered to a sample of 183
British adults a battery of questionnaires, measuring, among other things, different
Page 96
Chapter IV: Psychological correlates of religion
aspects of attitudes toward Christianity (.Francis Scale ofAttitude toward Christianity
[FSAC], Francis & Stubbs, 1987; a measurement that is closely related to intrinsic
orientation; formore on this relationship see also Hills & Francis, 2003), the Schizotypal
Personality Scale (STA, Claridge & Broks, 1984), the Magical Ideation Scale (Mgl;
Eckblad & Chapman, 1983), general personality traits, and social desirability. After
subjecting their data to a Principal Component Analysis with oblimin rotation, they
identified four factors accounting for 70.2% of the total variance. However, in these
factors, religiosity had a very low loading (.32) on the schizotypy-defined factor, while
its primary loading (.73) was on the same factor with psychotic traits of general
personality (-.73), which were used as an index of asociality. When looking at the
bivariate relationships between the individual components of schizotypal
symptomatology and religiosity, they identified a weak positive correlation between
religiosity and unusual perceptual experiences but only for the men in their sample (r =
.19, n = 78,p < .05). They concluded that their data show strong evidence of a negative
association between asociality and religiosity, and provide a weak support for a positive
relationship between aberrant experiences and religiosity. They suggested that the use
of dimensional measurements of religiosity (FSAC is unidimensional) may be more
sensitive to reveal a clearer picture of the underlying relationships. Their results do not
seem to provide support for any of the four hypotheses mentioned above.
In 1997, Diduca and Joseph took on board White's et al. suggestion, and working on the
same principle they essentially replicated the previous study. They retained the
schizotypy and religiosity measurements, but excluded the general personality and the
social desirability ones. They also added four six-item scales they had devised to
measure respectively religious preoccupation, religious guidance, religious conviction,
and religious emotional involvement. These questionnaires and other demographic
questions were administered to 201 British subjects (a mixed sample, 45% full-time
students, and the rest from the general population). Their correlational analysis
suggested a weak to moderate positive association between magical ideation and
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religious preoccupation, but once again only for men (controlling for age, r = .30, n =
87, p < .005). All other associations between the religiosity dimensions used and
schizotypal symptoms were lower than the above figure and not consistent in direction.
They concluded that although they also favour the use of dimensional measures of
religiosity, their findings do not provide adequate evidence for a relationship between
religiosity and schizotypy.
The major limitation of the above two studies, as I see it, is that their samples were not
controlled for the religious dimension - a consideration I also raised earlier in relation
to the use ofAllport's scales. In other words, the researchers had no prior knowledge
about whether their subjects considered themselves religious in the first place. This
partly leads us back to the earlier discussion on whether religiosity applies to
nonreligious individuals. In addition, for the part of both samples that may have been
religious, no information exists about the religion to which they adhered. All religious
measurements used in these studies appear to be primarily, ifnot exclusively, applicable
to Christians - for example, the dimensional questions asked in the second study
included terms like "Jesus" and the "Bible" in their wording. Therefore, I suggest that
their results may be contaminated by so much noise that they are rendered of little to no
value.
Samantha Day and Emmanuelle Peters (1999) attempted to rectify this shortcoming by
controlling for the religious background of their participants. They investigated the
relationship between religiosity and schizotypy among three groups in Britain: members
of new religious movements (NRM) (n = 22), mainstream Christians (n = 33), and
nonreligious individuals (n = 40). Among other measures, they administered two
questionnaires that assessed schizotypy - the STA, and the Oxford Liverpool Inventory
of Feelings & Experience (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995). Their results suggest that
although NRM tended to have significantly higher levels of schizotypy than both the
other groups, Christians did not score significantly higher than the nonreligious group.
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Incidentally, Christians had the highest levels of socially desirable responses, which
reached statistical significance only against the scores of the nonreligious group, t(l\)
= 3.7, p < .001. The authors interpreted their findings as suggesting that religiosity
appears to relate to schizotypy primarily in non-mainstream religious groups, and they
speculated along the lines of James's arguments that this may be because of the intense
religious experiences these groups tend to offer to their members. Their findings
therefore could be seen as providing a weak support for the excitement hypothesis or
even the causal hypothesis.
So far all research in the religion-schizotypy area cited has either not used any religiosity
measurement (as in the above study), or has utilized the Francis Scale ofAttitude toward
Christianity (the first two studies), or finally it used a measure that was specifically
devised for that given study (as in the study of Diduca & Joseph). Although there is
nothing inherently wrong with these approaches, their tendency to use attitudinal scales
to measure religiosity gives them a somewhat weak theoretical basis in respect to the
religiosity dimension. At the same time, their approach begs the question about the
possibility of their results being artefacts of the measurements used. Finally, I could not
directly utilise their findings, since in this thesis I am using more theory-driven
measurements, namely those based on Allporf s ideas discussed earlier. So I needed to
look for studies that had used the same measurements as I did. Fortunately, three of the
following four did so.
In 2000, John Maltby and his colleagues were the first in the published literature in the
psychology ofreligion and schizotypy to use ameasurement based onAllporf s approach
to assess religiosity. In an attempt to test empirically the excitement hypothesis, they
distributed among other measurements, the STA and an incarnation of Allport's
intrinsic, extrinsic personal, extrinsic social religiosity scale to 195 UK university
students. The relevant results are shown in Table 4.3. Once again religiosity tended to
have a low to moderate positive relationship with schizotypy, which in this research
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appeared to be stronger for women, while in the studies by White et al., and Diduca &
Joseph, mentioned earlier, this was true for men. In addition, intrinsic religiosity tended
to exhibit a positive, albeit low, relationship with schizotypy.
Table 4.3. Partially reproduced results from Maltby et al. (2000) depicting the relationship
between religiosity and schizotypy - numbers shown are Pearson's product moment
correlation coefficients for Males (z? = 81)/ Females (n = 114).
Intrinsic Extrinsic Personal Extrinsic Social
Total schizotypal traits .18/.04 .04 /.29* -.01 / .21*
Magical ideation .18 / .09 .02/.16 -.08/.17
Unusual perceptual experiences -.07/.14 -.02/.31** -.14/.15
Suspiciousness .14 / -.14 .02/.24** -.09/.18
*
p < .05; ** p <.01, both two-tailed
A series of standard multiple linear regression analyses was run separately for men and
women, with each of the schizotypal traits acting as dependent variables against the
religiosity dimensions and other factors (e.g. age), which largely supported the above
associations. Finally, age tended to have a moderate but of unclear directionality
association with both religiosity and schizotypy for both men and women. The authors
concluded that their results provide partial support for the excitement hypothesis, as
most of the relationships are toward the direction one would expect ifWulffwas right.
However, strictly speaking their reasoning is not in accordance with their analysis, since
according to the excitement hypothesis, one would expect schizotypy to predict
religiosity, and not vice versa. The way they analysed their data, i.e. by using religiosity
as a predictor of schizotypy, at best provides support for the causal hypothesis and not
the one they mention.
Joseph and Diduca (2001) decided to investigate the religiosity-schizotypy relationship
in teenagers. Their reasoning was that as the onset of a schizotypal personality disorder
is expected, according to the DSM-IV, to be sometime in late adolescence, any relation
between religiosity and schizotypy should become more evident during this period. Their
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participants (241 males, 251 females) were English pupils largely from a Christian
background (although the authors admit they had no control over that variable) divided
into two age cohorts, 13-15 (n = 216), and 17-18 (n = 276) year olds (no 16 year olds).
They were requested to provide responses to the Francis Scale ofAttitude toward
Christianity and to the Multidimensional Schizotypal Traits Questionnaire for
Adolescents (MSTQ-A; Rawlings & MacFarlane, 1994). The authors ran separate
standard multiple linear regression analyses for males and females between the two age
cohorts. For the first time, however, in the religiosity-schizotypy literature, religiosity
was used as the dependent variable. The results indicate that schizotypal traits accounted
for near zero percent of the religiosity variance in 13-15 year-old males and for 12% in
the females of the same age cohort. In the 17-18 year olds though, schizotypy
collectively predicted 22% of the religiosity variance in males and 23% in females. In
addition, these results tended to point to an inverse relationship between the tested
variables, with lower scores on schizotypy predicting higher scores on religiosity. One
finding the authors could not explain was the inverse relationship between magical
ideation and religiosity. They attributed this to the social desirability effect (the tendency
to present oneself in a favourable manner) for which they did not control. Overall the
findings of this study indicate the presence of a possible moderate underlying causal
relationship between schizotypy and religiosity, which seems to bemoderated by gender,
and thus partly supporting the prevention hypothesis.
Another attempt to assess the relationship between religious orientation and schizotypy
was published in 2002 by Joseph, Smith, and Diduca. Among other measurements, they
administered to 180 general public British adults, Batson's Religious Life Inventory (as
discussed in a previous session of this chapter), Claridge's STA, and a scale of general
personality traits. Standard multiple linear regression models, using each of the
religiosity dimensions as outcomes and the rest of the variables as predictors, indicated
that schizotypy was the highest and the only significant predictor of the quest religious
orientation (,standardised beta = .25). No other meaningful associations were found.
This result seems to support partly the excitement hypothesis. Although this was the first
time the quest orientation was used in schizotypy research, the authors made no attempt
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to explain the finding relating to it.
Finally, in 2002, Maltby and Day published a study in which once again an attempt was
made to test both the excitement and the prevention hypotheses. They administered to
308 general British public adults (132 males, 176 females) among other measurements,
Claridge's STA, an adaptation of Allport's intrinsic/extrinsic (personal/social)
questionnaire, and an 18-item scale they devised, tapping into a single religious
experience factor - the items asked participants to indicate how often during religious
worship they felt a sense of happiness, warmth, emotional intensity, and so forth. The
correlations once again suggested a gender specific relationship. The weaker
associations between religious orientation and schizotypal traits were observed among
males (Pearson's r ranged from -. 10 to . 19), while in females the correlations tended to
be higher and positive (r ranged from .10 to .30), except for the correlation between
intrinsic and paranoid suspiciousness that was -.15. Religious experience on the other
hand tended to show rather high positive correlations with schizotypal traits for both
men and women (r ranged from .27 to .45) Finally, age showed a moderate but amphi-
directional (sometimes positive and sometimes negative) relationship with both
religiosity and schizotypy in both sexes. A series of eight standard multiple linear
regressions largely confirmed the above picture - incidentally the effect of religious
experience on schizotypy became close to zero in almost all the regression models,
suggesting that perhaps religious orientation accounted for it. The authors concluded that
a "limited" association exists between religiosity and schizotypy, and that their findings
appear to support the excitement hypothesis. However, once again the authors used
religiosity as the independent variable, contrary to the predictions of the excitement
hypothesis that requires it to be the dependent one.
With this last study I conclude my presentation on the research on religiosity and
schizotypy. No other studies have been published to my knowledge in this area. The
results of the above studies are summarized in Table 4.4.
Page 102
Chapter IV: Psychological correlates of religion










FSAC STA, Mgl Religiosity had a low positive
association with general
schizotypal traits and a high
positive association with














STA, Mgl religiosity had a low to
moderate positive association
with magical ideation, mainly in
men; all other relationships were
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STA Religiosity tended to have a low
to moderate positive association
with schizotypy, mainly among
women.
* Abbreviations: FSAC: Francis Scale of Attitude toward Christianity; Mgl: Magical Ideation Scale;
I/E: Intrinsic/Extrinsic; MSTQ-A: Multidimensional Schizotypal Traits Questionnaire for Adolescents;
O-LIFE: Oxford Liverpool Inventory of Feelings and Experiences; RLI: Religious Life Inventory;
STA: Schizotypal Personality Scale.
Overall, these studies appear to agree on the existence of a low to moderate association
between religiosity and schizotypy, possibly moderated by gender and mediated by age
and social desirability. However, they seem to disagree, or at least be unclear with
almost anything else, including the directionality ofthe relationship and the nature of the
association between specific elements of both religiosity and schizotypy. Thus, going
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back to my initial question regarding the four hypotheses put forward to account for the
relationship between religiosity and schizotypy, the evidence so far cannot conclusively
favour any of them.
Several reasons may contribute to this lack of clarity, some of which I have already
mentioned. First, is the issue of sample type. As it can be seen from the summary table,
all but one of the studies did not take into account the religious background of their
participants. In addition, none of the studies appears to have collected, let alone utilised,
any sociodemographic information about their sample, besides age and gender.
Sociological research has shown that categories like marital status, education, and
employment status, may have an effect both on religiosity and on its relation to mental
health (for an overview see Ellison & Sherkat, 1995; Idle & George, 1998; Koenig,
McCullough, & Larson, 2001; Northcott, 1999). Lack of such controls may have
introduced unnecessary noise to the results.
Second, only three of the studies controlled for the effect of social desirability. As it has
been demonstrated almost consistently (see also the studies on religiosity and general
mental health, mentioned earlier) social desirability tends to mediate strongly the
association between religiosity and variables related to mental health. Thus not
controlling for it, seems to add another level of noise in the findings.
Third, as I said again earlier, the tendency to use simple, unidimensional attitudinal
measurements of religiosity does not allow for a fine-grain analysis of the importance
ofthe dimensional components ofreligiosity, and for results to be placed and interpreted
within a strong theoretical framework. At the same time, the schizotypal measurements
used tend to be somewhat dated or to an extent inappropriate. The Mgl, which was
developed in 1983, is too old to tap into the modern definition of schizotypy; the STA
is based on the DSM-III diagnostic criteria, which are not the currently accepted ones;
finally while both the MSTQ-A and the O-LIFE are partly based on the DSM-IV, they
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still include symptoms, like anhedonia, that are not part of the current DSM
classification (Mason, Claridge & Williams, 1997; Rawlings & MacFarlane, 1994).
Fourth, the statistical analyses used in these studies are somewhat elementary and rather
restrictive. One study used factor analysis, while all the rest employed the generalised
linear model, through either an analysis of variance, or linear regression. One gets the
feeling that these analyses were conducted in a rather clumsy or naive fashion. For
example, lack of information does not allow us to make a judgement on the
appropriateness of the extracted factors, or the factorability of the variables used in the
first study, while in the other studies, certain assumptions ofthe generalised linearmodel
may have been violated (as discussed later), casting doubt on the reliability of the
results. Moreover, none of the above studies used anymediated modes to partial out the
effects ofany other factors from the schizotypy-religiosity relationship (thus testing for
the phenotype hypothesis). Finally, the authors could have attempted to replicate their
findings with the use of alternative or complementary statistical techniques, such as
canonical correlations, multidimensional scaling models, or confirmatory models like
structural equation models.
Related to this is the fact that none of the above studies, and thus no study to my
knowledge on religiosity and schizotypy, employed any form ofqualitative assessment.
This, as I discuss in chapter VII, could have enriched the outcomes, by generating
parallel or additional information regarding the studied concepts, information that is
highly unlikely to have emerged through quantitative approaches. The combination of
qualitative and quantitative techniques could have allowed for a cross-validation of
research findings, and thus increased confidence in their value and meaning.
Finally, the somewhat arbitrary assignment of the religiosity and schizotypy
measurements as either predictors or outcomes may also have affected the magnitude
and consequently the interpretation of the results. At this level of consideration this is
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purely a methodological issue that refers to the degree of covariation (collinearity)
between the predictor variables; for example the subscales of schizotypal traits, not
surprisingly, may tend to be highly related to each other, and the same may hold true to
an extent for the extrinsic social and extrinsic personal religious. Should this be the case,
placing any of these groups of variables as predictors, say, in a standard regression
model, could have resulted in the effect of some of those variables to have "artificially"
disappeared, inversed, or appeared to be of little to no importance to the model.
Most important, at the conceptual level, the assignment of the variables as either
predictors or outcomes needs to have a theoretical justification. Both the excitement and
prevention hypotheses assume that religiosity is a dependent variable, while the causal
hypothesis requires religiosity to act as a predictor of schizotypy. At the same time, the
medical model of Rado and Meehl assumes that schizotypy is rooted in biological
mechanisms (schizotaxia), and that the (social) environment and life histories only affect
the phenotypic manifestations of the trait. Although research in this area is still highly
inconclusive, it nevertheless tends to support this theory to a great extent (e.g. Tsuang
et al., 2002; Vollema et ah, 2002). So by taking into account the medical model of
schizotypy can we justify the formulation of the above three hypotheses?
The causal hypothesis can be easily explained if we view religion (or at least certain
aspects of it) as an environmental factor that can affect the phenotypic variations of
schizotypal traits. For this to hold though firmly, a genetic disposition to these traits
needs to be present. However, neither I nor any of the researchers discussed above have
the means to assess this genetic disposition, not least because the mechanisms of this
disposition are not yet clear. It is also very important to point out that psychometric
questionnaire studies are at best capable ofmeasuring phenotypic expressions of latent
constructs. Whether any of the individuals in my sample or the samples of the above
studies possesses schizotaxia cannot be known to any degree of certainty. At the same
time, forced-choice questionnaires, like any of the ones used in these studies and most
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if not all of the psychometric ones, require by definition that participants register their
responses on a limited number of choices - these are usually based on Likert scales, or
Yes/No answers. Unless the participant choses to provide no answers to a scale, he or
she will almost always have a score on any given scale. Therefore, a participant
responding to a schizotypy questionnaire, will most certainly exhibit a degree of
phenotypic schizotypy, despite whether or not she or he possesses the genetic disposition
to the trait. All this leads me to suggest that although the causal hypothesis can still be
used with this kind of studies, one should be very careful with how one interprets and
justifies the findings.
Can the excitement and prevention hypotheses be placed within the medical model of
schizotypy? They can, only if it can be shown that religion is an outcome and not a
predictor of schizotypy. In order for this to happen, it must be shown that religion is not
an influential environmental factor, or for that matter that religion is not an
environmental factor in the first place. Thankfully, once again, it could be argued that
James provides the answer to this. If we go back to his writings, we shall remind
ourselves that religion is what a person does in his solitude, i.e. religion is a personal
matter. Yes of course there is a social component of religion, but that, according to
James, is not part of the psychological inquiry. Therefore, James's, and consequently
Allport's and Batson's, concepts and subsequent measurements of religiosity are based
on this notion of a personal, private religion. So it can be argued that this "personal"
religiosity cannot function as an environmental factor, and thus it is unlikely to act as a
predictor of schizotypy. But can it act as an outcome? Again James discusses how
"explosive emotions" can lead to a religious conversion, and how a state of internal
turmoil can deliver people to "twice-born" religious states. At the same time, Allport
describes how religious sentiment develops from the interplay between internal and
external forces. If we view schizotypy as one of those internal forces, it would not be
hard to see how it could affect the kind and degree of religious orientation.
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A third possibility exists though, one which none of the above hypotheses appears to be
considering directly. For both James and Allport (personal) religion is an integrated part
ofpersonality. In fact, Allport is clear on this when he says, as discussed in the previous
chapter, that religion is a fundamental "department of personality" with a pervasive
structure capable of giving to the individual "meaning and peace in the face of the
tragedy and confusion of life" (1950, p.159). At the same time, for Allport, religiosity
is shaped and developed partly through the effects of temperament and organic desires
for safety, nourishment, and so forth. Thus, it could be said that religiosity is partly
founded on biological, possibly adaptive mechanisms.
If religiosity is an integrated part of oneself, then in a schizotypal individual, it can
arguably be placed side-by-side with his or her schizotypal traits. In this case, how can
one claim that any of them causes the other? What is there that can provide us with a
temporal antecedence, by placing any of them (the cause) as temporally preceding the
other (the outcome)? I cannot see such a relationship; I can see, however, a possible
alternative, according to which certain elements or dimensions of schizotypy and
religiosity, both affect and at the same time are affected by each other - let us call this
the covariance hypothesis. Should this be the case, one would expect to see those
elements form clearly defined and relatively stable groups, dimensions, or clusters. In
fact, the study by White et al (1995) appears to be testing this hypothesis.
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Based on the evidence presented above and the discussion that followed, five
hypotheses regarding the relationship between religiosity and schizotypy were tested
in this thesis:
1. The excitement hypothesis'. Higher levels ofcertain schizotypal traits would predict
higher levels of certain religious orientations.
2. Theprevention hypothesis'. Higher levels ofcertain schizotypal traits would predict
lower levels of certain religious orientations.
3. The causal hypothesis: Certain religious orientations would predict certain
schizotypal traits (no direction is stated).
4. The covariance hypothesis: Certain religious orientations would form clear and
relatively stable groups with certain schizotypal traits (no direction is stated).
5. The phenotype hypothesis'. If the relationship between religiosity and schizotypy
is spurious, then evidence should exist to suggest that other factors (such as age,
gender, social desirability, etc.) are largely, if not totally, responsible for it, and thus
controlling for those factors should make the relationship disappear.
Religion & Identity
The concept of identity
In my mind, identity is a frustratingly complex psychosocial construct, with so many
meanings that at times it feels it has none. Unlike personality, which is an idea
exclusively developed within the realm of psychology, and as such it is viewed as one
of those psychological "facts" at least by most psychologists, the idea of identity has
been occupying the world and writings of other disciplines as well, such as sociology
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(e.g. Giddens, 1991), anthropology (e.g. Jacobson-Widding, 1983), and philosophy of
the mind (e.g. Lucan, 1996). This pluralism in thought, one could argue, is beneficial
since it allows for the idea to be constructed through multi-angular approaches and
consequently become more stable and meaningful. That said, since the focus of these
disciplines tends to be as diverse as their starting points of reasoning, the end-product
is in danger of being a fuzzy, hurly-burly of an idea.
Considerations aside, looking at the theoretical, cross-disciplinary approaches, a level
of consensus appears to be present. At an abstract level, I would say that identity tends
to be seen as an underlying connexion between psychosocial factors that is present in
spite ofproximal dissimilarities. This is not much of a useful definition though. Let me
attempt a different approach. It appears that broadly speaking, identity tends to be
subdivided into two higher order components: personal identity and group identity.
Within psychology at least, personal identity (or self-identity) tends to be used to refer
to those properties that distinguish us from each other, that make us unique individuals
(e.g. Durkin, 1995). These properties could include such things as personal values,
personal goals, ideas, feelings, and of course personality. Group identity, on the other
hand, refers to those properties that bind us with certain others, that make us similar to
them (e.g. Hogg & Vaughan, 1998). These can be our ethnic background, nationality,
social class, and not least our religion. Although one does possess elements of both of
the above identities in various hues, in reality the boundaries between them are not as
clear-cut as theymay appear from the above distinction. These identities fuse with each
other, while at the same time they partition into finer distinctions to refer to such
concepts as individualistic vs. collective identities, gender identity, cultural identity,
social identity and so forth.
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Personal Identity
One of the most influential psychological theories of personal identity was proposed by
Erik Erikson (1959/1980,1968). For Erikson, self-identity (or ego-identity as he called
it) is a fundamental element of the unconscious that attributes a consistent and persistent
meaning to the concept of the self. This concept of the self is a product of the interplay
between personality models and socialisation. Self-identity guides the "non-
pathological" individual in maintaining a continuous selfhood despite the contradictions
or tragedies he or she is faced through life. Identity development, according to Erikson,
begins in adolescence with identity diffusion (also known as the defused/avoidant
identity). During this stage, the individual tends to be confused regarding his or her
social role, and thus he or she tends to avoid commitment, and is more likely to alienate
him or herself. The next stage has two paths. One of them leads to the foreclosed
identity, which is defined by the acceptance of the status quo and the non-critical
adoption of the values of the authority. This identity is characterised by low levels of
uncertainty, doubt, and anxiety. The other path leads to the identity condition of
moratorium. During this, usually anxiety-laden period, the individual attempts to adopt
different roles while critically assessing their appropriateness and value. If the person
is successful in finding his or her role, he or she enters the next and final phase of this
route, the identity achievement phase, in which he or she achieves personal autonomy,
a self-identity chosen by him or her own, a "sense of reality of the self within social
reality" (Erikson, 1968, p. 211). It needs to be said that a person may stop at any of the
above stages and hold the identity of that stage for a lifetime.
Group Identity
More relevant perhaps to this thesis is the social identity theory devised by Henri Tajfel
and John Turner (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). The authors begin their
thesis from the psychological process of categorisation, which refers to the cognitive
arrangement of the physical environment (e.g. objects, events and so forth) into groups
on the basis of their shared characteristics. Humans, by systematically organising and
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segmenting their environment, simplify it and thus make it more manageable and
comprehensible. When categorisation is applied to the social environment, it is termed
social categorisation. The objects in this case are individuals who are being classified
into social groups. Stereotypes, for example, are seen as a form of expression of social
categorisation-Taj fel and Turnerterm this noninstrumental social categorisation-that
only takes into account the shared, usually most prominent, characteristics of the
members of a social group and ignores any individual differences, resulting in groups
being perceived as possessing great degrees of coherences, uniqueness, and
differentiation.
Unlike the categorisation ofthe physical environment, the individual in the social system
is both the observer and the actor. Thus social categorisation serves an additional
function, namely that of discriminating between social categories and at the same time
evaluating them by minimising the in-group (i.e. the group the observer belongs to)
differences and maximising the differences between social groups. According to Taj fel
and Turner, these elements of social behaviour as a function of social categorisation
cannot be explained simply through means ofcompetitive behaviour or cognitive group
classification. Therefore, the authors introduce the concept of social identity. This
concept is used to refer to the cognition the individual develops from belonging to
certain social groups and the evaluative and affective importance he or she attaches to
this membership. Social identity thus helps the individual assign, maintain, and
understand her or his place in the social environment.
Persons develop their social identity primarily through their drive to preserve or enhance
their self-esteem. When an individual cannot acquire ormaintain a positive self-concept
through a direct comparison between him or herself and others - the authors do refer to
this interpersonal differentiation as a form of self-identity - he or she attempts to do so
through social between-group comparisons or value-laden attributes, and thus develops
and utilises his or her social identity. Following this argument, it can be said that an
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individual always strives for a positive social identity. In order to achieve that, he or she
needs to view favourably the groups he or she belongs to and to positively discriminate
them from other relevant out-groups. If this process fails, one may either attempt to
change the basis of the between-group comparisons, or choose a different out-group as
a reference, or finally, identify oneself with other more favourable groups.
The Me & the I
At this point, I am drawn to refer yet again to the work ofWilliam James. As I warned
in the previous chapter, knowledge ofhis ideas makes new ones seem frustratingly old.
James in the tenth chapter of the first volume of his "Principles of Psychology"
(1890/1981), titled "The Consciousness of Self' talks indeed about the concept of
identity. Not surprisingly his thoughts cover to a great extent the content of both of the
above theories.
James divides the self into the Me, which constitutes the phenomenal, experienced self,
and the /, which is the self as a knower. In his words "let us see the words ME and I for
the empirical person and the judging Thought" (p. 371, capitalisation in the original).
The Me possesses three interrelated and hierarchically arranged aspects of the self,
which from lower to higher are: the material Me, the social Me, and the Spiritual Me.
Thematerial Me deals with aspects ofourmaterial existence, such as our possession and
our bodies, as well as our sense of vanity, modesty, or pride of wealth; the social Me
refers to our felt social relations, like the desire to be noticed, the degrees of our
sociability, our sense of love, honour, ambition, social and family pride; the spiritualMe,
to which James assigns the highest value, deals with the sense of our subjective inner
being, specifically our intellectual, moral, and religious aspirations, and our sense of
mental superiority, purity and so forth.
These three aspects of the Me develop and become part of our identity through the
processes of self-seeking (i.e. our actions towards maintaining and enhancing the
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characteristics ofourselves), and self-estimation, which refers to the degree of our self-
worth achieved through comparisons between the characteristics ofourselves and those
of others. He goes on to claim that "in each kind of self, material, social, and spiritual,
men distinguish between the immediate and actual, and the remote and potential" (p.
315). James calls the ratio between our actualities and potentialities self-esteem, and
suggests that it is a fundamental factor upon which a stable, positive self is built.
So James's social Me can be seen as an expression of one's social identity, which like
Tajfel and Turner's approach is closely related to self-esteem; James's idea, however,
attributes more positive, as well as personal characteristics to one's identity, without the
need of an a priori inclusion ofelements ofconflict and discrimination as they are found
in the latter theory.
The notion ofpersonal identity on the other hand is the expression, according to James,
of the /-self, and conceptually it is almost identical to that of Erikson's in its
fundamental assumptions. Like Erikson, James sees personal identity as our perception
of personal sameness. He says, it is the experience that "I am the same self that I was
yesterday" (p. 332). The rest of James's discussion on personal identity focuses on the
philosophical meaning of personal sameness, and as such it will not occupy any more
space in this thesis.
Identity & Personality
For Erikson, as noted earlier, personal identity is partly founded on personality models.
In fact, his identity diffusion and identity moratorium stages are also referred to as
noncommittedpersonalities, while the foreclosed identity stage has also been called the
foreclosed personality (Cramer, 1997). Tajfel and Turner agree with Erikson on the
presence of the above relation. However, they add that social identity bears no
relationship to personality as the former derives from group membership. For James
though, any identity, since it comes from the self, is part of personality. In his words
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"personality implies the incessant presence of two elements, an objective person [social
identity], known by a passing subjective Thought [personal identity] and recognized as
continuing in time" (1890/1981, p. 371). Recent theorists are more likely to agree with
James. For example, Emmons (1997) posits that the concept of identity is an integrated
component of personality that helps people "make sense of who they are in the world,
and [...] create life stories that provide their lives with overall unity, meaning, and
purpose" (pp. 69-70). Emmons's, and thus James's, ideas have also been supported,
almost unequivocally, by empirical findings. So far, evidence suggests that aspects of
identity seem to relate mainly to neuroticism, and partly to extraversion and
psychoticism (Clancy & Dollinger, 1993; Cramer, 2000; Dollinger & Clancy, 1993,
1995; Marcia, 1980; Muuss, 1996).
Therefore it was predicted in this thesis that there would be a relationship between
aspects of identity and primarily neuroticism and secondarily extraversion and
psychoticism.
Identity & mental health
Identity has been linked to mental health through identity disorders (i.e. dissociative
identity disorder and gender identity disorder). These disorders relate to the presence
of multiple egos in the self (in the former case), or to gender role socialisation and
hormonal imbalances (in the latter case) (Davison & Neale, 1997). However, since
neither of them is ofany relevance to this thesis, they will not be considered any further.
To my knowledge, no direct attempt has been made in the literature to identify the
relationship between mentally healthy aspects of identity and schizotypy, and thus no
educated predictions can be made regarding this relationship.
In this thesis the nature ofthe relationship between aspects of identity and schizotypy
was explored.
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Identity & Religion
Religion among other things is a form of group identity. With rituals, myths, and
symbols it groups people into distinct, well-defined, and often unique communities that
tend to be bound to specific cultures. As Milton Sernett (1978) puts it: "Religion [...]
serves as a unifying principle, helping people define a sense ofgroup identity according
to the nuances of social behaviour" (p. 217). According to Kate Loewenthal (2000), the
individual relies on religious group membership to gain self-esteem and support, and
that is especially true for minority groups.
As a group identity, religion unites people together into communities, while at the same
time sets apart those communities. When these divisions become polemic, religion,
because ofthe absolutistic character embedded in its doctrines, can potentially reinforce
social negative attitudes like dogmatism, racism, prejudice, and discrimination, resulting
in intractably violent conflicts. "War is more humane, when God is left out of it" wrote
Ronald Bainton (cited in Sernett, 1978, p. 224).
Religion is also a form of personal identity. With its moral codes and cognitive,
behavioural, and attitudinal directives, it provides the individual with a framework
within which he or she can develop a continuous sense of the self and find his or her
purpose in life. According to Emmons (1997) religion as personal identity offers to the
individual "unity, purpose, and coherence" (p. 70), as well as a philosophy of life that
can act as a stabilizing and integrating power.
Because religion is seen as an identity (e.g. Christian identity, or simply religious
identity) hardly any psychological research exists, to my knowledge, that directly
investigates the correlates of identity and religiosity. That said, scarce studies do suggest
that people who have stronger, more prominent personal identities tend to attend
religious services frequently (Becker, & Hofmeister, 2001; Markstrom-Adams, Hofstra,
& Dougher, 1994), and possess more mature forms of religious orientation
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(Markstrom-Adams & Smith, 1996; Pedersen, Williams, & Kristensen, 2000; Sanders,
1998; Watson et ah, 1992; Watson et al., 1998), while according to Crocker (1995) both
personal and social identities may act asmediators in the relationship between religiosity
and well-being.
Although studies on religiosity and group identity appear to be generally absent, I can
nevertheless make an educated prediction about their relationship. For this I would need
a little help from Allport and Ross (1967). Let us remind ourselves that an extrinsically
orientated person "is using his religious views to provide security, comfort, status, or
social support for himself' (p. 441). These characteristics overlap with both James's
(comfort and status) and Tajfel and Turner's (security and support) concepts of social
identity. It appears therefore that the higher the need for such religious goals, the more
likely it is that a person will possess a stronger sense of social identity.
It was predicted therefore in this thesis that personal identity would be positively
associated with church attendance, and mainly intrinsic and quest religious
orientations, while social identity would exhibit a positive association with extrinsic
orientation. In addition, aspects of identity may mediate the relationship between
schizotypy and at least some types of religiosity.
Religion &Attachment
An overview of Attachment Theory
Although, not surprisingly, a number of theories of human "bonding" have been
proposed (for an overview see Durkin, 1995, ch. 3), the one of relevance to this thesis,
due to its almost exclusive use in the psychology of religion, is the one known as the
attachment theory. Attachment theory has its origins in the theoretical work of British
psychiatrist John Bowlby and its experimental manifestation by the American
psychologist Mary Salter Ainsworth. Bowlby (1979) defines attachment as the tendency
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ofhuman beings to form strong affectional bonds to differentiated and preferred others.
Early-life attachment is formed between the infant and the caregiver and its function is
to provide the individual with a sense ofphysical and psychological safety and security.
Thus from a psychological point ofview, attachment behaves as amodulator ofanxiety
(Bowlby, 1980), and as anxiety increases so does attachment behaviour. Early
attachment experience shapes the person's cognitive-affective concept of the self as
either worthy or unworthy, and of the others as reliable or unreliable, and thus it frames
future expectations regarding relating to others and interpreting others' behaviour and
motives (Ainsworth, 1991).
Attachment styles are self-schemata, which represent the measure of the quality of the
attachment bond (Berk, 1994). Ainsworth was one of the earliest researchers to
operationalise Bowlby's theory, by examining individual attachment differences
(Ainsworth, 1969). She and her colleagues tested infants' responses to separation from
and reunion with their caregiver through a series of experiments known as the strange
situation, and coined the secure and the insecure attachment styles (Ainsworth, Bell &
Stayton, 1971; Ainsworth et al., 1978). Children classified as secure tend to seek contact
with their caregiver, and are easily comforted and soothed when upset. The insecure
style was further broken down into two types: detached/avoidant, and anxious/resistant.
Children of the former style tend to avoid contact with their caregiver, while the ones
of the latter style tend to seek and avoid contact at different times while showing
inability to be comforted. Mary Main and Judith Solomon (1990) suggested a third
insecure group - which they called disorganised/disoriented - to characterise children
who respond in confused, contradictory ways towards their caregiver.
Adult Attachment
According to the Bowlby-Ainsworth model, the attachment style one develops in early
life becomes a prototype upon which one tends to form other affectionate bonds across
the life-span and outside the immediate family circles (Bartholomew& Horowitz, 1991;
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Kerns & Stevens, 1996; Morrison, Goodlin-Jones & Urquiza, 1997). Early-life
attachment is therefore a strong predictor ofthe type ofattachment in later age. Although
adulthood attachment can be expressed through a variety of relationships (e.g.
friendship, role-models and so forth), it is most often conceptualised in romantic love
(Ainsworth, 1991; Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991; Shaver, Hazan & Bradshaw, 1988;
Sperling & Berman, 1994; Sroufe & Fleeson, 1986). Shaver and his colleagues (1988)
for example, pointed out that the underlying mechanisms in adult romantic relationships,
such as physical contact, caressing, and even baby-talk, are similar to the ones of the
child-caregiver attachment.
Cindy Hazan and Phillip Shaver (1987) used Ainsworth's attachment styles and
proposed that these same styles not only exist in adulthood, but they also crucially affect
one's behaviour in romantic relationships. Kim Bartholomew and Leonard Horowitz
(1991) refined Hazan & Shaver's typology, and, by integrating Bowlby's model of the
self and the other, proposed a four-style model for adult attachment. People comfortable
with intimacy and autonomy (positive model of self and other) were categorised as
secure; those who are preoccupied with relationships and strive for self-acceptance
(negative model of self vs. positive model of other) formed the preoccupied type;
individuals who tend to avoid close involvement with others (negativemodel ofselfand
other) were called fearful, and finally, those who maintain a sense of independence and
invulnerability (positive model of self vs. negative model of other) made up the
dismissing type. Finally, in a parallel evolution of the concept, Brennan, Shaver and
Tobey (1991) suggested that adult attachment can be represented as having a two-
dimensional (anxiety-avoidance) higher structure (Figure 4.1). These two dimensions
characterise attachment behaviour on degrees ofneed for approval (anxiety dimension)
and discomfort with closeness and dependence on others (avoidance dimension).
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Secure Low Avoidance Preoccupied
Figure 4.1. The relation between Brennan's et al. (1991) anxiety-avoidance
model of individual differences in adult attachment and the four-style model
developed by Bartholomew & Horowitz (1991) (adopted from Shaver &
Fraley, 1999).
Attachment & Personality
Attachment, the theory suggests, because of its inner representation of the self-other
bond, plays a vital part in personality development. As Rothbard and Shaver (1994) put
it: "Attachment theory offers both distal and proximal explanations of the emergence
and stability of personality" (p. 31). Bowlby (1969) himself recommended that in order
for an early-life attachment measurement to be of great value it will have to be
"predictive of future personality development" (p. 339). Empirical studies do indeed
demonstrate rather consistentlynot only a stable attachment-personality relationship but
also a clear direction in this relationship (Bretherton, 1992; Kagan, 1999; Kerns &
Stevens, 1996; Larstone et al., 2002; Reti et al., 2002; Rowatt & Kirkpatrick, 2002;
Wilkinson &Walford, 2001). Unequivocally, the evidence suggests that individuals with
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insecure attachment tend to be higher mainly in neuroticism and in part in psychoticism.
Irving Reti and his coauthors (2002) went a step further and suggested that "the role of
parenting in later personality disorders may be mediated by associations between
parenting and normal personality traits" (p. 55).
Consequently, it was expected that adult attachment would positively relate to both
neuroticism and psychoticism personality traits.
Attachment &mental health
The attachment style one develops has been demonstrated to have some profound effects
on or general relationships with one's psychological health. Isabel Goodwin (2003)
summarised the ways attachment has been found to influence mental health into the
following: (a) the breaking of the affectionate bond can cause a psychological
imbalance, (b) insecure early-life attachment can make an individual more vulnerable
to stress in their later life, and (c) the perception one has of intimate relationships can
influence coping strategies and tolerance to adversity.
Mikulincer and Florian (1995), and Feeney (1995) separately found that secure
attachment is associated with effective coping skills and development of positive,
constructive strategies for dealing with environmental stressors, whereas insecure
attachments relate to shame, anger, fear, and negative emotional evaluation. Cooper,
Shaver & Collins (1998) investigated psychological symptomatology and problem
behaviours in 1989 adolescents and concluded that insecurely attached individuals were
badly adjusted in the community and exhibited high levels of risk behaviours. Parental
physical punishment has been associated with anxious adult attachment in women, and
with avoidant adult attachment in men, whereas guilt induction seems to follow an
opposite trend (Magai et ah, 1995). Females appear to be particularly vulnerable to
dysfunctional empathy and guilt, especially when during early-life attachment, their
caregiver suffered from depression (Zahn-Waxier et ah, 1991), or they had been sexually
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abused by their caregiver (Roche et ah, 1999; also relevant Glod & Teicher, 1996).
Of relevance to this thesis is the relation of attachment to personality disorders, and
although research in this area has been slow to pick up pace, a few interesting points can
be mentioned here. It has been suggested that disorganisation in attachment behaviour,
which is an indicator of the person's inability to regulate their interpersonal distance
mainly because of their excessive fear of rejection, is linked to borderline personality
disorder (Fonagy et al., 1997), dependent personality disorder (Livesley, Schroeder, &
Jackson, 1990), and avoidant personality disorder (Sheldon &West, 1990). Furthermore,
West and Keller (1994) proposed that the idea ofdysfunctional attachment is present in
the language of all personality disorders through, for example, "lack of close friends or
confidants" in schizotypal and schizoid personality disorders, or the tendency ofpeople
with a histrionic personality disorder to consider relationships to be more intimate than
they actually are. Finally, let us remind ourselves of Meehl's theorising that the
functionality of the familial environment can play a catalytic role in the development of
schizotypy (Millon, 1996). Although further research is needed to identify the empirical
components of the above relationships, general predictions can still be made.
Therefore, in this thesis it was predicted that elements of adult attachment styles
would be related to at least some of the components of schizotypy, and that this
relationship would be stronger for the insecure attachment styles.
Attachment & Identity
As the core element of attachment theory is the development of mental models of the
selfand of the others, seeing the connection between attachment and identity should not
be hard. It has been argued that the stability of the model of the self, especially during
the early years ofone's life, affects the development ofone's personal identity (Haigler,
Day & Marshall, 1995; Matos et al., 1999; Meeus et al., 2002; Zimmermann & Becker-
Stoll, 2002) - the reader should keep in mind that all these studies used measurements
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of early parental attachment and not any of its adult forms. At the same time, Smith,
Murphy, and Coats (1999), suggested that group identity is in itself a form of
attachment, a group attachment. They claimed that group membership is as fundamental
to human survival as the bond to the caregiver, as it serves the same purposes of
security, dependence and closeness. Therefore, the model of the self-others becomes in
identity terms amodel of the selfas a groupmember vs. the group. However, the authors
warned that although group identity can be seen as a form of attachment, its dynamics
function in a relatively independent, albeit parallel fashion to the latter. The evidence so
far is not sufficient to allow for any concrete predictions in the relationship between
identity and adult attachment.
Therefore, in this thesis the nature of the relation of identity to adult attachment was
explored.
Attachment & Religion
In 1990, Lee Kirkpatrick and Phillip Shaver noted that modern research in the
psychology of religion lacked a sane theoretical foundation, and thus they set out to
deliver one. They proposed a theory that incorporated attachment into the functioning
of religion. In an attempt to investigate Freud's earlier claims of God as the projection
ofthe father, they were surprised by the striking resemblance between Christian theology
and attachment theory. God (or His representation through Jesus) appears to be the
ultimate secure attachment figure; one with whom the believer has a personal
relationship, interacting with Him through prayer and meditation; one that is always
there in times of need and emotional crisis; is always trustworthy and loving, and
provides a sense ofsafety and security to the believer. God, according to Kirkpatrick and
Shaver, is the ultimate antidote to fear and anxiety. They suggested that "theistic religion
may play an important role in many adults' lives because of its ability to function in the
manner of an attachment relationship" (p. 319).
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This religion-as-attachment theory was presented in finer detail by Kirkpatrick in 1992
and again in 1999. Although this presentation did not modify the original model, it did
however, attempt to justify and explain it in more depth, by clarifying some of its
premises and by providing empirical evidence that had by then accumulated, in support
of it. First, he defended the analogy of child-caregiver to believer-God, by saying that
although Bowlby's theory did not include God in any of the attachment bonds5, and that
he indeed acknowledged that attachment theory cannot be applied successfully to any
sort of bonding, Kirkpatrick did believe that the way God is perceived by or presented
to the believer can be best understood within the attachment theory framework. He then
went on and attempted to justify the concept of God as a father. Again according to
Bowlby the primary caregiver to whom the child attaches is the mother, and thus one
would expect God to be a female figure. Although a year earlier Bowlby had indeed
been criticised for putting too much reliance on observations in nonhuman animal
relationships (Quiery, as cited in Goodwin, 2003), Kirkpatrick did not refer to that
criticism. Instead he cited a number of studies with contradicting results, suggesting
either that, appearances aside, Godmay be perceived as having motherly characteristics,
or that God may be seen as the ultimate male parent. Kirkpatrick settled this debate by
simply stating that the image of God is not important, but what is important is that God
captures "the very essence of the 'stronger, wiser other' that a parent represents to a
child" (1999, p. 805). Finally, he claimed that his theory can be applied equally to
polytheistic and nontheistic religions, or in fact, to any spiritual belief systems, since
God as an attachment figure can easily be substituted for any supernatural figure, formal
or informal, personal or institutional.
For the believer-God bond to fall tightly into attachment theory, its proponents needed
That said, Bowlby did allude to this relationship, when he wrote that "probably in all normal
people [attachment] continues in one form or another throughout life and, although in many
ways transformed, underlies many of our attachments to country, sovereign, or church" (1956,
p. 588)
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to take into account the individual differences in the interpersonal religious attachment.
In other words, although God may be presented as a loving, caring, and helping parent,
some believers may still view Him as a punishing, fearing, distant, or unreliable entity,
or theymay not accept Him at all. In order to explain this, Kirkpatrick and Shaver (1990)
proposed two hypotheses both deriving from attachment theory.
The first one they termed the correspondence ofmental models hypothesis. According
to this hypothesis, the quality of the early-life attachment bonds leads to the
development of internal working models regarding expectations from the other and
beliefs of self-worth, and these models serve as frameworks upon which one builds
future relationships. So for example, a stable, secure attachment in early-life, leads the
child to perceive the caregiver as trustworthy and reliable, and at the same time view
him or herself as worth the affection and security the attachment bond provides.
Consequently future attachments will be perceived and treated with the same beliefs and
expectations. In other words, the attachment style of the believer-God relationship will
tend to be similar to that of the believer's early-life child-caregiver attachment, or to the
believer's adult romantic attachment, as the latter would fall into the above model as
well. In addition, securely attached individuals will tend to be more religious than
insecure ones, while the latter will be more likely to report themselves as being agnostic
or atheists.
The second hypothesis is the compensation hypothesis. This is based on the function of
attachment to regulate anxiety homoeostatically and sustain security. The attachment
system is a dynamic one that changes and responds to internal states and external
conditions. For example, an angry or stressed caregiver may respond differently to the
needs of the child than when they are calm or happy. Therefore, the mental models that
result from an attachment bond need to monitor continuously the system and adjust
accordingly, in order to restore or achieve adequate levels of security. However, it is
possible that no matter how much the mental models adjust, they can never reach
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security levels in a given attachment system. This can happen when (a) the attachment
figure is no longer available, as in cases of death or divorce (in adult attachment); (b) it
is beyond the attachment figure's capacity to provide security, e.g. in times of extreme
stress or crisis; and (c) the developed attachment style is insecure and unstable and thus
by nature inhibits any sense of security. In all the above instances, the individual will
seek to form attachment bonds with surrogate figures that can restore comfort and
security in them. The compensation hypothesis therefore suggests that God is such a
substitute attachment figure. He compensates for the lack of love and security in one's
"earthly" attachments, primarily those with their parents, caregivers, or partners. So the
compensation hypothesis predicts that individuals with a history of insecure attachments,
will tend to form a secure attachment with God, they will tend to pray more (or perceive
prayer as central to their religious practices), they will be more likely to have
experienced sudden religious conversion, and they will tend to have more strict,
fundamental religious beliefs.
The first to test the above hypotheses were the actual proponents of them. Kirkpatrick
and Shaver (1990) asked 213 participants who responded to a newspaper advert to fill
in questionnaires about their parents' levels of religiousness (dichotomized into high or
low), their own religious orientation (intrinsic/extrinsic total), their perception of God
(loving, controlling and so forth) and religion, their religious practices, and their early-
life attachment styles (secure/avoidant/anxious). They found that avoidant individuals
had on average significantly higher intrinsic orientation scores, while the picture in
respect to the extrinsic orientation was not clear. Avoidant individuals were also the
most likely ones to have experienced sudden religious conversions, and have more
fundamental religious thoughts. However, all those results held only when the mother's
religiousness was low. When maternal religiousness was high, or when controlling for
the father's religiousness, all the above effects disappeared. The authors concluded that
their findings provide partial support to the compensation hypothesis, and thatmaternal
religiousness tends to moderate the relationship between attachment and religiosity.
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These findings were replicated by Pehr Granqvist (1998) in 203 Swedish university
students, with the only difference that he found paternal religiousness also to have a
moderating effect. In 2001, Annette Mahoney and her colleagues ran ameta-analysis of
ninety-four studies on religion and marital or parental functioning and found that
"greater parental religiousness relates to more positive parenting and better child
adjustment" (p. 559). Furthermore, Kirkpatrick (1999) offered additional, mainly
indirect, evidence in support of the compensation hypothesis.
That said, in 1992, Kirkpatrick and Shaver ran a similar to their previous one survey
study (N= 213) by adding a measurement of adult attachment styles and a measurement
they devised to assess attachment to God. This time, however, they found that secure
individuals tended to form more secure attachments with God than insecure ones, be
more religious and committed, while avoidant participants were the most likely to be
agnostic. This result provides support for the correspondence hypothesis. The hypothesis
was also partly supported in a study with 72 kindergarten Dutch children (de Roos,
Miedema, & Iedema, 2001) in which it was found that although negative concepts of
God had a very low to no relationship with attachment measurements, positive concepts
of God were predicted by a secure attachment to the teacher but not to the mother.
Finally, Kirkpatrick (1998), performed a large-scale longitudinal study with 1126 (at 77)
and 297 (at T2) university students, and found that his cross-sectional data supported the
compensation hypothesis, while his longitudinal data corroborated the correspondence
one (also of interest is Saroglou, Kempeneers, & Seynhaeve, 2003).
All of the above studies suffer to an extent from methodological problems. All, except
that of de Roos et al., tended to use either rather simplified measurements for assessing
attachment or religious intensity and commitment usually addressed through single-item
questions, or measurements developed for the specific study and thus had unknown
psychometric properties. This move is understandable, since the authors were interested
in attracting a large-A sample and since their intentions were to generate an initial
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impression of the underlying relationships. The de Roos et al. study has limitations of
its own. For example although the authors assessed the attachment styles of the child-
mother bond directly from the children's responses to a role-play measurement, the
child-teacher attachment styles were assessed through the teachers' responses to a
questionnaire. This may have introduced a response bias in the study. In addition, the
authors say that although maternal attachment correlated with teacher attachment, only
the latter correlated with positive beliefs in God. However, they fail to address the
possibility that teacher attachment may be a direct total mediator in the relationship
between maternal attachment and beliefs in God.
Regardless of the shortcomings, the above studies collectively provide evidence for an
important association between attachment and religiosity leading to the inclusion of the
attachment variable in the present thesis. As neither of the generic hypotheses could be
rejected, both were assessed, to a degree possible, in this thesis.
In accordance with the correspondence hypothesis, the more securely attached a
person is themore likely they will be to exhibitmature religious orientation, while the
more insecure the attachment the more their orientation will tend to be an immature
one or they will show low religious orientation indiscriminately.
According to the compensation hypothesis the above pattern was expected to be
reversed, with insecure individuals exhibiting mature religious orientations. In
addition, insecure individuals, were expected to pray more often and go to church
more frequently than secure ones.
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Three Integra tedmodels
Schizotypal traitsReligiosity
Model 1: Religiosity as predictor
Mediating variables
Schizotypal traits Religiosity
Model 2: Religiosity as outcome
Mediating variables
Thus far I have described all the
variables used in the two studies to
be presented in this thesis, as well
as evidence of the kind and degree
of association between them.
Given the information available
and the aims of this thesis, I will
now attempt to integrate all those
variables in a structural model.
Since the main aim of this thesis
was to investigate the relationship
between religiosity and schizotypy,
the model is based on the
predictions I have made earlier
about this relationship. In fact, the
five religion-schizotypy
hypotheses discussed earlier
Figure 4.2. Alternative theoretical models of
religion and schizotypy.
combined with the rest of the predictions allow for the generation of three models,
namely one that places religiosity as a predictor, one that treats it as an outcome, and
finally, one that does not assume any causal relationships. The rest of the variables may
serve as mediators in the first two models and as covariates in the final one (Figure 4.2).
I do not intend to test all three models, unless the evidence from the rest of the analyses
are inconclusive. Instead, I expect through testing the various predictions a picture to
emerge that would make one of those three models more likely to represent the
relationships in the dataset.
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Chapter synopsis
In this chapter, I presented the concepts behind the variables used in the two studies of
this thesis that follow. The variables ofprimary focus were: (1) religious orientation, as
measured through Allport's and Batson's approaches; and (2) schizotypal personality
traits of the DSM-IV classification. Secondary variables that were treated as
mediators/covariates were: (3) general personality traits, as measured using Eysenck's
theory; (4) aspects of identity, both personal and group; and (5) adult attachment styles,
assessed using Bowlby's theory. Finally, variables whose role was also consideredwere:
religious practices relating to (6) church attendance and (7) prayer, (8) religious
(Christian) denomination, (9) age, (10) gender, (11) social desirability, and (12) when
feasible, additional sociodemographic characteristics.
Furthermore, the relationship betweenmainly the primary and secondary variables, with
the central focus being on religiosity versus the rest, was considered from both a
theoretical and mainly an empirical perspective. The evidence presented and discussed
helped formulate the predictions tested in the questionnaire study (and in part shaped the
focus of the interview study), and design the three integrated models above.
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Summary of predictions
Primarypredictors (religiosity vs. schizotypy)
Higher levels of certain schizotypal traits will predict higher levels of certain religious
orientations (the excitement hypothesis).
Higher levels of certain schizotypal traits will predict lower levels of certain religious
orientations (the prevention hypothesis).
Certain religious orientations will predict certain schizotypal traits (no direction is stated)
(the causal hypothesis).
Certain religious orientations will form clear and relatively stable groups with certain
schizotypal traits (no direction is stated) (the covariance hypothesis).
An assessment into the degree of spuriousness in the relationship between religiosity and
schizotypy will be made (the phenotype hypothesis).
The mediating effect of the secondary and the sociodemographic variables on the religiosity-
schizotypy relationship will be assessed in an integrated model
Secondary predictors related to religiosity
Neuroticism will tend to have a positive relationship with religiosity.
Psychoticism will have a negative, low to moderate, relationship with religiosity.
Psychoticism will be inversely related to frequency of prayer and church attendance.
Frequency ofchurch attendance and prayerwill have an inverse relationship with schizotypy.
Personal identity will be positively associated with church attendance, and mainly intrinsic
and quest religious orientations
Group identity will exhibit a positive association with extrinsic orientation.
The more securely attached one is the more likely they will be to exhibit mature religious
orientation, while the more insecure the attachment the more their orientation will tend to be
an immature one or they will show low religious orientation indiscriminately
(correspondence hypothesis).
Alternatively, insecure individuals will possess a more mature form of religious orientation,
would pray more often and go to church more frequently than secure ones (compensation
hypothesis).
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Secondarypredictors rela ted to the rest of the psychometric variables
Schizotypy will have a positive and moderate relationship with neuroticism, a very low or
negative one with extraversion, and a positive low relationship with psychoticism.
The relationship between schizotypy and aspects of identity will be explored.
Aspects of identity will relate primarily to neuroticism and secondarily to extraversion and
psychoticism.
Adult attachment will be related to at least some of the schizotypal traits, and that this
relationship will be stronger for the insecure attachment styles.
Adult attachment will relate positively to both neuroticism and psychoticism.
The relationship between adult attachment and aspects of identity will be explored.
Other predictors & miscellaneousexploratory goals
An attempt will be made to recover Allport's religious orientation dimensions.
Intrinsic orientation will relate to both internal and external orientations.
Extrinsic orientation will only show a low association with external.
Quest orientation will be largely independent from all the rest of the orientations, and only
show a low negative association with the intrinsic orientation.
The possibility of the existence ofnonlinear relationships between the religious orientations
will be explored.
The variation in the intensity of schizotypal traits between different Christian denominations
will be explored.






"Though this be madness, yet there is method in it."
(Shakespeare, Hamlet, act II, scene ii)
Chapter aims & organisation
In this chapter, a detailed presentation of the methodology employed for the
questionnaire study of this thesis is given. Initially issues regarding sampling and
participant selection are presented. Standardised or otherwise measurements, their
rationale and psychometric properties are discussed, followed by a description of the
research procedure. Finally, issues relating to data analysis and the statistical procedures
used in the study are addressed.
Questionnaire study aims
By assessing the predictions presented in the previous chapter, the questionnaire study
aimed to map the quantitative aspects of the religiosity-schizotypy relationship, and
identify and incorporate the effects ofpsychological and sociodemographic variables in
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Sampling is the process of selecting to observe some part (a sample) of a target
population, in order to estimate some characteristics of interest in that population.
Generally, there are two broad types of sampling (Barnett, 2002): (a) probability or
random sampling, which is a family of sampling techniques through which every
population unit has a known, though not necessarily equal, chance (probability) ofbeing
included in the sample; (b) non-probability or non-random sampling that defines a
family of sampling techniques that do not take into account elements of chance.
Through probability sampling one can inductively infer, with a degree ofconfidence and
error (bias), accurate, precise, and meaningful estimates of the characteristics of interest
in the target population. Non-random sampling techniques on the other hand do not
allow for such inferences, i.e. findings based on such sampling procedures may not be
used to generate inferences to the population of interest. In other words, any
generalisation of conclusions needs to be based on some a priori knowledge of the
sampling distribution, knowledge that can only be available through random sampling.
On these premises, it is claimed that inferential statistical procedures can only be used
with data collected through random sampling techniques (Anderson, 2001; Cochran,
1977; Krishnaiah & Rao, 1988). At the same time it has been argued (e.g. Oakes, 1986;
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991) that such statistics can be used with non-probability
sampling (a) if evidence suggests that the sample appears to be sufficiently
representative of the population, and (b) in the form of convenience, if somewhat
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arbitrary, assessment criteria - a practice widespread in psychological research.
In the current study the initial approach was towards devising a probability sampling
technique, through which, based on an a priori specified confidence interval, a random
sample ofcongregations would be drawn from all the Christian congregations in Greater
Edinburgh, and a cluster sampling method would be subsequently applied, through
which all members of the selected congregations would be requested to take part in the
study. However, this approach was dropped for the following reasons.
My initial contact with various congregations in the wider Edinburgh was discouraging.
Indeed, all of the clergy or elders I spoke to, although they found the topic interesting,
were notwilling to allow or encourage their congregations to take part in the study. They
claimed they had been over-researched (though they were not clear by whom) to an
extent that they felt they needed to "protect" their members. In addition, they were not
comfortable with the idea of psychology analysing their faith, and Freud's ideas were
indeed mentioned in a number of instances - which brings back the issues discussed in
chapter III regarding the uneasy relationship between religion and psychology. This
response alone, made the application of the random selection process infeasible.
Furthermore, since the aim of the study was not to estimate a true value of a population
parameter, as is the case with surveys or opinion polls, but rather identify a model that
could provide a reasonable and plausible explanation of the association between the
variables of interest, probability sampling may have been indeed unnecessary (see also
Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, pp. 219-220).
Therefore, a non-random sampling method was adopted. This sampling technique was
purposive in the sense that certain inclusion criteria were a priori layed down forming
the study protocol. Thus potential participants needed to (a) classify themselves as
Christians, (b) be adults and thus potentially have amore mature approach to their faith,
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(c) either be British nationals or have lived in Britain for aminimum ofone year in order
to allow for a degree of familiarity with the British culture, and (d) speak English
fluently.
Sample size & Power
When estimating an acceptable sample size for a study, the following two measurements
are of central importance: (a) statistical power, which refers to the probability of
detecting an existing effect, or in other words the probability of rejecting a false null
hypothesis (Everitt, 1998, p. 259), and (b) effect size, which is a measure of the degree
of manifestation of an effect in a population (Cohen, 1988, pp. 9-10).
A priori estimations of these measures can be calculated from previous findings, and
they can be used to estimate the optimum sample size needed for a study. For example,
the study by Diduca and Joseph (1997) (discussed in the previous chapter), found no
statistically significant bivariate correlations between the religiosity dimensions used and
schizotypal symptoms. By running a power analysis, I found that their power was . 19
and their tests showed an effect size of r = .08. These findings suggest that detecting an
effect was highly improbable for them (probabilistically speaking, they would have
needed to conduct five trials like the one they did, in order to get significant results in
one of them). In fact, under these conditions, had they wanted to increase the power of
their tests, say to .40 they would have needed to recruit about 320 participants (they
actually had 201 subjects).
Sample size in the current study was estimated through an a priori power analysis. The
literature suggests that the bivariate associations between religiosity and the other
variables used in this study tend to have a small to medium effect size (approx. r = . 10
to .38). Assuming a desirable statistical power of .80 at an a-level of .05 (two-tails), the
above effect-size range suggests that the sample size needed to be between 84 and 800
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subjects. However, since this is obviously an impractical interval, it was compressed
down to 100-200 individuals, which allowed for an effect-size range of r = . 19 to .27 to
achieve an 80% power at the above a-level.
Participants
A total of 161 adult individuals took part in the study. Participants were drawn from the
following groups:
1. The psychology volunteer panel of the University ofEdinburgh. The panel consists
of a growing number of individuals (currently 214) who have shown interest in taking
part in psychological research. These individuals had responded to invitations through
posters, newspaper articles, and adverts. The department ofpsychology keeps a database
record of their contact details and some basic demographic information.
2. University students. All Christian first and second year undergraduates in the
psychology department of the University ofEdinburgh were encouraged to take part in
the study, through direct contact in classrooms.
In addition, several participants from the above groups volunteered to function as
intermediators and help recruit other individuals from their familial or broader circles.
I am aware that the use of volunteers may have introduced biases in the data that could
have led to a misestimation of the relationships present in the dataset and a reduction in
the validity ofthe measurements. Indeed a number ofcharacteristics have been identified
that differ between volunteers and non-volunteers (for an overview see Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1991), of which the ones that are of relevance to this study suggest that
volunteers (a) tend to bemore educated than non-volunteers, (b) tend to be both or either
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more sociable and in higher need for social approval, (c) tend to be less conforming and
less authoritarian, (d) tend to have a higher interest in religion, and (e) tend to exhibit
more maladjusted behaviour than non-volunteers. Since data from a non-volunteer
sample were not available in this study, I simply acknowledge the potential ofa presence




For all the standardised questionnaires used in the current study, the following
psychometric properties were reported when available in their manuals:
Reliability
Reliability refers to the degree of random error in the observed variability of the results
ofameasurement (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1991, p. 46). The reliability ofa psychological
test can be assessed through statistics. For each measurement used in this study up to
two types of reliability estimates are presented:
1. Internal consistency: The degree of consistency of related components of a scale. In
other words, internal consistency provides a measurement of respondents' tendency to
reply to related questionnaire items in similar ways. The most commonly used measure
of internal consistency, and the one reported in this study, is Cronbach's alpha (or alpha
coefficient) based on Luis Guttman's work and made popular by Lee Cronbach in 1951.
The coefficient alpha could be seen as an average (weighted) intercorrelation between
a set of items, although it is commonly and wrongly perceived as a measure of
unidimensionality. Alpha is expected to lie within zero and one, with values closer to
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one suggesting better internal consistency. However, it can still take negative values or
values greater than one (for example, when the scale consists of two items with equal
variances and a perfectly negative correlation, their alpha will reach infinity) (Nichols,
1999). For a set of items to be considered a (psychological) scale a common cutoffpoint
of alpha is .70 (de Vaus, 2002), while some suggest .80 (Carmines & Zeller, 1990).
It should be noted that whenever a study utilises a standardised psychometric
questionnaire, it is advisable always to check the internal consistencies of the scales, as
they may vary (at times dramatically) from the normative ones reported by their
developers. This can be a result ofnumber ofreasons. For example, (a) the questionnaire
may possess flaws that were not picked up by its developers, such as unclear instructions
and wording of items or inappropriate inclusion of items; or (b) the instrument may be
only ormainly applicable to certain age, area, or socioeconomic groups. When in a given
study a questionnaire is found to possess much lower internal consistencies than its
norms, the researcher may wish to investigate the source of this discrepancy and either
omit this questionnaire from the study, especially if its reliability is also much lower than
the recommended cutoffpoints, or apply caution when interpreting results that are based
on this measurement.
2. Test-retest reliability: An estimate of a scale's stability over time, assessed by the
administration of the same measurement to the same respondents at two or more points
in time. For a scale to be reliable, a respondent's scores need to be similar across all
time-points. The assumption that appears to underline test-retest reliability is that
individuals possess a "true score" on the latent construct the instrument is measuring,
and that score is relatively stable through time. It is this assumption that allows for the
estimation of an instrument's normative scores within a population of interest. This
assumption may hold for personality traits for example, whereas attitudinal
measurements may generate more variable responses and be susceptible to the timing
of the sampling and the length of the interval between two consecutive sampling points.
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Correlational statistics are commonly used to assess the degree of agreement between
pairs of scores. I would argue that these statistics alone, although necessary, are not
sufficient to reveal the stability of a scale through time, i.e. its test-retest reliability.
Though true that in a reliable scale pairwise comparisons should demonstrate positive,
high, and at least monotonic relationships, in order to satisfy the true-score assumption,
point-pairs should also be free of systematic error. Correlational statistics do not tend
to take into account the presence of systematic error. So if the paired data differ by a
constant, or in other words, if scores at a time-point tend to be systematically higher or
lower than scores taken at another time, correlational statistics will fail to notice it. Thus
I suggest that in addition to the above statistical techniques one should use tests that
measure average differences (e.g. paired-samples t-test or equivalent) that indirectly take
into account the presence of systematic error. In this instance of course one would wish
these statistics to reveal zero or near zero average differences between the compared
pairs. To my knowledge, researchers tend not to combine the above two groups of
statistical procedures when assessing a scale's test-retest reliability.
Validity
In general, a test is said to be valid if itmeasures what it claims to measure (Black, 1993,
pp. 68-71). However, this is a rather vague definition. In the social sciences where the
"thing" measured is usually an abstract concept or construct, it may appear at first that
the empirical validation of a measurement is a rather futile process. How do we know
that this abstract "thing" is there and that a given instrument does indeed measure it? A
simple response to this is that we do not know. In fact, a psychosocial construct may
exist only within the instrument that measures it - the famous positivistic view of
intelligence being what intelligence tests measure. All this led Lee Cronbach (1990) to
claim that declaring that an instrument is either valid or invalid in any absolute sense is
unjustifiable. In the same line of thought, Bram Oppenheim (2001) suggested that
depending on the level of desirable and acceptable conclusions one wants to draw,
instruments can have more than one validity, i.e. they can be measuring more than one,
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and potentially an infinite number of constructs. Despite these considerations,
instruments can still be, and indeed are, validated. Ultimately, confidence on an
instrument's validity rests on the meaningfulness of the theoretical framework that the
instrument is based upon and the accumulating evidence from empirical investigations
into the matter.
Several types of validity have been proposed (for an overview see Bryant, 2002), most
of which, though not all, can be assessed through statistical procedures (Rosenthal &
Rosnow, 1991, pp. 550-553). Moreover, Norman Anderson (2001, pp. 8-16, 572-575)
demonstrates how any validity type can be conceptually represented on a two-
dimensional space defined by what he callsfocus ofconcern and generality dimensions.
Focus ofconcern is expressed through the outcome-process polarity, where research on
the outcome end is concerned with practical applications of outcomes, while the focus
on the process end is on conceptual interpretations of the underlying processes. The
generality dimension is expressed through the internal-external polarity, which indicates
the extent to which validity can be applied within a given research setting (internally)
or generalised to other (external) settings.
At this point it is worth noting that reliability and validity are highly related concepts,
with the former being a necessary, but not sufficient condition for the latter. In other
words, a valid measurement needs to be reliable, while a reliable measurement may not
be valid within a given framework.
For each measurement used in this study up to two types of validity are presented when
available in their manuals:
1. Convergence validity: A type of validity that refers to the degree of agreement
(convergence) between differentmeasurements ofthe same construct. One would expect
that scales or instruments that claim to measure the same thing, albeit through different
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means, to be highly related. Convergence validity is commonly measured through
correlational statistics, while multivariate statistics, like exploratory or confirmatory
factor analysis allow for a finer assessment. Fred Bryant (2002, pp. 113-114) favours the
use ofconfirmatory statistics, as these techniques provide goodness-of-fit indices of the
tested models against a model that assumes absence of convergent validity between the
model components.
2. Discriminant validity: A type of validity that refers to the degree of distinctiveness
between measures of different constructs. In other words, one would expect that scales
or instruments that measure unrelated constructs to exhibit no or low association. The
same statistics as in the previous type of validity can also be used here, although in this
instance either low correlations or distinct factors formed by the differentmeasurements
are expected. Addressing issues ofconvergence and discriminant validity simultaneously
is therefore possible - and in fact, these two validity types combined form in part the
concept of construct validity.
Moreover, regressing the instruments under validation against an outcome measure
allows for the assessment of discriminant validity since conceptually unrelated scales
should exhibit low levels of multicollinearity (i.e. intercorrelation), and thus should
demonstrate unique contributions to the variability of the outcome measure.
Another way of assessing discriminant validity is through evaluating the ability of a set
ofscales to classify correctly (i.e. discriminate) responses into well-defined groups (e.g.
presence or absence of a particular disorder). This can be done through the use ofbinary
or multinomial logistic regression, or discriminant analysis.
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Descriptionof the questionnairemeasurements
From the appropriate pool of standardised psychometric questionnaires, the following
seven were selected based on (a) their frequency ofoccurrence in previous studies in the
area, (b) their psychometric properties, (c) the level upon which their results can be
combined and compared, and (d) the researcher's personal correspondence with other
investigators in the area. All questionnaires were in the public domain and no explicit
permission for use was required from their developers. A summary of the psychometric
and descriptive characteristics of these measurements is presented in Table 5.1.
Age-Universal Intrinsic/Extrinsic-Revised Scale (I/E-R)
(Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989)
A 14-item pen-and-pencil measurement of the intrinsic and extrinsic religious
orientations initially conceptualised by Allport (1950) and operationalised by Allport
and Ross (1967). To remind the reader, intrinsic orientation refers to a mature form of
religious sentiment that serves as a master motive and guide for one's way of life (e.g.
"
My whole approach to life is based on my religion" [item 12]), while extrinsic
orientation addresses the issue of immature faith that serves as a means of convenience
for self-serving goals (e.g. "I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends" [item
11]) (for more see the relevant discussion in chapters III and IV)
The original Allport-Ross scale (a 20-item scale) had been initially revised by Gorsuch
and Venable in 1983 to make it an "age universal" scale that can be used with children,
young adults, and various educational levels - the revision was almost exclusively at the
wording level. When, however, Lee Kirkpatrick (1989) used a Principal Axis Factor
Analysis with Equamax rotation and re-analysed data from twelve studies done in the
US (total N= 1070) that used the original Allport-Ross scale he found the presence of
two distinct extrinsic dimensions he termed extrinsic-personal and extrinsic-social. The
former refers to a form of extrinsic orientation that is personally directed (e.g. "What
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religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble" [item 8]), while the latter
addresses extrinsic aspects that are socially oriented (e.g. "I go to church because it helps
me make friends" [item 2]).
In a parallel attempt, Gorsuch and McPherson (1989) revised their 1983 scale by factor-
analysing data (Principal Axis Analysis, no information on rotation was provided) from
a large sample study (N= 771, US college students) to accommodate for the presence
of three dimensions (the three-dimensional structure was also confirmed in a later study
by Genia, 1993). The new scale is the I/E-R one used in the current study (for a critique
of the above see chapter IV).
The I/E-R consists of 14 items, eight thatmeasure intrinsic religiousness, and three items
in each of the extrinsic forms (Appendix III). Internal consistencies are .83 for intrinsic,
.57 for extrinsic-personal and .58 for extrinsic-social (.65 for a combined extrinsic
dimension). Gorsuch and McPherson do acknowledge that the reliabilities of the
extrinsic orientations are rather low, but they explain this by the small number of items
that make up these scales (1989, p. 352). In addition, they are confident that the brevity
of the measurement would make its use possible with large samples (N > 100), where
statistical power would be high enough to overcome any reliability issues. Discriminant
validity is reported as .07 (intrinsic vs. extrinsic-personal), -.12 (intrinsic vs. extrinsic-
social), and .41 (between the two extrinsic subscales).
Responses on I/E-R are measured on a 5-point Likert scale (from 1 = Strongly disagree,
to 5 = Strongly agree). Three reverse-keyed items are present (all located in the intrinsic
dimension). The scales are scored by adding up the responses in all of their items. Thus
scores range from 8 to 40 for intrinsic, and from 3 to 15 for each of the extrinsic scales.
Higher scores indicate higher levels of a given religious orientation.
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Religious Life Inventory (RIT)
(Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a, 1991b)
A 34-item self-report measurement that assesses religious orientation on three
independent dimensions - namely internal, external and quest - as defined by Batson
and Ventis (1982). As it was discussed in chapter IV, these dimensions are conceptually
based on Allport's ideas, but unlike the I/E-R or the original Allport-Ross measurement
they centre around the mature form of religiousness.
Thus the internal or end orientation is essentially similar to the generic definition of the
intrinsic religiousness, although it is more tailored towards addressing the importance
of internal needs for religious balance and certainty to one's religious orientation (e.g.
"God's will should shapemy life" [item 9]). The external or means aspect is also related
mainly to intrinsic orientation (and partly to extrinsic) and it refers to the degree to
which various external influences shape one's perspective on their religion (e.g. "The
church has been very important for my religious development" [item 1]). Finally, the
quest dimension (initially called the interactional scale, Batson, 1976) assigns to doubt
a central and positive role in one's religious outlook and development (e.g. "For me,
doubting is an important part of what it means to be religious" [item 11]).
The RLI has gone through various revisions in order to improve the psychometric
properties mainly of the quest dimension, and its final version is the one used in this
study (Appendix IV). In its final incarnation the quest orientation has been broken down
into three subscales (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991b, p. 431), viz. (a) "readiness to face
existential questions", which in the current study is referred to as quest complexity (e.g.
"I was not interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning &
purpose ofmy life" [item 8]); (b) "self-criticism and perceptions of religious doubts as
positive" (e.g. "Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are
answers" [item 32]), here referred to as quest doubt, and (c) "openness to change" (e.g.
"As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change" [item 3]), termed
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quest openness.
RLI's final structure derives from factor-analysing (Principal Axis Analysis with
Varimax rotation) data from two independent studies run on Christian undergraduate
students at the University of Kansas (Lawrence) (N, = 210, N2 = 214). Internal
consistencies reported from these studies were .84 for internal, .77 to .81 for external,
and .75 to .81 for quest. Discriminant validities ranged from .60 to .65 (internal vs.
external), -.21 to -.22 (internal vs. quest), -.14 to -.18 (external vs. quest). Finally,
convergence validity between I/E's intrinsic versus internal and external were .72 and
.60 respectively.
Of the total items of RLI, nine address internal orientation, six refer to external, and
twelve to the quest dimension (four for each subscale), while seven items serve as
unscored buffers. The scale has six reverse-keyed items (three in internal, one in
external, and two in quest). Responses are scored on a 9-point Likert-like scale, from 1
= Strongly disagree, through 5 = I'm not sure, to 9 = Strongly agree. Scoring is done by
summing up the responses in all the items of each dimension. Thus, scores range
between 9 and 81 for internal, 9 and 54 for external, and 9 to 108 for quest. Higher
scores indicate higher levels of the given orientation.
Both the I/E-R and RLI are the most commonly used measures of religious orientation
(Wulff, 1997). Although I could have used only one of them in this study, given the
centrality of religiousness in my research, I took extra caution to ensure that the results
produced were as reliable and as valid as possible. The decision to use both instruments
in the current study was based on the following considerations, which relate to my
discussion on the two scales presented in the previous chapter:
(a) Neither measurement exhibits superior psychometric properties. The I/E-R suffers
from low internal consistencies, while the RLI's validity has been frequently attacked
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(for an overview see Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; Ventis, 1995). Since, however, the
two measures are to a great extent compatible and comparable, they can be used jointly
to check consistency of responses, and therefore increase confidence in the results.
(b) The various religious orientations assessed by the two measurements are not "real",
but they rather represent regions in n-dimensional spaces. This makes their "existence"
vulnerable to methodological or statistical insufficiencies. Bearing in mind that the field
of the psychology of religion is rather unsettled, and that there does not seem to be a
definitive consensus on the meaning and the nature of the notions it involves, the use of
both of the above measurements seems prudent if not necessary.
(c) Finally, each instrument offers a unique dimension ofreligiousness (the extrinsic and
the quest), whose effects on the psychosocial world of the individual, as I have sketched
in the previous chapter, have been repeatedly reported in the literature. The inclusion of
all five religious orientations allows for the empirical coverage of almost the entire
notion of religiousness as it has been operationalised and studied thus far.
Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPO)
(Raine, 1991)
A 74-item self-report measure of symptoms of schizotypal personality disorders
(Appendix V). The SPQ was developed by British psychologist Adrian Raine (currently
professor of psychology at the University of Southern California) as a screening
instrument to be used in the general population to identity individuals with schizotypal
tendencies and to assess differences across individuals in schizotypal personality.
The instrument's conceptual structure is based on the nine DSM-III-R (American
Psychiatric Association, 1987) diagnostic criteria ofschizotypal personality disorder (as
presented in the previous chapter), which also classify the disorder inDSM-IV. The SPQ
consists of the above nine criterion-based, first-order factors that subsequently were
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found to load onto three oblique second-order factors tapping into specific schizotypal
orientations (Raine et al., 1994).
The first second-order factor identifies the Cognitive-Perceptual Deficits (sometimes
called positive schizotypy - 33 items) characterised by distorted ideas of reference (9
items), odd beliefs or magical thinking (7 items), unusual perceptual experiences (9
items), andparanoid ideation (8 items) (e.g. "I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts
aloud" [item 31]).
The second factor describes the Interpersonal Deficits (closely related to negative
schizotypy - 33 items), characterised by excessive social anxiety (8 items), lack of close
friends (9 items), constricted affect (8 items), and as with the previous factor, paranoid
ideation (8 items) (e.g. "I tend to keep my feelings to myself' [item 73]).
The final factor is termed Disorganized (16 items) and it involves individuals who
exhibit odd or eccentric behaviour (7 items) and oddspeech (9 items) (e.g. "I am an odd
unusual person" [item 67]).
The above factorial structure of the instrument has been closely replicated, primarily
through confirmatory techniques, in various settings, cultures, and populations (Fossati
et al., 2003; Raine et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2000; Suhr & Spitznagel, 2001). New
evidence suggests that the SPQ could also be used successfully with psychiatric
populations (Rossi & Daneluzzo, 2002; Vollema & Hoijtink, 2000). In fact, Raine
(1991) found that in his validation US sample of undergraduate volunteers (N = 497),
55% of the respondents who were in the 90th percentile of the instrument's scores, had
been clinically diagnosed with a schizotypal personality disorder as assessed by the
Structured Clinical Interviewfor DSM-III-Rpersonality Disorders (SCID-II, Spitzer et
al. 1990).
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Raine (1991) reports internal consistencies for the nine first-order scales ranging from
.63 to .81 (total alpha of SPQ .90); total test-retest reliability over a two-month interval
is .82; convergence validity is mainly demonstrated through the high correlations (.65
to .81) between the SPQ and the STA (Claridge & Broks, 1984) and between the SPQ
and the SCID-II (.55 to .80); finally the discriminant validity of the measurement is
shown through its low correlation with instruments that assess psychotic-proneness
outside the DSM criteria of schizotypy (e.g. .19 to .37 with Eysenck's psychoticism
scale).
Responses on the SPQ are registered on a No (= 0) / Yes (= 1) scale. No reverse-keyed
items are present. Scoring is done by summing up all the "yes" responses in each factor.
Thus scores range from 0 to 33 for cognitive perceptual, 0 to 33 for interpersonal, and
0 to 16 for disorganised. Higher scores indicate higher schizotypal tendencies.
The SPQ, having been translated into at least 11 languages (Raine, n.d.), appears to be
a rather powerful, highly stable measure, being widely used in schizophrenia-related
research. In addition, it is the only self-report instrument that directly assesses
schizotypy as defined by the DSM criteria (Fossati et al., 2003).
Eysenck Personality Questionnaire. Revised. Short Scale (EPQ-R-S)
(Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985)
A self-report measure that assesses personality dimensions in the general population
(Appendix VI). Conceptually the instrument is based on Eysenck's traits theory of
personality as described in the previous chapter.
Eysenck makes it explicitly clear (Eysenck& Eysenck, 1991) that the EPQ only attempts
to measure the phenotypical manifestations of personality, while genotypic aspects are
best studied through experimental or clinical designs.
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The EPQ assesses a person's personality under three independent dimensions, viz.
Neuroticism, Extraversion, and Psychoticism. The version used in this study is the short
form of the instrument. It consists of 36 items, 12 for each personality trait. In addition,
in its original form it includes a 12-item Lie scale that measures subjects' tendency to
"fake good" (Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991, pp. 13-14). The Lie scale was not used in this
study, as it was substituted by the Balanced Inventory ofDesirable Responding (see
below), since the latter offers a broader coverage of the issue.
The EPQ-R-S was developed in Britain from data collected in two studies (iV, = 674, a
random sample of adults; N2 = 902, volunteer adults) that were subjected to Principal
ComponentAnalyses withDirectOblimin rotation (Eysenck, Eysenck, & Barrett, 1985).
Internal consistencies ranged from .80 to .84 for neuroticism, .84 to .88 for extraversion,
and .61 to .62 for psychoticism. Test-retest reliabilities were .76 to .81 for neuroticism,
.83 to .89 for extraversion, and .77 to .81 for psychoticism. Discriminant validity ranged
from .04 between extraversion and psychoticism to .14 between neuroticism and
psychoticism.
Responses on the EPQ-R-S are registered on aNo (= 0) / Yes (= 1) scale. Nine reverse-
keyed items are present (two in extraversion and seven in psychoticism). Scoring is done
by summing up all the "yes" responses in each trait. Thus, scores for any of the traits
range from 0 to 12. Higher scores on a trait indicate a stronger presence of that trait in
the individual.
The EPQ is one ofthemost commonly used self-reportmeasurements ofpersonality (for
an overview see Ferrando, 2003; van Hemert et ah, 2002), and it has been used
extensively in research in the psychology of religion as I have discussed in the previous
chapter.
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Aspects of Identity Questionnaire - IIIx (AIO-IIIx)
(Cheek, Tropp, Chen, & Underwood, 1994)
A 35-item self-reportmeasure that assesses the degree of importance individuals assign
to three distinct aspects of identity, viz.personal, social, and collective (Appendix VII).
Personal identity (10 items) is defined as the private sense of one's uniqueness and the
perception of oneself (e.g. "My personal self-evaluation, the private opinion I have of
myself' [item 28]). Social identity (7 items) describes one's public image or social
reputation (e.g. "My popularity with other people" [item 3]). Finally, collective identity
(8 items) is conceptualised as the individual's collective self-esteem and feelings of
belonging to a group or a community (e.g. "My feeling of pride in my country, being
proud to be a citizen" [item 26]).
The developers of the instrument make it clear that the social identity dimension is based
on William James' ideas of the social Me (James, 1891/1981), and that it is the
collective identity dimension that roughly corresponds to Tajfel and Turner's social
identity theory (Tajfel, 1978, 1982; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). Finally, personal identity
incorporates elements from both James's / and Erikson's ego-identity (1959/1980,
1968).
AIQ-IIIx is a revised edition of the third version of the measurement - the revision was
centred around the improvement ofthe psychometric properties ofthe collective identity
dimension. The instrument's three dimensions derive from the first three orthogonal
components of an exploratory factor analysis run on data collected from 185 US
undergraduate university students. Reported internal consistencies are .84 for personal,
.86 for social, and .74 for the revised collective identity. Test-retest reliabilities over a
60-day interval are .77 (personal), .77 (social), and .81 (collective). Finally, discriminant
validities are .15 (personal vs. social), .22 (personal vs. collective), and .18 (social vs.
collective).
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Responses on AIQ-IIIx are recorded on a 5-point unbalanced scale (from 1 = Not
important to my sense of who I am, through 3 = Somewhat important to my sense of
who I am, to 5 = Extremely important to my sense ofwho I am). No reverse-keyed items
are present. However, the developers have included ten unscored buffer items to be used
as moderators or demographic questions (Cheek & Tropp, 1997). The instrument is
scored by adding up the responses to all the items in each identity dimension. Thus
scores range from 5 to 50 for personal, 5 to 35 for social, and 5 to 40 for collective.
Higher scores indicate higher levels of importance on a given aspect of identity.
The AIQ-IIIx has been used in a number of studies (Cheek & Tropp, 1997, summarise
the findings of 33 studies that used the instrument in its various versions), where it has
shown acceptable psychometric behaviour. To my knowledge, it has never been used in
the psychology of religion research. That said, I am also not aware of any other identity
psychometric instrument used in this area, except the ones measuring exclusively
Erikson's personal identity stages, which have been almost exclusively used with
adolescent participants (see previous chapter). The decision to include the AIQ-IIIx in
the current study was partly based on the instrument's psychometric properties, and
mainly on the fact that it appears to be the only standardised instrument that can assess
both personal and group identities.
Experience of Close Relationships Scale IECR)
Developed by Brennan, Clark and Shaver (1998). ECR is a forced choice, 36-short
statement, self-report measure (Appendix VIII) that assesses adult attachment on two
higher-order orthogonal attachment dimensions (halfof the items for each dimension):
avoidance or discomfort with closeness and depending on others (e.g. "I try to avoid
getting too close tomy partner" [item 17]), andAnxiety or fear ofabandonment and need
for approval (e.g. "I worry a lot about my relationships" [item 4]).
In developing the instrument, Kelly Brennan and her colleagues conducted a large scale
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study in the US (N = 1086, psychology undergraduates at the University of Texas,
Austin) in which they extracted from all available attachment measurements to that date
482 items (after excluding redundant items the final pool consisted of 323 items) that
addressed 60 attachment constructs. Results from a factor analysis suggested the
existence of two independent factors, which corresponded to the avoidance - anxiety
dimensions.
Responses on ECR indicate degree of agreement on a 7-point Likert-like scale (from 1
= Strongly disagree, through 4 =Neither agree nor disagree, to 7 = Strongly agree). Ten
items are reverse-keyed (nine in avoidance). Each factor is scored by adding up the
responses in all of its 18 items. Thus, total scores range from 18 to 126 points per factor.
Higher scores suggest higher levels of avoidance or anxiety, and thus a more insecure
attachment.
Among the tenmost commonly used adult attachment measures, ECR claims to possess
the highest internal consistency, which is .94 for the avoidance and .91 for the anxiety
dimension. In addition, ECR is also the most recently developed attachment
measurement. Being that so, to my knowledge the instrument has not been used in the
psychology of religion studies yet.
Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding version 6 (BIDR-6)
(Paulhus, 1991, 1994)
A self-report instrument that assesses the tendency to give socially desirable responses.
There are several reasons why someone may seek to deceive us. First, they may not
know that they do it -which relates to the cognitive and attribution biases a person may
hold - in which case they may quite possibly be deceiving themselves too by believing
in something that is wrong. Lack of trust especially to an outsider could be another
reason. Idiosyncratic and personality characteristics may also offer an explanation; it
may be simply a matter of impression formation processes, i.e. people may inflate
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certain aspects of themselves and their environment or degrade others to create a
favourable impression. Finally, the deception may be indirect in the sense that the
participant, by omitting the-for-granted, may communicate thewrong message (formore
see Holden et al., 2003; Kroner & Weekes, 1996; Peterson, Driver-Linn, & DeYoung,
2002).
BIDR-6 consists of40 proposition-like items (Appendix IX). Half of the items measure
Self-Deception Enhancement (SDE), defined as the subconscious tendency to give
positively biased, yet honest, self-reports (e.g. "I always know why I like things" [item
5]); SDE indexes levels ofego-enhancement under the assumption that individuals with
self-deceptive inclinations tend to overreport positive cognitive attributes, or in other
words, they tend to be overconfident with their reasoning and judgement (this scale is
also labelled cognitive rigidity or dogmatism).
The other halfofthe BIDR-6 items assess Impression Management (IM), conceptualised
as the conscious tendency to report inflated self-descriptions (e.g. "I never swear" [item
24]). IM rests on the assumption that certain individuals in presenting themselves as
"nice people" may deliberately and systematically exaggerate their socially desirable
behaviours, while at the same time understate any unpreferred behaviours. In other
words, IM indexes the individual's tendency to lie consciously, and thus conceptually
the construct is similar to Eysenck's Lie scale and theMMPI Lie scale (Paulhus & Reid,
1991).
The above two constructs were developed from the first two extracted orthogonal factors
from a series ofexploratory principal component analyses with Varimax rotation on data
from three studies conducted in Canada (N] = 130,N2- 670, N3 = 137, all undergraduate
university students) (Paulhus & Reid, 1991). The orthogonal two-factor model was
further assessed in a separate study (N= 180, Canadian undergraduate students) through
confirmatory factor analysis, and it was found to have a better fit than the alternative
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one-factor and oblique two-factor models (Paulhus, 1994). The final forty items of the
inventory were selected from a large pool of items (K = 993) based on the stability and
strength of their loadings on the two factors.
Paulhus (1991) reports that the instrument's internal consistency, as measured through
Cronbach's alpha, is ranging from .68 to .80 for the SDE and from .75 to .86 for the IM
factor. Reported test-retest reliability over a five-week period is .69 for SDE and .65 for
IM. Discriminant validity between the two factors ranges from .05 to .40. Finally,
convergence validity of the IM against Eysenck's Lie scale has been reported at .41
(Gillings & Joseph, 1996).
Responses in BIDR-6 are registered on a 7-point unbalanced scale (from 1 = Not true,
through 4 = Somewhat true, to 7 = Very true). Half of its items are reverse-keyed (ten
items in each factor). Two ways of scoring are possible: continuous scoring, in which
each factor is scored by adding the responses in all 20 items, and thus scores range
between 20 and 140 points per factor; or dichotomous scoring, where only responses on
points 6 and 7 (approximately the 4th quartile of the scale) receive a point each, and thus
scores range from 0 to 20 per factor. In the current study the first method of scoring was
employed. In both cases, higher scoring suggests a greater tendency to desirable
responding.
Due to the measurement's demonstrated associationwith general personality traits, it has
been suggested that either or both of its factors should be used as controls for personality
self-reports (Holden & Fekken, 1989; Lewis, 2000; Paulhus & Reid, 1991; Pauls &
Stemmler, 2003; Rowatt & Kirkpatrick, 2002).
It was deemed necessary to include a social desirability scale in this study, since, as the
literature review in the previous chapter suggests, social desirability appears to be
associated with religiosity and tends to mediate the religiosity-schizotypy relationship,
and for that matter possibly any religiosity relationship. BIDR-6 has been used, though
not extensively, in psychology of religion studies and has given consistent evidence of
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its association with religiosity ( for an overview see Rowatt & Kirkpatrick, 2002; also
Saroglou & Galard, 2004).
For example, Gillings and Joseph (1996; also Joseph, 2000) found IM to be positively
correlated with the Francis Scale of Attitudes towards Christianity (Francis & Stubbs,
1987) (r = .20, tV= 106,p< .05), while Leak and Fish (1989) identified an association
between intrinsic religiosity (but neither extrinsic nor quest) and both the SDE (r = .27,
N=84,p< .05) and the IM factor (r = .23, N = 84,p < .05).
Finally, the BIDR-6 was preferred to other existing measurements of social desirability
(e.g. Eysenck's Lie scale), because of its two-dimensional structure, which other
measurements lack.
Table 5.1. Summary of the psychometric properties of the questionnaires used in this
study
Reliability Validity










External: .77 to .81
Quest: .75 to .81
.60 to .72 -.22 to .65
SPQ
74 items
.63 to .78 .82 .65 to .81 with STA




N: .80 to .88
E: .84 to .88
P: .61 to .62
N: .76 to .81
E: .83 to .89
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SOCIODEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES
Participants were also requested to respond to a number of sociodemographic and
descriptive questions. These questions asked the participants:
General sociodemographics
(i) Gender (female, Male)
(ii) Age, measured in years (free response)
(iii) Ethnic background (free response)
(iv) Nationality (free response)
(v) Duration of stay in Britain, measured in years (free response)
(vi) Student status (full-time, part-time, neither)
(vii) Employment status (full-time, part-time, unemployed, home-maker)
(viii) Marital status (married or living with a partner, in a relationship but not living with
a partner, single, divorced, widowed, separated)
Demographics on religion
(ix) Religious denomination (Presbyterian, Episcopalian/Anglican, Roman Catholic,
other).
(x) Duration of being a Christian, measured in years (free response).
(xiii) Religious groups: Whether they would categorise themselves as being (a)
monk/nun, (b) clergy, (c) churchgoer, (d) born-again Christian, and (e) member of a
Christian group/society (multiple response).
Religious practices
(xi) Frequency of church attendance (8-point scale, from 1 = never or almost never, to
8 = every day).
(x) Frequency ofprayer (8-point scale, from 1 = never or almost never, to 8 = every day).
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These variables were used to check whether the study protocol was satisfied (e.g. the
duration of stay in Britain), or they served as controls in the religiosity-schizotypy
relationship (e.g. gender). The selection of the control variables was based upon their
frequency of use and their empirical importance as identified in related studies and
discussed in the previous chapter (for an overview see Argyle, 2000; Batson et al., 1993;
Beit-Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997; Brown, 1987; Jonte-Pace& Parson, 2001; Wulff, 1997).
Participants were also asked to indicate whether they would have been interested in
being interviewed (74 [46%] expressed interest), and whether they would have wanted
feedback after the completion of the study (88, 54.7% requested feedback, which they
received at the completion of the study in a form of a short general description of the
study's findings). Finally, participants were encouraged to provide comments that could
be of relevance to their responses (56, 34.8% of the participants did so).
The final questionnaire battery was titled "The Faith & Well-being Questionnaire", and
it was arranged in the form of an A4, double-sided booklet, with a "peacock blue"
front/back cover. All instructions were printed in bold, size 14 Arial fonts, while the
questionnaire items were presented in normal, size 11 Times New Roman fonts. The
booklet opened with an introductory statement, which briefly described the aims of the
study, gave instructions to the participants on how to fill in the measurement and how
to contact the researcher, and addressed ethical issues (Appendix II). The battery took
approximately twenty-five minutes to fill in.
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Procedure
Pilotstudy
A pilot study was conducted in order to help (a) finalise the number and type of
psychometric or otherwise measurements, (b) address issues of proper/desirable
presentation of the materials to the participants, ( c) get an estimate of the time needed
to be spent per participant, and finally (d) identify and prevent any design pitfalls.
The study involved the recruitment of 18 participants (academic staffand postgraduates)
from the psychology department of the University of Edinburgh (ofwhom three stated
that they were not religious). Besides having been instructed to fill in all the
sociodemographic questions and the initially selected psychometric questionnaires (nine
in total, see below), the participants were requested in writing to provide written
comments on the overall format of the measurement compilation and give any advice
that could help improve the organisation and presentation of the material.
The comments received helped improve the presentation of the material by pointing to
alternative and simpler ways to phrase the instructions, or by suggesting a different,
more welcoming, order ofpresentation of the questionnaires, e.g. by placing at least one
of the two religiosity instruments in the beginning of the battery. Moreover, the
comments led to the exclusion of two measurements, viz., the Oxford-Liverpool
Inventory of Feelings & Experiences (O-LIFE; Mason et al., 1995) that measured
schizotypal traits, and the Relationship Questionnaire (RQ; Bartholomew & Horowitz,
1991) that assessed attachment styles, bringing the final number ofquestionnaires in the
study to seven.
The O-LIFE was initially included in the battery as I was not sure whether to use that
one (a British-based instrument) or the SPQ (an American-based one). The O-LIFE was
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finally excluded because it had inferior psychometric properties to the SPQ, was not
entirely based on the DSM criteria of schizotypy, was heavily criticised by the pilot-
study participant on the way it worded its items (e.g. double-negatives or unclear
questions), and it felt too long (103 items). The RQ was initially included as an
additional measurement of adult attachment, since it represented attachment styles in a
categorical manner (see chapter IV for more details about the Bartholomew and
Horowitz model). However, it was decided that this was not necessary, since the
dimensional assessment of the ECR appeared to provide all the important information
needed for this study.
MainStudy
Contact
Participants were recruited through (a) direct contact (e.g. students at the psychology
department of the University ofEdinburgh, the psychology volunteer panel), (b) indirect
contact through volunteers that functioned as intermediators. Students were verbally
invited by the researcher, while participants from the volunteer panel were initially
contacted by either email or post. All conductees were presented with the same script
(see Appendix I)
Questionnaire distribution
Questionnaires were posted to the participants either directly or indirectly through an
intermediator. In all cases a stamped self-addressed return envelope was also included.
Almost all responses were returned by post, except for very few that were handed to the
researcher in person. A total of 200 questionnaires were handed out of which 163
(81.5%) were returned. Two of the returned questionnaires were discarded as invalid,
because the participants, who had remained anonymous, had not filled in most of the
items. In two other separate instances, where participants had left large sections of the
battery unchecked, but had provided their contact details, they were contacted and
requested to fill in the blanks, which they subsequently did. As the questionnaires were
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anonymous (unless the participants had volunteered their details), there was no way for
me to know who the non-respondents were, and thus I could not contact them with a
reminder.
Ethical issues
The study complied with the University of Edinburgh ethical standards. Treatment of
participants was in accordance with the ethical standards of the APA (American
Psychological Association, 1992) and the UK Data Protection Act (1998).
Statistical analysis
Data input& statistical packages
A dataset was created in SPSS™ version 11 in which responses in all 161 questionnaires
were entered and coded. The standardised questionnaires were scored according to the
instructions from their manuals, as described above. A number of statistical packages
were utilised that allowed for a more specialised analytical and graphical treatment of
the data. SPSS™ (vl 1) was used for r-tests, ANOVAs, Pearson's correlations, multiple
linear and nonlinear regression analyses, binary logistic regression analysis, Exploratory
Factor Analysis, and missing data analysis; algebraic and matrix operations were
performed in Corel Quattro Pro™ 2000 and KyPlot™ version 2 (Yoshioka, 2000);
exploratory data analysis and a number of multivariate analyses, namely canonical
correlation analysis, cluster analysis, and nonlinear correlations, were conducted in
NCSS™ version 2001 (Hintze, 2001) and MiniTab™ version 13.1 (Ryan, Jr., Ryan, &
Joiner, 2000); power and effect size analyses were run in PASS™ version 2001 (Hintze,
2001) and GPower™ version 2 (Faul & Erdfelder, 1992); nonparametric tests were run
in StatXact™ version 3.1 (Cytel Software Corporation, 1997); Confirmatory Factor
Analysis and Structural Equation Modeling were tested in Statistica version 6 (StatSoft,
Inc., 2001) and AMOS™ version 4 (Arbuckle, 1999); finally, scaling procedures were
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run in part in MDSX™ version 2.5 (Coxon & Brier, 2002) and PerMap™ version 9.7
(Heady & Lucas, 2002). Results were presented in accordance with the APA publication
manual directions (American Psychological Association, 2002).
Overviewof the mainanalyses used
Three general groups of statistical analyses were utilised in this study: exploratory data
analysis (EDA), inferential statistics, and modelling statistics.
Exploratory data analysis (Tukev. 1977)
EDA was used as a graphical and statistical set of tools to (a) generate an initial
impression of the data, specifically regarding the distribution of the variables through
averages, dispersion, skewness and kurtosis measurements; (b) identify outlying cases
and their impact on the data; (c) assess the presence of missingness in the dataset; and
(e) describe the psychometric properties of the seven standardised questionnaires in this
study, by applying the same procedures used to develop those measurements as
described earlier and in their manuals.
Inferential statistics
These were employed to test the study's predictions. One of the main issues regarding
the use of specific inferential tests relates to their statistical assumptions. Traditionally,
inferential statistical tests were based on certain sets of qualifiers calledparameters or
moments, and thus those tests are calledparametric (mainly the mean and the variance
of a distribution; for more see Stuart & Ord, 1994, ch. 8; Tacq, 1997). Whenever a
parametric test was used in this study, its specific parametric assumptions were checked.
The main inferential parametric tests used in this study were the f-test for comparisons
between two related or unrelated groups, the analysis ofvariance family (ANOVA) for
comparisons between more than two related or unrelated groups, Pearson's product
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moment correlation for the assessment of bivariate relationships, multiple linear
regression for the identification ofcausal linear relationships between a set ofpredictors
and an outcome measure, and canonical correlation for linear relationships between two
sets ofvariables (although these two last methods are mentioned here, they weremainly
used for modelling purposes).
At the same time nonparametric tests, which do not make such strict assumptions about
the properties of the data, were used either with categorical data or when parametric
assumptions were grossly and irreversibly violated, i.e. when no permissible operations
would allow for their satisfaction. Having said that, however, I would like to clarify that
nonparametric tests, contrary to the common belief, do require certain assumptions to
be satisfied in order to produce reliable outcomes. For example, almost all require the
data to be symmetrically distributed around the median (Gravetter & Wallnau, 1996;
Siegel & Castelian, 1988). As with the previous tests, whenever a nonparametric test
was used, its assumptions were assessed.
The main nonparametric statistics used in this study were: Spearman's rho for bivariate
associations between ordinal data, and the chi-square family for associations between
dichotomous or nominal data.
Although nonparametric techniques were indeed utilised in this study, parametric
procedures were the main inferential tools. This is mainly so because (a) all previous
research I have come across in this area has used parametric tests for the same or similar
scales, and thus by following their example I was able to easily, and perhaps
meaningfully, compare my results with theirs, allow for effect size comparisons, and
even allow for the future option of performing meta-analyses; and (b) the recent
development ofmodern statistics permits the accurate use ofparametric techniques, even
when data seem to violate the parametric assumptions (Wilcox, 1998).
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For all inferential statistics used, the values of post hoc power and effect size
measurements were also presented when applicable. Finally, unless otherwise stated, an
a-level of .05 was accepted as a cutoff point for a result to be statistically significant.
Modelling statistics
Besides regression and canonical correlation models, two additional techniques were
employed for the identification of underlying structures in the dataset: factor analysis
and multidimensional scaling.
1. Factor analysis (FA) is a generic term that refers to a general multivariate statistical
data reduction approach, which objective is to analyse interrelations among variables
and represent them, with a minimum loss of information, in terms of a smaller number
of common underlying hypothetical dimensions calledfactors or components (Kim &
Mueller, 1994). Thus, FA has a twofold purpose: (a) to reduce meaningfully a large
number of variables, and (b) to identify the underlying structure in the relationship
among those variables.
Factor analysis encompasses a variety of statistical techniques, which can be classified
into two general groups: Exploratory FactorAnalysis (EFA), and Confirmatory Factor
Analysis (CFA). Exploratory factor analysis is the most commonly used type of factor
analysis in psychometric research and research in the psychology ofreligion. As its name
suggests, it is used for exploring underlying variable relationships. It can be used in areas
of study where no prior analyses are available, for example in the construction of a
questionnaire measurement. The main tests of this kind used in this study were
Principal Component Analysis (PCA), and Principal Axis Factor Analysis (PFA).
Exploratory factor analysis has had a series of criticisms (for an overview see Mulaik,
1987; also of interest Meehl, 1993). Its philosophical foundations have been questioned
on the basis that without the existence ofprior assumption, the extraction ofknowledge
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from empirical evidence cannot be logically validated. In that sense interpretation ofthe
results may be misleading, unjustifiable, and at times inappropriate. Also the commonly
used linear model ofEFA may lead to misinterpretations ofvariable relationships when
these relationships are nonlinear. Put simply, EFA was devised always to fit the data,
without taking into account the "true" underlying relationships.
CFA on the other end is a theory-based approach, which tests the goodness-of-fit
between predetermined, and at times theoretical, variable relationships and factor
constructs within a given set of observations (Bryant & Yarnold, 2001). This analysis
is rather useful when the researcher wants to develop theoretically based models, or
check whether data fit the profile of existent standardised scales. It should be noted that
CFA is also grouped under a general class of confirmatory structural procedures,
collectively known as Structural Equation Modeling (SEM), through which causal
relationships are sought among a set of variables, some of which may not be directly
measured (Bollen, 1989).
The main criticism of CFA (and as an extension of SEM) revolves around procedural
issues (Stevens, 2002). Critics have questioned (a) the validity of post hoc model
modifications, i.e. the series ofcorrection steps, through which researchers may attempt
to adjust the original model in order for it to fit in with a given dataset; (b) the adequacy
of the sample sizes employed in many studies of that kind; and (c) the arbitrary, and at
times erroneous, way in which researchers select the "best" model to fit their data.
2. Multidimensional scaling (MDS) is another large family of statistical modelling
techniques (which could include cluster analysis, correspondence analysis, and optimal
scaling) that attempt to generate a visual representation of the latent structure ofthe data
in a low-dimensional space (these techniques are also known as perceptual mapping,
spatial analysis or smallest space analysis) (Borg & Groenen, 1997; Cox & Cox, 2001).
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MDS, like factor analysis, seeks to identify the underlying dimensions of a set of data.
Unlike factor analysis, which insists on the relations being linear, MDS has the ability
to generate reasonably accurate representations of a set of variables at a low
dimensionality, e.g. two or three dimensions, as it can utilise nonlinear or monotonic
relationships (Coxon, 1982). Therefore, provided that the distances or similarities (e.g.
correlations) between the variables are meaningful, the MDS solutions tend to be more
parsimonious and interpretable than the factor analytic ones. MDS also tends to have
fewer and less strict assumptions than FA and it can be used potentially with any kind
of data (Bartholomew et ah, 2002). Finally, MDS like FA can be employed as either an
exploratory or a confirmatory technique.
The main criticism of MDS relates to (a) the arbitrariness of the criteria used to select
the number of dimensions, (b) the susceptibility of the method to the so-called local
minima solutions, i.e. solutions that are less than optimal, and (c) its apparent inability
to represent the asymmetry of causal models (Coxon, 2003).
Chapter synopsis
A total of 161 adult Christians, all British residents, took part in the study. A non-
probability purposive sampling was used. Sample size was estimated through an a priori
power analysis with effect sizes based on previous findings. Participants were recruited
from the undergraduate programs of the University of Edinburgh, the volunteer panel
of the psychology department of the above university, and through individuals who
served as intermediate contacts. Alongside a series of sociodemographic questions,
seven standardised questionnaires were used measuring religiosity (I/E-R and RLI),
personality (EPQ-R-S), schizotypal traits (SPQ), identity (AIQ-IIIx), attachment (ECR),
and desirable responding (BIDR-6). Participants were asked to complete the
questionnaires at their own pace and mail them back to the researcher. A series of
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statistical techniques were utilised to analyse the data, test the study hypotheses






"To understand God's thoughts we must study statistics,
for these are the measure of His purpose"
(Attributed to Florence Nightingale by Karl Pearson, 1924)
Chapter aims & organisation
In this chapter, I present the statistical analysis of the questionnaire data of this thesis
and discuss the findings, by focussing on those directly relevant to the study predictions
presented in chapter IV. The chapter is divided into three sections. In the first section,
descriptive information about the variables in the dataset is given, followed by an in-
depth analysis of missing values, and an assessment of the psychometric properties of
the standardised questionnaires. The second section explores the relationships between
the psychometric measurements and the sociodemographic variables. In the first two
sections all miscellaneous predictions (chapter IV) are assessed. In the final and main
section of this chapter the relationships among the primary variables as well as between
the primary and the secondary variables of this study are assessed (primary and
secondary predictions), and based on the results of this assessment the most plausible
integrated model is developed and analysed.
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1. Gender & age: Of the total 161 participants, 68.3% (110 of 161) were females. The
age distribution was bimodal (kurtosis, Fisher's g2 = -1.27) and slightly negatively
skewed (skewness, Fisher's gl = -0.126), with a median age of 50 years and a semi-
interquartile range of 16.36 years.
2. Ethnic background & nationality: White was the modal ethnic background (55.3%,
89 of 161), while the categories White, Scottish, Caucasian and British collectively
represented 86.3% (139 of 161) of the respondents. British was the modal nationality
(57.8%, 93 of 161),while British, Scottish, English, andN. Irish collectively represented
94.4% (152 of 161) of the sample.
3. Duration of stay in Britain: The distribution of the duration of stay in Britain was
bimodal (kurtosis, Fisher's g2 = -1.07) and slightly negatively skewed (skewness,
Fisher's gl = -0.22), with a median duration of 49 years, a semi-interquartile range of
18 years, and aminimum stay ofone year (this was the minimum accepted length ofstay
for inclusion in this study, as specified in the previous chapter).
4. Student status: Ofthe sample, 21.7% (35 of 161) were full-time university students,
6.2% (10 of 161) were part-time university students, while the rest 69.6% (112 of 161)
did not study (four individuals [0.5%] did not provide an answer). The students in the
sample (full and part-time) came from 22 different study areas,with themodal frequency
6
Following APA guidelines (2002), a zero before the decimal point is only used when the number can take
values greater than |1|.
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being that ofpsychology students (35.5%, 16 of45). In the analyses that follow student
status is dichotomized into students (full-time and part-time) and non-students.
5. Employment status: 26.7% (43 of 161) were in full-time employment (modal
frequency), 23% (37 of 161) in part-time employment, 14.3% (23 of 161) were
unemployed, and 19.3% (31 of 161) presented themselves as home-makers (ten
individuals [6.2%] did not provide an answer). Moreover, 17 participants (10.6%) added
the category of "retired", which was not an option in the questionnaire.
6. Marital status: Finally, responses to the marital status question indicated that 53.4%
(86 of 161) were married or living with a partner (modal frequency), 8.1% (13 of 161)
were in a relationship but did not live with their partner, 23.6% (38 of 161) were single,
4.3 % (7 of 161) divorced, 6.8% (11 of 161) widowed, and 3.7% (6 of 161) separated.
Demographics on religion
1. Religious denomination: 14.9% (24 or 161) were Roman Catholics, while the rest
85.1% (137 of 161) were Protestants. Of the Protestants, 45.3% (73 of 161) were
Presbyterian, 18% (29 of 161) Episcopalian or Anglican, and the rest (21.7%, 3 5 of 161)
belonged to other denominations. Eighteen Other Protestant denominations were
represented, although almost all consisted ofone to three participants, with Baptists and
Jehovah's Witnesses occupying the two modal frequencies of 11.4% (4 of 35)
respectively.
2. Duration of being a Christian: Of the total sample, 66.5% (107 of 161) had been
Christians for all of their life. The distribution of the duration of being a Christian was
unimodal but rather platykurtic (kurtosis, Fisher's g2 = -1.31) and symmetrical
(skewness, Fisher's gl = -0.06), with a median duration of 41 years and a semi-
interquartile range of 20 years.
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3. Religious groups: Finally, of the total, 1.2% (2 of 161) were a nun and amonk, 6.2%
(10 of 161) were clergy, 64.6% (104 of 161) were churchgoers, 23% (37 of 161) were
born-again Christians, and 19.9% (32 of 161) declared themselves as members of a
Christian group, such as church choir, church elders, and so forth (all these responses
were part of a multiple response item, and thus they add up to more than 100%).
Religious practices
1. Church attendance: Frequency of church attendance (8-point scale), had an
asymmetrical distribution (skewness, Fisher's gl = -0.86; kurtosis, Fisher'sg2 = -0.56),
with amedian andmodal frequency ofonce aweek and a semi-interquartile range of 1.5.
2. Prayer: The distribution of the frequency of prayer (8-point scale) was mirror re¬
shaped (skewness, Fisher's gl = -1.72; kurtosis, Fisher's g2 = 1.75), with a median
frequency ofmore than once a week but not every day, and a semi-interquartile range
of 0.5. The two religious practices had a monotonic positive high association with each
other (rho = .60, N = 160, p < .005, two-tailed), although their relationship could
perhaps be best described by a cubic curve (pseudo-i? = .65, N = 160,/? < .005, two-
tailed).
Power
Stepwise power analysis during various stages of the sampling process, indicated that
the final sample size seemed sufficient to reveal any statistically important effects that
may exist in the dataset. Indeed, not only was the current power high enough to detect
any bivariate relationship in the data at a = .05 with an effect size of r > |.15|, but also
any effect size equal to or greater than .38 appeared to be stable already when the sample
size consisted of 100 participants.
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Missingdata
Missingness refers to the situation where missing values are present in a dataset (Little
& Rubin, 1997). In the current study, missingness refers to nonresponses to
questionnaire items. Although missingness is a common and expected phenomenon in
questionnaire studies, it can be problematic. Besides the obvious undesirable reduction
in the sample size, a question one needs to try to answer is why responses were not given
by certain participants to certain items. This question consists of the following two
components.
First is the issue of the participants themselves. Is there anything idiosyncratic about the
participants who did not give answers? If there is, it may suggest a sampling error, for
example these people should not have been in the study in the first place. It could also
suggest that perhaps these participants form a separate group (a specific cluster of the
population) that is of interest in each own right, and requires special attention. In
psychological sense, people may avoid responding to questions that are of a sensitive,
personal, or private nature to them, and sometimes, it is exactly those people that are of
interest to psychologists.
This brings me to the second component of the initial question, which relates to the
questionnaire items. Why did specific items receive a nonresponse? It could be because
they did not apply to some of the participants; or perhaps they were too difficult or too
vague; or perhaps the questionnaire felt too long to some people; or, as I said above,
these items were addressing sensitive issues.
In psychology we tend not to pay attention to missingness, an attitude that may have led
to erroneous research findings and claims. Before proceeding with analysing any dataset
that contains missing values, one needs to attempt to answer the above two questions.
Missingness is ignorable when evidence indicates the absence of an underlying
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systematic pattern that governs the missing values (participant-wise and item-wise).
Only in this instance may one safely proceed with the analysis by either ignoring the
missing data or imputing them through a number of available techniques (see Allison,
2001).
Missing by participants
Overall in the current dataset there were 834 (1.8%) missing cases out of a total of
47012 (161 participants by 292 initial variables). In total 60% (97 of 161) of the
participants had one or more missing responses, ofwhich 67 were females (69.1 % of the
participants with missing values; 60.9% of total females), and 30 were males (30.9%;
58.8% as above) - the gender variable had no missing cases itself.
In the total sample, the proportion ofmales vs. females was (.317 : .683; that is 51/161
[males]: 110/161 [females]). Using these as the expected frequencies, a goodness-of-fit
chi-square test was utilised to assess whether the observed frequencies of males and
females with missing data deviated from chance. The test results suggest that this was
not so, x2 (1 ,N = 97) = 0.02, ns, effect size W= 0.02, power 05 =.05. Also the number
ofmissing values was not on average statistically different between the sexes, 7(95) =
0.81, ns, two-tailed, confidence intervals (CI95%) = -3.15 to 7.47, effect size <7= 0.17,
power 05 = .11.
The same procedure as above was followed with the rest ofthe major sociodemographic
variables that did not have missing values themselves. Those were religious
denomination, and marital status, while student status and employment status were not
assessed, because the presence of ten and four missing cases respectively would have
rendered the above procedure inaccurate if not invalid. Descriptive information is
presented in Table 6.1. The table shows, for example, that 42 Presbyterians had missing
values, and these made up 43.3% of the missing cases in the religious denomination
variable (42 of 97), while at the same time they constituted 56.7% of the total number
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ofPresbyterians in the sample (42 of 74). Once again by treating the actual frequencies
of each category in the total sample as the expected frequencies, the number of
participants with missing values among the four denominational groups did not differ
significantly from chance, %2 (3,N = 97) = 0.99, ns, effect size W= 0.10, power 05 = .11.
In addition, the number of missing values was on average not statistically different
between the denominations, F(3, 93) = 0.18, ns, effect size r)2 = .01, power 05 = .08.
In the same line of thought, the number of participants with missing values among the
six marital status categories did not differ significantly from what was expected by
chance, yj (5, N = 97) = 1.29, ns, effect size W= 0.12, power 05 = .12. Finally, the
number of missing values was on average not statistically different among marital
statuses, F(5, 91) = 1.16, ns, effect size rp = .06, power05 = .39.
Table 6.1. Missingness broken down by the main sociodemographic variables that did not
have missing values.






















In a relation, not
living with partner
8 61.5 8.2
Marital status Single 22 57.9 22.7
Divorced 6 85.7 6.2
Widowed 8 72.7 8.3
Separated 4 66.6 4.1
* these numbers add up to 100% within each variable
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Within the subsample of people with missing values, age did not have either a linear (r
= .02, N= 97, ns, two-tailed, power 05 = .05.), or a nonlinear (maximum pseudo-i? = .04)
association with numberofmissing values. In the whole sample, there was no significant
difference between the average age of the people without missing values (mean = 44.7
years, SD = 17.3 years) and those with missing (mean = 48.2 years, SD = 19.8 years),
t(159) = 1.14, ns, two-tailed, confidence intervals (CI95o/o) = -9.48 to 2.52, effect size d
= 0.18, power 05 = .22.
Finally, all the above sociodemographic variables, viz. gender, religious denomination,
marital status, and age, were put in a standard binary logistic regression model as
predictors against a dichotomous variable of missingness (missing vs. not missing,
prediction towards the former), to investigate whether their predictive power would
change in the presence of each other. The model was not significantly better from a
model with only the constant in, "£~ (10, N = 161) = 7.03, ns, effect size W = 0.17,
power 05 = .24, and it had very low predictive value (Nagelkerke R2 = .06), with none of
the predictors' log-odds being statistically significant.
All the above findings seem to suggest the absence of an obvious pattern in overall
missingness in respect to the participants.
Missing by questionnaire items
Ofthe total 292 items, 211 (72.2%) items had one or moremissing responses. Focussing
on the responses to the psychometric questionnaire items (K= 269), (9-analysis revealed
that the median number of missing values was one (semi-interquartile range = 1),
coming from a heavily L-shaped distribution (skewness, Fisher's gl =2.17; kurtosis,
Fisher's g2 = 5.05), with a range of 0 to 20 missing values, where 90.7% of the items
(244 of 269) had between 0 and 8 missing cases inclusively.
Table 6.2 shows a clearer picture of this distribution broken down by inventory. The I/E-
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R and the AIQ-IIIx had very similar patterns ofmissingness followed by the EPQ-R-S.
The outlying item of the AIQ-IIIx that had 20 missing cases asked about the importance
of one's student status to who one was [Item 34], Some participants commented that
they could not answer this question since they either were not or had never been
students. However, this was a buffer item that did not contribute to the development of
any of the identity factors ofthat questionnaire, and thus these responses could be safely
ignored.





















19 155.9%! 4 (5.4%) 13
(36.1%)
3 (8.6%) 2 (5%)
3 10(29.4%) 1 (1.3%) 3 (8.3%)
4 4(11.8%) 1 (2.5%)










%* .71 1.62 .25 .95 1.01 5.45 .53
* percent ofmissing of the total cases
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Nonresponses on the SPQ appeared to have a similar distribution to those on the BIDR-
6. Incidentally, the two items of the BIDR-6 that had eight missing cases addressed
driving behaviour [Items 8 and 33], and some of the participants who did not respond
to these commended that they did not drive and thus the questions seemed not applicable
to them.
The RLI had slightly higher number of missing values than any of the above
questionnaires. The item with the highest number ofmissing cases (five) ("My religious
development is a natural response to our innate need for devotion to God" [Item 4]) was
found too abstract by a number ofparticipants. Participants,mainly from other Protestant
denominations, also commented on the use of the word "church", which they found not
applicable to their practices. A few participants also expressed their unease to discuss
religion in general. For example:
I find it a bit difficult to talk about "my" religion. I have certain beliefs that one
might call religious; also I am a member of a church that adds to my spiritual
life. But my religion is not something I keep in a drawer and get out at the
appropriate moments. [59-year-old female, other Christian]
I find "religious" quite a scary and alienating term. [ 19-year-old female, Quaker]
The concept of faith cannot be analysed. [24-year-old male, Presbyterian]
Although these comments could equally apply to the study as a whole, it should be said
that of the two religious orientation questionnaires, RLI may have been perceived to be
addressing more personal issues, perhaps because of the way it phrases the items or the
inclusion of the quest dimension. Should this have been the case, it is conceivable that
a number ofpeople may have been reluctant to answer certain items. Finally, it is worth
mentioning that the RLI was presented last in the battery (before the
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sociodemographics), and thus there is also a possibility that participants were getting
tired - and indeed a small number ofthem commented that the questionnaire battery felt
too long.
In relation to the total number of items in each questionnaire, the SPQ had the smallest
proportion of nonresponses - 30 cases (0.25%) of a total of 11914 (161 participants by
74 items in the SPQ) - followed by the BIDR-6 (0.53%).
However, by far the most distinct pattern of missingness was observed in the ECR,
which accessed adult attachment. This inventory had both the highest number ofmissing
cases per item (30% of the items fell on the modal frequency of 9 missing values), and
the highest percentage ofnonresponse (5.45%). Once again participants' comments can
help with the understanding of this pattern:
My answers to the questions on romantic partners were vague because I have
never been in a romantic relationship, so don't know how I'd react.
[21-year-old female, Catholic]
[This questionnaire] does not apply as I have no partner at present but I had a
long and happy marriage. [64-year-old female, Presbyterian]
In fact, I once received a call during the study from an 80-year-old female participant
asking me to help her complete the ECR. She commented she could not see how the
issues addressed in the instrument could apply to her, as she had only had a single
partner in her whole life. Taking these comments into consideration, I investigated
whether missingness in the ECR was related to any of the sociodemographic
information. No important associations were found.
In all fairness, however, I would have to admit post hoc that the wording ofthe inventory
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and its instructions, through phrases like "we are interested in how you generally
experience relationships, not just in what is happening in a current relationship"
[instructions, see Appendix VIII] or "when romantic partners disapprove ofme, I feel
really bad about myself' [Item 34], seem to suggest that one was expected to have had
more than one relationship. This study has made clear, at least to me, that this is not
necessarily so. Thus, the questionnaire may be biased towards certain groups ofpeople
with perhaps relatively more "modern" or "liberal" attitudes. Perhaps in the future the
wording of the inventory could be adjusted to accommodate people who have had a
single partner.
So far the analysis by item suggests that missingness appears to be relatively similar
between the psychometric questionnaires. The Scheffe test can give us an additional
impression ofhow the questionnaires group in terms ofnumber ofmissing values (Table
6.3). This picture complements that of Table 6.2 and it seems to agree with what has
been discussed so far, i.e. that most of the tests tend to possess similar levels of
missingness except for the ECR and possibly the RLI.
Table 6.3. Homogenous subsets of questionnaires based
on their mean number of missing values as displayed in
each subset (generated by the Scheffe test).
Subset




EPQ 36 1.53 1.53
AIQ 35 1.63 1.63
RLI 34 2.62
ECR 36
Is this evidence that missingness is nonignorable? Not really. It only suggests that as far
as the psychometric questionnaires are concerned, missing values do not appear to be
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allocated completely at random. However, missing values can still be random,
conditional upon the given questionnaire, or in other words, when within each
questionnaire no patterns of missingness are observed. Should this be the case,
missingness can still be considered ignorable (Allison, 2001).
When the items of the psychometric questionnaires were replaced by the questionnaire
factors and buffer items were excluded from the dataset (£=17, present in AIQ-IIIx and
RLI), the total number of variables (sociodemographics plus psychometric factors) was
reduced to 49, of which 42 (85.7%) had at least one missing value. Focussing on the
psychometric questionnaires, as it was shown in Table 6.2 only two had items with no
missing cases (the BIDR-6 and the SPQ). For these two measurements, in order to assess
whether the number of items with missing values that each of their factors had was
significantly different from chance, two goodness-of-fit chi-squares were utilised, one
for each measurement, by using the actual number of items that made up each factor as
the expected frequencies.
Test results were nonsignificant for both measurements: For the BIRD-6 (expected
frequencies .5 : .5), yj (1,77= 15) = 3.26, ns, effect size W= 0.46, power 05 = .43; for the
SPQ (expected frequencies .34 : .34 : .22 : .10, yj (3,77= 24) = 1.55, ns, effect size W
= 0.25, power 05 = .15 (the degrees of freedom in this last test were 3 because two of the
second order factors of the SPQ, viz. "cognitive perceptual" and "interpersonal" had a
common first order factor, viz. "suspiciousness", which, for the purpose ofthis analysis,
was excluded from their scoring and was used as a separate factor). For the rest of the
questionnaires the above analyses were not performed since all of their items had
missing values, and thus their expected frequencies would have been identical to their
observed ones.
For all the psychometric questionnaires it was investigated whether the mean number of
missing values was significantly different between their factors (Table 6.4). These results
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suggest that, on average, cases with missing values did not vary significantly between
the questionnaire factors.
Table 6.4. Comparisons between the mean number ofmissing values in the factors of each
questionnaire (none of the results were statistically significant at a = .05).
Statistic I/E-R RLI SPQ EPQ-R-S AIQ-IIIx ECR BIDR-6
F 0.61 0.62 1.35 2.14 0.77 .15 0.11
df 2, 11 2, 24 8*, 65 2,33 2, 22 1,34 1, 38
h2 .10 .05 .14 .11 .06 .004 .003
power 05 .13 .14 .57 .41 .16 .07 .06
* the nine first-order factors were used
These results indicate that although missingness seemed to be related to the content of
the questionnaires, within each measurement, both missing values and number of items
with missing cases appeared to be randomly allocated.
Overall the findings presented in this section were taken as evidence of ignorable
missingness. Thus, subjects or items with missing values were not excluded from the
dataset. Missing values were only imputed for certain tests that did not accept empty




Internal consistency statistics for all questionnaires are shown in Table 6.5. As it can be
seen from that table, the scales appear to possess very similar, and most of the times
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better internal reliabilities that their normative ones. Allow me to discuss the scales that
had reliabilities below .70.
First the reliability of the extrinsic personal scale, though just below .70 was still twelve
units higher than its normative value, and thus it was considered adequate.
Also the relatively low reliability of the psychoticism scale (.63) was expected, and as
Eysenck and Eysenck (1991) state " the P scale taps several different facets (hostility,
cruelty, lack of empathy, nonconformity, etc.) which may hold reliabilities lower than
would be true" (p. 19). I decided to look closer into what may be causing this low
reliability.
I ran an Alpha-factoring analysis (Kaiser & Coffrey, 1965) with Direct Oblimin (i.e.
non-orthogonal) rotation on the 12 items that form the psychoticism scale. Alpha-
factoring is a type of exploratory factor analysis appropriate for items that form scales,
which fall into the psychological theory ofmeasurement (Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001).
Thus the factors extracted are such that maximise the internal reliability of the scale
based on the values of the alpha coefficient.
The most parsimonious and meaningful model, extracted three factors, which when
unrotated accounted for 48.48% of the variance in the psychoticism. When rotated the
factors appeared relatively independent, with the highest correlation being between the
first and the second factor (.24), and the lowest between the second and the third factor
(-.08) - factor independence was confirmed by the very similar item-factor correlations
reported in both the structure and the pattern matrixes. Although most of the items
loaded on the first factor, of interest were the four items that formed the other two
factors.
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Table 6.5. Cronbach's alpha coefficients for all the scales (in brackets are the reported
reliabilities by the developers of the measurements, where available).
Inventory Sub-scales alpha
Intrinsic .86 (.83)
I/E-R Extrinsic personal .69 (.57)











Ideas of reference .77 (.71)
Social anxiety .84 (.72)
SPQ* Magical thinking .78 (.81)
Unusual experiences .73 (.71)
Eccentric behaviour .85 (.76)
No close friends .81 (.67)
Odd speech .73 (.70)
Constricted affect .78 (.66)
Suspiciousness .76 (.78)
Neuroticism .84 (.80-.84)
EPQ-R-S* Extraversion .86 (.84-.88)
Psychoticism .63 (.61-.62)
Personal identity .79 (.84)
AIQ-IIIx Social identity .87 (.86)
Collective identity .65 (.74)
I.-f i J
Anxious attachment .90 (.91)
Avoidant attachment .92 (.94)
BIRD-6 Self-deception .71 (.68-.80)
Impression management .80 (.75-86)
* Since responses in these scales are dichotomous, the Kuder-Richardson 20 (K-R 20) coefficient is
presented (Kuder & Richardson, 1937).
The second factor consisted of the following three items, presented in descending order
of loadings: "Is it better to follow society's rules than go your own way?" (Item 33,
reverse coding), "Do you prefer to go your own way rather than act by the rules?" (Item
11), and "Do you take notice of what people think?" (Item 2, reverse coding). These
Page 183
Chapter VI: The questionnaire study: Results & discussion
items are the only ones in the inventory that appear to be directly addressing issues of
nonconformity.
The third factor had a single item, viz. "Do you think people spend too much time
safeguarding their future with savings and insurances?" (Item 24). This last item had the
lowest item-scale correlation (.09) in the reliability diagnostics, which, by also taking
into account the single-item factor it formed, may suggest either that it needs to be
reworded or that perhaps it should be excluded from the scale. In fact, when all four
items of the second and third factor were excluded from the scale, the internal reliability
of the scale improved considerably (K-R 20 = .73).
However, this misbehaviour of the above four items could be sample-specific.
Unfortunately, both the EPQ manual and the Eysenck et al. (1985) article (in which the
development of the psychoticism scale was presented) do not provide enough
information to access the normative behaviour of those items. That said, in a recent
article, Aluja, Garcia, and Garcia (2003) ran a psychometric assessment of EPQ-R-S
(Spanish version) by using both exploratory and confirmatory analyses (N = 1006).
Among other findings, they identified six items in psychoticism that were significantly
reducing the goodness-of-fit indices of the scale. Of those items, three were the same
as the ones identified above (item 2 was not one of them). This additional evidence
seems to suggest that the misbehaviour of these items may not be sample-specific, and
that the psychoticism scale may indeed need to be modified.
The other scale that had a reliability value below .70, and one that was well below its
normative value (.74), was collective identity (observed reliability was .65). In this case,
however, diagnostics indicated that a single item was entirely responsible for the
decrease in reliability. Interestingly, this item asked how important religion was to the
sense ofwho one was (Item 10). The item-scale correlation was -.07, and when the item
was excluded, the reliability of the scale was raised to .72. Spearman's correlations
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between this item and each of the rest seven items in the scale tended to have negative,
but near zero coefficients, with only two exceeding the value of |.10|, viz. against the
importance of the place one lives (Item 13) (rho = -.17, N = 160), and against the
importance of one's language (Item 33) (rho = -.18, N = 160). In addition, curve
estimations revealed the absence of nonlinear bivariate relationships. Finally, this lack
of association did not appear to be based on outlying cases.
It is possible that because the sample was largely homogenous in respect to religion, Item
10, which can be seen as a crude and broad index of religious identity, may lack
discriminating power. Indeed, 65.2% of the respondents (105 of 161) said that religion
was very important or extremely important to the sense of who they were, and this
percentage rose to 81.3% when responses on the "somewhat important" point were
added. According to de Vaus (2002, pp. 48-53) this pattern of responding is indicative
of a nondiscriminating item.
Finally, perhaps of minor concern are the relatively low reliabilities of the quest sub-
scales (.58, .62, and .64). Reliability diagnostics suggest that none of the items in each
of these scales was problematic. Moreover, lack of comparative results does not allow
me to assess their consistency in relative terms. Since each of these sub-scales consisted
of four items, it is conceivable that their low reliabilities are at least in part artefacts of
the small number of items involved (Hair et ah, 1998). I revisit this issue when I
examine the structural integrity of these scales below.
Overall, it can be said that the scales appear to function reliably enough with the sample
of this study.
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Validity
Both convergence and discriminant validities were assessed primarily by replicating the
exact statistical analyses run by the developers of the instruments, while additional
analyses were performed when further clarifications were necessary.
Religiosity (I/E-R)
The correlation matrix of the 14 items of the scale was subjected to a Principal Axis
analysis with Equamax rotation, and three factors were requested (Table 6.6). The three
factors were extracted in nine iterations, while the rotation converged in five iterations.
Based on the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy (Kaiser
& Cerny, 1977), the proportion of variance in the items attributed to common variance
was 80.5%, while the Bartlett's test of sphericity (Bartlett, 1950) suggested that the
items' correlation matrix was significantly different from the identity matrix, yj (91, N
= 158) = 809.9,p < .005. The extracted three factors accounted for 49.18% of the total
variance, and as can be seen from Table 6.6, they show unambiguously the three
religious orientations of the inventory.
To check whether factor independence was an artefact of the rotation used, Principal
Axis analysis was rerun using direct Oblimin rotation. The results suggested that indeed
the three factors were largely independent, with the highest correlation (.10) being
between the extrinsic personal and the extrinsic social factors. When the items were
scored on the three religious orientations, i.e. by summing up the responses on the items
ofeach factors, the above levels ofvery low correlations were sustained, with the highest
correlation still being between extrinsic personal and extrinsic social, which in this
instance had slightly increased to .16, while the rest were below |.08|. It is also worth
mentioning that themean levels ofthe orientation ofthis sample were significantly lower
than the norms.
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Table 6.6. Principal Axis factor loadings after Equamax rotation of the 14 I/E-R items after
scoring. Loadings below .30 are not shown*.
Factor
1 2 3
Item 12 (intrinsic) .87
Item 14 (intrinsic-reversed) .82
Item 10 (intrinsic-reversed) .67
Item 7 (intrinsic) .66
Item 1 (intrinsic) .65
Item 3 (intrinsic-reversed) .64
Item 4 (intrinsic) .51
Item 5 (intrinsic) .51
Item 13 (extrinsic social) .74
Item 11 (extrinsic social) .74
Item 2 (extrinsic social) .71
Item 6 (extrinsic personal) .72
Item 8 (extrinsic personal) .64
Item 9 (extrinsic personal) .59
Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 3.79 1.87 1.22
Mean (SD) 29.72 (6.88) 15.25 (3.96)
Norm** 37.2 25.6***
ft 158) 13 69**** 32 97****
* Although Stevens (2002, p. 394) suggests |.40|, I opted for a less conservative cutoff point;
** from Hill & Hood, 1999; *** only the combined norm was available; **** p < .005, two-
tailed
To test further the study's prediction that the I/E-R structure would be recovered in the
current sample, an MDS analysis of the measurement was carried out, which generated
a very interesting picture. Kruskal's non-metricmonotone regression algorithm was used
(Kruskal, 1964), because it does not require any metric assumptions from the data (such
as multidimensional normality or linearity), and it tends to produce a clearer picture of
the distances between the variables in comparison to a metric alternative, when the
fewest possible dimensions are desirable (Hammond, 1987). Proximitieswere calculated
from the scored items using Euclidean distances with a primary approach to ties. In order
to minimize the risk of a less-than-optimum solution, two thousand initial random
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Figure 6.1. A two-dimensional representation of Allport's religious orientations as mapped
through anon-metric multidimensional scaling analysis (I = intrinsic, EP = extrinsic personal,
ES = extrinsic social; numbers shown are item numbers).
configurations were requested. A two-dimensional solution was selected (Kruskal's
Stress = .053) for being themost parsimonious one (solution converged in 50 iterations),
which accounted for 46.2% of the variance and maintained 56.7% of the rank ordering
of the dissimilarities (Figure 6.1).
First observation from the two-dimensional map is that the three orientations form
clearly defined clusters. Second, since MDS is reproducing a spatial picture of the
underlying structure of the data, the meaning of the dimensions is not as central as are
the factors in factor analysis. However, in the above configuration, I was tempted to
name the dimensions since they appeared to be very meaningful. The x-axis seems to
represent the continuum between social and personal aspects of religiosity, with the
extrinsic social orientation lying on the one end, the intrinsic on the other, while the
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extrinsic personal forming a bridge between the two. The y-axis, however, is the most
interesting one. As discussed in chapter IV, Kenneth Pargament (1997) theorised that
any orientation (intrinsic, extrinsic, or quest) could be classified as being either the ends
or the means of someone's approach to life (see Table 4.1). He suggested that an
intrinsic means orientation is highly embedded in one's life, while the intrinsic ends has
more of a spiritual nature. At the same time the extrinsic means is a lightly held
religiosity, while the extrinsic ends deals with the need for safety and comfort.
The MDS map not only seems to support empirically Pargament's ideas, but it also
suggests that the means and ends distinction is not a categorical classification but rather
a dimensional one. The y-axis can be seen as the continuum between the ends and means
religiosity. The ends pole is populated by the extrinsic personal, which taps into issues
of comfort, safety and happiness, while the two intrinsic items on this end (14 and 15)
address issues of private prayer and the feeling of a strong presence of God. At the
means pole, the extrinsic social deals with using religion mainly as the means to
socialising, while the three intrinsic items (110,112, and 114) refer to religion as being
the centre ofone's life. In addition, the intrinsic orientation provides the link to the two
poles of this dimension.
All the above findings suggest in a rather clear manner that Allport's measurement
consists of three independent and rather stable orientations ofreligiosity. At the same
time they indicate that the three orientations can be meaningfully represented in a
lower two-dimensional space defined by the social-personal and the means-ends
aspects of religiosity7.
7
Whenever a conclusion relates to any of the predictions of this study, it is presented in a box.
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Religiosity (RLI)
The correlation matrix of the 27 items (seven of the total 34 items in the inventory were
buffer items) of the scale was subjected to a Principal Axis analysis with Varimax
rotation, and three factors were requested (Table 6.7). The three factors were extracted
in ten iterations, while the rotation converged in five iterations.
Based on the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, the
proportion of variance in the items attributed to common variance was 81%, while the
Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that the items' correlationmatrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, y2 (351, N = 153) = 1581.7,/? < .0005. The extracted
three factors accounted for 37.96% of the total variance. However, as it can be seen in
Table 6.7 the factors extracted did not correspond to the three orientations of the
measurement. The first factor contained both the internal and external orientation items
plus one quest item, while the rest of the quest items were split between the other two
factors.
When only the items of the quest orientation were factor-analysed through Principal
Axis with Varimax rotation, and three factors were requested, the picture that emerged
was still not the one proposed by Batson (Table 6.7). The three factors were extracted
in 29 iterations, while the rotation converged in five iterations. The Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin
measure of sampling adequacy suggested that the proportion of variance in the items
attributed to common variance was 75.1%, the Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that
the items' correlation matrix was significantly different from the identity matrix, y2 (66,
N= 159) = 440.6,/? < .0005, while the extracted three factors accounted for 39.39% of
the total variance. However, once again the factors did not resemble the three divisions
of the quest orientation.
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Table 6.7. Principal Axis factor loadings after Varimax rotation of the 27 RLI items after
scoring. Loadings below |.30| are not shown, unless no higher loading is available.
Factor total Factor quest
1 2 3 1 2 3
Item 1 (external) .71
Item 9 (internal) .68 -.35
Item 27 (internal) .67
Item 12 (internal) .66
Item 30 (internal) .65
Item 23 (internal-reversed) .63 -.32
Item 4 (internal) .62
Item 7 (external) .60
Item 25 (external) .57
Item 34 (internal-reversed) .56
Item 13 (internal) .50
Item 20 (external) .49 .34
Item 18 (internal-reversed) .47
Item 33 (external-reversed) .36
Item 17 (quest, doubt-reversed) -.32 .56
Item 15 (external) .30
Item 5 (quest, openness) .78 .82
Item 6 (quest, doubt) .77 .74
Item 11 (quest, doubt) .61 .62
Item 26 (quest, openness) .61 .60
Item 16 (quest, openness-reversed) .51 .49
Item 32 (quest, doubt) .44 .44
Item 3 (quest, openness) .38 .36
Item 24 (quest, complexity) .38 .32 .36 .34
Item 29 (quest, complexity) .82 .86
Item 8 (quest, complexity) .74 .70
Item 19 (quest, complexity) .26 -.27
Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 6.24 3.39 2.27 2.87 1.38 .48
As exploratory factor analysis only allows for the manipulation of the number of factors
to be extracted and not for the forced placement of items to given factors, I decided to
run two confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), one for all the items (except the buffer
ones) in the RLI and one for only the quest subscales. The models converged in eleven
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and nine iterations respectively, and the goodness-of-fit statistics are shown in Table 6.8.
The minimum discrepancy function (yj) was significant for both of Batson's models,
suggesting that the data do not adequately fit the hypothesised models. However,
researchers have long ceased relying on this index of absolute fit, due to its
unrealistically strict expectations from the data, and its sensitivity to sample size and
non-normality in the variables (Byrne, 2001). A better index of fit is given by the
minimum discrepancy divided by the degrees of freedom (CMINDF). Marsh and
Hocevar (1985) suggested that a CMINDF below five indicates a good fit. Both models
in the current study have much smaller values on this index (2.16 for the total RLI and
1.83 for the quest subscales model).
Table 6.8. CFA goodness-of-fit statistics for Batson's models of the whole RLI and the
quest subscales.













x2 694.68 0 10077.01 93.44 0 3764.38
df 321 - 378 51 - 78
P< .0001 - .0001 .0001 - .0001
CMINDF 2.16 - 26.66 1.83 - 48.26
NFI .93 1 0 .97 1 0
CFI .96 1 0 .99 1 0
RMSEA .086 0 .403 .073 0 .547
90%CIrmsea .07 - .09 - .39- .41 .05 - .06 - .53 - .56
ECVI 5.46 5.13 64.12 1.08 1.14 23.98
90%CIecvi 5-6 - 62.1- 66.2 0.9- 1.2 - 22.7 - 25.3
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The Bentler-Bonett normedfit index (NFI) and the Bentler comparative fit index (CFI)
are two commonly used indices of relative fit. Both indices range from zero
(independence model, no fit) to one (saturated model, perfect fit), with values greater
than .90 suggesting a good fit (Bentler, 1992). As can be seen, in the current models
these indices are within the acceptable range.
The rootmean square error ofapproximation (RMSEA) is another index of fit. Browne
and Cudeck (1993) suggested as a rule of a thumb that values of .08 or less should be
regarded as indicative ofa close fit. By taking into account the 90% confidence intervals
of the index, Batson's models appear to possess acceptable levels ofRMSEA. The final
index presented in Table 6.8 is the expected cross-validation index (ECVI), which is a
measure of how well the model would fit with a similar-sized sample taken from the
same population (Byrne, 2001). The index can take any value, with values either or both
close to zero and the saturated model suggesting a good fit. Again both Batson's models
satisfy this assumption.
Taken as a whole the above indices suggest that the structures ofboth the RLI and the
quest subscales appear to possess acceptable levels of convergence validity.
Unlike, however, Batson's assumption and the subsequent development of the scale on
orthogonal (i.e. independent) orientations, the CFA run in the current study revealed that
for the RLI model to have adequate fit the three orientations needed to be free to covary
- and indeed when the items were scored, the orientations did tend to do so (Table 6.9).
As it can be seen from this table, the internal and external orientations had a high
positive association (r = .60). The quest appeared to be independent from the external
orientation (r = -.06), but relatively related to the internal one, though this last
relationship was of an inverse nature (r = -.21).
When the quest orientation was broken down into its three subscales, once again it
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appeared to have no important association with external, while with the internal it was
primarily the doubt and secondarily the openness subscale that had a relationship, while
complexity seemed to be independent from the internal orientation.
Although no reports are available in the literature regarding the levels of association
between the quest subscales and the rest of Batson's orientations, the three higher
orientations had to a great extent the expected relationships with each other. Indeed,
Batson and Schoenrade (1991), and Batson et al. (1993) report correlations between
internal an external ranging from .60 to .65, and between internal and quest ranging from
-.21 to -.22.
Table 6.9. Pearson's productmoment correlation coefficients between the RLI orientations,
with observed and norm means for each orientation.
Upper off diagonal elements are observed correlations in the dataset






Internal gQa*** _ 21b** .03a . 24**** ] 9a*
External a*** -,06c ,02b -. 12a -,04b










Lower off diagonal elements show estimated correlations through CFA
Mean
(SD)
6.69 (1.52) 5.54 (1.59) 4.98 (1.15)
Normf 6.42 5.89 5.04
?(155) 2.19* 2.75** 0.59 1
f from Batson & Schoenrade, 1991; J df= 154;a n = 155, bn= 154,c« = 153; *p< 05; **p < .01;
***
p < .005, all two-tailed
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The current study's results sit comfortably at the lower end of those ranges. However,
the correlation between external and quest in their studies ranged from -.14 to -.18,
which is two and a half to three times as high as the one found in my study (-.06) -
although by using Fisher's z-transformation this difference was not statistically
significant.
Finally, it should be noted that this sample was on average significantly more internally
and significantly less externally orientated than the norms, while it showed similar quest
levels to the latter.
Convergence Validity between I/E-R & RIL
The correlations between I/E-R and RLI are presented in Table 6.10. As predicted,
intrinsic orientation had relatively high correlations with both internal (r = .79) and
external (r = .48). Moreover, external had a relatively low association with extrinsic
social (r = .27) and a much lower one with extrinsic personal (r = .15), supporting the
notion that it is primarily a facet ofmature religiosity, and only partially a component
of the immature one. Although quest as a whole had the predicted low and negative
correlation with intrinsic (r = -.15), while at the same time it appeared to be almost
totally independent from both the extrinsic ones, when broken down to its three
subscales an interesting picture emerged.
Quest openness showed almost the same profile as total quest. Quest doubt, however,
had a much higher negative correlation with intrinsic (r = -.26), which for the current
sample size was statistically significant. Finally, quest complexity appeared to exhibit
a low, yet much higher than the total quest, association with extrinsic personal (r = . 13),
while at the same time being almost orthogonal to the other I/E-R orientations.
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Table 6.10. Pearson's productmoment correlation coefficients between the RLI and the I/E-
R scales.
RLI
Intrinsic Extrinsic personal Extrinsic social
Internal 79b** .10b ,16c*
External ,48b** .15" 27°**
Quest -,15a .06a -,01b
Quest complexity .05" .13" -,06c
Quest doubt -.26°** -,03c ,003d
Quest openness -.14b 0b ,01c
a
n = 153,b n = 154,c n = 155,6 n = 156; * p < .05, ** p < .01, both two-tailed
These results support to an extent Donahue's (1985) suggestion that quest is not a
mature form of religiosity, but rather a stage of religious sentiment, through which an
individual passes in order to acquire a mature orientation (I revisit this issue later).
Overall, these results suggest that (a) the I/E and the RLI appear to have acceptable
levels ofconvergence validity, (b) internal and intrinsic orientations seem to be rather
similar, (c) external appears to be mainly a part of intrinsic, and (d) quest, or at least
an aspect of it, viz. doubt, may not be as independent from intrinsic as it was initially
predicted.
Furthermore, the relationship between the orientations of the two measurements
exhibited a degree of nonlinearity. Only nonlinear associations with the highest and
statistically significant pseudo-f? were compared with the corresponding linear r-
coefficients. The following techniques were used in order to assess whether the
correlation coefficients of the nonlinear functions were significantly higher than the
linear ones:
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i. For quadratic (Y = b0 + b,X + b2X2) or cubic (Y = b0 + b,X + b2X2 + b3X3) functions,
one of the two variables in the pair was assigned to Y and the other to the X position.
The X2 and X3 were both calculated when necessary, and inserted as new variables in
SPSS. Hierarchical linearmultiple regressions were run, in which X, and X2, X3 (the last
only for the cubic function) were added in the model in this block-order, and the
significance of the change in the R2 was assessed.
ii. For any other nonlinear functions (e.g. logarithmic, growth, exponential, and so forth)
the formula found in Cohen & Cohen (1983, p. 57) was used. One of the two
orientations in the pair was subjected to the given function-transformation and a new
variable was created in SPSS. An SPSS syntax file was created to compute the
significance of the difference between the two Rs (Appendix X).
Table 6.11. Hierarchical multiple linear regression results for tests ofcubic relations between
three quest scales and the intrinsic orientation of I/E-R.
Block Predictor partial-r R2 change R2
It Quest -.15 .02
2 Quest -.08
Quest2 -.05 .06* .08*
Quest3 -.02
If Quest complexity .05 .002
2 Quest complexity -.04
Quest complexity2 .01 .054* .056*
Quest complexity3 .02
n Quest openness -.14 .02
2 Quest openness -.08
Quest openness2 .05 .02 .04
Quest openness3 -.04
t Y= 153; % N= 154; * p < .05
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Extrinsic personal possessed no significant nonlinear associations with any of the RLI
orientations. Extrinsic social had a significant cubic relationship with external, which
however, was ofan equal magnitude to the linear one (pseudo-R = .27), and a significant
cubic association with internal (pseudo-R = .18), whichwas not significantly higher from
the linear one (R2-change = .006, N = 154, ns).
The intrinsic orientation had statistically significant nonlinear associations with all the
RLI orientations. The highest nonlinear one was against the internal orientation and
followed a logarithmic function [Y = b0 + (bjlnX)], which however, was of a smaller
magnitude than the linear one presented in Table 6.10 (pseudo-R = .77). In relation to
external, the highest nonlinear association had an S-shaped function [Y = e(b0+(bl/X))] and
an almost identical magnitude to the linear one (pseudo-R = .48).
Total quest, quest complexity, and quest openness, all had cubic relationships with
intrinsic, which, with the exception of quest openness, were significantly higher that
their linear ones (Table 6.11). Finally, the highest nonlinear association between intrinsic
and quest doubt was of an exponential nature (Y = b0e(blx)) (pseudo-R = .28) and
significantly higher than the linear one, /(152) = 4.24,p < .005, (two-tailed).
Summing up, it can be said that nonlinear relationships between the orientations of
the I/E-R and RLI were present in the current dataset. Elowever, by taking into account
issues ofparsimony and simplicity, these relationships did not appear to possessmuch
greater predictive values than their linear counterparts, with perhaps the exception of
quest and more specifically the quest complexity orientation against intrinsic.
SCHIZOTYPY
The developers of the SPQ assessed its structural integrity only through confirmatory
models, and at the level between the nine first-order and the three second-order factors
(Raine et al., 1994; Reynolds et al., 2000; Rossi & Daneluzzo, 2002). Following their
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Figure 6.2. Structural representation of the SPQ second-
order traits, showing correlation coefficients, and
standardised loadings.
method, the covariance matrix of the nine first-order scales was subjected to a CFA (see
Table 6.12 for factorial structure). The model converged in nine iterations. However,
goodness-of-fit statistics were not satisfactory. The CMINDF was 10.12 (values below
5 are needed for a good fit), the NFI was .80 and the CFI .82 (for both indices values
above .90 suggest a good fit), and the RMSEA was .24 (below .08 for a good fit).
I decided to investigate further into potential modifications that could be applied to the
model to improve fit. However, AMOS™ does not produce modification indices for
incomplete data. Therefore I imputed the missing values through the SPSS expectation-
maximization (EM) maximum likelihood algorithm (Dempster, Laird & Rubin, 1977),
and reran the model. The goodness-of-fit indices of the initial model remained
essentially the same. However, this time, modification indices were available.
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Given that the structure of the instrument is explicitly based on the DSM-III-R nine
diagnostic criteria of schizotypy, only theoretically permissible Lagrange modifications
were considered. So for example, modifications pointing to causal paths between the
first-order factors were ignored. Also ignored was the suggestion that magical thinking
should be allowed to load on the interpersonal factor as this has not been so with any
tested or proposed conceptual model of the inventory (see Rossi & Daneluzzo, 2002).
Therefore, the only modifications made were in respect to residual covariation.
Table 6.12. CFA goodness-of-fit statistics for the SPQ inventory, after
imputation of missing values and modification of residual covariation.
SPQ Saturated model Independence model
t 15.29 0 776.71
df 16 - 36
P< ns - .0001
CM1NDF 0.96 - 21.57
NFI .98 1 0
CFI .99 1 0
RMSEA .0001 0 .36
90%CIrmsea 0- .07 - .34- .38
ECVI 0.46 0.56 4.97
90%CIecvi 0.46-0.54 - 4.42-5.56
Out of the possible 36 residual pairs, seven were allowed to covary. The model was
rerun and it converged in nine iterations. As the two models were nested, improvements
in fit could be directly computed through the difference in the minimum discrepancy
function (Ax2) and with df= df{original model) - dfifmal model). The final model had
a significantly improved fit than the original one, Ax2(16,N= 161) = 308.65,/>< .0005.
No further modifications were indicated, and the goodness-of-fit statistics (Table 6.12)
were now all acceptable.
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Factor loading and correlation coefficients are shown in Table 6.13 and Figure 6.2. As
it can be seen, the loadings were generally high, except for those ofmagical ideation on
the cognitive-perceptual factor and of paranoid ideation (suspiciousness) on the
interpersonal factor. Paranoid ideation was expected to have a low loading (Raine et al.,
1994), though not as low. The result regarding the loading of magical ideation was
unexpected.
Looking at the observed correlations between the first and second-order factors after
scoring (Table 6.14), the above discrepancy appeared less severe. Indeed, magical
ideation had a high correlation with the cognitive-perceptual factor (r = .69), while
paranoid ideation had high correlations with both the cognitive-perceptual (r = .77) and
the interpersonal (r = .74) factors.
Table 6.13. AMOS™ maximum-likelihood Oblimin second-order factor loadings of the nine
first-order SPQ factors after scoring. Loadings not shown were fixed to zero. All shown
loadings were statistically significant (p < .0005).
Factor
Cognitive-Perceptual Interpersonal Disorganisation
Ideas of reference .76
Magical ideation .29
Unusual experiences .85
Paranoid ideation .54 .28
Social anxiety .69




Mean (SD) 7.83 (6.25) 8.01 (6.88) 4.14 (3.64)
Norm* 11.1 9.7 6
/(160) 6.54** 3.12** 6.50**
* from Raine (nd); ** p < .005, all two-tailed
Finally, compared with the norms presented in Table 6.13 it appears that the current
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sample tended to be significantly less schizotypal than the general population. Could this
have something to do with the religiosity of the participants? I am addressing this issue
later in the chapter.
Table 6.14. Pearson product moment correlations between the first and second-order factors
of the SPQ. Coefficients in bold were not statistically significant; all other coefficients were
significant at a = .01.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
I Cognitive perceptual ,61a ,58b ,87c ,69c ,86c ,77c ,42b ,42b ,46b ,58c ,46b
2 Interpersonal .61e .51 e .16c ,56e ,74f .82f .86f ,86f .63f ,48e
3 Disorganised .52g .16e ,59g • 54g .52h .36h •59g ,88i .91 i
4 Ideas of reference ,45d ,64h ,64h •37g .35h .39h .53 i •42g
5 Magical ideation .5 Id ,22d .lie .13f .08e ■21g .08e
6 Unusual experiences .59h •42g .38h ,50h .58i ■49g
7 Paranoid ideation •47g .49i .53 i •52j •45g
8 Social anxiety .54h .58h .51 i ,43h
9 No friends ■76j .421 .24h
10 Constricted affect ,61k •46g
11 Eccentric behaviour .61 i
12 Odd speech
an= 148, % = 149,cn = 150, % = 152,e n = 153,%= 154,8 « = 155, 156,1 n= 157,% =458,k
n =159,1 n =160
General Personality
The correlation matrix of the 36 items of the EPQ-R-S was subjected to a Principal
Components analysis with Direct Oblimin rotation, and three factors were requested
(Table 6.15). The three factors were extracted in three iterations, while the rotation
converged in nine iterations.
Based on the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, the
proportion ofvariance in the items attributed to common variance was 72.4%, while the
Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that the items' correlation matrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, yj (630, N = 151) = 2023.5,p < .0005.
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Table 6.15. Principal Components loadings (pattern matrix) after Direct Oblimin
rotation of the 36 EPQ-R-S items after scoring. Loadings below |.30| are not shown,
unless no higher loadings are available for a given item on the factor it belongs.
Factor
1 2 3
Item 12 (extraversion) -.75
Item 36 (extraversion) -.71
Item 6 (extraversion) -.70
Item 18 (extraversion) -.68
Item 21 (extraversion-reversed) -.68
Item 31 (extraversion-reversed) -.67
Item 34 (extraversion) -.66
Item 3 (extraversion) -.62
Item 25 (extraversion) -.51 -.44
Item 15 (extraversion) -.49
Item 9 (extraversion) -.48 -.34
Item 28 (extraversion) -.46
Item 30 (psychoticism) .74
Item 22 (psychoticism-reversed) .64
Item 27 (psychoticism-reversed) .62
Item 17 (psychoticism) .58
Item 14 (psychoticism-reversed) .55
Item 5 (psychoticism-reversed) .51
Item 20 (psychoticism-reversed) .48
Item 8 (psychoticism) .45
Item 2 (psychoticism-reversed) .25 -.47
Item 33 (psychoticism-reversed) .25
Item 11 (psychoticism) .18
Item 24 (psychoticism) .12
Item 4 (neuroticism) .63
Item 1 (neuroticism) .62
Item 29 (neuroticism) .61
Item 23 (neuroticism) .61
Item 19 (neuroticism) .60
Item 7 (neuroticism) .59
Item 10 (neuroticism) .58
Item 13 (neuroticism) .55
Item 35 (neuroticism) .54
Item 26 (neuroticism) .51
Item 16 (neuroticism) .51
Item 32 (neuroticism) .31 .49
Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 6.51 3.7 2.97
Mean (SD) 7.67 (3.46) 2.01 (1.90) 4.87 (3.44)
Norm* 6.98 2.72 5.43
/fl 54) 2.49** 4.63*** 2.04**t
* from Eysenck & Eysenck, 1991; t df== 157; **p< .05, *** p < .005, both two-tailed
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The extracted three factors accounted for 36.61% of the total variance (the
correlations between the traits are presented in Table 6.16). Interestingly, extraversion
was the first extracted factor accounting for 18.07% of the total variance before
rotation, while neuroticism was the last (8.25% of the total variance before rotation).
Although overall, the EPQ-R-S appears to possess a satisfactory factorial structure,
the four psychoticism items that were already identified in the reliability analysis
section, viz. Items 2,11,24,33, all have rather low loadings on the psychoticism trait,
while interestingly Item 2 has its main loading on the neuroticism dimension (-.47).
It should also be noted that the current sample tended to be significantly higher on
extraversion, and lower on both neuroticism and psychoticism than the norm.
Table 6.16. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients between the EPQ-R-S traits.
The correlations between the oblique factors ofthe Principal Components analysis are shown
in round brackets.
Extraversion Psychoticism
Neuroticism -,32b*(-.21) . 1 lb (.14)
Extraversion -.06a (-.06)
a« = 152,b « = 154; * p< .005
Aspects of Identity
The correlation matrix of the 25 items of the AIQ-IIIx scale (10 of the 35 items of the
questionnaire were buffer items) was subjected to a Principal Components analysis with
Varimax rotation, and three factors were requested (Table 6.17). The three factors were
extracted in nine iterations, while the rotation converged in five iterations.
Based on the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, the
proportion of variance in the items attributed to common variance was 80%, while the
Bartletf s test of sphericity suggested that the items' correlationmatrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, %2 (300, N= 159) = 1382.1 ,p < .0005. The extracted
three factors accounted for 43.82% of the total variance.
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To check whether factor independence was an artefact of the rotation used, Principal
Components analysis was rerun using Direct Oblimin rotation. The results suggested that
indeed the three factors were largely independent, with the highest correlation (.19)
being between social and personal identity.
Table 6.17. PCA loadings after Varimax rotation of the 25 AIQ-IIIx scored items. Loadings




Item 24 (personal) .74
Item 14 (personal) .65
Item 28 (personal) .63
Item 11 (personal) .58 .35
Item 8 (personal) .58
Item 21 (personal) .56
Item 19 (personal) .56
Item 17 (personal) .54
Item 2 (personal) .50
Item 5 (personal) .40
Item 3 (social) .76
Item 15 (social) .31 .75
Item 6 (social) .73
Item 9 (social) .73
Item 12 (social) .69
Item 22 (social) .31 .66
Item 25 (social) .42 .49
Item 4 (collective) .73
Item 26 (collective) .71
Item 13 (collective) .32 .66
Item 33 (collective) .61
Item 7 (collective) .58
Item 23 (collective) .34 .41
Item 31 (collective) .41
Item 10 (collective) -.37 -.03
Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 6.16 2.76 2.03
Mean (SD) 37.37 (6.11) 20.74 (5.19) 23 (5.25)
Norm* 41.24 23.81 22.94
1(159) 7 99**| 7 48** 0.15
* from Cheek et al., 1994; f df= 158; ** p < .005, two-tailed
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However, when the items were scored on the three identity dimensions, the actual
correlation between personal and social was r = .44, between personal and collective r
= .21, and between social and collective r = .32.
Finally, the sample exhibited similar to the norm average levels of collective identity,
while it showed significantly lower levels of both personal and social identity.
Adult Attachment Styles
The correlation matrix of the 36 items of the ECR was subjected to a Principal
Components analysis with Varimax rotation (rotation converged in three iterations), and
two factors were requested (Table 6.18).
According to the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, the
proportion ofvariance in the items attributed to common variance was 85.3%, while the
Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that the items' correlation matrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, yj (630, N- 145) = 2946.4,/? < .0005. The extracted
two factors accounted for 43.99% of the total variance, and as it can be seen from Table
6.18, they show unambiguously the two attachment styles of the inventory. To check
whether factor independence was an artefact of the rotation used, Principal Components
analysis was rerun using Direct Oblimin rotation. The results suggested that indeed the
two factors were largely independent, (r = .10). However, when the items were scored
on the two attachment dimensions, the actual correlation was r = .21.
Finally, the current sample tended to have levels of anxious attachment similar to the
norm, while showing significantly lower levels of avoidant attachment.
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Table 6.18. Principal Components loadings after Varimax rotation of the 36 ECR items after
scoring. Loadings below 1.301 are not shown.
Factor
1 2
Item 17 (avoidance) .77
Item 25 (avoidance-reversed) .76
Item 27 (avoidance-reversed) .76
Item 33 (avoidance-reversed) .76
Item 35 (avoidance-reversed) .74
Item 13 (avoidance) .71 .32
Item 23 (avoidance) .69
Item 11 (avoidance) .67
Item 9 (avoidance) .67
Item 31 (avoidance-reversed) .67
Item 5 (avoidance) .66
Item 21 (avoidance) .64
Item 19 (avoidance-reversed) .62
Item 29 (avoidance-reversed) .61
Item 7 (avoidance) .60
Item 3 (avoidance-reversed) .60
Item 15 (avoidance-reversed) .39
Item 1 (avoidance) .36
Item 2 (anxiety) .75
Item 18 (anxiety) .72
Item 8 (anxiety) .69
Item 4 (anxiety) .67
Item 24 (anxiety) .63
Item 14 (anxiety) .63
Item 22 (anxiety-reversed) .62
Item 36 (anxiety) .61
Item 6 (anxiety) .39 .61
Item 10 (anxiety) .31 .60
Item 28 (anxiety) .60
Item 30 (anxiety) -.31 .59
Item 16 (anxiety) .59
Item 26 (anxiety) .42 .54
Item 12 (anxiety) .54
Item 20 (anxiety) .54
Item 32 (anxiety) .52
Item 34 (anxiety) .35
Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 9.62 6.21
Mean (SD) 45.91 (19.04) 65.21 (20.40)
Norm* 52.74 62.28
t 4.37**t 1.731
* personal communication with Kelly Brennan (November, 2003); t df= 147; % df= 144; ** p < .05, two-tailed
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Social Desirability
Finally, the correlationmatrix of the 40 items of the BIDR-6 was subjected to a Principal
Components analysis with Varimax rotation (rotation converged in three iterations), and
two factors were requested (Table 6.19).
Based on the results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy, the
proportion ofvariance in the items attributed to common variance was 63.3%, while the
Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that the items' correlation matrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, yj (780, N= 146) = 1588.93,/? < .0005. The extracted
two factors accounted for 21.39% of the total variance.
When the analysis was rerun using Direct Oblimin rotation, the two factors appeared
largely independent (r = .11). However, the observed correlation in the sample after
scoring wasmuch higher (r = .32). Overall, however, the factorial structure ofthe BIDR-
6 does not seem adequate at least for the current sample and in particular in respect to
the self-deception factor. Therefore, subsequent results on the association between the
instrument and the rest of the variables should be treated with caution. Finally, taken at
face value, the sample was similar on average to the norm levels of impression
management, while it showed significantly higher levels of self-deception.
Summing up, the findings from the psychometric analyses of the questionnaires appear
to suggest that the measurements, with the exception perhaps of the BIDR-6, possess
acceptable levels of internal reliability, as well as both convergence and discriminant
validity.
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Table 6.19. PCA loadings after Varimax rotation of the 40 BIDR-6 scored items. Loadings below |.30|
are not shown, unless when no higher loadings are available for a given item on the factor it belongs.
Factor
1 2
Item 40 ( mpression management) .64
Item 21 ( mpression management-reversed) .62
Item 23 ( mpression management-reversed) .60
Item 34 ( mpression management) .51
Item 35 ( mpression management-reversed) .51
Item 28 ( mpression management) .51
Item 29 ( mpression management-reversed) .51
Item 36 ( mpression management) .50
Item 27 ( mpression management-reversed) .50
Item 26 ( mpression management) .48
Item 24 ( mpression management) .47
Item 39 ( mpression management-reversed) .44 .33
Item 32 ( mpression management) .40
Item 25 ( mpression management-reversed) .39
Item 37 ( mpression management-reversed) .38
Item 31 ( mpression management-reversed) .35
Item 30 mpression management) .30
Item 22 ( mpression management) .28
Item 33 ( mpression management-reversed) .24
Item 38 ( mpression management) .23
Item 17 (self-deception) .72
Item 5 (self-deception) .60
Item 12 (self-deception-reversed) .56
Item 11 (self-deception) .55
Item 20 (self-deception-reversed) .50
Item 15 (self-deception) .42
Item 19 (self-deception) .39
Item 9 (self-deception) .38
Item 13 (self-deception) .38
Item 18 (self-deception-reversed) .38
Item 7 (self-deception) .37
Item 1 (self-deception) .36
Item 4 (self-deception-reversed) .42 .34
Item 10 (self-deception-reversed) .30
Item 8 (self-deception-reversed) .27
Item 6 (self-deception-reversed) .50 .25
Item 3 (self-deception) .19 .10
Item 14 (self-deception-reversed) .18 .06
Item 2 (self-deception-reversed) .22 .05
Item 16 (self-deception-reversed) .16 -.01
Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 13.95 7.44
Mean (SD) 88.56 (17.90) 80.89 (12.71)
Norm* 86.4 72.3
t 1.49t 8.24**t
* from Paulhus, 1994; t df= 150; } df= 148; ** p < .005, two-tailed
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The relationship between psychometric & sociodemographic variables
Religiosity (I/E-R)
The three orientations had an almost zero correlation with age (Pearson's r ranged from
-.04 to .07), and with the duration one had been a Christian (Pearson's r ranged from -
.08 to .01).
Table 6.20. Pearson's productmoment correlation coefficients




Extrinsic personal .17a* .02a
Extrinsic social .12b ,28b**
a
n = 159,b n = 160; * p < .05, ** p < .005 (both two-tailed)
However, the correlations with either frequency ofprayer and church attendance tended
to be rather high (Table 6.20). All orientations had a positive association with both
prayer and church attendance, with intrinsic showing the highest relationship. This result
was expected since the more central religion is to an individual, the more frequently he
or she would practise it.
Table 6.21. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the three
religious orientations. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless
otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Females = 109, Males = 50.
Females Males F" df P2 power 05
Intrinsic 29.12(6.71) 31.04 (7.13) 2.69 1, 157 .02 .37
Extrinsic personal 9.22 (2.66) 8.62 (2.86) 1.66 1, 157 .01 .25
Extrinsic social 6.16(2.37)* 6.34 (2.62) 0.18 1, 158 .001 .07
* n = 110;a based on Type IV sum of squares
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On average females did not differ from males in respect to the intensity of their religious
orientations (Table 6.21). Among religious denominations, a single significant
difference was found, with Other Protestants having a higher on average intrinsic
orientation than Catholics (Table 6.22).
Table 6.22. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the three religious
orientations1. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Mainstream





Catholics F° df h2 power 05
Intrinsic 29.64 (6.99) 32.29| (5.78) 26.33f (6.62) 5.65* 2, 156 .07 .86
Extrinsic
personal
8.68 (2.74) 9.49 (2.58) 9.83 (2.71) 2.39 2, 156 .03 .48
Extrinsic
social
6.36 (2.51)* 6.51 (2.38) 5.21 (2.06) 2.51 2, 157 .03 .49
1 For all the analyses that follow the Protestant denominations were divided into Mainstream ones
(Presbyterian & Episcopalian / Anglican) and Other (all the rest); f denotes significant pairwise
differences based on the Scheffe test; J n =101;a based on Type IV sum of squares; * p < .005
Table 6.23. Means (and standard deviations) between students and non-students on the three
religious orientations. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless
otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Students = 45, Non-students =110.
Students Non-students F° df T power 05
Intrinsic 28.87 (6.79) 30.25 (6.88) 1.30 1, 153 .01 .21
Extrinsic personal 6.40 (2.75) 6.15 (2.33) 3.10 1, 153 .02 .41
Extrinsic social 9.64 (2.46) 8.80* (2.82) 0.30 1, 154 .002 .09
* n = 111;a based on Type IV sum of squares
Students (full-time and part-time combined) and non-students had similar levels of
religiosity (Table 6.23), while as far as employment status was concerned, participants
in full-time employment tended to have significantly lower levels of extrinsic personal
orientation than both unemployed and home-makers (Table 6.24). Finally, no significant
differences were found between the marital statuses (Table 6.25).
Page 211
Chapter VI: The questionnaire study: Results & discussion
Table 6.24. Means (and standard deviations) between employment statuses on the three
religious orientations. Unless otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Ful 1-
time = 43, Part-time = 37, Unemployed = 23, Home-makers = 30, Retired = 17.
Intrinsic Extrinsic personal Extrinsic social
Full-time 29.12(7.86) 7.631§ (2.41) 6.12(2.38)
Part-time 29.68 (6.27) 9.43 (2.46) 5.78 (2.26)
Unemployed 27 (6.78) 9.831 (2.35) 6.43 (3.42)
Home-maker 30.90 (6.68) 9.93§ (3.19) 6.65b (2.33)
Retired 32.24 (4.99) 9.65 (2.74) 6.18(2.16)
F" 1.8 4.91* 0.56
df 4, 145 4, 145 4, 146
if .05 .12 .01
power 05 .54 .95 .18
a based on Type IV sum of squares; § denote significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe
test;b n = 31; * p < .001
Table 6.25. Means (and standard deviations) between marital statuses on the three religious
orientations. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless otherwise
indicated number of subjects was as follows: Married/living as married = 86, In a





Married /Living as married 30.01 (7.10) 8.79** (2.98) 5.88 (2.40)
In a relationship not living w ithpartner 29.54 (6.38) 9.15 (2.23) 6.85 (2.44)
Single 30.34 (6.66) 9.32(2.12) 6.82 (2.69)
Divorced 30.17* (5.34) 9(3.21) 6(1.53)
Widowed 29.30 (7.12) 9.10(2.81) 6.80 (2.25)
Separated 22.33 (2.94) 10.33 (3.27) 5.17(2.14)
1.51 0.49 1.31
df 5, 153 5, 153 5, 154
if .05 .02 .04
power os .52 .18 .45
* n = 6; ** n = 85;a based on Type IV sum of squares
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Religiosity (RLI)
The three orientations had low correlations with age (Pearson's r ranged from -.14 to -
.01; the highest value was with quest and the lowest with internal), and with the duration
one had been a Christian (Pearson's r ranged from -.12 to -.06; the highest value was
with internal and the lowest with external). A single significant, yet rather low,
association was found between quest complexity and duration of being a Christian, r =
-.18, N = 151, p < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .60. Interestingly, although these
relationships were low, they were all negative. These findings provide a weak support
to Hood & Morris' (1985) results that showed that quest tended to decrease with age,
suggesting once again that perhaps it is not a mature form of religiosity as Batson may
have wanted it to be.
Table 6.26. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients
between the RLI orientations and frequency of prayer and church
attendance.
Prayer Church attendance
Internal 64b ** ,68b **
External 32b ** 52b **
Quest -,07a -.15a
Quest complexity _oGOo ,03b
Quest doubt -,20c* _ 23c **
Quest openness ■ O4^ cr -,13b
arc = 154, bn= 155,cn = 156; * p < .05, ** p < .005 (both two-tailed)
In respect to frequency of prayer and church attendance, both internal and external
orientations showed significant positive correlations, with the former having the highest
ones (Table 6.26). On the quest front, it was only doubt that had an association, albeit
a negative one, with both religious practices.
No gender (Table 6.27), denominational (Table 6.28), student status (Table 6.29), nor
employment status (Table 6.30) significant differences in the levels of religiosity were
observed.
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Table 6.27. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the three
religious orientations. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless
otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Females = 107, Males = 48.
Females Males F1 df h2 power 05
Internal 59.59* (13.69) 61.52 (13.77) 0.4 1, 154 .004 .13
External 32.37 (9.71) 35.12* (9.01) 2.8 1, 154 .02 .38
Quest 59.17 (13.76)** 61.27 (14.04) 0.8 1, 153 .01 .14
* n = 108, ** n = 49;a based on Type IV sum of squares
However, in respect to marital status, separated individuals tended to be significantly
less externally orientated that those who were married, had a partner, or were single
(Table 6.31).
Table 6.28. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the three religious
orientations. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Mainstream
Protestants = 100, Other Protestants = 23, Catholics = 32.
Mainstream Other Catholics F° df rf power os
Protestants Protestants
Internal 59.68 (14.42) 62* (13.73) 59.78 (10.27) 0.4 2,153 .01 .11
External 33.34** (10.23) 33.28 (9.09) 32.74 (7.09) 0.04 2,153 0 .05
Quest 59.54 (12.71) 59.69 (17.54) 61.22 (13.31) 0.1 2,152 .002 .07
* n = 33, ** n= 101;a based on Type IV sum of squares
In order to explore whether participants belonging to the above three denominational
classes also formed the same denominational groups post hoc on the basis of their
responses on both the religiosity questionnaires (i.e. the I/E and the RLI), an
agglomerative hierarchical cluster Q-analysiswas performed on the standardised values
of the six religious orientations (i.e. intrinsic, extrinsic personal, extrinsic social,
internal, external, and quest). Various clustering methods were tested. The unweighted
group average linkage with Euclidean distances was preferred, because it produced the
highest cophenetic correlation coefficient8 (rc = .64). However, not only the value ofthis
8
This is the correlation between the original distances and those that result from the cluster configuration
(Everitt, Landau, & Leese, 2001).
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coefficient fell short of the suggested cutoff point of .75 (Hintze, 2001), but also no
meaningful denomination-defined clusters were observed at any distance obtained from
the cluster configuration. This result indicates that any religiosity pattern present in the
dataset does not appear to be distinctively different among the participants that belonged
to the above three denominational categories, or in other words, it does not appear to be
bound by denomination.
Table 6.29. Means (and standard deviations) between students and non-students on the three
religious orientations. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless
otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Students = 43, Non-students = 109.
Students Non-students F" df h2 power 05
Internal 60.28 (12.59) 60.56 (14.03) 0.01 1, 150 0 .05
External 33.3 (8.99) 33.54 (9.71) 0.02 1, 150 0 .05
Quest 62.51 (11.78) 58.41* (14.27) 2.8 1, 149 .02 .38
* n = 108;a based on Type IV sum of squares
Table 6.30. Means (and standard deviations) between employment statuses on the three
religious orientations. Unless otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Full¬
time = 42, Part-time = 37, Unemployed = 22, Home-makers = 30, Retired = 16.
Internal External Quest
Full-time 58.83 (13.78) 32.43 (10.64) 61.19a (15.21)
Part-time 60.7 (12.86) 32.33b (9.47) 61.97(14.59)
Unemployed 56.18(15) 31.86 (7.73) 62(10.13)
Home-maker 61.7(13.82) 33.63 (10.10) 54.28° (13.45)
Retired 64.25 (14.31) 35.38 (9.31) 55.67d (11.27)
F" 1.01 0.42 2
df 4, 142 4, 141 4, 141
h2 .03 .01 .05
power 05 .31 .15 .59
a
n = 43,b « = 36,c « = 29,d « =15,a based on Type IV sum of squares
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Table 6.31. Means (and standard deviations) between marital statuses on the three religious
orientations. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless otherwise
indicated number ofsubjects was as follows: Married/living as married = 82, In a relationship
= 13, Single = 37, Divorced = 7, Widowed =11, Separated = 6.
Internal External Quest
Married /Living as married 59.72 (13.88) 33.29f (9.64) 59.65a (15.02)
In a relationship not living with partner 61.15 (14.40) 37.38J (10.06) 64.46 (9.79)
Single 63.27 (11.57) 35.14§ (6.54) 60.21b (14.44)
Divorced 62(12.67) 29.57 (8.02) 58 (12.52)
Widowed 55.64 (19.67) 31.45 (11.42) 57.09 (10.76)
Separated 51.67 (7.28) 19.33tt5 (10.23) 56.67 (6.95)
F1 1.14 3.95* 0.46
df 5, 150 5, 150 5, 149
r\- .04 .12 .01
power 05 .40 .94 .17
a
n = 80,b n = 38; f $ § denote significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test;a based on
Type IV sum of squares; * p< .005
SCHIZOTYPY
Schizotypal traits tended to have low and negative correlations with both age and
duration of being a Christian (Table 6.32).
On average females tended to report significantly lower levels of constricted affect and
odd behaviour than males (Table 6.33). The literature is unclear about the relationship
between gender and schizotypy, with studies showing higher levels among males (Maier
et al., 1992), females (Roth & Baribeau, 1997) or neither (Golomb et al., 1995).
Page 216
Chapter VI: The questionnaire study: Results & discussion
Table 6.32. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients (plus N) between the
subjects' age, duration of being a Christian, and the SPQ first and second-order factors.













Ideas of reference -.27** -.23**
(157) (152)
Magical ideation .03 .05
(155) (150)











No close friends .07 .10
(160) (155)
Constricted affect -.05 .02
(159) (154)
Odd behaviour _ 23** -.19*
(161) (156)
Odd speech -.24** -.16*
(157) (152)
*p < .05; ** p < .01 (both two-tailed)
Among religious denominations, Catholics reported significantly higher levels of
cognitive-perceptual schizotypal traits than mainstream Protestants, and this result
appears to be mainly attributable to the significant differences between these two
denominational groups in ideas of reference, unusual experiences, and suspiciousness
(Table 6.34.).
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Table 6.33. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the SPQ first
and second order traits. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows:
Females =110. Males = 50,
Females Males F° df T)2 power o,
Cognitive-
perceptual
7.28b (6.40) 9.06c (6.63) 2.46 1, 148 .01 .30
Interpersonal 7.42d (7.42) 9.17C (8.04) 2.07 1, 152 .01 .19
Disorganised 3.82e (3.32) 4.84 (4.32) 2.63 1, 155 .01 .21
Ideas of reference 1.80f (2.15) 2.51s (2.07) 3.81 1, 155 .02 .31
Magical ideation 1.92h (1.99) 1.94j (2.09) 0.003 1, 153 .001 .06
Unusual 1.84' (1.94) 2.42c (2.07) 2.81 1, 155 .01 .30
experiences
Suspiciousness 1.61' (1.89) 2.16s (2.14) 2.62 1, 156 .01 .28
Social anxiety 3.1 le (2.52) 2.90 (2.79) 0.23 1, 155 .01 .15
No close friends 1.48 (1.99) 2.18 (2.41) 3.68 1, 158 .02 .41
Constricted affect 1.27' (1.64) 1.96 (2.29) 4.75* 1, 157 .02 .44
Odd behaviour 0.89 (1.67) 1.92j (2.18) 10.89" 1, 159 .06 .82
Odd speech 2.94e (2.0) 2.88 (2.58) 0.03 1, 155 .002 .09
a based on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 102,c n = 48,d n = 106, « =107,f« = 108,8 n = 49,
toIICoII£-C n = 109; * p < .05; **p< .001
Table 6.34. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the SPQ first and second
order traits. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Mainstream





Catholics F' df Tf power 05
Cognitive-
perceptual
6.74"f (5.93) 8.91b (7.60) 11.38ct
(6.03)
5.19" 2, 147 .07 .82
Interpersonal 7.46d (6.76) 8.91 (7.96) 8.74e (6.75) 0.69 2, 151 .01 .17
Disorganised 3.73 (3.52) 4.79 (3.94) 5 (3.86) 1.80 2, 154 .01 .23
Ideas of
reference
1.64| (1.74) 2.58 (2.67) 2.83f (2.53) 4.61* 2, 154 .06 .77
Magical ideation 1.78d (1.88) 2.09r(2.38) 2.36s (2.04) 0.89 2, 152 .02 .33
Unusual 1.74+ (1.93) 2.12h (2.03) 3.09e + (1.86) 4.57* 2, 154 .06 .77
experiences
Suspiciousness OOoo'VD 1.76 (1.82) 2.75f (2.38) 3.59* 2, 155 .04 .66
Social anxiety 3.03j (2.66) 2.88 (2.53) 3.33 (2.58) 0.21 2, 154 0 .05
No close friends 1.57k (2.02) 2.17f(2.61) 1.57® (1.93) 1.08 2, 157 .02 .35
Constricted
affect
1.38 (1.69) 1.77f (2.44) 1.50 (1.77) 0.56 2, 156 .02 .25
Odd behaviour 1.011 (1.77) 1.60f (2.25) 1.54 (1.82) 1.68 2, 158 .03 .42
Odd speech 2.74 (2.09) 3.09 (2.34) 3.46 (2.40) 1.16 2| 154 .01 .10
t denotes significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test;1 based on Type IV sum ofsquares;
a
n = 97,b n = 32,c n = 21,d n = 98,e n = 23,f n = 35, 8 n = 22,h n = 34,1 n = 101, = 99,k n = 102;
*p< .05, **p < .01
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Students tended to have significantly higher scores than non-students on ideas of
reference, unusual experiences, suspiciousness, and on both the disorganised traits, i.e.
odd behaviour and odd speech (Table 6.35).
Within employment status, part-timers had the highest score on cognitive perceptual
traits, which was mainly due to their high scores on ideas of reference, while
unemployed received the highest scores on unusual experiences and social anxiety traits.
Although the omnibus F-statistic was statistically significant, once again, no post-hoc
pairwise differences were identified after correcting for the familywise error (Table
6.36).
Table 6.35. Means (and standard deviations) between students and non-students on the SPQ
first and second order traits. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows:
Students = 45, Non-students = 108.
Students Non-students F° df p2 power 05
Cognitive-
perceptual
9.28b (6.12) 1.2V (6.31) 3.31 1, 144 .03 .50
Interpersonal 9.13 (7.12) 7.36d (6.88) 2.05 1, 148 .01 .24
Disorganised 5.58 (3.95) 3.52 (3.40) 10.57*** 1, 151 .06 .84
Ideas of reference 2.73 (2.42) 1.71 (1.89) 7.82** 1, 151 .05 .75
Magical ideation 1.68® (1.79) 2.01f (2.08) 0.84 1, 149 .01 .14
Unusual 2.55" (1.90) 1.78s (1.88) 5.16* 1, 151 .03 .56
experiences
Suspiciousness 2.29(2.14) 1.59s (1.88) 4.09* 1, 152 .04 .66
Social anxiety 3.64 (2.75) 2.81 (2.54) 3.30 1, 151 .02 .38
No close friends 1.51 (1.96) 1.72h (2.18) 0.31 1, 154 .01 .13
Constricted affect 1.69 (2.09) 1.35' (1.77) 1.08 1, 153 .01 .14
Odd behaviour 1.91 (2.17) 0.95j (1.72) 8.65** 1, 155 .04 .68
Odd speech 3.67 (2.24) 2.57 (2.10) 8.29** 1, 151 .05 .80
a based on Type IV
lll,i«= 110,j« =
sum of squares;b
112; */? < .05, **
n = 43,cn= 103,
p < .01, *** p <
d« = 105, en =
005
II£ 107,8« = 109, hn =
Finally, an overall significant difference was found among marital statuses on the
disorganised traits, which was concentrated to the differences in odd behaviour, where
all divorced participants received a zero score (Table 6.37).
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General Personality
The three personality traits had negative, albeit low correlations with age (Pearson's r
ranged from -.14 for psychoticism to -.13 for neuroticism), and with the duration one
had been a Christian (Pearson's r ranged from -.13 for psychoticism to -.07 for
neuroticism).
Table 6.38. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the three
personality traits. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05.















1.8 1, 153 .01 .26
* n = 110;3 based on Type IV sum of squares
Females and males tended to have rather similar levels on the three personality
dimensions (Table 6.38). These results agree with those reported by Eysenck & Eysenck
(1991), and Eysenck et al. (1985).
Table 6.39. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the three personality
traits. Unless otherwise indicated numberofsubjects was as follows: Mainstream Protestants
= 100, Other Protestants = 34, Catholics = 24.
Mainstream Other Catholics F" df r\2 power 05
Protestants Protestants
Neuroticism 4.52f (3.26) 4.62 (3.67) 6.71+ (3.38) 4.21* 2,155 .05 .73
Extraversion 7.79b(3.45) 6.88c (3.58) 8.29 (3.29) 1.31 2,152 .02 .28
Psychoticism 1.75d(1.91) 2.66e(2,01) 2.25 (1.57) 3.06 2,152 .04 .58
| denotes significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test;a based on Type IV sum of
squares;b n = 98,c n = 33,d n = 99,e n = 32; * p < .005
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Among religious denominations, a single significant difference was found, with
Catholics being on average more neurotic than mainstream Protestants (Table 6.39).
Table 6.40. Means (and standard deviations) between students and non-students on the three
personality traits.















0.13 1, 149 .001 .06
° based on Type IV sum of squares; * p < .05
Students tended to be significantly more neurotic than non-students (Table 6.40). In
respect to employment status, unemployed were significantly more neurotic than
participants in full-time employment or those who were retired (Table 6.41). Finally, no
significant differences were found between the marital statuses (Table 6.42).
Table 6.41. Means (and standard deviations) between employment statuses on the three
personality traits. Unless otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Full-time
= 43, Part-time = 37, Unemployed = 23, Home-makers = 30, Retired = 15.
Neuroticism Extraversion psychoticism
Full-time 4.331 (3.21) 8.36b (3.44) 2.49 (1.64)
Part-time 4.81 (3.73) 7.66° (3.48) 2.22d (2.24)
Unemployed 7.171$ (3.40) 7.74 (3.29) 1.83 (1.11)
Home-maker 4.20J (3.23) 7.67 (3.54) 1.53 (2.37)
Retired 5.13 (2.95) 5.87 (3.83) 1.36 (1.50)
F" 3.30* 1.41 1.73
df 4, 143 4, 140 4, 141
h2 .08 .04 .05
power n, .83 .43 .52
t, $ denote significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test; a based on Type IV sum of
squares;b n = 42,c n = 35,d n = 36; *p< .05
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Table 6.42. Means (and standard deviations) between marital statuses on the three
personality traits. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless
otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Married/living as married = 85, In
a relationship = 13, Single = 37, Divorced = 7, Widowed = 10, Separated = 6.
Neuroticism Extraversion Psychoticism
Married / Living as married 4.49 (3.24) 7.5lb (3.65) 2.02d (1.98)
In a relationship not living with partner 6(2.1) 8.69 (3.20) 1.62(1.71)
Single 5.59(4.1) 7.33° (3.59) 2.34e (1.81)
Divorced 5.29 (3.95) 8.29 (2.50) 1.71 (2.36)
Widowed 3.50 (3.78) 8.10(3.03) 1.22f (1.48)
Separated 5.17(2.49) 8.33 (2.58) 2.17(2.04)
F* 1.17 0.44 0.69
df 5, 152 5, 149 5, 149
h2 .04 .02 .02
power 05 .41 .17 .24
a based on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 83,c n = 36,d n = 82,e n = 38,f n = 9
Aspects of Identity
All three aspects of identity had statistically significant correlations with both the
subjects' age and the duration of being a Christian, although only the correlations
involving collective identity were positive (Table 6.43).
Table 6.43. Pearson's productmoment correlation coefficients between the AIQ-IIIx identity
aspects versus subjects' age and duration of being a Christian.
Age Duration of being a Christian
Personal _ 32° ** -,26a **
Social .23d ** _ 20b *
Collective j yd * 22b **
a
n = 154,b n = 155,c n = 159,d n = 160; *p < .05, ** p < .005 (both two-tailed)
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On average, no statistically significant differences in all three identities were observed
between females vs. males (Table 6.44), and between marital statuses (Table 6.48).
Among religious denominations, Catholics tended to have significantly higher personal
identity than both mainstream and other Protestants, while they tended to be significantly
higher on collective identity against other Protestants (Table 6.45).
Table 6.44. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the three identity
aspects. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless otherwise
indicated number of subjects was as follows: Females =110, Males = 50.
Females Males F" df fi2 power 05
Personal 37.52* (6.36) 37.04 (5.57) 0.2 1, 157 .001 .07
Social 20.66 (5.15) 20.92 (5.32) 0.08 1, 158 .001 .06
Collective 22.62 (5.35) 23.84 (4.97) 1.9 1, 158 .01 .28
* n = 109;a based on Type IV sum of squares
Students tended to have a significantly higher personal identity and a significantly lower
collective identity than non-students (Table 6.46). Finally, as far as employment status
is concerned, although unemployed participants appear to have the highest levels of
personal identity, after correcting for the familywise error, post-hoc pairwise
comparisons did not yield any statistically significant differences (Table 6.47).
Table 6.45. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the three identity
aspects. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Mainstream
Protestants =101, Other Protestants - 24, Catholics = 35.
Mainstream Other „ , F° df ri2 power ns
Protestants Protestants Cath°kcS
Personal 36.73f 36.53$ 41.25b n (4.59) 6.09" 2,156 .07 .88
(6.14) (6.04)
Social 20.64 (5.33) 19.91 (4.89) 22.38 (4.84) 1.67 2,157 .02 .35
Collective 23.35 (5.15) 20.97$ 24.50f(5.98) 3.95* 2,157 .05 .70
2
*
p < .05, ** p < .005; $, $ denote significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test;a based
on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 34
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Table 6.46. Means (and standard deviations) between students and non-students on the three
identity aspects. Unless otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Students =
45, Non-students =111.
Students Non-students F° df P2 power 05
Personal 40.40 (4.93) 36.31b (6.18) 15.64** 1, 153 .09 .98
Social 22.07 (5.68) 20.32 (4.91) 3.72 1, 154 .02 .48
Collective 21.64 (5.03) 23.56 (5.31) 4.28* 1, 154 .03 .54
*
p < .05, ** p < .0005;a based on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 110
Table 6.47. Means (and standard deviations) between employment statuses on the three
identity aspects. Unless otherwise indicated number of subjects was as follows: Full-time =
42, Part-time = 37, Unemployed = 23, Home-makers = 31, Retired = 17.
Personal Social Collective
Full-time 36.93 (5.86) 20.98 (4.66) 22.86 (5.06)
Part-time 39.11 (4.87) 21.62 (5.32) 22.97 (5.25)
Unemployed 39.70 (5.56) 21.83 (5.88) 21.70 (5.06)
Home-maker 35.93b (4.95) 19.81 (5.62) 22.94 (5.94)
Retired 35.65 (4.95) 18.71 (4.74) 25.18 (4.90)
F° 2.57* 1.42 1.08
df 4, 144 4, 145 4, 145
il2 .07 .04 .03
power 05 .71 .43 .33
a based on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 30; * p < .05 (the Scheffe test did not identify any significant
pairwise differences)
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Table 6.48. Means (and standard deviations) between marital statuses on the three identity
aspects. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless otherwise
indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Married/living as married = 86, In a
relationship = 13, Single = 37, Divorced = 7, Widowed = 11, Separated = 6.
Personal Social Collective
Married/Living as married 37.21* (5.43) 20.67 (4.68) 23.56 (5.07)
In a relationship not living withpartner 39.15 (4.74) 20.46 (3.99) 21 (4.14)
Single 37.76 (6.95) 21.46 (6.47) 22.76 (5.09)
Divorced 36.29 (6.47) 20.86 (5.67) 22.71 (5.16)
Widowed 34.18 (8.41) 18.09 (6.01) 20.82 (7.81)
Separated 40.50 (6.63) 22.67 (3.08) 25.17(5.12)
F* 1.23 0.89 1.18
df 5, 153 5, 154 5, 154
h2 .04 .03 .04
power n, .43 .31 .41
* n = 85;a based on Type IV sum of squares
AdultA ttachmentStyles
Although avoidant attachment had a very low positive association with both age and
duration of being a Christian (Pearson's r ranged from .10 to .11), anxious attachment
was significantly correlated with both the above variables (with age: r = -.27, N = 145,
p < .005, two-tailed, power 05 = .91; with duration of being Christian: r = -.23, N= 140,
p < .01, two tailed, power 05 = .79).
Table 6.49. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the two
attachment styles. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless
otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Females = 104, Males = 44.
Females Males F" df T|2 power 05
Avoidance 45.89 (19.13) 45.93 (19.04) 0 1, 146 0 .05
Anxiety 63.47* (19.33) 69.33** (22.46) 2.5 1, 143 .02 .35
* n = 102, ** n = 43;a based on Type IV sum of squares
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No statistically significant differences in attachment styles were observed between
females and males (Table 6.49), and among the three main Christian denominations
(Table 6.50). Students tended to have a significantlymore anxious attachment than non-
students (Table 6.51).
Table 6.50. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the two attachment
styles. None of the results were statistically significant at a = .05. Unless otherwise
indicated, number ofsubjects was as follows: Mainstream Protestants = 92, OtherProtestants
= 23, Catholics = 33.
Mainstream Other Catholics F" df r)2 power 05
Protestants Protestants
Avoidance 44.76 (18.14) 48.58 (19.18) 46.65 (22.61) 0.51 2,145 .01 .13
Anxiety 64.36* (19.33) 64.30(21.94) 70.05** (22.47) 0.73 2,142 .01 .17
* n = 90, ** n = 22;3 based on Type IV sum of squares
Although unemployed participants exhibited the highest levels of anxious attachment,
post-hoc pairwise comparisons did not show any significant differences, after correcting
for the familywise error (Table 6.52).
Table 6.51. Means (and standard deviations) between students and non-students on the two
attachment styles. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows:
Students = 41, Non-students = 103.
Students Non-students F" df h2 power 05
Avoidance 45.12 (20.43) 45.73 (18.40) 0.03 1, 142 0 .03
Anxiety 75.85 (21.60) 61.01 * (18.68) 16.74** 1, 139 .10 .98
* n = 100;3 based on Type IV sum of squares; ** p < .0005
Finally, in respect to marital statuses, participants who had been separated had the
highest levels of avoidant attachment, but as above no post-hoc pairwise differences
were observed, while single participants tended to have a significantly higher anxious
attachment than those being married or living with a partner (Table 6.53).
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Table 6.52. Means (and standard deviations) between employment statuses on the two
attachment styles. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows:
Full-time — 41, Part-time = 33, Unemployed = 22, Home-makers = 29, Retired =13.
Avoidance Anxiety
Full-time 43.88 (16.87) 59.55* (17.05)
Part-time 44.21 (19.85) 68.58** (21.93)
Unemployed 45.09(19.25) 75.86 (24.91)
Home-maker 45.59 (17.24) 62.28 (20.23)
Retired 56.92 (23.79) 65.77 (15.86)
F" 1.32 2.67f
df 4, 133 4, 130
o2 .04 .08
power ns .40 .73
* n = 40, ** n = 31;a based on Type IV sum of squares; | P
significant pairwise differences)
< .05 (the Scheffe test did not identify any
Table 6.53. Means (and standard deviations) between marital statuses on the two attachment
styles. Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Married/living as
married = 82, In a relationship = 13, Single = 32, Divorced = 7, Widowed = 9, Separated =
5.
Avoidance Anxiety
Married/Living as married 42.17 (17.80) 58.18bf (17.46)
In a relationship not living with partner 40.62 (12.76) 73.08 (14.51)
Single 53.94 (20.80) 79.34| (20.78)
Divorced 50(15.61) 70.86 (13.64)
Widowed 50.67 (23.65) 61.22 (29.06)
Separated 55.20 (22.44) 64.60(15.13)
F* 2.51* 6.58**
df 5, 142 5, 139
if .08 .19
power n, .77 .99
f denotes significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test;a based on Type IV sum ofsquares;
b
n = 79; *p<.05; ** p < .005; (the Scheffe test did not identify any significant pairwise differences)
SocialDesirability
Of the two desirability factors, impression management appears to be themost important
in respect to the subjects' age {r = .33, N= 151,/? < .0005, two-tailed, power 05 = .99)
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and duration ofbeing a Christian (r = .28, N= 146,/? < .005, two-tailed, power 05 = .93),
while self-deception was largely independent from both of them (maximum r = .14)
Table 6.54. Means (and standard deviations) between females and males on the BIDR-6
factors.
Females Males F' df r)2 power 05
Impression 91.14(17.32) 83.36(18.09) 6.55* 1,149 .04 .72
management (n = 101) (n = 50)
Self-deception 80.83 (13.32) 81 (11.50) 0.01 1,147 0 .05
(» = 100) (n = 49)
*
p < .05 a based on Type IV sum of squares
Impression management tended to be significantly higher in females (Table 6.54), and
in non-students (Table 6.56). Both these results are similar to those reported by Paulhus
(1994). The levels of desirable responding were not significantly different among the
religious denominations (Table 6.55).
Table 6.55. Means (and standard deviations) between Christians on the BIDR-6 factors.
Unless otherwise indicated, number ofsubjects was as follows: Mainstream Protestants = 95,





Catholics F° df h2 power 05
Impression 88.51 (19.23) 92.97 82.48 2.37 2, 148 .03 .47
management (13.71) (16.20)
Self- 81.59b 79.94c 79.48 2.37 2, 148 .01 .47
deception (13.02) (12.80) (11.60)
a based on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 92,c n = 34
Table 6.56. Means (standard deviations) between students and non-students on the BIDR-6.
Students Non-students F' df Tl2 power 05






1.37 1, 143 .01 .21
a based on Type IV sum of squares; * p < .05
Unemployed participants showed the lowest impression management responses, which
were significantly lower from those given by the part-time employed, home-makers, and
retired (Table 6.57). Moreover, home-makers (who tended to have the highest levels of
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impression management) were significantly higher from the full-time employed.
Table 6.57. Means (and standard deviations) between employment statuses on the BIDR-6
factors. Unless otherwise indicated, number ofsubjects was as follows: Full-time = 42, Part-
time = 32, Unemployed = 21, Home-makers = 29, Retired = 17.
Impression management Self-deception
Full-time 81.671(16.41) 81.78b (13.16)
Part-time 92.28} (18.24) 79.15c (13.99)
Unemployed 76.10} §$(17.55) 76.50d (14.60)
Home-maker 97.83} § (12.88) 82.71e (8.89)
Retired 94.65$ (11.97) 84.29 (10.55)
F° 8.68* 1.28
df 4, 136 4, 135
h2 .20 .04
power .99 .39
|, J, §, $ denote significant pairwise differences based on the Scheffe test;a based on Type IV sum of
squares;b n= 41,c n = 34,d n = 20,e n = 28; * p < .0005
Finally, although widowers appear to show the highest levels of impression
management, after correcting for the familywise error, post-hoc pairwise comparisons
did not yield any statistically significant differences (Table 6.58).
Table 6.58. Means (and standard deviations) between marital statuses on the BIDR-6 factors.
Unless otherwise indicated, number of subjects was as follows: Married/living as married
= 80, In a relationship = 12, Single = 37, Divorced = 7, Widowed = 10, Separated = 5.
Impression management Self-deception
Married /Living as married 89.83 (16.38) 80.99b (11.73)
In a relationship not living with partner 87.83 (15.23) 82.75 (7.24)
Single 81.95 (20.04) 78.43c (14.42)
Divorced 93 (13.70) 87.67d (12.28)
Widowed 101.50 (21.08) 80.1 le (19.97)
Separated 87(16.91) 85.20 (12.71)
H 2.33* 0.77
df 5, 145 5, 143
h2 .07 .03
power .74 .27
a based on Type IV sum of squares;b n = 82,c n - 35,d n = 6,e n = 9; * p < .05 (no significant pairwise
differences were identified by the Scheffe test)
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Summaryof findings
In this section the relationships between the sociodemographic and psychometric
variables were presented. Although most of those relationships are not directly relevant
to the aims and the predictions of this thesis, and as such they will not be discussed in
any further detail, their presentation was deemed appropriate, in order to allow the reader
to form an as much of a complete picture of the dataset as possible.
Overall, the sociodemographics exhibited several significant effects on the psychometric
variables. However, caution should be applied when interpreting those effects because
(a) their sizes, as measured by the r|2 coefficient, tended to be rather small, and thus it
is possible that they could be artefacts of statistical power, which tended to be high; and
(b) the robustness of a number of them cannot be assessed due to the general absence of
previous findings. The results can be summarised as follows:
Age & Christian duration
Age and duration ofbeing a Christian did not appear to be statistically at least important
to one's religious orientation (with the exception perhaps of quest) and personality,
although both were moderately related to all the rest of the variables. The findings, in
respect to religiosity, were to an extent unexpected as previous research tends to show
a low to moderate relationship between at least internal, quest and those variables (Beit-
Hallahmi & Argyle, 1997, ch. 8; Joseph et al., 2002; Maltby & day, 2002; Maltby et al.,
2000). Additional analyses of the current dataset suggested that at least two of the rest
of the sociodemographic variables had a significant effect on the above relationships.
Within Christian denomination, Catholics (but no other denominational group) tended
to have relatively high associations between both age and duration ofbeing a Christian
vs. intrinsic (r = .52, in both cases), extrinsic social (r = -.20, in both cases), internal {r
= .22, in both cases), and quest complexity (r = -.23, in both cases). The other
sociodemographic variable that appeared to have a significantmoderating effect on these
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relationships was student status, where among students, quest showed an increased
association with age (r = -.25), while quest complexity had a moderate association with
duration ofbeing a Christian (r = -.33). Future researchmay attempt to clarify the nature
of the above moderations, and understand theirmeaning within a psychosocial context.
Gender
Religious orientation, personality, aspects of identity, and attachment styles were not
significantly different between females and males. Males tended to have significantly
higher levels of constricted affect and odd behaviour, and significantly lower levels of
impression management desirable responses.
Religious denomination
The three religious denominational groups did not differ significantly in respect to
attachment styles, desirable responses, and most of the religious orientations. However,
Other Protestants tended to be significantlymore intrinsically orientated, while Catholics
showed significantly higher levels of certain schizotypal traits, were more neurotic, and
tended to have stronger personal and collective identities.
Student status
Students did not differ significantly from non-students in respect to religious orientation.
Students, however, tended to be significantly higher in a number of schizotypal traits,
more neurotic, have a more anxious attachment, a stronger personal and a weaker
collective identity, and they were less likely to provide impression management
desirable responses. These findings, as well as the ones presented earlier in respect to
the association between religiosity and age or duration ofbeing a Christian, suggest that
to an extent the student population tends to be different from the non-student population,
and as such, inferences based on results from the former group should be treated with
caution.
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Employment status
Employment statuses tended to show similar levels onmost religiosity orientations, with
home-makers having a significantly stronger extrinsic personal orientation. In the rest
of the variables a number of significant findings were observed, most of which
concentrated on unemployed individuals having higher levels of certain schizotypal
traits, beingmore neurotic, with a stronger personal identity, a more anxious attachment,
and a lower level of impression management.
Marital status
Finally, marital status had the least number of significant results. Religious orientations
(with perhaps the exception of external, which was significantly higher in separated
individuals), personality, and identity, were all similar across the marital statuses. Single
individuals tended to have significantly higher levels of certain schizotypal traits, and
they tended to have a more avoidant and anxious attachment. Finally, widowed
participants tended to show a higher impression management.
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The relationship among the psychometric variables
Introduction
So far in this chapter I have described the main statistical characteristics of the dataset,
assessed the psychometric properties of the questionnaires, and explored the
relationships between the sociodemographic data and the psychometric variables. In this
following section, I test the predictions regarding the relationships between the
psychometric measurements. Where predicted, certain sociodemographic variables were
used as controls in the above relationships. The two religious practices (frequency of
prayer and church attendance), due to being fairly independent from the religious
orientations - with the exception perhaps of intrinsic and internal (see Tables 6.20 and
6.26) -were used alongside the religiosity variables and at the same level of functioning,
e.g. as predictors, outcomes, or covariates.
This section builds gradually, starting from the secondary predictions regarding the
expected relationships among the measurements, moving to the primary predictions, i.e.
the relationship between religion and schizotypy, and finally ending with the assessment
of the most plausible integrated model or models based on analysis evidence of this
study. The last two steps above involve a progression from micro- to macro-analysis. At
the micro level of analysis, the relationships between the individual components of
religion and schizotypywere examined, while at the macro level, religion and schizotypy
served as lattent variates and the overall associations were assessed.
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Secondary predictions
Religiosity vs. Personality
All three personality traits showed relatively low associations with religiosity.
Neuroticism had three statistically significant correlations with intrinsic (r = -.21, N-
156,/? < .01, two-tailed, power05 = .76), extrinsic personal (r = .22, N= 156,/? < .005,
two-tailed, power 05 = .80), and frequency of church attendance (r = -.23, N = 157,/? <
.005, two-tailed, power05 = .80), with all other effect sizes being smaller than |.13|.
Extraversion had two statistically significant, albeit rather low, correlations with quest
(r - -.16, N= 151,/? < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .50), and quest openness (r = -.19, N
= 151,/? < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .65), with the rest of the relationships having
smaller than 1.13| coefficients. Finally, psychoticism also had two statistically significant
correlations with quest (r = .23, N= 151 ,P< .005, two-tailed, power 05 = .82), and quest
complexity (r = .29, N = 152, /? < .0005, two-tailed, power 05 = .95), while all other
effects were below 1.111. All the above relationships were checked further to ensure they
were not artefacts of outlying influences in the dataset.
These bivariate relationships were to an extent expected and to another extent surprising.
First, as expected, all effect sizes were rather low. Neuroticism showed the predicted and
well-documented relationship with extrinsic (personal) both in terms ofmagnitude and
direction (see Table 4.4, in chapter IV for previous research results). In the literature,
however, neuroticism had a near zero, not always negative, association with both
intrinsic orientation and church attendance. This was not the case with the current
sample, where it clearly showed a negative relationship with both religiosity variables.
This result contradicts to an extent Freud's ideas, according to which one would have
expected a positive association at least between church attendance and neuroticism.
However, the present results partly support my ideas discussed in chapter III, through
which I argued that although religious practices may appear to have a "superficial"
resemblance to neurotic acts, at closer examination the core elements of neurotic
behaviour, such as compulsion, obsession, anxiety and so forth, appear to be normatively
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absent from such practices. Not only that, but the current results suggest that mature
religiosity and church attendance appear to be associated with lower levels of such
neurotic behaviour.
Psychoticism was also expected to relate to quest, even though the results in the
literature have been rather unclear, with studies showing both positive (e.g. Hills et ah,
2004) and negative (e.g. Joseph et ah, 2002) correlations between the two constructs.
Finally, extraversion showed the highest, reported in the literature, associations with
religiosity, and specifically the quest orientation. However, these were still rather low
to allow for any meaningful conclusions.
As the relationship between religiosity and personality is of central at least theoretical
importance, I decided to look further into it. In order to assess the pattern of this
relationship at a multivariate level, a Principal Components Analysis was run on the
correlation matrix of all the religiosity (the overall quest was used) and personality
variables.
Table 6.59. Pattern matrix of the Principal Components factor
loadings after Direct Oblimin rotation of the religiosity and the














Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 3.60 1.44 1.23
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The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkin measure of sampling adequacy indicated that the
proportion of variance in the items attributed to common variance was 75%, while the
Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that the items' correlationmatrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, yj (55, N= 143) = 503.76,p < .0005. The scree plot
(Cattell, 1966) clearly suggested the retention of one factor (32.7% of total variance),
while the Kaiser criterion (Kaiser, 1960) pointed to four (67.2% of total variance).
All four factor solutions were tested, and although all two-, three-, and four-factor
solutions were to an extent meaningful, I opted for the three-factor one (57% of total
variance). The three factors were allowed to covary, thus a Direct Oblimin rotation was
used (rotation converged in six iterations), although that was not entirely necessary since
the factors were relatively independent from each other (largest r = -.18). As it can be
seen in Table 6.59, at this level ofanalysis, it appears that ofall the religiosity variables,
the quest orientation is ofmost relevance to personality, followed perhaps by mainly
extrinsic personal.
In conclusion, it can be said that the expected relationships between religiosity and
personality were partially recovered. In the current dataset, at a bivariate level (a)
neuroticism, as predicted, was inversely related mainly to intrinsic orientation and
church attendance, and positively related to extrinsic personal; (b) extraversion had
an inverse low relationship with both quest and quest openness (no predictions were
made regarding the behaviour ofextraversion); while (c) psychoticism was positively
related to quest and quest complexity, counter to predictions. At the multivariate
level, quest and extrinsic personal appear to be the most relevant orientations to
personality.
Religiosity vs. Identity
Although there were a number ofstatistically significant associations between religiosity
and identity, overall the effect sizes were rather low. As predicted, personal identity had
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a positive relationship with quest (r = .25, N= 153,p< .005, two-tailed, power 05 = .88),
which could be attributed primarily to its relationship with quest complexity (r = .22, N
= 154,p< .01, two-tailed, power 05 = .79) and to a lesser degree with quest openness (r
= .17,N- 154,/? < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .56). However, counter to my predictions
personal identity did not show significant associations with intrinsic, internal, and
church attendance (Pearson's r ranged from -.08 to .11).
Social identity did correlate significantly with intrinsic (r = -.23, N= 158,p < .005, two-
tailed, power 05 = .83), extrinsic personal (r = .23, N= 158,p < .005, two-tailed, power 05
= .83), and church attendance (r = -.26,77= 159,p < .001, two-tailed, power05 = .91).
Finally, collective identity also showed a few significant, albeit low, relationships with
extrinsic personal (r = .18, N= 158,p < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .62), quest (r = .17,
N~ 154 ,p< .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .56), and quest openness (r = .17, N= 155 ,p<
.05, two-tailed, power05 = .56)
It seems that whether religion is or is not a driving force of one's life (intrinsic
orientation), is not ofmajor relevance to the importance one assigns to their personal
identity, at least as measured by the AIQ-IIIx. At the same time, the more intrinsically
one is orientated toward religion, the less likely one is to assign importance to social
aspects of identity, such popularity, physical appearance, and reputation. The importance
of these identity aspects, on the other hand, appears to be concordant with the degree to
which one is "using" religion as a means for comfort and support, i.e. the degree to
which one has developed an extrinsic personal orientation toward religion.
Moreover, the more one is driven to ask existential questions, to try to understand one's
place in the universe, i.e. the higher one's quest orientation is, the more likely one is to
view as important at least certain aspects ofpersonal identity such as personal values and
goals, ideas, and feelings of uniqueness.
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The lack of association between church attendance and personal identity was not
expected, although to a degree it can make some intuitive sense: Why should the
importance of who one is at the personal level (e.g. the importance of one's values,
dreams, uniqueness, etc.) be related to how often one goes to church? The negative
relationship between church attendance and social identity came as a surprise. Although
I could attribute this finding to chance, I would like to attempt a different approach.
The scale used to measure social identity seems to capture only the degree to which this
identity is important to who one is, and not the quality of that identity (this of course
applies to the rest of the identities assessed by this measurement). That is obvious, one
may say, as this was a quantitative questionnaire. Not quite so, I believe. Most of the
rest of the instruments used in this study attribute certain qualities to the observed
measurements. A person with a high score on neuroticism or anxiety or intrinsic
orientation is expected to have a number of direct, explicit, and specific psychological
qualities attached to her or his score. But what are the direct, explicit and specific
psychological qualities of a person with a high score on social identity? Perhaps they
value more the opinion other people have about them; perhaps they pay more attention
to theirmanners or appearance. All these, however, say nothing about the quality oftheir
identity. The quality of one's identity can vary from functional to totally dysfunctional
(as Erikson and Tajfel & Turner have theorised). However, from the answers to the
questionnaire used in this study, I can only assess the prominence ofone's identity, and
not how functional it is. What I am trying to say is that perhaps this negative relationship
between church attendance and social identity could be based on the not-so-functional
forms of the latter. In other words, perhaps a number of participants in my sample, who
so happened to give to their social identity a central place in their sense of who they
were, in fear of rejection and negative criticism were less likely to go to church.
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Overall, the predicted relationship between religiosity and aspects of identity was to
an extent supported. As expected, personal identity showed a positive associationwith
quest, while social identitywas positively related to extrinsic personal, and negatively
to intrinsic. Counter to my predictions, church attendance had an inverse association
with social identity, while it lacked an obvious association with personal identity.
Religiosity vs. Attachment
In order to understand the relationship between attachment styles and religiosity, we
need to remind ourselves of the interpretation of the scores in the attachment scale. Items
in the ECR are scored so that the higher the scores the more insecure the attachment.
Therefore, any positive correlations between religiosity and attachment indicate that the
more an insecure attachment one possesses the more one is orientated toward a given
religiosity. Negative correlations of course suggest the opposite trend.
As it can be seen in Table 6.60, prayer, church attendance, intrinsic, internal and external
tend to have significant negative associations with attachment (avoidance dimension).
As mature orientations form the basis of this group, it could be said that these results
suggest that the more securely attached one is, the more likely one is to have a mature
religiosity.
At the same time extrinsic personal had a positive, statistically significant, correlation
with attachment (anxiety dimension), while extrinsic social appeared to be independent
ofattachment. These results indicate a relatively weak link between immature religiosity
and insecure attachment.
The quest orientations showed a positive, statistically significant, association with
anxious attachment. I would not, however, call this necessarily an "unhealthy"
relationship. Let us remind ourselves that the anxiety dimension ofattachment taps into
the positive-negative mental model of the self, with higher scores indicating a more
negative self-image. Granted the results suggest that a negative model of the selfappears
to be associated with higher levels of quest orientation, but these results could be
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interpreted as indicating that Christians who tend to have a negative self-image, may be
more orientated toward trying to understand their place in this world, and who they are.
In other words, they may be utilising their religious beliefs in such ways that could help
them improve their concept of the self. By placing this assumption into attachment
theory, it could be said that these individuals are attempting to adjust or improve their
model of the self, in order to restore or achieve adequate levels of security.




Church attendance -.26*** -.07
(147) (144)
Intrinsic _ 23** -.08
(146) (143)
Extrinsic personal .02 28***
(146) (143)








Quest complexity -.04 .20*
(144) (141)
Quest doubt .08 .09
(145) (142)
Quest openness .07 .19*
(143) (140)
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005, all two-tailed
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Overall, the above results do not support the compensation hypothesis. At least in this
dataset, the correspondence hypothesis is largely supported, leading to the conclusion
that the more securely attached a person is, the more likely he or she is to possess a
mature form of religiosity, and less likely to have an immature one.
Religiosity / Schizotypy vs. Social Desirability
By looking at the associations between social desirability and either religiosity or
schizotypy (Table 6.61) the main conclusion is that impression management, but not
self-deception, is of primary importance to these relationships. In other words, the
tendency to lie consciously (or for that matter, be more truthful) appears to dominate
these relationships and not so much the subconscious disposition to provide positively
biased self-reports (although the latter still exhibited some strong associations with
schizotypy).
The religiosity-social desirability affair closely replicates previous research findings, by
showing that people who tend to pray more, go to church more often, be more
intrinsically or internally orientated, also tend to (consciously) inflate socially desirable
self-descriptions and behaviour. Immature forms of religiosity did not and were not
expected to demonstrate any important associations with social desirability.
Quest, once again, showed an interesting pattern, by having a negative relationship with
both social desirability dimensions. It seems that when believers are driven to ask
questions about their faith, they aremore likely to be truthful to themselves and to others
regarding their behaviour. This of course makes intuitive sense, if one's quest to seek
existential answers is an honest act itself, and I see no empirical or theoretical reason
why it should not be.
All schizotypal traits had statistically significant moderate correlations with at least one
of the social desirability dimensions. It should also be pointed out that all meaningful
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associations here were negative. To my knowledge, no literature exists that directly
addresses these relationships. Are schizotypal individuals more honest? I do not know.
I am inclined, however, to suggest that the more schizotypal a person is, the more
incapable of providing or perhaps less willing to provide socially desirable responses
they are. In fact, almost all of the questions in the SPQ ask primarily about socially
undesirable characteristics.
Table 6.61. Pearson's product moment correlations (plus N) between social desirability and









Prayer .20** .07 _ 39**** -.09 Cognitive-perceptual
(150) (148) (142) (140)
Church
attendance
27*** .06 _ 34**** -.22** Interpersonal
(150) (148) (144) (143)
Intrinsic 22**** .09 32**** _ 03*** Disorganised
(149) (147) (147) (145)
Extrinsic personal .04 -.05 32**** -.12 Ideas of reference
(149) (147) (147) (146)
Extrinsic social .03 .03 -.26*** .03 Magical ideation
(150) (148) (146) (144)
Internal 23** .02 _ 37**** -.01 Unusual experiences
(146) (145) (148) (146)
External .15 -.03 _ 3Q**** -.17* Suspiciousness
(147) (145) (148) (147)
Quest 31**** -.17* _ 29**** _ 24*** Social anxiety
(145) (143) (147) (145)
Quest complexity -.13 -.15 -.20** -.12 No friends
(146) (144) (150) (148)
Quest doubt -.21** -.03 _ 30**** -.12 Constricted affect
(147) (145) (149) (148)








*p< .05, **p < .01, ***p< .005, ****p< .001, all two-tailed
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To be classified as highly schizotypal a person would have to admit to such things as
being strange, unsociable, oversuspicious, and having unusual beliefs. In such cases,
consistency dictates that this person would have to deny a number of socially desirable
characteristics as they appear in the BIDR-6, such as being rational, not paying attention
to other people's opinions about them, or obeying the law. Whatever the meaning of
these findings, they are nevertheless fascinating, and I believe they deserve further
attention.
In conclusion, social desirability had the expected relationship with religiosity, with
maturely orientated individuals having a tendency to give more socially desirable
responses. Quest had a negative association with desirability, which although not
predicted, could have been expected. Finally, the new finding is the consistently
negative relationship between schizotypy and desirability.
Viewed collectively the above relationships between religiosity and the rest of the
psychometric variables seem to suggest that although religiosity shows some
associations with them, these tend to be rather low, leading me to conclude that
religiosity is a fairly independent construct from the rest of the mainstream
psychological variables present in this dataset.
Schizotypy vs. Personality
Schizotypal traits tended to exhibit rather strong correlations with general personality
traits (Table 6.62). As predicted, all correlations between neuroticism and schizotypy
were positive and statistically significant, ranging from . 17 (with magical ideation) to
.51 (with social anxiety). Psychoticism had also the expected positive, albeit relatively
lower, correlations with schizotypy, ranging from the near zero one with odd speech (r
= .02) to a moderate one with the second-order cognitive-perceptual factor (r = .36).
These results follow closely the empirical evidence presented in the literature (e.g. Deary
et ah, 1998; Joseph et al., 2002; Raine, 1991; Wuthrich & Bates, 2001; all discussed in
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chapters IV and V).
Unlike, however, the literature findings, in which extraversion tended to exhibit near
zero andmainly negative association with schizotypy, in the present study, extraversion
demonstrated some relatively high, still negative, correlations with schizotypy, which
were exclusively concentrated around the interpersonal first and second-order traits.
Table 6.62. Pearson's product moment correlation coefficients (plus N) between schizotypal
and general personality traits.
N E P
Cognitive-perceptual 38**** .05 36****
(148) (146) (145)
Interpersonal 46**** _ 44**** .26***
(152) (151) (149)
Disorganised 39**** -.01 .14
(155) (152) (152)
Ideas of reference 37**** .05 28****
(155) (153) (152)
Magical ideation .17* .13 28****
(152) (149) (149)
Unusual experiences 29**** .07 32****
(155) (153) (152)
Suspiciousness 42**** -.13 31****
(156) (154) (153)
Social anxiety 51**** - 43**** .11
(155) (153) (152)
No friends 28**** _ 47**** .21**
(157) (154) (154)
Constricted affect 33 **** 36**** 29****
(156) (155) (153)
Odd behaviour 32* * * * -.04 .26***
(158) (155) (155)
Odd speech 38**** .01 .02
(155) (152) (152)
*
p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005, **** p < .001, all two-tailed
This behaviour could to an extent have been theoretically predicted. As discussed in
chapter IV, Eysenck & Eysenck (1991) suggested that a person with a tendency toward
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psychosis is more likely to be highly psychotic and highly introverted, as measured by
the Eysenck's model (the role of neuroticism in this relationship is not discussed). The
bivariate relationships here appear to support such claim. This relationship is further
discussed when the integrated model is presented later.
In conclusion, as predicted schizotypy had a positive and moderate relationship with
neuroticism, and a positive yet lower relationship with psychoticism. Interestingly,
extraversion had a negative and moderate association with the interpersonal
schizotypal traits. Moreover, the current results can be seen as providing some support
to the dimensional approach to psychopathology.
Schizotypy vs. Identity
Generally, schizotypy was fairly independent from identity, showing only a few
significant, yet rather low, correlations mainly with personal identity (versus cognitive-
perceptual: r = .22, N = 149,/? < .01, two-tailed, power 05 = .78; ideas of reference: r =
.22, N = 156,/? < .01, two-tailed, power05 = .80; magical thinking: r = .17, iV= 153,/?
< .05, two-tailed, power05 = .56), and secondarily with social identity (versus ideas of
reference: r = .17, N = 157,/? < .05, two-tailed, power05 = .57; social anxiety: r = .17,
N= 156,/? < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .57). As no prior evidence is available regarding
these relationships, the current results should be seen as exploratory in nature.
Schizotypal traits had a low positive association with personal and social aspects of
identity (no directional predictions were made regarding this relationship).
Schizotypy vs. Attachment
Although attachment was predicted to correlate positively with schizotypy, it did so in
a far more obvious and consistent manner (Table 6.63). The picture seems rather clear
to me: The attachment-schizotypy pair shows some of the strongest relationships
presented in this study, which indicate that insecure attachment is associated with higher
levels of schizotypal traits.
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Not surprisingly, a central part of this relationship is formed by the attachment-
interpersonal traits pairs, which indicate the person's inability to regulate their
interpersonal distance. The association between anxious attachment and both cognitive-
perceptual and disorganised traits suggests that these two psychological variables
possess a fundamental, possibly, biologically-rooted relationship, a relationship that
deserves future attention, as it may provide a valuable insight into the workings and
development of schizotypy and schizotypal personality disorder.
Table 6.63. Pearson's product moment correlation









Ideas of reference .10 30***
(146) (143)
Magical ideation -.16 -.07
(142) (139)




Social anxiety .25** 31***
(145) (142)
No friends 39*** .13
(147) (144)
Constricted affect 35*** .22*
(147) (144)
Odd behaviour .13 .25**
(148) (145)
Odd speech .10 36***
(145) (142)
*
p < .01, ** p < .005, *** p < .001, all two-tailed
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In conclusion the results suggest a clear and possibly fundamental association
between insecure attachment and schizotypal symptomatology.
Personality vs. Identity
The only observed statistically significant correlations were those between neuroticism
and personal (r = .29, N= 156,p < .0005, two-tailed, power 05 = .96) and social identities
(r = .23, N = 157, p < .005, two-tailed, power05 = .83), and a single rather low
correlation between psychoticism and personal identity (r = .18, iV= 153,p< .05, two-
tailed, power05 = .61). As collective identity derives from the ideas of community
membership it was not expected to show any important relationships with personality.
As predicted, aspects of identity, namely personal and social, were almost exclusively
related to neuroticism.
Personality vs. Attachment
Attachment was indeed primarily related to neuroticism (avoidant attachment: r - .20,
N= 146,p < .05, two-tailed, power 05 = .68; and anxious attachment: r = .48, N= 143,
p < .0005, two-tailed, power 05 = .99), while a single statistically significant correlation
was found between extraversion and avoidant attachment (r = -.31, N= 145,/? < .0005,
two-tailed, power 05 = .97). All other correlation coefficients, including those involving
psychoticism, had near zero values (highest was -.04 between extraversion and anxious
attachment).
This pattern of associations does make intuitive sense. A person who is highly avoidant
and primarily anxious in their relationships would be expected to be more emotionally
unstable (i.e. neurotic). In fact, anxiety is a key construct of neuroticism. At the same
time, the negative relationship between avoidance and extraversion, seems also
reasonable, since a person who tends to avoid forming intimate bonds, could be doing
so in part because they are not sociable, impulsive, or active enough.
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Although a lack of a relationship between psychoticism and attachment was not
expected, in all honesty I cannot see how these two constructs, at least as measured in
this study, could have been related. Although an insecurely attached individual may
exhibit, in extreme cases, some forms ofmaladaptive behaviour, it seems more likely
that this behaviour is related to emotional instability or perhaps inadequate levels of
sociability, rather than any antisocial or for that matter prosocial tendencies.
In conclusion, attachment styles were primarily related to neuroticism (as predicted)
and secondarily to extraversion (no predictions were made regarding this
relationship), while they appeared to be completely independent from psychoticism
(counter to predictions).
Identity vs. Attachment
Exploring the relationship between aspects of identity and attachment styles, it was
anxious attachment that had the largest and only significant correlations with personal
identity (r = .30, N= 144, p < .0005, two-tailed, power 05 = .96) and social identity ( r
= .42, N= 145, p < .0005, two-tailed, power 05 = .99). Avoidant attachment showed
rather low associations with identity (highest correlation coefficient was .14 against
social identity). Collective identity was almost entirely independent from attachment
styles.
How does one go about explaining these relationships? I am not entirely sure. The
relationship between social identity and anxious attachment, seems rather
straightforward, as soon as we remind ourselves ofwhat the two constructs refer to. The
anxious style captures one's need for approval, while social identity (the social ME)
refers, among other things, to one's desire to be noticed. I can easily see how these two
ideas can relate to each other. The lack of association between collective identity and
attachment, was to an extent expected, given that collective identity refers to the
individual's sense of belonging to a community, and as such does not seem to possess
any obvious resemblance to romantic attachment styles.
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The positive correlation between personal identity and anxious attachment though is not
clear to me. Personal identity refers to the private sense of one's uniqueness and the
perception ofoneself. Ifwe bring forward Erikson's ideas, we can remind ourselves that
depending on in which of the four stages of personal identity development a person is,
his or her personal identity can be from functional to totally dysfunctional. However, as
I discussed earlier, from the answers to the identity questionnaire used in this study, I
can only assess the strength ofone's personal identity, and not how functional it is. The
literature suggests that the stability of attachment affects the development of personal
identity (Haigler, Day & Marshall, 1995; Matos et al., 1999; Meeus et al., 2002;
Zimmermann & Becker-Stoll, 2002). Therefore, the above relationship is expected to
be a causal one with attachment predicting identity.
So, it could be claimed that the more insecure one's attachment the more dysfunctional
his or her personal identity will be, and it so happened that in the current sample a few
of those people with such identities also gave them a central place in their sense ofwho
they were. I could discuss this further, but as it is not central to the sense ofwhat this
thesis is, I will leave it here.
In conclusion, the attachment-identity relationship seems to be almost exclusively
represented by the relationship between anxious attachment and social, personal
identities (no specific predictions were made regarding this relationship).
Primarypredictions
The excitement & prevention hypotheses
Both the excitement and prevention hypotheses, which expect schizotypy to predict
religiosity, were tested simultaneously through a series of multiple linear stepwise
regressions using all the first-order schizotypal traits as predictors against each of the
religiosity variables (multicollinearity did not appear to be a problem in these models,
since maximum VIF [variance inflationfactor] = 3.40 was below the cutoffpoint of 10,
Stevens, 2002, pp. 91-93). The bivariate correlations between the two groups of
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variables (Table 6.64) show a number of moderate associations.
Frequency of church attendance had the highest correlations from all the religiosity
variables, being significantly associated with ten out of the twelve schizotypal traits.
This behaviour is followed closely by intrinsic, internal, and frequency of prayer.
Moreover, all these variables had consistently negative associations with schizotypy.
Both extrinsic orientations appeared to be relatively independent from schizotypy, with
extrinsic personal showing a few significant, albeit rather low, positive correlations,
while the behaviour of extrinsic social seems to be practically just noise. External
orientation also appears to be largely orthogonal to schizotypy. Quest on the other hand
had a consistently positive association with schizotypy, with a number of significant
coefficients. Looking into the quest subscales, the quest-schizotypy relationship seems
to be best captured by the behaviour of quest openness. Interestingly, magical ideation
showed near zero associations with religiosity.
Summing up, these results suggest that at least at this level of comparison, mature
religiosity and religious practices appear to be the most important bivariate correlates
ofschizotypy (negative association), followed closely by quest (positive association),
while the extrinsic / external orientations are to a large extent unrelated to the traits.
The results from the stepwise regressions of the total sample presented in Table 6.64
seem to suggest that both hypotheses could be supported to an extent. Suspiciousness
and close friends tended to have negative coefficients thus supporting the prevention
hypothesis, unusual experiences, constricted affect, odd behaviour and speech tended
to have positive coefficients thus favouring the excitement hypothesis, while social
anxiety appeared to have an amphi-directional effect (at times positive and at other times
negative). Ofall the schizotypal traits, social anxiety appeared to be the most significant
predictor, being present in four out of the eleven models.
Looking at the second-order traits, it appears that interpersonal schizotypal traits are the
most relevant to religiosity. Interestinglymagical ideation did not appear as a significant
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predictor in any of the models. Frequency of church attendance seemed to have the
highest, yet negative, association with schizotypy (R2 = .13), followed by intrinsic
orientation (R2 = .10). Extrinsic religiosity did not appear to be a significant outcome of
schizotypal traits, except for the 4% of the variability in extrinsic personal being
predicted by unusual experiences.
Given the unclear picture in the literature regarding the moderating effect of gender in
the above relationship, I decided to rerun the analyses separately for men and women
(Table 6.66). However, given sample size limitations, especially with men (n = 51), the
results ofthese analysesmay not cross-validate well, and thus they should be interpreted
with caution and only be seen as possible and broad indicators of the underlying
relationships (for a further discussion see Stevens, 2002, pp. 143-146).
Although overall the direction of the effects did not change, thus still supporting to an
extent both hypotheses, the magnitude of the effects tended to be higher for men. The
main schizotypal predictor for women seemed to be social anxiety, while the rest of the
significant effects were distributed among the ideas of reference, odd speech, and odd
behaviour. For women, the model best predicted intrinsic religiosity (R2 = .14) and
church attendance (R2 = .10).
For men the statistically significant effects of schizotypy were distributed among
constricted affect, no friends, social anxiety, odd behaviour, odd speech, and
suspiciousness. In this case, most of the religiosity variables were highly accounted by
schizotypy, with quest openness being the most significant outcome (R2 = .31)
Overall these results could be seen as providing a relatively weak support to both the
excitement and prevention hypotheses. The model holds better for men.
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The causal hypothesis
In order to test the causal hypothesis that treated religiosity as a predictor of schizotypy,
the religious variables were grouped into two separatemodels. Both models included the
two religious practices (frequency of prayer and church attendance), and the I/E-R and
RLI orientations. However, in one of the models the three quest subscales were used
instead of the overall quest orientation. Moreover, the internal orientation was excluded
from both models, under the assumption that due to its high correlation with intrinsic (r
= .79) its behaviour would be largely expressed by the latter orientation - this was also
done to avoid potential collinearity problems in the regression models (maximum VIF
for the variables that remained in the two models was 2.70). As no hierarchy in the
predictive behaviour of the religious variables was a priori assumed, a number of
multiple linear stepwise regressions were run, with each of the two models above as
predictors against each of the first and second-order schizotypal traits.
The total-sample results point to a far more interesting picture than the one observed
when schizotypy functioned as a predictor of religiosity (Table 6.67). Supporting the
evidence from the literature discussed in chapter IV, higher levels of intrinsic orientation
tended to predict significantly lower levels ofschizotypy, while higher levels ofextrinsic
appeared to predict significantly higher levels of schizotypy, though this result was
mainly concentrated in the personal domain of this orientation. At the same time,
frequency of church attendance, but not as much as frequency of prayer, emerged as a
significant deterrent of schizotypy.
One of the most frequently significant predictors of schizotypal traits appeared to be the
quest orientation, with higher levels of it predicting higher levels of schizotypy. This
effect can be almost exclusively attributed to the quest openness subscale. Finally, the
external orientation did not have a significant effect on any of the schizotypal traits; this
result does not seem to be an artefact ofmulticollinearity problems (tolerance - .66).
Almost all schizotypal traits appeared to be significant outcomes ofreligiosity. Themost
relevant were again the interpersonal traits (R2 — .14) - mainly social anxiety, lack of
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close friends, and constricted affect - followed by the cognitive-perceptual traits (R2 =
.10) - especially ideas of reference and unusual experiences. Finally, once again,
magical ideation had only 2% of its variability accounted for by the variability in
religiosity.
When the analyses were run separately for men and women, the picture changed (Table
6.68). The direction of the effects remained the same to the one observed in the total
sample. Still religiosity appeared to behave better as a predictor of schizotypy, although
the religiosity variables with statistically significant effects tended to be different
between the two sexes.
For women church attendance and quest complexity were the most frequent predictors
of schizotypy, while for men it was mainly intrinsic and the two extrinsic orientations
that appearedmore often. Unlike, however, the schizotypy-as-a-predictor models, where
the effects were stronger for men, in this case the effects appear to be equally strong for
both sexes.
Taking into account all the above models, gender seems to have an important
moderating effect on the religiosity-schizotypy relation. This moderation, however,
mainly impacts on the kind of variables from both sides that have a significant effect,
and not on the direction of the relationship. In addition, it seems that the strength of the
relationship may vary between the sexes depending on whether schizotypy acts as a
predictor of religiosity or vice versa.
Moving on, it is worth commenting at this point on the magical ideation schizotypal
trait. The magical ideation scale in this sample did receive some "yes" answers (mean
= 1.93, SD = 2.02), although given that the range of the scale was 0 to 7, one can see that
the distribution of the responses was heavily positively skewed (in fact, almost L-
shaped), suggesting thatmost people gave the "no" response. In the literature it has been
assumed that there would be a relationship between magical ideation and religiosity.
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That said, only one study in the religiosity-schizotypy area has found such a relationship
(Diduca & Joseph, 1997, discussed in chapter IV). That was between religious
preoccupation - a measure devised for that study - and only among men. The results of
the current study suggest that this relationship appears to be present only among women,
but is absent both in the total sample and among men. By taking into account the
bivariate relationships presented earlier, this trait appears to be largely independent from
religiosity. Is this finding strange? I do not think so.
By believing to a supernatural deity, it could be argued that Christians exhibit a degree
ofmagical ideation, but this is not necessarily comparable to the structure of magical
ideation within schizotypy. In the latter context, magical ideation refers to beliefs in
UFOs, extra terrestrials and certain parapsychological concepts, such as telepathy,
clairvoyance and so forth. Most of these concepts are not part of (at least mainstream)
Christian teachings, and the ones that may be, are characteristics that are clearly
attributed to saints and God, and are not normally seen as abilities humans would tend
to possess.
As such, it seems to me that at least an "orthodox" Christian would be less inclined to
admitting believing in them or at least a number of them. In the same line of thought, I
fail to see a relationship between religious orientation and magical ideation. Inmymind,
a Christian, or for that matter any religious person, is not necessarily someone with a
disposition toward indiscriminate magical thinking. In conclusion, both previous and
current findings clearly suggest that one should not expect to find an important
relationship between religiosity and magical thinking, at least within the context of
schizotypy.
Overall, the above results seem to provide a relatively strong support to the causal
hypothesis, generally in the direction predicted by the literature. The causal models
had equally strong predictability for both men and women.
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Therefore, it seems that, at least in this dataset, religiosity functions better as a predictor
of schizotypy and not vice versa. In order to clarify this observation, a Canonical
Correlation Analysis was performed between the two sets of variables on the total
sample.
Given sample size considerations (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p. 180), only the
second-order schizotypal traits were used (three variables in the set) against the
religiosity model that included the overall quest orientation and excluded the internal
orientation (seven variables in the set). For this configuration, the maximum number of
possible canonical variate pairs was three, i.e. equal to the smallest of the two sets (see
Stevens, 2002, p.473).
With all three canonical pairs included, F{2\, 371) = 2.54,p < .0005, with the first
canonical pair removed, 7^(12, 260) = 1.77,/? = .052, while with both first and second
canonical pairs removed, F(5, 131) = 1.01,/? = .42. Therefore, only the first pair of
canonical variates, with a canonical correlation coefficient of R = .45 (20.3%
overlapping variance), appeared to account significantly for the relationship between
these two sets - the second pair just missed inclusion.
The religiosity variate accounted for 26.1% of the variability within the religiosity set,
while the schizotypy variate covered 65.8% of the variability in the schizotypy set. The
schizotypy variate explained 5.3% of the variability in the religiosity variate, while the
latter accounted for 13.5% of the variability in schizotypy. This last result supports the
previous observation that the causal hypothesis appears to be more plausible, at least in
the current dataset.
By inspecting the loadings on the first canonical variates (Table 6.69) and using a
suggested loading cutoffpoint of |.30| (see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001, p. 199) it appears
that the external religiosity and both the extrinsic ones do not belong to this variate - in
fact, these three variables loaded primarily on the second religiosity variate, which was
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not included in the final model.
Table 6.69. Primary loadings of the religiosity and schizotypy
variables on the first canonical variate they belong (N= 139).
Religiosity Schizotypy
Frequency of prayer



















Focussing on the extracted first canonical pair, the relationship between the two sets
could be described as follows: Individuals who tend to pray more frequently, go to
church more often, be more intrinsically and less quest orientated, have lower levels of
schizotypal traits.
The covariance hypothesis
However, one thing still remains unanswered. Why attribute causality in the first place?
After all, the results of the canonical correlation indicate a 20.3% overlap between the
religiosity and schizotypy variability, and although the redundancies (i.e. the amount of
variation in each of the variates explained by the other; see Tabachnick & Fidell, 2001,
pp. 189-190) were not balanced, this could be an artifact of forced-variate membership.
What if we allowed the variables to fall into the variates freely? Would that result in
groups formed with elements of both religiosity and schizotypy components?
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This question of course addresses the covariance hypothesis of chapter IV, and in order
to check its plausibility a Principal Components Analysis (PCA) was run on the second-
order schizotypal traits and the religiosity set that included the overall quest orientation
and excluded the internal one. Given sample size considerations (see Tabachnick &
Fidell, 2001, p. 588), PCA was run only with the total sample. It still remains to be seen
whether the results presented below would hold for men and women.
The results of the Kaiser-Meyer-Olkinmeasure ofsampling adequacy indicated that the
proportion of variance in the items attributed to common variance was 71%, while the
Bartlett's test ofsphericity suggested that the items' correlation matrix was significantly
different from the identity matrix, %2 (45, N= 139) = 465.76, p < .005. The scree plot
clearly suggested the retention of two factors (52.6% of total variance), while the Kaiser
criterium pointed to three (62.7% of total variance). For reasons of parsimony I opted
for two factors. A Direct Oblimin rotation suggested that these two factors were
independent from each other (r = -.05), thus a solution based on a Varimax rotation was
adopted (Table 6.70).
Table 6.70. Principal Components factor loadings after Varimax
rotation of the primary religiosity variables and the second-order













Extracted eigenvalues (unrotated) 3.22 2.04
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The results clearly indicate a religiosity factor and a separate schizotypy factor.
Interestingly, extrinsic personal and quest orientations loaded primarily on the
schizotypy factor. However, the distance between the loadings of those two orientations
and the principal loadings of the schizotypal traits suggests that probably these
orientations do not belong in this factor and if placed there, perhaps they should not be
seen as forming a stable group with the schizotypal traits.
When a three-factor solution was requested, the third factor (unrotated eigenvalue =
1.02) was formed by the extrinsic social (r = .66) and the extrinsic personal (r = .64)
orientations, while quest cross-loaded on that factor (r = -.47) and the schizotypy one
(r = .50).
In order to view the above configuration from a different perspective, an MDS analysis
was run on these data using Kruskal's non-metric monotone regression algorithm.
Proximities were calculated from the standardised values of the data9 using Euclidean
distances with a primary approach to ties.
Two thousand initial random configurations were requested. A two-dimensional solution
was selected (Kruskal's Stress = .06), which accounted for 52.2% of the total variance
in the set and maintained 52.3% of the rank ordering of the dissimilarities (solution
converged in 61 iterations). As it can be seen in Figure 6.3, the two factors can be fairly
reproduced (dashed line). Both quest and extrinsic personal appear to be relatively
"closer" to the schizotypal group than to the group formed by the rest of the religiosity
variables.
Standardisation was seen as a necessary step, in order to avoid the problem of degeneracy in
the MDS solution (Stalans, 2001, pp. 154-156). As the variables were measured on different
scales, when they were entered into the MDS model in their raw scores, a degenerative solution
occurred whereby variables formed very tight, distinct, yet artificial clusters, leading to a
perceptual map that was misleading and of little to no use.
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Figure 6.3. A two-dimensional representation ofthe religiosity-schizotypy relation as mapped
through a non-metric multidimensional scaling analysis.
One may point out that the arrangement of the variables on the map could also suggest
that the two-factor solution may not reflect a simple, and perhaps stable, underlying
structure of the relationship between religiosity and schizotypy, since the space can be
partitioned into a number of alternative ways, e.g. a group defined only by church
attendance and intrinsic orientation. However, I would argue that the applied
partitioning, when viewed alongside the FA results, is both conceptually meaningful and
empirically useful, since it shows that not only religiosity tends to occupy its own
"space", which is distinct from that populated by schizotypy, but also that the two
religiosity variables that appear to be "attracted" to schizotypy do not form a clear group
with it.
Therefore, collectively the FA and MDS results seem to provide a rather weak
support to the covariance hypothesis.
Together the findings from the four hypotheses that attempted to identify the underlying
relationship between schizotypy and religiosity suggest that a causal model that places
Page 266
Chapter VI: The questionnaire study: Results & Discussion
religiosity as a predictor of schizotypy seems to be the most plausible one in this dataset.
Moreover, collectively seen these results point to another interesting finding.
Although in the literature the effect of quest is unclear (for an overview see Batson et
al., 1993, chap. 8), in this study quest not only comes as one of the main predictors of
schizotypy, but should one adopt the causal model, then higher levels of the quest
orientation appear to result consistently in higher levels of schizotypal traits.
This is a very important observation, because if we accept Batson's model that places
quest as the most mature form of religiosity, then one is compelled by the above results
to admit that the more mature one's religion is, the more likely one is to be schizotypal,
and as an extension, the more likely one is to develop a schizotypal personality disorder.
That said, as I commented earlier, the results of this study do not seem to support
Batson's model. Quest and its subscales showed in a rather consistent manner negative,
albeit generally low, associations with age (r = -.14), duration of being a Christian (r =
-. 18, for quest complexity), frequency ofprayer (r = -.20, for quest doubt), frequency of
church attendance (r = -.15), intrinsic (r = -.15) and internal (r = -.21), while at the same
time quest appeared almost entirely independent from the external and the two extrinsic
orientations.
According to these findings, it seems more likely that, at least in this sample, quest is not
a form of mature religiosity. It could be, as Donahue (1985) suggested, a passage to
maturity. In other words, quest could be the doubt stage or process through which one
will need to go in order to acquire a mature form of faith.
Whatever the case is, Iwill agree with DavidWulff that quest deserves special attention
in future studies, since it may be capturing a unique element of religiosity with
properties well-worth investigating.
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The integrated model
Given the findings above, the integrated model presented hereinafter treats religiosity
as a predictor of schizotypy. Having identified the model that best describes the
religiosity-schizotypy relationship in the current dataset, the next step was to take into
account the mediating effects of the rest of the variables and assess their impact on the
initial model. To allow for the structural model (a recursive one) to emerge, a number
of steps were necessary.
First, the exogenous variate (religiosity) consisted of the three I/E-R orientations, the
three RLI orientations, and the two religious practices. By taking into account theoretical
considerations as well as the bivariate relationships between these variables, I grouped
them as follows: intrinsic, internal, external, prayer, and church attendance formed a
group I named "mature"; extrinsic personal and extrinsic social formed another group,
I called " immature"; quest was left on its own (see Figure 6.4). Finally, external was
allowed to cross-load on the immature group. The endogenous variate (schizotypy)
consisted of the three SPQ second-order traits.
Due to sample size restrictions it was not possible for all measured variables to enter the
model as controls - when this was attempted, the structural model was unidentified.
General personality, identity, attachment, and desirability, all served as mediators,
because, as described earlier in this section, they tended to show clear and relatively
large associations with both or either the religiosity and schizotypy variables. However,
ofall the sociodemographic variables, only age was included in the model as amediator,
and given its large correlation with the duration of being a Christian (r = .92), it was
assumed that the effect of the former would also represent that of the latter.
All other sociodemographics, which would have served as moderators in the structural
model, i.e. they would have partitioned the model into a number of sub-models equal to
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the number of groups that formed them, had to be dropped. While student status,
employment status, and marital status could be viewed to an extent as secondary to the
psychological assessment of the religiosity-schizotypy relationship (even though they
indeed showed some interesting effects, as presented earlier in the chapter), the main
disappointment was the exclusion of gender and religious denomination, both ofwhich
showed a number of significant effects on either religiosity or schizotypy.
Missing values were imputed through the SPSS expectation-maximization (EM)
algorithm (Dempster et ah, 1977). Structural discrepancies were estimated through a
maximum likelihood procedure. The structural model was run twice, once with the
initial data and once with the imputed data. As missingness was found earlier to be
ignorable, the goodness-of-fit indices were essentially identical in the two models.
Although these models had acceptable levels of fit (Table 6.71), the fit could clearly be
improved with only a few modifications. By considering primarily theoretically
permissible modifications and secondly themagnitude ofthe Lagrangemultipliers, only
three adjustments were made through which (a) a path was added between personality
and schizotypy - a move that is justifiable both theoretically and empirically (b) the
residuals ofextraversion and interpersonal schizotypal traits were allowed to covary, and
(c) the residuals of extrinsic social and church attendance were also allowed to covary.
The final model consisted of 61 variables of which 22 were observed and 39 were
unobserved. Of these variables, 31 served as exogenous and 30 as endogenous. The
model contained 275 distinct sample moments, 43 fixed parameters, and 75 parameters
to be estimated (Figure 6.4). A minimum discrepancy function was achieved in 26
iterations. The three modifications led to a significant reduction in the minimum
discrepancy function of the initial model, A%2(3 ,N= 161) = 83.56, /? < .0005.
The other major improvement was the relatively large reduction of the expected cross-
validation index (ECVI), suggesting that of the two models the final one had a greater
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potential for replication. Overall the values of the indices in Table 6.71 suggest that the
final model has an acceptable fit.
Table 6.71. SEM goodness-of-fit statistics for the initial model and the final nested model
after post hoc modifications (N= 161).




x2 505.83 422.27 0 9056.26
df 203 200 0 253
P< .0005 .0005 - .0005
CM1NDF 2.49 2.11 - 35.80
NFI .94 .95 1 0
CFI .97 .98 1 0
RMSEA .10 .08 0 .47
90% CIRMSEA 0 kO 1 0 1 o kO - OOIkO
ECVI 4.06 3.58 3.44 56.88
90% CIECVI 3.67-4.50 3.23-3.73 - 54.95 - 58.84
Moving away from these indices and looking into the effects on schizotypy, a far more
interesting picture emerges (Table 6.72). Focussing on the three variates that directly
connect with schizotypy, religiosity clearly appears to have a substantial effect. The
direct standardised effect (standardised regression weight) of religiosity on schizotypy
(-.21) was rather similar to that ofpersonality (.26) and not much smaller than the effect
of all the mediators taken collectively (.35).
In fact, and perhaps to the surprise ofmainstream psychologists, the total standardised
effect of religiosity (-.34) was larger than that ofpersonality -which remained the same
as above. Moreover, only around one third of the total effect of religiosity (-.13) was
mediated by the other variables in the model. Finally, according to the value of the
square multiple correlation, the final model explained 40% of the variability in
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schizotypal traits.
Therefore, based on these findings, the first conclusion is that the phenotype
hypothesis, according to which the religiosity-schizotypy relationship is a spurious
one, should be rejected.
Table 6.72. The effect on schizotypy ofthe three variates with direct paths to it (standardised
effects are given in round brackets).
Religiosity Mediators Personality
Direct effect -5.18 (-.21) 0.05 (.35) 0.37 (.26)
Indirect effect -3.19 (-.13) 0.12 (.15) -
Total effect -8.37 (-.34) 0.17 (.50) 0.37 (.26)
By inspecting the path diagram, a number of additional interesting observations can be
made. First, it is not surprising that a relatively "maladaptive" personality - in this case,
one that tends to be neurotic, introverted and relatively psychotic - would be positively
associated with schizotypal traits. These results follow closely the empirical evidence
presented in this study (see the schizotypy vs. personality section earlier). In the current
model it seems that the most important general personality trait to schizotypy is
neuroticism, while the least is psychoticism - the low loading of psychoticism is not
surprising given the trait's rather low correlations with the rest of the personality
dimensions (see the first section of this chapter under the EPQ heading).
The high negative residual correlation (-.79) between extraversion and interpersonal
traits was also to an extent expected given the relatively high negative bivariate
correlation between the two traits (-.44) identified earlier. This relationship leads to the
conclusion, which follows closely the Claridge and Davis (2003) theorising, that the
more introverted a person is, the more likely he or she is to possess (or for that matter,
develop) relatively "dysfunctional" interpersonal traits.
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Moving to the mediator variate, it appears to be composed, in descending order of
"importance", by (a) primarily a tendency toward an insecure attachment (mainly a
highly anxious one); (b) a tendency to provide responses less socially desirable, i.e. a
tendency to honesty or inability to lie as discussed earlier; followed by (c) relatively
"maladaptive" general personality traits (as described above); and (d) a relatively strong
sense of identity (mainly social identity). Finally, the mediator variate had an inverse
relationship with age (standardised coefficient = -.36), which indirectly suggests also an
inverse relationship with the duration of one being a Christian.
Therefore, all mediating variables in the model seem to make a relatively important
contribution to the religiosity-schizotypy relationship, with the most important
mediator appearing to be attachment, closely followed by social desirability, while the
least important, but by no means unimportant, appear to be aspects of identity.
The mediator shows the profile of a person that is relatively not so healthy-minded. The
direct positive effect of the mediator on schizotypy appears to suggest that such a person
is more likely to possess higher levels of schizotypal traits.
Homing in on the religiosity variate, it can be seen that, given the rest of the results
presented in this chapter, the variables behave in a rather expected way. Internal,
intrinsic, prayer, and church attendance, have all high positive loadings on the mature
group, as they all showed relatively high correlations with each other. External loads
moderately mainly on mature and less on immature, again in accordance with both its
observed behaviour and its theoretical construction discussed in chapter IV.
The immature group appears to be a relatively "weak" one, which was also expected
given the rather low correlations among the three variables that form it. The bivariate
correlation between extrinsic social and church attendance (.28) can explain to an extent
the residual covariation between the two variables in this model (.31). Finally, the
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relatively low and negative loading of quest on religiosity (-.19) is not surprising given
its tendency to distance itself from the rest of the religious variables in the dataset and
consistently show low and negative associations with them.
An interesting finding here is that the immature group appears to have a negative
association with schizotypy, while in the regression models earlier, it showed a positive
one. Although these findings may at first seem inconsistent, in fact they are
complementary. Extrinsic social and personal (and external for that matter) had in this
study either a positive or at times a nonexistent association with the rest of the
religiosity variables (see Tables 6.9, 6.10, and 6.20). Therefore, when all the religiosity
variables formed a single variate in the integrated model, the immature ones were
expected to have loadings pointing to the same direction with the variables they
associated positively with. And this is what we are witnessing here. In fact, when I ran
a PCA on the religiosity variable, and requested a single factor, the picture was
essentially identical to that in the integrated model.
All this suggests that immature religiosity, when treated as part of the total religious
profile ofan individual, may have a relatively small, yet positive effect onmental health.
This is an interesting finding that previous studies appear to have failed to identify,
primarily because they either used exploratory statistical techniques or treated the
immature religiosity independently from the rest of the religiosity variables. Moreover,
it points to a more complex relationship between religiosity and, at least, schizotypy than
the literature appears to suggest. Therefore, the religiosity variate consists of lower quest
levels and higher levels on each of the rest of the religious variables, primarily those
making the mature group. Such a profile appears to account for lower levels of
schizotypal traits, or in other words, by taking into account also its direct effect on the
mediator (-.26), it seems to promote psychological well-being, by leading to a more
healthy-minded individual.
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Figure 6.4. The integrated structural model of the causal relationship between
religiosity and schizotypy, by taking into account the mediating effect of a
number of mainstream psychological variables. Numbers are standardised
loadings and correlation coefficients.
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This finding is of an utmost importance as it forms half the core of this thesis. The other
half is formed by the indirect effect of religiosity on schizotypy. Here again the results
seem to speak for themselves: When such a profile is filtered through an ill-minded
person, one that is relatively high neurotic, insecurely attached to others, with a
relatively strong sense of primarily social identity, it tends to produce the opposite
results and increase the levels of schizotypal traits.
Collectively these results suggest that at least in this dataset, and perhaps to an extent
in any dataset coming from the same or similar population, religiosity appears to have
a substantial and unique contribution to the variability in schizotypy, which is not
accounted for by the variability in the (mainstream) psychological variablesmeasured
in this study. Taken at face value, certain aspects of religiosity appear to enhance
psychological well being, and may only become problematic when filtered through
a dysfunctional psychological profile.
Chapter synopsis
In this chapter I have attempted to the best ofmy abilities to analyse the questionnaire
data and provide answers to the predictions made in chapter IV. Given the size of the
dataset the possible associations between the variables were practically endless.
However, I had to maintain focus on the predicted relationships, instead of going for a
treasure-hunt. Consequently, the potential effects ofa number ofvariables in the dataset
were not checked. So for example, all identity and religiosity buffer items (17 variables
in total) were ignored. Moreover, certain variables, like ethnic background, number of
years the participant had lived in Britain, areas of study, and so forth, were only used to
check whether the inclusion criteria in the study protocol were met.
That said, sample size restrictions also forced me to ignore the effects of variables that
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could have potentially played a serious part in the shaping of the main relationships.
Regrettably variables like gender, religious denomination, student, employment and
marital statuses had to be dropped from the final model.
When assessing the predictions, I also had to constrain the analysis. One ofmy implicit
purposes in respect to the outcomes was to ensure as best as I could that the results are
not artefacts of the statistical tests used, but rather accurate enough representations of
the actual underlying relationships. With that in mind, I triangulated my analysis by
using different techniques, and thus increased my confidence in the results.
However, I only did so when I felt it was necessary, or when the information sought
seemed to be of central importance to this thesis. Granted I could have done that more
frequently or for thatmatter less frequently; granted I could have used a number ofother
analytical tools, alternatively or additionally. I had, however, to strike a balance between
overanalysing and superficially exploring the data. Ultimately, the level of analysis I
used was sufficient to reveal at least a part of the essential elements of the major
relationships in the dataset.
What follows is a summary of the main results, and of the results I found of interest
despite their centrality to this thesis:
1. Students appear to be different from the general population in a number of
psychological aspects. This functions more as a warning than a finding. A large part of
the research in the psychology of religion (and I will concentrate on this area to avoid
offending too many people) is carried out on the student population. This population, as
discussed in chapter IV, is also not checked for religious background. This is a potential
recipe for disaster. Perhaps a greater consensus among the literature findings would have
been achieved if researchers had taken into account these issues. Psychology (of
religion) may be a cumulative science, but let us also ensure it is not built on straw.
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2. People belonging to different Christian denominations appear to have different
psychological characteristics. This is again an issue of control that could be of great
value to the psychology of religion, potentially reducing unnecessary noise in research
findings, and allowing for the generation ofdenomination-specific knowledge ofapplied
as well as academic importance.
3. Alongside personality, attachment seems to be of great relevance to schizotypy. It
seems surprising to me that research in this area appears to have so far largely neglected
it. Understanding the relationship between attachment and schizotypy, I would argue,
could be of greater applied value than understanding the relationship between
personality and schizotypy. Why? Because personality is a fuzzier and more abstract
construct than attachment. Therefore, when it comes to developing and applying health
policies, counselling strategies and so forth, attachment seems easier to work with. As
attachment directly refers to human bonding, by affecting that bonding we can
catalytically influence its development. If attachment affects schizotypal
symptomatology, we potentially have a relatively straightforward way of preventing,
controlling, and even treating SPD. If, on the other hand, it is schizotypy that affects the
nature of attachment, by focussing on the latter we can develop the means of offering
a more accurate prognosis or diagnosis of the disorder.
4. Gender appears to be a serious moderator of the religiosity-schizotypy relationship.
Its effect should be considered further, as it seems to suggest that different variables are
important for the different sexes. Again finer knowledge can lead to more accurate
predictions and better application of research findings. That said, although gender is
important, its effect should not "worry" us, as the moderation appears to be of an
ordinate nature. By that I mean that gender appears to affect mainly the nature of the
variables involved in the religiosity-schizotypy relationship, less the strength of those
relationships, and not at all the direction of those relationships.
5. Magical ideation, at least within the context it has been used thus far in the literature,
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does not appear to be of great relevance to religiosity. Magical ideation seems to be too
"new age" a construct to be expected to either be normatively present in Christian
thought, or be something that Christians would openly admit having, not least because
aspects of it may conflict with certain elements of Christian teaching. Therefore, using
magical thinking as a link between religiosity and schizotypy may be a fruitless
enterprise. Instead, other aspects of schizotypy like suspiciousness, anxiety, and the
eccentric elements may be more accurate and stable indicators of that relationship.
6. The relationship between extrinsic religiosity and schizotypy may be more complex
than initially thought. On its own it appears to have a small, yet positive association with
schizotypy, while in the company ofthe rest ofthe religiosity variables, this relationship
is inversed. Although, according to Allport, it is theoretically possible for a person to
have only an extrinsic orientation towards religion, I doubt this is often the case in real
life. Given that extrinsic is a dimension of religiosity, it seems less appropriate to me to
assess its behaviour independently and outside the total religious profile of the
individual, as studies have done so far.
7. The quest orientation does not behave like a mature form of religiosity. All the
evidence from this study consistently points toward this conclusion. It seems more likely
that quest is a stage of religious development that may lead to amature religiosity. Does
this diminish its value? On the contrary. Ifquest is found to be a stage ofmaturity, it will
occupy a unique niche in the religiosity space with properties as valuable as, or if we
take into account its relationship with psychopathology, at times even more valuable
than the mature and immature forms.
8. Finally, the integrated model was an epiphany. Not only does it place religiosity at the
same level as mainstream psychological variables by showing that it has a unique effect
on schizotypy, which is as strong as theirs, but it also paints a picture of a relationship
that is far more complex than research so far has shown.
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The effect of religiosity on schizotypy is there, and it is such that should not be ignored.
The direction of this effect, however, seems to be determined by the interplay between
the religious and the psychological profiles ofthe individual. In the current dataset, these
profiles come out crystal clear. The psychological one is of a relatively maladjusted,
dysfunctional individual, while the religious one is of a straightforward ordinary
believer. The religious one has a negative effect on schizotypy, the psychological one
a positive; put them together and you have potentially created a time-bomb. Religiosity
on its own and in its "natural", ordinary state seems to enhance the well-being of the
individual. It is only through its interplay with certain kinds and degrees of other





"[We live in] an age in which it is in the highest degree unfashionable
to speak of religion or spiritual peace or consolation,
an age in which words like these
draw forth only derision, pity, or contempt."
(Abdullah Yusuf Ali, 1934/2000, p. iv)
Chapter aims & organisation
The aims of this chapter are to present and discuss the methodology used for the second
study in this thesis, which was based on qualitative interviews. Initially I present my
views on the quantitative and qualitative methodologies, and attempt to justify their use
in this thesis. The aim of this study appears next, followed by the participant selection
process, the rationale behind the use of the interview as the research technique, the item
development, and the results of the pilot study. Finally, the procedure of the study is laid
out, and the analytic approach employed is presented.
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Mixing qualitative with quantitative approaches
Before I home in on the specific methodological issues of this study, I would like to
pause the flow of this thesis, and present my views and position on the quantitative
versus qualitative research approaches. Given the apparently bitter dispute over the years
between the two camps (e.g. Cook & Reichardt, 1979; Nau, 1995; Salomon, 1991) that
still seems to be largely unresolved (e.g. Bavelas, 1995; Creswell, 2001; Krantz, 1995;
Redmond, Keenan, & Landorf, 2002), I find this a necessary step, in order to justify to
either of those "arch-rival" sides why I used both approaches in this thesis. Thus for a
little while allow me to sketch as "graphically" and as subjectively as permissible the
way I understand the difference, or shall I say the similarity between "counting sunsets
[and] appreciating them" (courtesy of Hugh Coolican, 1999, p. 42).
The quantity vs. the quality of life
For most of the past sixteen years ofmy life, I had embarked on a mental journey of
argonautic proportions to discover and comprehend any probability-based research
procedure I would encounter. When during my undergraduate studies I was introduced
to statistical inferences and probability-based sampling, I initially received these ideas
with confusion, skepticism, and rejection. The whole notion of my world as a solid,
stable, and controllable unit was being dangerously challenged. My shock was so great
that I exorcised this new and threatening knowledge into the depths ofmy subconscious.
However, by doing so, without knowing it, I had placed that knowledge into an
incubating state, and it was not long until it spawned out in full glory and converted me.
Suddenly my reality wore a different "veil".
I adopted a positivistic attitude and advocated with the euphoric zeal ofa fundamentalist
preacher that any phenomenon could be reduced to observable facts and studied through
mathematical relationships. Paraphrasing Henry Thoreau, I would argue that anything
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that we can perceive we can measure in this way. Moreover, by measuring the world
with the use ofmathematics, to be more precise statistics, we gain information at the
highest level of objectivity - or so I thought. I will not attempt to produce an
essentialistic definition of objectivity, since greater minds than mine have failed,
however, I will suggest that it points to "factual evidence". By that I mean,
interpretations of clues that can be verified and confirmed irrespectively of the
idiosyncratic nature and the time-space limited specificities of the observer. To put it in
a simple statement, I thought that a number by itself could not lie. By using statistics,
researchers can communicate ideas and findings in the "ecumenically trusted" language
of numbers.
Through quantitative research one can build hypotheses and test them in strictly
structured ways. A well-organised experiment, for example, can be to a great extent
foolproof and therefore its outcomes may possess high levels of internal validity, i.e.
those outcomes will be the direct results of the experimental treatment. In the same line
of thought, by carrying those virtues, quantitative research allows fellow scientists to
scrutinise or replicate findings, even by using different settings and instruments.
Validity, reliability, and replicability are central characteristics of the hypothetico-
deductive model that shapes the quantitative enquiry (also see Meehl, 1998). They also
permit inductive inferences and predictions, often at a nomothetic level (for example,
John Stuart Mill, 1843/1963, was a main advocate of the power of such reasoning).
The single aspect ofquantitative procedures that had the greatest impact on me was that
they could be falsified or disconfirmed. The world was no longer a dogmatic bipolar
system of "yes" and "no", of "black" or "white", of error-free experts and naive
followers, but a colourful continuum where no one held "The Truth", and where there
was no "absolute yes" but insteadmany "maybes". The world had become a frightening,
fluid, and complicated place, but at the same time it had become radiant, interesting, and
infinite. As Jack Smart acknowledges "... it is precisely such a reality that science reveals
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[...] a reality of a different order" (1968, pp. 158-159). I had found the panacea to my
thoughts and I let it bloom in the fertility of its brave new world.
However, not long ago I began doubting the power ofthat knowledge. In a Kantian way,
the idea of "reality" emerged only when I was confronted with too many contradictions.
The foundations of classical scientific thought advocate that not only are there
observable, measurable facts out in the real world (i.e. states-of-affairs that exist
independently ofhow people interpret them), but there are also objective measurements
of them. Determinism appears to have dominated science (and with good reason I
suppose - see the science vs. religion debate in chapter III) at least up until statistics
became mainstreammethods ofscientific investigation and challenged the whole notion
of scientific truths and laws. However, this new paradigm grew up to become as rigid
as its predecessor. Perhaps there were no facts out there, as Newton may have wanted
them to be, but there were objective "factual", "unmistakable" measurements (i.e.
statistics) that could to a degree generate those facts.
I realised that the world (i.e. the psychosocial world) was too complex to be captured
just in numeric relations. Thus the information obtained through this type ofprocedures
appeared to be rather narrow and artificial, and thus at times failed to attain ecological
validity, i.e. failed to allow for real-life applications.
Furthermore, I realised that numbers can indeed deceive and lie, in the sense that they
can conceal an error. The true significance (i.e. impact) ofan event, state, behaviour, etc.
is not bound by its statistical significance, therefore, the real importance of a findingmay
be exaggerated or overlooked. For example, statistics can estimate the probability of
dying in a plane-crash, but it cannot capture directly the impact of that "improbable"
death on the family of the deceased. In recent years, several scholars (Cohen, 1994; Falk
& Greenbaum, 1995; Rossi, 1997; Wilcox, 1998) have warned about the dangers of
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treating those two concepts (statistical importance vs. practical importance) as meaning
the same thing. Regrettably, more often than not researchers, in their ignorance or
because of their "political agendas", do make such claims. A recent example involves
the publication of two articles, where in the first (Enstrom & Kabat, 2003) the authors
claimed absence of evidence for a long-term health effect on passive smoking, while in
the second (Gilliland et al., 2003) the reverse claim was made, even though the studies
in both articles had produced very similar results - in the first article the claim was based
on the final probability values, while in the second on odds ratios and confidence
intervals.
Moreover, I found out that the inductive validity of quantitative procedures had been at
times ferociously criticised by scholars. William Jevons (1999), for example, argued that
the consequences of a finding would have to agree with what was observed, and
induction could not provide such an agreement indisputably. More than two centuries
before Jevons, David Hume (1739/1985) questioned the entire acceptability of inductive
inferences and predictions, by claiming that formal logic does not permit past
uniformities to be used as a basis for future ones (cf. Harre, 1965, pp. 113-134). This
may well be the case with the social and behavioural sciences, not only in regard to
future inferences, but also to cross-cultural ones (for evidence see Berry et al., 1992).
Finally, I realised that there were scientific theories (such as Newton's laws, or the
Theory of Evolution by Natural Selection) that it was very difficult - a difficulty
reaching the boundaries of impossibility - to falsify. And I was not alone in this
realisation. Indeed, some psychologists have abandoned the idea of falsification
altogether, and have adopted alternative strategies along the lines of coimterfactual
reasoning10 (for more see Gorman, 1996, pp. 54-56; Lewis, 1973; Menzies, 2001).
10
Counterfactual reasoning posits that the meaning of a singular causal claim of the form "event
X caused event Y" can be explained in terms of counterfactual conditionals of the form "ifX
had not occurred, Y would not have occurred".
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This accumulating evidence delivered an unsettled blow to my new world of science,
and hung like a Damoclean sword over my Popperian attitude. Since, however, I could
not find an alternative to replace or modify my research approach, I felt, in an opaque
way, trapped. And then I was introduced to the qualitative measurement procedures
afresh.
Qualitative research is generally formulated on the idea that the social space is
discursively constructed. This is widely communicated through perhaps the aphorism
that "there is nothing outside the text" (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p. 108). However,
before we fall into an acute catatonic state, the above authors rush to explain themselves
by saying that "what is denied is not that [...] objects exist externally to thought, but the
rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any
discursive conditions of emergence" (p. 108). Post-structuralist thinkers, for example,
not only propose the idea that people construct the phenomenal alethea of the world
through ameaning-making discursive process, but also that this process is neither stable
nor finite (Mills, 1997). However, having said that, they also argue that at certain times
in all societies certain world-constructs achieve hegemonic status through the influence
ofpower (e.g. Worth, 1999, pp. 91-92).
Qualitative research adopts a more interpretivist philosophical approach to the social
world. Through this approach the scientist is concerned with the way the social world
is interpreted, understood and ultimately (re)produced (Potter, 1996). The approach
advocates that the information gathered is rich and that richness is not represented by
numbers but by text, speech, images, and written accounts of events and behaviour,
observed in real life settings. There are no sophisticated "artificial" laboratories where
the researcher distances him or herself from the participants, and by controlling and
manipulating variables can "play God" - or in the words ofHammersley & Atkinson "a
Martian [...], viewing society from outside" (1995, pp. 11).
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The observer, qualitative researchers claim, is often a "humble" participant, thus
allowing the social actors studied, the freedom to behave as naturally as possible. Using
a social setting as a natural laboratory, the researcher interacts with subjects, and in a
maieutic way gains in-depth, inside knowledge of their life (for more see Fetterman,
1997; Stewart & Shamdasani, 1997).
I became truly captivated by the qualitative approach. It was a revelation of a plethora
ofnew research techniques, which flooded an abundant gathering ofknowledge into my
"scientific" world and cocooned it like a halo. For a time it felt that this fresh craft, I
dare say, dwarfed and preceded all quantitative research methods I had previously
experienced. My "brave newworld" was, for once more, enriched by dimensions of fine
light. By paving my way with rhapsodic ardour and a glance of confidence I began
praising this new approach like the roman legionnaires praised Caesar. Ceteris paribus,
however, soon the clouds of scepticism gathered around my convictions.
Due to the nature of qualitative research, the information obtained is rather subjective.
What one scientist finds important, may be viewed as trivial by another (Boyatzis,
1998). Adding insult to injury, Michel Foucault states that the way we talk about the
world affects how we understand and see it (1990). It appears that there is no
standardised, structured design that all researchers in this field accept and follow.
Consequently, the reliability of the findings seems doubtful. In addition, the results of
such studies cannot be replicated, or perhaps can only be partially replicated, since they
belong to the place and time they refer to. Thus, making inferences from this type of
studies may be very dangerous. Indeed, qualitative research is, or at least should be,
idiographic in nature, and researchers tend to be discouraged to make generalisations
(e.g. Mason, 1996).
In conversations I had with social anthropologists - a field where qualitative research
is frequently used - they argued that though the issues of reliability and replicability are
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marginal, in this approach, validity and reflexivity are central. However, their argument
begged the question. Ifwe are not able to replicate findings, ifwe are not sure whether
we would have observed the same events and interpreted them in the same way, how can
we realistically trust and accept results? What is there that prevents a malicious, or at
best, ill-qualified researcher from providing us with false information?
This was not science; this was fiction. Indeed, I was told by my social constructionist
acquaintances that qualitative research is more like art, where the researcher like the
artist seeks the particular, as the general resides in the particular. All these artistic
parables automatically brought in mind D. H. Laurence's admonition not to trust the
artist.
Unlike art, however, qualitative research has an agenda that is explicitly formulated
within and for the psychosocial scientific community. The artist does not have nor need
to prove or disprove anything (perhaps beyond themselves); she or he does not have to
conduct any research in order to produce art, and certainly contributing to the general
knowledge-pool is not any ofher or hismain concerns. I am using a category entitlement
here - a familiar term in qualitative research - since I am an artist myself. However, one
can notice how my writing style and attitude change throughout this thesis depending
on the focus of my thoughts and the content of my discourse. I wear one hat when I
express myself as an "objective" researcher, and another when I attempt to reflect my
inner "subjective" thoughts and feelings. Furthermore, these distinct selves of mine -
perhaps products of a false dichotomy - spontaneously materialise when the conditions
request it. Though I cherish the idea, I have to accept that qualitative research, as it tends
to be used in the social and behavioural sciences, is not art. Its purpose, its function, and
its environment are not artistic. It does not behave though like a science too. So what is
it?
The psychosocial sciences are not arts (in the strong use of the term) by their nature, and
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they are not pure sciences by definition. The qualitative approach may just be filling the
necessary and appropriate niche in these disciplines; a connoisseur in social research:
a sciencart.
DifferentHorses forDifferentCourses
I neither condemn nor prefer any of the above research paradigms. At the level I have
approached the issue, I would be naive to claim any preference. In fact, I do think that
they are the appropriate designs for the questions they address. When used
interdependently and, in an eclectic way, interactively they can strengthen our
suppositions and allow for more pluralistic interpretations. The synergy of their powers
can indeed produce a powerful tool, amagic wand, in our quest to understand the human
world.
The value ofany scientific inquiry needs to be judged within a pragmatic, pluralistic and
empirical, yet most of the times non-statistically-based framework that takes into
account references of practical importance, meaningfulness, and plausibility. These
references are tightly related to, and to an extent derive from, the actual context of the
study, and vary - at times dramatically - among areas, disciplines, and settings. It is
those references that assign meaning and importance to research findings (and not the
other way around).
As true scientists we need to assess and understand the real-life importance of our
findings above and beyond the application of any quantitative or qualitative
methodology. Failure to do so may lead to claims that are trivial, meaningless or even
implausible, and yet have enormous consequences (I refer you to "The Mismeasure of
Man" by the late Steven Jay Gould, 1997 ). Since one of the main things that makes us
scientists is the way we look at the world, our greatest weapons against pitfalls of the
kinds I mention above are intuition, in-depth knowledge of our field, and (not)
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surprisingly common sense. By recognising and utilising the subjectivity in our thought,
I believe, as I mentioned in chapter I, we can gain much more than by promoting our
objective selves, and perhaps we may eventually be able to generate those powerful
"imaginary" tools by which Sir Francis Galton believed "an opening can be cut through
the formidable thicket ofdifficulties that bars the path of those who pursue the Science
ofMan" (1889, p. 63).
Interim synopsis
For most ofmy academic life I had been a true advocate of the quantitative paradigm
and fully implemented it into my research. I was captivated by its clarity of
measurement, its structured organisation, and its unambiguity of findings. Flowever, I
now understand that with its reductionistic approach, it tends tomanipulate or even limit
one's view of the human world. My exposure to the qualitative paradigm, caused a
radical shift in my scientific attitude, and left me astonished by its pluralism and its
richness. Nevertheless, this approach is not foolproof either, and it raises considerations
about its objectivity, its validity, and its wider applicability.
Besides their shortcomings and problems, or maybe because of them, these two
approaches may produce better results when combined and used interdependently. This
approach requires from us scientists to steer our focus away from the specific
methodological "cans and cannots" and instead concentrate on the interpretation ofour
findings by placing them into an appropriate real-life context.
Having placed my position onto the quantitative-qualitative continuum, I proceed by
discussing the specific issues around the methodology ofthe quantitative interview study
of this thesis.
Page 289
Chapter VII: The interview study: Methodology
Interview study aims
The general aim of this study was to generate an impression of the participants'
representation, understanding, and conception of religion, religious life, and their
thoughts on the acquisition and development of their religious practices and
commitments, by taking into account the participants' characteristics on the rest of the
variables in this thesis (primarily on the seven psychometric measurements) as they
emerged through their responses in the questionnaire study.
This study was run after the completion of the questionnaire one and the analysis of the
quantitative data. As such, its aims are based on the results of the first study, with a
primary focus on the integrated model.
More specifically, the integrated model presented me with an issue I believe required
further investigation. As I said in the closing discussion in the previous chapter, the
natural, ordinary state of religiosity appears to enhance both psychological well-being
and mental health. But what makes up that "natural, ordinary state" of religiosity? The
quantitative analysis points to internal aspects of religiosity, low levels of existential
questioning, and frequent religious practices. But are these elements important to the
believer or are they some sort ofphenotypic expressions ofothermore personal ormore
specific components oftheir religion? And even if it is these elements that are important
to the equation, what are the characteristic aspects of them that the believer tends to
identify with, and cogitate upon?
Therefore, the specific aim of the interview study was to identify the main bottom-up
elements that make up that natural and ordinal mental health enhancing state of
religiosity.
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Participant selection
Of the total sample that took part in the questionnaire study, 46% (74 of 161) showed
interest in taking part in the interview. Because of time constrains, but mainly because
of my interest in receiving accounts that would be as variable as possible, I did not
attempt, or for that matter intended to interview all 74 participants. Instead a form of
heterogeneity theoretical sampling was employed. Theoretical sampling has been
defined as a form of systematic, purposive, non-probabilistic collection of sample-units
that is based on the idea of making comparisons that increase the possibility of
establishing maximum variation in the studied concepts and allow for a more holistic
picture of the dimensionality of these concepts to emerge (Strauss & Corbin, 1998,
ch.13).
The actual sampling procedure I devised and its rationale are as follows: First, it was
decided that it was best not to include in the interview questions that addressed
schizotypy-related issues. This was a tactical decision, as I feared that the implication
of mental illness could potentially create a negative atmosphere during the interview,
especially at a time when the September 11 terrorist attack on the US was still fresh in
people's minds and the war on Iraq was imminent. In fact, a few people had already
expressed their concerns in the previous study that appeared to be related to the content
of the schizotypy questionnaire, through comments (written on the margins of the
questionnaire) like:
If you believe that you are without sin then you don't need religion.
[24-year-old male Presbyterian]
My faith can appear to make me at odds with current scientific discoveries
however to me all these findings help to make me appreciate the wonders of
God's creation. [57-year-old woman Roman Catholic]
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This study is biased before it starts. It doesn't really consider the positive aspects
ofChristianity (which is completely different to religion) as the possibility that
it might be real. [22-year-old female Presbyterian]
Because of all the above, schizotypy scores were used in the interview study as a
grouping variable as follows:
The responses of all 74 participants who showed interest in being interviewed were
categorised on their total score on the schizotypy scale. The initial grouping was
according to the following percentile cutoffs: less than or equal to the 10th percentile,
between the 40th and the 60th percentile (roughly the semi-interquartile range), more than
or equal to the 90th percentile; anything else was given a score ofzero and was discarded.
The decision to generate the above percentile cutoff points was a result of an attempt to
increase the between-groups heterogeneity and increase the within-groups homogeneity
of responses in a controlled manner. The underlying assumption here was that the
artificially increased between-groups variability would manifest itself in the interview
responses and thus produce a more diverse and pluralistic picture of the studied
concepts. More specifically, it was expected that if the structure of the integrated model
was valid, then at least aspects of the predicted pattern in religiosity and the mediating
psychological variables would be more distinct and obvious in the two extreme
schizotypal groups, while the "average" groupwould possess somewhat undifferentiated
or unclear characteristics (i.e. the group would be indiscriminately heterogeneous).
According to the above grouping, 6.8% of the participants (5 of 74 cases) fell into the
less than or equal to the 10th percentile group, 32.4% (24 of74) between the 40th and 60th
percentile (median group), 9.5% (7 of 74) into the more than or equal to the 90th
percentile group, while 51.3% of the cases (38 of 74) belonged to the group that
included the rest of the percentiles and were subsequently ignored. Therefore, a total of
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36 participants were potential interview candidates. Three were instantly excluded from
the study as they had not provided any contact details, while four more had given wrong
or invalid contact details. Of the ones left, 27.6% (8 of 29) agreed to be interviewed, of
which two belonged to the less than or equal to the 10th percentile group, five to the
median group, and one to the more than or equal to the 90th percentile group (Table 7.1).
Table 7.1. Sociodemographic characteristics ofthe interview participants and the schizotypy
group membership.








1 Female 23 Baptist Student Part-time Single oso1JZ©■St
2 Female 69 Quaker Non-student Retired Single i 90th
3 Female 66 Presbyterian Non-student Home-maker Married <; 10th
4 Male 72 Episcopalian Non-student Retired Married 40th - 60th
5 Female 69 Presbyterian Non-student Home-maker Widowed 40th - 60th
6 Male 50 Episcopalian Non-student Full-time Married 40th - 60th
7 Female 76 Methodist Non-student Home-maker Married okO1JZo"3"
8 Female 58 Christian
Fellowship
Non-student Home-maker Married <; 10th
However, it soon became clear that the three-group split was not working in practical
terms, since the two extreme groups had a very low membership. Therefore, a decision
was taken to dichotomize the sample on the median split. By doing so, interviewees 1
and 7 fell in the lower-schizotypy group, while interviewees 4,5, and 6 grouped with the
higher-schizotypy one. This move resulted in two groups of four participants each.
I do acknowledge that this partitioning may have made the distinctiveness of the two
extreme groups less obvious, but not necessarily by much. In Table 7.2,1 present the
distances between the mean normalised schizotypy scores of the four participant
subgroups (lower schizotypy, average-low, average-high, and higher schizotypy). Since
the numbers in the table are normalised, they have a range from zero to one, with smaller
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numbers indicating more similar scores. As it can be seen, the average-low group is
more similar to the lower group (distance = .183) than to the average-high group
(distance = .349). At the same time, the average-high group is more similar to the higher
group (distance = .452) than to the lower-schizotypy one (distance = .532), although its
highest similarity still lies with the average-low one.
Table 7.2. Distances between the mean normalised schizotypy scores of the four interview
subgroups (percentiles in brackets).









Lower group 0 .183 .532 .984
Avg-low group 0 .349 .802
Avg-high group 0 .452
Higher group 0
These results seem to suggest that at least the low end of the dichotomy (lower and
average-low group) could be expected to be relatively homogenous (should the
integrated model stand), while perhaps the other halfofthe dichotomy (average-high and
higher group) may bemore heterogenous in nature. At the same time, the distinctiveness
of the two extreme groups may have not been as jeopardised as initially thought.
I am aware that all this is post hoc justification, and that ideally I should have avoided
such partitioning. Because of all the above, this study should be seen as a small scale
exploratory inquiry that attempts to provide additional evidence that can strengthen the
validity of the identified quantitative relationships. My suggestion for future studies is
that if one follows the sampling procedure used in this study, perhaps one should (a)
exclude the average-scores group, and (b) use a less strict grouping of extreme cases,
and instead of the extreme 10%, perhaps use the extreme 20% or even 25% of cases,
thus allowing for larger group memberships to occur.
Page 294
Chapter VII; The interview study: Methodology
Interview rationale & item development
TheQualita tive Interview
Besides our high scores on the encephalisation index, the next characteristic that makes
us unique as human species is, as Daniel Dennet (1995) boldly advocates, language.
Language has certain properties, three ofwhich are of relevance to this study; language
is rulebound, referential, and constructive (Whitney, 1998). At the micro-level these
properties have been studied and addressed for aeons through psycholinguistic
approaches.
However, only when these properties are projected to amacro-(sociocultural)-level, their
true power, the realistic niche language occupies and at the same time transforms that
shapes our social and personal world is revealed. After all, the social arena is governed
by language. Indeed, since language appears to be a socioculturally constructed product,
social psychology seems to be dependent on language as the latter forms one of the
fundamental means of human interaction. As Jonathan Potter and Margaret Wetherell
suggest, "texts are not part of some natural process like a chemical reaction or electrons
moving around a circuit. They are complex cultural and psychological products,
constructed in particular ways to make things happen" (1992, p. 3).
One of the main ways language, and consequently knowledge, is communicated is
through conversations. In research settings, at least within the psychosocial sciences,
these conversations have been primarily and dynamically generated through various
forms of interview methods (Kvale, 1996). What purpose does an interview as a study
tool serve to the researcher? If qualitative observations carry all those potential traps,
some ofwhich I mentioned earlier, then I would argue that the interview is a directly
dialectic approach to deciphering the observed events (situations, conditions, behaviour
etc.), clarifying and evaluating them, and perhaps identifying what hinges on them.
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Through this process the researcher should initially try to make the interviewee visualise
the events he or she takes part in, become conscious of them, and if this step is
successful only then the researchermay proceed to seek the interviewee's opinion about
those events. Since we wish to receive meaningful answers, we would need to lead that
person to realise his or her ideas, perception, feelings, and behaviour before homing in
on more specific issues.
During this realisationprocess, using direct questions or statements may not always be
possible or appropriate. We may feel that the subject is of a sensitive nature, taboo,
personal, or we may have evidence that the respondent would deny our claims. In those
cases especially, indirect assumptions or leading questions may be useful or even
unavoidable. I do acknowledge that what I say may be objected to. Indeed, often the
researcher may not be able to know whether the interviewee is aware of his or her
behaviour, or may make a wrong judgement due to perhaps insufficient observations;
sometime the answer "I don't know" may reveal useful information nevertheless.
Finally, by leading the respondent to realisation, he or she may be obliged to comply
with our ideas and give us desirable, yet false (i.e. unrealistic) explanations.
Furthermore, interviews are a valuable tool in qualitative research as they allow for a
controlled, at times manipulative, way ofproducing knowledge, by leading the subjects
to construct interactively and progressively their own perception oftheir world. Through
the qualitative interview the researcher enhances the subject's freedom of
communicative expression, while at the same time indirectly "oppresses" the
meandering of their thoughts by encouraging them to flow in a comprehensive way
within the framework of the research interests.
Interviews were chosen as the qualitative research tool for this study, because their
properties and potentials seemed most appropriate for the study's aims and the content
of the investigation. Indeed, the participant's religious convictions were viewed as best
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approached through one-to-one conversational interactions due to their personal, at times
sensitive, and possibly subconsciously structured characteristics.
Interview-itemdevelopment
Interview-items were developed through a hierarchical approach. Through this approach,
abstract concepts were initially formulated (e.g. intrinsic religiosity) and subsequently
broken down into progressivelymore specific and empirically manageable components
(e.g. direct relation with God) until a level of specificity was reached (e.g. prayer) at
which exact questions could be formulated (e.g. "What do you mainly pray for?").
Questions were designed to be open-ended, involving no double-negatives or jargon
terms. In addition, in order to facilitate a more natural flow of the interview, questions
were further organised under five general modules, which were discussed in the
following order: (a) the participants' sense ofbeing Christians, (b) their upbringing and
personal development in relation to religion, (c) the role of religious beliefs in their
lives, (d) their religious practices, and (e) the possibility ofreligion not being part of the
participants' lives.
The interviews were semi-structured in the sense that, although all participants were
asked the same questions, (a) the actual wording was allowed to be adjusted according
to the participants' specific characteristics (e.g. the word "Quaker" was used with a
participant that belong to this faith group), and (b) the researcher would alter the order
of the questions within limits, to allow for a more naturalistic form of interaction,
whenever the situation prompted it.
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PilotStudy
Initially a total of thirty-five questions was formulated. The initial interview protocol
was piloted in two stages. In the first stage, the protocol was distributed to three
members of the psychology department at the University of Edinburgh that either
specialised in qualitative interview research or had a good experience with it. Their
comments helped (a) reduce the number of questions to sixteen, by either combining
questions or omitting less central ones that had their content covered by others; and (b)
rearrange the order of the questions in a more naturally flowing manner.
In the second stage two interviews were conducted following the same procedure as in
themain study (see next section below). These interviews were run with two participants
that had not been selected for the main study because they did not belong to any of the
three initial groups (low, average, high). These interviewees were encouraged to provide
live comments on the interview protocol. The experience through this pilot led to the
final version of the protocol, which consisted of an introductory and closing statement,
a total of fifteen questions - three ofwhich containing sub-questions - and a number of




Prior to the interview each of the 33 initially selected participants (36 minus the three
that had not provided any contact details) was contacted through means of letter or
email. They were reminded of their willingness to take part in an interview study and
were asked whether they were still interested in doing so. A short description of the
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interview procedure was also included in the contact (Appendix XI).
As mentioned earlier, of the 33 conductees, two email addresses were returned as
unknown, and two letters were also returned as "recipient unknown". No further
attempts were made to contact the people that did not respond to the interview invitation
(N= 21), as it would have been inappropriate.
With the 8 participants that responded to the invitation, arrangements were made for the
interviews to take place. What became obvious from their responses was that most of
them were not able to come to Edinburgh for the interview. Only three people lived in
Edinburgh while the rest were located all over Scotland. Therefore, a decision was taken
to conduct all the interviews through the telephone.
Telephone inter views
Although the choice oftelephone interviews came out ofnecessity rather than being part
of the initial design, it appears to allow for a set of advantages that are of relevance to
this study. The interviews were conducted at the highest participant convenience. Indeed,
all but one decided to be interviewed while at home (the one exception chose his office
settings); the problem with their geographic dispersion was instantly eliminated; no
expenses were involved (e.g. transport costs) at least on the part of the participant; at a
deeper level it can be argued that participants, being in a condition of higher anonymity
and at the same time not being influenced by any visual stimuli (e.g. the appearance of
the researcher) that may have negatively affected their expressions and behaviour, may
have been keener on being more open and producing truthful accounts of personal
matters (Oppenheim, 2001).
However, in the same line of thought, telephone interviews may produce a set of
undesirable effects. Themost obvious one is that answers tend to be somewhat short and
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perhaps shorter than during face-to-face interviews - this situation was indeed observed
with one of the participants in this study; naturally visual stimuli, such as body language,
cannot be used to enhance the interaction between interviewee-researcher; by being in
an uncontrolled environment, interviewees may be distracted and lose their train of
thought; finally, that level of anonymity may also lead participants to act irresponsibly
or in a more spontaneous manner, e.g. hang up if they feel unhappy with the way the
interview is progressing.
Interviewprocedure
The interviews were conducted over a period of two weeks. Ten minutes before each
interview participants were contacted and were briefly told about the five main focus
areas of the interview, as they are described above. I am not aware if this procedure is
common practice in telephone interviews, but in this study it was done primarily in order
to allow the participants some time to gather their thoughts and thus provide more
readily available answers. Moreover, they were advised to find a comfortable setting for
themselves for when the actual interview would take place. Tenminutes later, they were
called again and the actual interview commenced.
Each participant was interviewed individually, and each interview lasted between 25 and
45 minutes. Each participant was welcomed and thanked for taking part in the study.
They were asked to adjust the meaning of any generic terms used in the interview (e.g.
"Church" or "Minister") to fit their own specific understanding or circumstances,
although the researcher also tended to adjust these terms as appropriate and when
additional information was available (see interview protocol in Appendix XII).
Participants were also explicitly allowed not to answer any questions they did not feel
they wished to, although no one did so. In order to preserve anonymity and guarantee
confidentiality, participants were advised not to disclose any identifying information
during the interview process. When the interviews concluded, participants were once
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again thanked and they were also reminded that they would receive feedback on the
thesis's findings as requested. Also they were given the option of sending additional
remarks, comments, or thoughts to the researcher regarding the issues touched by the
interview items, through means of email or letter - however, no one did.
All interviews were tape-recorded with the explicit permission of the interviewees, and
with the use ofa tape-recorder (PhonApart™, Automatic 2-way telephone conversation




The interviews were transcribed in their entirety (using a SANYO™ Memo-scriber,
TRC-8080) and subjected to a form of thematic analysis. This approach is seen as rather
useful for analysing in-depth interview data (Banister et ah, 2001, p. 57; Smith, 1995,
pp. 9-26). The general aim of thematic analysis is to allow the researcher to learn about
the participants' ideas, perception, and feelings of their psychosocial world and make
sense out of them (Dittmar & Drury, 2000). Thematic analysis is usually a bottom-up
method (although to an extent it can be at times theory-driven) of analysing written or
spoken language at a macro-level, by encoding and interpreting qualitative information
(that may initially appear unrelated) into theme-based patterns (Kellehear, 1993). This
is accomplished through the identification of recurring and underlying themes (i.e.
similar ideas, topics, and ways of talking) within and across the interview transcripts
(Boyatzis, 1998). These themes are rarely a priori constructed by the researcher, as is the
case with content analysis, but they emerge from the data through a diligent and
purposive process of identification - this is the most commonly used form of thematic
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analysis, also known as inductive thematic analysis. It has been acknowledged (e.g.
Cinnirella & Loewenthal, 1999) that although the interaction between interviewer and
interviewee may affect the quality and content of the data, the interviewee's responses
will nevertheless carry distinctive elements of their ideas, beliefs and intentions.
In the current study, although the thematic analysis used was not a top-down, theory-
driven approach, it was nevertheless mainly focussed on the identification of themes that
appeared to be relevant to the findings of the questionnaire study, and in particular the
integrated model. In other words, the specific questions that resulted in the development
ofthis study (see interview study aims above), shaped and guided the search for patterns
and meaning in the data.
Transcription coding
Spoken text requires, and at the same time permits, a detailed, yet at times rather
painstaking, transcription. A variety of transcription levels and coding notations exist,
from extremely detailed, and at times unreadable, transcripts (e.g. Stenstrom, 1994) to
more relaxed forms (e.g. Wetherell & Potter, 1992). Obviously, the level oftranscription
depends on either or both the questions asked (i.e. the focus of the investigation) and the
theoretical background of the researcher. Since thematic analysis deals with the ideas
people present us with, and not the detailed ways they articulate those ideas in a
discursive or linguistic manner, the transcription of the interviews of this study only
included speech errors and word segments, in order to keep the consistency of the flow
of the speech. However, it ignored features to do with breathing, changes of speed,
volume, or emphasis, since they were not analysed. Moreover, no punctuation was
transcribed, with the exception of question marks. Although punctuation could have
made the transcript more readable, it could have also hindered the theme-identification
process, since it would have been to a great extent arbitrary. Unclear utterances were
indicated in the transcripts with round brackets, while square brackets were used to
indicate omitted or altered material. The latter was mainly done with identifying
information that could potentially compromise the anonymity of the participant. Finally,
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in the extracts presented in the next chapter, the researcher is represented with the letter
"Q" (for "Question") and the participant with "A" (for "Answer"), while line numbers
refer to the lines that the extract appeared in the interview transcripts.
Analysis procedure
Interview transcripts were systematically read several times by the researcher separately
and in conjunction with the tape recordings. Initially, first-order or proto-themes were
identified, e.g. themes that occurred within each interview. Most of those proto-themes
arose directly from the aims of this study, and were directly related to the results of the
questionnaire study. However, new ones emerged from the interview experience and
from reading the transcripts. In the next step, first-order themes across the interviews
were clustered under higher or second-order or true themes based on their commonality
ofmeaning. At this level, a theme was considered "stable" if it appeared, in one form
or another, in the accounts of at least three out of the four members of each of the two
groups ofparticipants. Proto-themes thatwere only relevant to isolated participants were
ignored. Finally, when grouping ofsecond-order themes was plausible it was carried out.
Those groups were then used to generate superordinate themes, which, when possible,
were linked with existing literature. This was a cyclical process, and as the themes were
developed and better understood, the researcher would go back to the interview
transcripts and look for instances that could now be seen as relevant to the themes, or
that could provide further information and support to the themes. During this process,
the merging of the themes was also refined. When the process was over, representative
interview instances that illustrated each theme were selected and they are presented in
the following chapter.
It should be noted that this kind of analysis appears to be potentially influenced by the
researcher's preconceptions, and thus it may be meaning-dependant or situation-
dependant. Although, as Gill (1996) points out, the analyst before conducting a
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qualitative analysis should not only suspend their prior beliefs in the-for-granted, but
also by assuming nothing they should question everything, it should be apparent that
more than one readings are often possible. That said, one should be aware that thematic
analysis - and in that sense, perhaps any kind of analysis - does not deal with any sort
of facts and thus it is subject to multiple, and at times diverse, yet plausible,
interpretations.
Two of the main safeguards of the validity of such research are the internal coherence
of the arguments made, and the sufficiency of the presentation of evidence (Smith,
1996). The former refers to the degree to which the arguments presented are justified and
internally consistent with the data. The latter suggests that a sufficient amount of
evidence (in the current study this refers to the interview extracts) should be presented
to allow the reader to form an educated opinion about their interpretation in the study.
Chapter synopsis
Both qualitative and quantitative methodologies were employed in this thesis as they are
seen as complementary approaches to the scientific production ofknowledge. The focus
of the qualitative study of this thesis was to identify conceptual themes, through
participants' religious discourse, that directly related to the thesis aim. The study utilised
semi-structured, open-ended, telephone interviews with a sample of eight participants
who had taken part in the first study, selected through a process of theoretical sampling
that allowed for a greater heterogeneity in the responses. Fifteen main interview-items
were developed that addressed issues of religious life, upbringing, meaning, and





"i'm fighting so i can die a martyr and go to heaven to meet God"
(Osama bin Laden, quoted in Boston Globe; Nye, 2001, September 16)
"God told me to strike at al Qaeda and i struck them,
and then he instructed me to strike at Saddam, which i did"
(George W. Bush, quoted in The Washington Post; Kamen, 2003, June 27)
Chapter aims & organisation
The aims of this chapter are to present the results of the qualitative analysis of the
interview study and discuss them in connection to the findings ofthe questionnaire study
and the overall thesis aims. The reader is reminded that interviewees 1, 3, 7, and 8 fall
in the lower-schizotypy group (see also table 7.1 for descriptive information about the
interviewees in both groups).
Page 305
Chapter VIII: The interview study: Results & discussion
Major Identified Themes
From the interview transcriptions, several interrelated, superordinate themes were
identified that appear to be central to the participants' religious beliefs, behaviour, and
practices. The most pervasive of these themes concerned (a) the nature of faith, (b) the
centrality of religion, (c) religious choice, and (d) religious doubt. These four themes are
elaborated into the categories presented below.
The na ture of faith
In both groups, religiosity was seen as a personal matter. At the same time, all
interviewees referred to the presence of a higher power. However, the nature of these
two categories was experienced and expressed in different ways in the two groups. In
the lower-schizotypy group, religiosity was expressed as an explicit and direct personal
relationship with God. This relationship appears to be the essence of this group's faith.
This notion was communicated through statements like:
[1:3]"
[being a Christian] means having a personal relationship with God
[3:3]
it means worshipping God
[8:3]
having a living relationship with Jesus Christ
At the same time, it seems that for this relationship to be understood, practised, and
ii
Extract headings indicate the interview number and the line(s) number, e.g. [1:3] refers to
interview 1, line 3. Utterances that appear inside the extracts in square brackets indicate altered
or omitted material, or additional information; utterances in round brackets were not clearly
heard.
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communicated, God tended to be seen as having attributed human characteristics,
especially emotions:
[1: 154-156]
the fact that He loves me so much that He gave Jesus to die for me is
really it's a huge thing for me and I know that He loves me that He's just
mad about me in a way that nobody else might be
[7: 17]
God is loving me and forgiving me for the sins and errors I make in my
life
Furthermore, this humanlike God was at times assigned a specific role in that
relationship, i.e. that of the father:
[1:45]
[God] wanted me to be his daughter
[7: 165-166]
God is father and because I never knew my father my father was killed
when I was nine months old so I never really knew him you know and I
just feel this is this is my father looking after me
Therefore the religiosity of the lower-schizotypy group tended to manifest itself through
a relationship that had an outwards and upwards direction towards a personified God.
The above characteristics were not present in the accounts of the higher-schizotypy
group. Although the descriptions here were more heterogenous than in the first group
(as it was expected) they still appear to possess some broad underlying similarities. In
this group religion was still referred to as a personal matter, but it was understood in
rather abstract terms like:
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[2: 275-276]
[Religion] is something in all of us that is that is is precious
[4: 3-4]
[By being a Christian] I am much clearer in my moral judgements by
virtue of going to church hearing sermons reading the Bible
[6: 321-322]
[Religion is] a direct sort of instruction but there are there are there is a
framework and there are guidelines to be for which within which
decisions are made
In fact, three of the interviewees (except interviewee 4), tended to talk about their faith
in terms that seem rather close to the idea ofspirituality as discussed in chapter II. Thus,
faith was seen as something that "gives [...] peace ofmind" [5: 3], or as interviewee 6
put "something about seeing my life caught up in something greater than and beyond
myself' [6: 10-11], Moreover, interviewees 2 and 5 were rather reluctant to discuss their
faith, because they wanted to "keep it pure and unadulterated" [2:197],
In addition, nowhere in all four accounts was God defined as a person, but rather as a
sort of internal or supernatural power:
[2: 49-50]
[God] is a higher presence that I can turn to and that if I through prayer
and meditation that I do find I get a lot of spiritual comfort
[4: 16, 19]
[God] is a fall back position [...] He is a focal point
[6: 24-25]
I experience God as within I mean part of who I am [...] within me I
experience God
Therefore, in the higher-schizotypy group, faith was stated to be of a rather spiritual
nature, which tended to have an inwards directed character, not clearly defined, and not
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explicitly bound by specific religious practices or doctrines.
I would like to remind the reader that the formation of the two groups was post-hoc, and
thus the religious characteristics of their membersmay not entirely represent those of the
two ends of schizotypy, several interesting points can still be raised regarding the above
differences.
These differences do not appear to be related to religious practices, as participants in
both groups, based on their responses to both the questionnaire study and the interview,
tended to pray at least once a week and go to church at least once a week (this last
practice was not applicable to interviewee 2 who was a Quaker).
I suggest that these differences reflect to an extent the degree of insecurity in the
attachment styles, as participants in the higher-schizotypy group tended to possess
relatively higher levels ofboth anxious (mean = 85.50, SD = 11.85) and avoidant (mean
= 55.75, SD = 19.82) attachments than the lower-schizotypy group (anxious attachment:
mean = 65.25, SD = 30.51; avoidant attachment: mean = 41, SD = 13.39).
Let us remind ourselves that the results of the questionnaire study appear to support the
correspondence hypothesis according to which, themore secure one's attachment is, the
more likely one is to possess a mature form of religiosity (for more, see the relevant
discussion in chapter IV). However, this does not explain why the nature of religiosity
in the lower-schizotypy group tended to be outwards and upwards and in the higher
group inwards? For a possible explanation of this difference, we may need to look a bit
deeper into Kirkpatrick & Shaver's (1990) theory.
A relatively securely attached individual will tend to project their attachment style and
form a relatively secure, healthy, and stable bond with God (at least according to the
correspondence hypothesis). In doing so, such an individual will also tend to see God
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as an all-loving, all-caring, parent-like figure. To an extent that is what the lower-
schizotypy group appeared to be doing. They were perhaps projecting an adaptive need,
and structuring their religiosity around a figure ofultimate security, as they "knew" that
this had paid off in their daily life. For them it appears to be the safest bet, and
apparently they seem to capitalise on that through their faith.
In the higher-schizotypy group the attachment figure appeared to be absent, as God was
seen more in terms of an abstract power, which tended to be less central to the nature of
their religiosity. According to the correspondence hypothesis, the characteristics of a
caregiver will be projected onto God. Thus relatively insecurely attached individuals
would tend to see God as a punitive, fear-inducing, or at least unreliable attachment
figure. However, nothing in the accounts of the higher-schizotypy group painted such
a picture ofGod. What came out clearly though was that their religiosity was not based
on their relationship with God, and that God was not seen as an attachment figure.
Why would an adult Christian willingly project onto God such undesirable, non-
beneficial attributes? What are the advantages of constructing God as an unreliable, yet
all-powerful, figure, and basing the whole nature of one's religious beliefs on that
figure? According to the correspondence hypothesis, that would be the obvious
projection. I do acknowledge that there appear to be adherents that tend to attribute to
God such characteristics, although, recent studies have linked this concept of God to
child sexual abuse (Finkelhor et al., 1989; Imbens & Jonker, 1992; Webb & Whitmer,
2003). I propose that a more adaptive response would be to dissociate God from
anything that resembles an attachment figure. God now becomes an abstract force, a part
of who one is (as interviewees 2 and 6 noted), still all-powerful, yet without the
attribution ofany humanlike characteristics. Perhaps this is just what the participants in
the higher-schizotypy group were communicating.
Should this be, at least in part, the case, it adds an interesting twist to Kirkpatrick &
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Shaver's theory, which is well-worth further consideration. By taking into account what
I have just said, and the relevant results from the questionnaire study, it could be argued
that God may be seen as the ultimate attachment figure, so long as it is to the adaptive
advantage of the believer to do so. This hypothesis is not only interesting on its own
right, but also because of its direct derivatives, such as: What is the nature of the internal
or external forces that may lead a believer to form, in a persistent manner, an insecure
attachment figure of God, counter to any adaptive values or simply psychological well-
being benefits? Or for thatmatter, assuming for themoment that Kirkpatrick & Shaver's
theory stands, what factors can result in a disassociation of God from being seen as an
insecure attachment figure?
Another interesting difference between the two groups in respect to the nature of their
faith is that the higher-schizotypy group appeared to present their religious faith within
a somewhat spiritual context (and in fact interviewees 2 and 6 explicitly used the words
"spirituality" or "spiritual" when referring to their beliefs). Let us remind ourselves what
I briefly discussed in chapter II regarding the notion of spirituality. Spirituality tends to
be seen, at least among psychologists and psychiatrists, as a broader and more abstract
concept than religiosity, in that spirituality refers to the "degree of involvement or state
of awareness or devotion to a higher being or life philosophy" (Walker, 1991, p. 208).
It is being perceived as "the ability to see the sacred in the ordinary" (Elkins, 1999,
p.45), and it involves awide range ofbeliefs in metaphysical or supernatural phenomena
(Fontana, 2003). As such, although to a large extent it conceptually overlaps with
religiosity, it can nevertheless be present in religious as well as nonreligious individuals
(Emmons, 2003).
The accounts of the higher-schizotypy group, but not those in the lower schizotypy,
appeared to be rather spiritual in nature. Can there be a link between spirituality and
schizotypy? I cannot say. Since spirituality was not part of this thesis, besides these four
accounts I do not have any other data that directly assessed any aspects of the concept.
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Therefore, although only participants in the higher-schizotypy group referred to
spirituality, I have no evidence to suggest that spirituality is a characteristic exclusive
to that group. If, as interviewee 2 suggested, spiritual beliefs are a personal matter better
left unspoken, it is possible that other "spiritual" participants, who could well have been
placed in the lower-schizotypy group (or for that matter anywhere in the schizotypy
continuum) had no interest in discussing their beliefs and thus taking part in the
interview study.
Since the issue ofspirituality emerged in this study, it is worth making a couple ofpoints
here. First, in a study that formed part ofmy Masters dissertation (2000) I interviewed
a number ofpsychotherapists (counsellors, psychiatrists, and clinical psychologists) in
order to form an impression oftheir views on the role religion can play in their practices,
and to explore the impact those views can have on issues of treatment and training. Of
relevance to this discussion is the picture that emerged, which suggested that
respondents tended to be biased towards a generally positive idea of spirituality and a
negative or at best neutral image of religiosity (this bias was also later observed by
Seybold & Hill, 2001). It appears that at least the psychotherapists I interviewed tended
to see spirituality as a fundamental, universal aspect of the human mind, associated it
with something adaptive, and thus as more likely to have a positive effect on the mental
health of the individual. However, if for a moment we took the results of the current
study at face value, and as indicative of the spirituality-schizotypy relationship, thismay
well not be the case.
Second, the research literature does not appear to agree on whether spiritual beliefs are
psychologically healthier than religious ones. Although it has been suggested that
spirituality may promote good mental health (e.g. Daaleman, Cobb, & Frey, 2001;
Elkins, 1999), studies have also shown that certain types of highly spiritual people (for
example, adherents of new religious movements) are more likely than religious ones to
be psychotic (Bullough, 1993; Greenberg et ah, 1992), while still others failed to find
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any association between spirituality, but not religiosity, and psychological well-being
(Crawford, 2003). Finally, let us remind ourselves that the DSM-IV gives equal weight
to both religious and spiritual problems (American Psychiatric Association, 1994).
It would be interesting to investigate whether a favouritism toward spirituality is
normatively present in the mental health system, and ifso, what causes it. Moreover, the
role spirituality plays in mental health within and outside the realms of religion is an
issue that certainly deserves further research attention, not least because it may well be
another link in the religiosity-mental health relationship.
The centralityof religion
In both groups, participants acknowledged that religion was providing them with
guidance and support, at least in respect to certain areas of their lives. In the lower-
schizotypy group religion was highly embedded in life, giving purpose and meaning to
every of its aspects:
[1:4, 171-172]
it is more of a continuous thing that affects every area ofmy life
without God my life would feel very empty
[3: 59, 88, 120]
I wouldn't have a purpose unless I had a religious belief
I always make decisions in the light ofmy beliefs
it really enters into all the things I do
[7:25,273-274, 430-431]
it's the basis ofmy whole life
it's shaped my life because it's given it a purpose it's shaped me because
I have had to live as near to the way Christ lived as possible
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I can't imagine what life would be like without having religion in it I
think it would be very drab very frightening
[8: 9-10, 185-186]
it's the whole the whole basis for my life and everything I do that belief
motivates all decisions and things I do with my life
Q: how do you think your life would be without religion?
A: I think that that would be absolutely awful
In contrast, in the accounts of the higher-schizotypy group the centrality of religiosity
tended to be played down, or at times defused within other broadly speaking
nonreligious elements:
[2: 259-261]
I feel being a Quaker I am quite happy to say that I am a dedicated pacifist
and I would stick to that that that for me that is important to to be to feel
that you know I am focussing in on that aspect and if I didn't' have that
then I think I think then what the hell is it all about anyway?
[4: 154-155]
I am claiming too much if I say that religion shaped my life if it did shape
my life and probably it did I was not aware of it
[5: 235-236]
on the whole I wouldn't say there is a large part of [my social life that] is
connected with religion there is a part of it yes but I wouldn't say there
was a large part that had to do with religion
[6: 264-266 discussing his involvement with community affairs]
you don't have to be religious to do it but for me that that sort of flows
from a belief that society is important and community is important
[6: 366-367]
I suppose it is conceivable that I could find myself living a similar style
of life [...] in some other way without a a definable belief in God
This difference in the centrality ofreligion between the two groups, could be to an extent
explained by the difference in the levels of intrinsic religious orientation. On average the
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lower-schizotypy group was more intrinsically orientated than the higher-schizotypy one
- a finding that was also expected given the structure of the unified model presented in
the previous chapter - lower schizotypy: mean = 37.5, SD = 1.92; higher schizotypy:
mean = 30.50, SD = 4.66.
The accounts ofthe lower-schizotypy group clearlymap onAllport's ideas aboutmature
orientation (see chapter III). The more religiously mature a person is, the more their life
and behaviour are guided by their religion, and the more their religious sentiment is
expressed as a direct approach to God. In fact, this last characteristic of intrinsic
religiosity could be also used as a partial explanation ofwhy the lower-schizotypy group
tended to personify God and place Him at the centre of their faith (the previous theme).
It is conceivable that this was so, in part because the nature of their religious orientation
dictated it.
Did the higher-schizotypy group though have a more immature form of religiosity?
Given the direction of the findings in the questionnaire study and the way the interview
sample was selected, this should not be expected to be the case. In fact, the higher-
schizotypy group was on average lower on every religious orientation (with the
exception of quest). Therefore, the accounts in this group could not be expressing
characteristics of immature religiosity. So what were they expressing?
I would suggest that at least in respect to the above two themes, both groups were in part
expressing elements oftheir intrinsic religious orientation; however, this orientationmay
not only have been quantitatively different between the two groups, but also
qualitatively. Naturally, one may comment, as this was evident in their accounts. I am,
however, referring to a specific quality, that of "religious significance" as defined by
Pargament (1997) and discussed in chapter IV. To remind the reader, Kenneth
Pargament theorised that any orientation could be classified as being either the ends or
the means ofsomeone's approach to life (see Table 4.1). More specifically, he suggested
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that an intrinsic means orientation is highly embedded in one's life, acting as a guide for
living, while the intrinsic ends has more of a spiritual nature, which is at times expressed
through acts of compassion or unselfishness.
I am tempted to suggest that this was the main, or perhaps the most obvious, religious
quality that differentiated the accounts of the two groups, in respect to both the nature
and the centrality of their religiosity. The lower-schizotypy group clearly exhibited
elements of intrinsic means orientation, while in the higher-schizotypy one, the spiritual
character ofreligiosity, as well as the nature ofthe acts and thoughts of its members (e.g.
being a pacifist, a full-time volunteer, or being involved in community affairs) appear
to indicate an intrinsic ends orientation.
All the above explanations still leave a question largely unanswered: If both groups
appear to be expressing, so far at least, a form ofmainly intrinsic orientation, why was
the centrality of religiosity so different between them? According to Allport's theory,
this should not have been the case. The following theme may help address this issue.
Religious choice
The next highly pervasive theme across accounts was that of religious choice. In the
lower-schizotypy group, being or becoming religious was seen as either a rational choice
or a result of a sudden conversion or both:
[1: 44-46]
then just one night I really realized that [God] definitely was there and
that he wanted me to be his daughter so that's when I became a Christian
[3:43]
I was never forced I was left to make up my own mind the whole thing
was very rational
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[7: 113-116]
I just happened to stray into a Baptists' church and I thought I've never
been in a Baptists' church you know and I went in and they were having
a baptism and that was where and the stories suddenly came alive
[7: 238-239]
Q: how much of that [interviewee had just described some aspects ofher
religious development] actually would you say was choice?
A: oh well I think it was choice
[8: 76-77]
I was very very sore and downhearted and that was it was a Sunday and
actually I was by myself and I just asked God to come into my life and to
change my life and he did
In the higher-schizotypy group, religion tended to be seen as a natural part of life, and
although religious beliefs did tend to develop, at times through questioning (see next
theme), their development was not directly attributed to rational choice - except for
interviewee 6 who was the only one in this group who did put it down to choice.
[2: 88-90]
I had a very traditional sort ofChurch ofEngland upbringing so [religion]
was a part ofmy life going to Sunday School going to church you know
maybe at least once on a Sunday it was all very normal and ordinary
[4: 96-98]
[it was] part of my normal life all my school fellows were getting the
same treatment [...] at Sunday School I knew the kids there we were all
being told the same thing at the same time so it all seemed very very
normal
[5: 160-161]
A: no I wouldn't say I chose [to develop my religious beliefs] I mean I
didn't sort of say to myselfyou know this Imust do somethingmore about
or what have you it's just as I said it has evolved just gradually developed
[6: 133-136]
my infant and primary school were very it (was) a church school this was
back in the 50's I think there was enough scripture and and sort of
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religious worship and stories and prayers for that to make an impact in my
inner world because when I did come to faith and to religion as a a young
adult you know those things lived on for me they were still there
I will not attempt to dwell in the realm of the psychology of religious conversion
(choosing to become religious has to an extent also been viewed as a form of "gradual"
conversion, e.g. Richardson, 1985), because not only is it a large area, but also because
it is not part of this thesis. Perhaps of some relevance to the current study is empirical
evidence that tends to demonstrate that converts (especially those who had experienced
a sudden conversion) tend to report (at least initially) higher levels of subjective well-
being than people who have always been religious (for an overview see Argyle, 2000,
pp. 19-25; Fontana, 2003, pp. 131-135; Loewenthal, 2000, pp. 45-56; Pargament, 1997,
pp. 247-260).
Moreover, the above references suggest that for the converted individuals religion tends
to occupy a central place in their life, providing it with meaning and purpose. All this
evidence can be used as additional explanation both ofwhy conversion was exclusively
observed in the lower-schizotypy group (i.e. apparently the more "psychologically
healthy" one), and of why in that group religion was highly embedded in life. At the
same time the centrality of religiosity was played down in the higher-schizotypy group,
perhaps because religion was always part of their normal life; no significant event was
described in these accounts that could have brought religion in the foreground, and
assigned it a special and central meaning in life; they did not choose to be or become
Christians (except interviewee 6), but rather accepted religion as one of those things in
life that are "naturally" present.
RELIGIOUS DOUBT
Participants in both groups (except interviewee 3) acknowledged that their religious
beliefs had been changing through their life, and this development was at times linked
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to religious knowledge gained over the years. In the lower-schizotypy group, however,
religious beliefs and religion tended to be accepted without questioning:
[1: 180]
[being a Christian] is not about answering questions it is more to do with
the relationship with God
[3:46]
I absolutely [believe] that [is] the way that life should be organised
[7: 434, 439]
Q: Is there anything that could make you question your religious beliefs?
A: no I think I'm very fortunate
[8: 92-93]
I think that as time goes on you realise that you don't have the answer to
everything
In the higher-schizotypy group, however, doubt and questioning was at times strongly
communicated:
[4: 290-291]
Q: is there anything at all that could make you question your religious
beliefs?
A: [...] a somewhat fatalistic principle thing I dread is my wife's death
[5: 141-142]
as I got older I began to question more and be more interested really to
sort of instead of just dealing with it
[6: 198-200]
questions began to loom larger and larger really so that they the shape of
my believing that the sort if you like both the doctrinal content and the
way I regarded a whole range ofother things began to open up and loosen
up
All the above accounts appear to be related to the degree one is quest orientated towards
religion. Indeed, as it was predicted from the integrated model, the higher-schizotypy
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group had on averaged higher levels of quest orientation than the lower-schizotypy one
(lower schizotypy: mean = 45.50, SD = 23.10; higher schizotypy: mean = 63.50, SD =
23.62).
In the lower-schizotypy group, questioning religion did not appear to be part of their
faith. Being relatively highly intrinsically orientated, it was expected - given the results
of the previous study - that they would be relatively low on quest, as the two
orientations appear to have an inverse relationship. Additionally, the new evidence that
emerged in the current study can be used to enrich the significance ofthe above findings.
These individuals either chose to be religious or had a religious revelation that converted
them or both; for them religion was everything in life, and without religion their life
would be, as interviewee 7 put it, "very frightening"; moreover they tended to have a
personal relationship with a secure figure of an all-loving, all-caring God. Given these
accounts, events, or life choices, it is very likely these participants were less inclined,
ifnot unwilling to question their faith. As religion seemed to be a safe haven, they more
or less chose to be in, it would have not been to their benefit to question it.
In the higher-schizotypy group, however, questioning appeared to occupy a significant
place in their faith (perhaps not so for interviewee 4). According to Batson et al. (1993),
the quest orientation develops as a direct response to "existential questions raised by the
contradictions and tragedies of life" (p. 169). This idea was to an extent communicated
in the accounts of the higher-schizotypy group. Two participants (interviewees 4 and 6)
referred to tragedies and contradictions in their lives, and directly linked them to
religious questioning. For interviewee 4, such a tragedy would be the death of his wife.
Interviewee 6 discussed the following contradiction and explicitly used it to justify why
he was questioning:
[6: 204-206]
the answers that I thought I had got in my early twenties didn't actually fit
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they didn't actually make sense of people's lives seemed to put God in a
box and didn't actually help them so you begin to look outside the box
Interviewee 2 talked about war and specifically theWWII bombings and the war on Iraq,
but she did not directly relate these to her religious questions. Finally, tragedies and
contradictions were not present in the account of interviewee 5. Instead, she referred to
certain events in the Bible (e.g. the virgin birth), whose meaning she had started
questioning in her recent life, as she said, "out of interest".
Ofthe themes identified in this study, the one that refers to religious choice can be used
to inform further these accounts. In the higher-schizotypy group, religion was always
part of life, and being religious tended not to be seen as a choice. This being the case,
it is conceivable that these participants may have reached a stage in their life or their
religious development where they started questioning the de facto presence of religion
and its meaning to them. As interviewee 5 said, she had accepted the Bible "without
really thinking about it" [5: 183]; for interviewee 2, although religion was always there,
she "never felt it meant anything" to her until she started in her late adult life questioning
its personal significance, or as she put it "flirting with it all" [2: 93]; finally, interviewee
6 first begun questioning in his teens as a reaction to the established religious norms he
was brought up.
According to James (and for that matter to both Allport and Batson), religion is a
personal affair; it is "the feelings, acts, and experiences of individual men in their
solitude" (James, 1902/2002, p.29) and it relates to the understanding of oneself in
relation to the divine. The lower-schizotypy group had managed to construct this
personal relation through means of sudden or gradual conversion. In their need to create
a personal meaning to their religion, the adherents of the other group had turned to
questioning.
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It seems that, one way or another, religion may have to have a personal meaning to the
believer. Simply adherence to or conformity with institutional or sociocultural religious
norms, codes, and doctrines, may never be sufficient by itself to convey to the believer
the "true" meaning of faith, to deliver him or her to the divine. An individual who
"wants" to (continue to) believe, may be driven by a somewhat innate tendency to find
that personal meaning in his or her faith, without necessarily abolishing its sociocultural
forms, either through reason and questioning or through subconscious processes that can
result in instant conversion.
Chapter synopsis
The aim of the interview study was to identify the main bottom-up themes that are of
relevance to the elements that make up the religiosity profile - as identified in the
questionnaire study - which appears to enhance both aspects ofmental health (at least
in relation to schizotypy) and a number of fundamental components of psychological
well-being. The interview analysis revealed four major interrelated, superordinate
themes, which appeared to possess clear and distinct characteristics between the two
interview groups. These themes were discussed under the following groupings: (a) the
nature ofreligiosity, (b) the centrality ofreligiosity, (c) religious choice, and (d) religious
doubt.
The identified themes appear to be in part qualitative expressions of aspects of intrinsic
and quest orientations. The characteristics of those two orientations that seem to be
related to low levels of at least phenotypic manifestations of schizotypy involve an
apparent absence of existential or religious questioning and a construction of religion
as the foundation of one's whole approach to life.
Moreover, central to the way participants constructed their faith appears to be the
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distinction between a theistic (in the lower-schizotypy group) and a more abstract, rather
spiritual, form of religiosity (in the higher-schizotypy group). Specifically, a personal
relationship with a personified, all-loving God, seems to be an important "faith factor"
of lower schizotypal Christian individuals. The above distinction could be to an extent
a result of the attachment styles of the participants, although I would not dismiss the
possibility of it being artificial, since as it emerged from this study, spiritual individuals
may be less willing to volunteer to discuss their faith.
Finally, an important role appears to play the degree to which religiosity is perceived as
a result of choice or sudden conversion (lower schizotypy), or as a natural part of life
(higher schizotypy). It seems that the former case allows for the development of a
religiosity that has a personal significance to the believer, while for this to be achieved
in the latter case, an element of doubt needs to enter the equation.
One should be reminded that the inferential power of these results is limited by the
study's small sample size, and the post-hoc arrangement of the two interview groups,
as discussed in the previous chapter. Although the identified four themes come out
rather clearly in this study, future studies may be able to refine them further (or identify
additional ones), by addressing these limitations.
Summing up, the results of this study suggest that the main bottom-up elements of a
well-being-enhancing religiosity appear to involve: (a) a personal relationship with a
loving God, (b) religious beliefs that act as guidance and provide meaning and purpose
to life, (c) a conviction that religious beliefs are a result of choice or revelation, and (d)




"A painting is never finished. It simply stops in interesting places."
(attributed to Paul Gardner)
Chapter aims & organisation
As the specific results of the two studies have already been discussed in the respective
chapters, the aim ofthis chapter is to bring together and summarise the general findings
of this thesis, by linking them back to the thesis aims and objectives. The ways this
thesis addressed both its empirical and conceptual considerations are discussed and
conclusions are drawn. Finally, general future directions for the field of the study of the
psychology of religion are proposed.
All truth to lightall crosses nailed
The thesis aims
The overall aim of this thesis was to study the relationship between faith and
psychological well-being. Concurrently, the circumstances under which institutional
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religious faith can have a positive or negative association with mental health were
explored. Specifically, an attempt was made to map the relationship between degrees
and kinds ofChristian religious orientation and schizotypal personality traits (psychosis-
proneness), by taking into account the effects of general personality traits, as well as
social and developmental psychological elements, primarily identity aspects and
attachment styles.
There seems to be a genuine, mainly research-driven, interest in the role religion plays
in these psychological areas, not least because of their current importance in
understanding the roots of religiously-driven conflict. It needs to be said that
psychological interest in religion is not exclusively concentrated in the focus areas of
this thesis, and indeed topics like prosocial behaviour, social attitudes, coping, and social
support are receiving their share of research activity. Although it would have been of
interest to incorporate elements of those areas in this thesis, it was beyond its bounds.
Empirical considerations
The four objectives of this thesis were addressed as summarised below:
Testing of existing methodologies
Relatively stable, relevant, as well as unequivocally important the role of religion may
be in the variables of this thesis, it appears that empirical evidence has so far been rather
inconclusive, and measurement or methodology dependant. In earlier chapters of this
thesis I have discussed the reasons why this may be so. To summarise, it appears that
psychological studies in religion seem to suffer from methodological flaws and have
serious limitations, such as inappropriate sample types, little or no control over certain,
potentially important, religious, psychological, or sociodemographic variables, simplistic
implementation of statistical techniques, and almost total neglect of qualitative
methodologies. These limitations could potentially have either or both artificially
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reduced the strength of the association between religion and certain psychological
variables, and inflated the levels of bias in the findings.
In this thesis, an attempt was made to apply more rigorous controls over the studied
variables. By keeping the focus on the religiosity-schizotypy relationship, I partialled out
the effects of the secondary psychological predictors, while at the same time identified
potential moderating effects of a number of sociodemographic variables. Moreover,
strenuous attempts were made to ensure that the results were not artefacts of the
statistical tests used, but rather accurate enough representations of the actual underlying
relationships. Triangulations of analyses were made by using different techniques, as
well as a combination of quantitative and qualitative methodologies, to increase
confidence in the results.
That said, sample size restrictions did not allow for all of the sociodemographic
variables to enter the final integrated model. These variables could have potentially
played a part in the shaping of the primary relationships. Student status, denominational
adherence, and gender appear to have amoderating effect that demands further attention
in future studies.
Replication & extension of previous findings
Research so far has suggested that religion tends to play a low to moderate role in the
activity in the chosen psychological areas of this thesis. Statistically speaking, the direct
(standardised) effect of religiosity on schizotypy, as identified in the integrated model
ofthe questionnaire study was .21, which taken at face value may indeed seem relatively
low. After all, how serious can an overlap of 4.6% between the variability of two
variables be? Ifwe were to ask this question, we should step back a bit, and attempt to
have a birds-eye view on the matter.
First, it is psychological concepts, or shall I say constructs, we are dealing with here. As
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such, they are embedded in a mesh of other perhaps infinite concepts, interacting with
them, fusing with them, and taking shape from them, in infinite ways and directions.
Humans are not automata, following simple rules of behaviour and thought, as perhaps
the behaviourists would have wanted us to be. Already the subdivisions ofmainstream
psychology count into the dozens and all of them have something to say about one
another. Because of all this, through my experience, it is exceptional for any two
psychological variables to overlap highly, unless perhaps they fall conceptually into the
same psychological subdivision, or in other words are perceived to be related
theoretically.
Second, the psychology of religion, to the dismay of myself and perhaps a handful of
other psychologists, is nowhere close yet to being one ofthose mainstream psychological
subdivision - although it appears to be slowly getting there. In fact, to my knowledge,
no mainstream, general psychology text-book exists, that includes sections on religion
or spirituality, or for that matter any major reference to either of them, in its
presentation. In other words, religion does not appear to be considered by psychologists
in general as a psychological area or concept.
However, religion - this not so important, a not-of-psychological nature or interest
variable - seems to have, at least according to the findings of this thesis, a .21 (or even
higher at times) direct effect on mainstream psychological concepts, such as in this case
schizotypal personality traits. Moreover, this effect ofreligion on schizotypy is as strong
as that of the other mainstream psychological variables included in this thesis.
This evidence leads to the conclusion that, at least at the empirical level, religion should
indeed be treated as an important psychological variable, or set of them, well-worth
considering in our psychological investigations, as it appears to have a potentially unique
role in the shaping of major aspects of the psychosocial world of the individual.
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Identification of areas that require further attention
Through the use ofprimarily advanced statistical techniques and secondarily qualitative
methodologies several psychological variables were identified that deserve further
research and theoretical attention.
Notably both studies in this thesis indicated that the triangle of attachment-religiosity-
schizotypy was one of those areas. Attachment appears to have a rather strong
relationship with schizotypy, at least among religious individuals, which so far has been
relatively overlooked. A study of this relationship could potentially enhance
understanding of the schizotypal personality development among religious people, and
in general perhaps lead to better ways of diagnosing, preventing, and even treating
schizotypal personality disorder.
Another area of interest identified but not addressed in this thesis is the possible link
between spirituality and schizotypy. In the interview study, spirituality was found to
have a positive relationship with schizotypy; despite the study limitations, this result
may be seen as a fruitful area for further research. Specifically, an understanding of the
role spirituality plays in mental health may allow us further to clarify the asaphia in the
religiosity-mental health relationship.
The behaviour of extrinsic religiosity needs to be understood better, as it seems to be
greatly influenced by the presence of other religiosity elements. The findings so far in
the literature that tend to associate extrinsic with reduced mental health and negative
social attitudes are based on rather simplistic analytical approaches that inherently fail
to capture the complexity of the underlying interrelations. Future studies should attempt
to model the behaviour of the extrinsic religiosity, and identify the factors that influence
its strength and direction.
Another area discussed extensively in this thesis is the nature and behaviour of the quest
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orientation. The evidence here shows consistently that the quest orientation is probably
a passage to mature faith rather than maturity in itself. Furthermore, quest appears to
have a distinct relationship with mental health. This was the only religious component
in this thesis that consistently showed a positive association practically with all
schizotypal traits, as well as a clear manifestation in the high schizotypy interview
group.
Moreover, by taking into account the interview findings, it seems an individual may
develop a quest orientation towards religion not only as a result of life tragedies and
contradictions, but also through an attempt to assign to religion a unique character of
personal significance. This idea has not been put forward before, either by the
developers of quest or by any subsequent students of it. Should this finding hold, it has
potentially important implications for the concept of the quest orientation, as itmay need
to be reconsidered and restructured radically.
Finally, the means-ends aspect of religious orientation needs a closer look. This thesis
has found evidence that suggests that the means-ends element may function better as an
independent dimension of religiosity. Should this be the case, it may influence
dynamically either or both the intensity and the direction of the behaviour of the
religious orientations. Consequently, a study of the means-ends role could lead to a
better understanding of the performance of religiosity.
Determination of a plausible structural model
This thesis has attempted to construct an integrated model that can provide an adequate,
coherent, and concise explanation of the relationships among the study variables, the
first to combine these psychological and religious components into a single unified
model.
I do acknowledge that alternative, theory-permissible models are possible, and that I do
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not claim to have constructed the "ultimate" model. Moreover, the cross-sectional nature
of the study does limit the strength of the nomothetic causal explanations of the
identified model (for more on this see Stark, Roberts, & Corbett, 2002). I intend to
conduct future studies employing longitudinal designs when testing causal models like
this one. However, despite the limitations of the dataset, I do believe that the model I
present, when viewed alongside the rest of the findings in this thesis, captures to a large
extent the picture of the underlying relationships among the measured variables, and
provides a clear enough structure for future research.
The findings of this thesis indicate that the relationship between religiosity and
schizotypy is probably an asymmetrical, causal one, with religion functioning better as
a predictor of schizotypy. In this arrangement, the model showed that a certain religious
profile - which I termed that of an ordinary believer - tends to reduce at least the
phenotypic manifestation of schizotypal traits. Both studies in this thesis strongly
suggest that the key religiosity components in the above equation are maturity of faith
(intrinsic orientation) and religious questioning (quest orientation).
Once again these results need to be interpreted with caution, since as discussed in
chapter IV, the questionnaire-based nature of this study does not allow for an assessment
of the presence of a genetic disposition (schizotaxia) to schizotypal traits in the sample.
Therefore the observed phenotypic manifestation of schizotypy may have been to an
extent an artefact of design, and not an accurate representation of the underlying traits.
Besides employing longitudinal designs, future studies should attempt to test mymodel
on individuals diagnosed with schizotypal personality disorder.
Returning to the findings of this thesis and the identified religious profile seems to
enhance the overall psychological well-being of the individual, at least in respect to the
rest of the psychological variables (attachment, general personality, and identity) studied
in this thesis. However, the interplay between certain aspects of those psychological
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variables and religiosity appears to result in poorer mental health, as expressed through
schizotypy. This finding can be interpreted as suggesting that one should not be looking
in the transcendental realms to identify the origins of religious harm. It is the human
interpretation of the divine, the filtering of the sacred and the otherworldly domain
through, in this case, certain psychological factors, that allows, promotes, or causes that
harm. In order to understand the role religion plays in the economy ofhuman behaviour
and thought, psychologists need to study, decipher, and map this filtering. By doing so,
it may lead to religious problems becoming manageable and largely solvable.
The thesis aims revisited
Putting together the findings of this thesis, an amended model ofAllport's (and as an
extension James's and Batson's) theory of personal religion development that
incorporates elements of psychological well-being and mental health can be proposed.
This model is as follows (Fig. 9.1):
According to the above theories, the individual's religious development can consist of
up to three main stages. The immature religion stage is the one characterised by
dominant forms of extrinsic religious orientation (personal or social). This stage of
religious development, according to the findings of this thesis, is the only one that
appears to be capable of having both a positive (indirect) and a negative (direct) effect
on mental health. The nature of the elements that influence the direction of this effect
remains to be clarified.
The prevalence of intrinsic religious orientation characterises the mature religion stage
("the completest form of religion" according to James). Both this thesis and previous
research discussed in chapter IV indicate that this stage appears to enhance aspects of
both mental health and psychological well-being in general.
The passage from the immature to the mature stage can occur either through gradual or
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Figure 9.1. The proposed general model of personal religious development (dashed line
indicates path not directly assessed in this thesis).
instant conversion (according to James) or through doubt (according to Allport). This
thesis supports the idea that both these paths are possible. To an extent both authors
identify these two paths as specific (intermediate) stages of religious development.
Moreover, the results of this thesis suggest that the doubt stage is characterised by the
presence of Batson's quest religious orientation, which is also recognised, at least by
Batson and his followers, as a developmental stage of the religious sentiment.
It is unclear, however, whether the doubt and the conversion stages are mutually
exclusive, and which (psychological) factors determine which one is more likely to
occur or develop. Additionally, these two stages seem to have a diametrically opposite
relationship with mental health. The conversion stage appears to be associated with an
enhancement in mental health, while the doubt stage seems to be related to aspects that
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can arguably lead to a reduction ofmental health. Considering this, it is unclear whether
both stages lead to the same kind of religious maturity.
It should be noted that, as both James and Allport indicate, a person's religious
development may stop at either the immature or the mature stage, while according to
Batson, this is also true for the quest stage (I know ofno evidence that suggests that this
is possible with the conversion stage). At the same time, all these stages appear to show
a certain degree of overlap with each other, e.g. in the indiscriminately proreligious
individuals identified by Allport & Ross (1967).
Therefore, it is possible, for example, for a person to have developed relatively high
levels of intrinsic religious orientation, while still having religious doubts (as appears
to be the case in this thesis with interviewees from the high schizotypy group). In
situations like this, it is unclear which of the religious orientations present determines
the direction and intensity of the relationship between religiosity and mental health or
general psychological well-being. It is possible that it is the prominent religious
orientation, or the one that has the strongest effect on mental health, or perhaps it is a
combined result.
The empirical merit and the implications of this proposed model need to be assessed.
This model is more general than the integrated one developed in this thesis. However,
the two models are highly compatible. In fact, the model of this thesis can be used to
clarify the issues raised above. At the same time, its use can lead to a further refinement
of its structure. For example, how would the integrated model behave if only used on
believers who had experienced instant conversion?
The proposed general model deserves further attention, because although it highlights
the complex role religion plays in mental health and general psychological well-being,
at the same time disseminates that role into parts with characteristics that are




At the conceptual level the thesis addressed the following three considerations: (a) Why
should psychology be interested in religion, a topic that seems to be ofgreater relevance
to philosophy, sociology, or anthropology? (b) what may be the contribution of such
study to the psychological knowledge? and finally (c) what can psychology offer to
religion? My conclusions are presented below:
Psychological interest in religion
Since the dawn of modern psychology, it seems that many psychologists have been
battered with similar scepticism, which apparently resulted in a rather uneasy
relationship between psychology and religion. Had it not been for people like William
James and Gordon Allport, who through their pioneering ideas helped lift to a great
extent that doubt, the field of the psychology of religion may have been far more
marginal than it is today.
Echoing their words, I have argued that religion is a fundamental, multidimensional, and
multilevel aspect of humanity. Since it carries a set of experiences, communal as well
as personal belief systems, and codes of values that seem to have a direct, at times
powerful, and distinct impact on a person's functional and dysfunctional mental
processes and behaviour, its investigation considerably overlaps with the domain of
psychology.
The existence of religious objects and the transcendent are best addressed through
philosophy or theology. It is the feeling or thought of transcendence and the associated
attitudes and behaviours that are of interest to psychology. It would be sagacious to
stress Hood et al.'s (1996) disclaimer that states that the object of the psychological
study of religion is neither God nor the worldview of religious institutions, nor faith
versus reason, nor religion versus science, but people. And religion appears to be
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important to our understanding of people, not only because it addresses an element of
life that seems to be central to most individuals and societies, but also because it seems
to affect a plethora of areas, such as well-being and mental health, that are of principal
interest to psychologists. Despite Sigmund Freud's attempts to present it as an
anachronistic and disappearing concept, it looks like psychologists are gradually
acknowledging that the psychology of religion is here to stay.
Contribution of religion to psychological knowledge
Religion, and in that sense spirituality, because of their properties fundamental to
humans, have a lot to offer to psychological knowledge. For example, in the area of
mental health, because of the overwhelming evidence and the influence of humanistic
psychologists (e.g. Lukoff et ah, 1998), religious and spiritual problems have been
recognised (in the DSM-IV) to occupy a unique niche in the psychological well-being
of the individual, and as such they deserve to be studied and assessed separately and
independently from other mental disorders. In fact, it has been argued by religious
psychologists (e.g. Heinrich, 1997) that the visions and ecstasies of religious people are
not in principle pathological, and that their similarities with symptoms of mental
disorders, such as psychotic ones, are epiphenomena produced by the limited capacity
of humans to express extreme emotions.
At the same time, Whitwell and Barker (1980), in an article on delusional religious
patients in Britain, concluded that psychotherapists, in order to form a therapeutic
relation with their patients, "must" understand their patients' religious beliefs, respect
them, and not treat them as part ofthe symptomatology. Furthermore, for Pfeifer (1993,
1994) and Tan (2003) psychotherapists and psychology counsellors should seek to
strengthen the positive aspects of religious beliefs that can provide support to their
clients or patients.
Issues like these challenge our views on mental illness and demand closer attention and
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further research. They also suggest that our approach to mental health may need to be
changed, and indeed it appears to be changing, and become more sensitive and more
holistic (see also Mental Health Foundation, 1997). Psychologists can use findings like
the ones reported in this thesis to gain a better understanding of the mechanisms that
shape the various aspects of mental health, and of the ways these aspects manifest
themselves in different individuals and sociocultural setting.
Contribution of psychological knowledge to religion
Consequently, enrichment ofpsychological knowledge in the areaofreligion can be very
beneficial to religious individuals and communities. Research has shown that religious
individuals with mental health problems prefer to be treated by professionals who show
sensitivity and understanding of their beliefs (Bergin & Jensen, 1990; Kane, 2003;
Macmin & Foskett, 2004; Rose, Westefeld, & Ansley, 2001; Sims, 1999; Sloan et al.,
1999). Thus by being aware of these issues, psychotherapists have now the ability -
although perhaps not yet the will or the knowledge (Coyle, 2001) - to provide better and
more accurate diagnoses and treatment to religious clients and patients. This may result
in religious people gaining confidence and trust in psychologists, and stop seeing them
as a threat to their beliefs (see also Brown, 1988, pp. 130-132; Meyers, 2004).
Psychology can also show religious individuals and groups different ways they can use
their beliefs and practices as coping mechanisms and psychological resources when
dealing with emotional or mental disturbances, or as means to promote better cultural,
intergroup, or interpersonal relations.
General future directions
The psychology of religion has a promising and viable future only if it can learn from
its past mistakes and proceed to develop a coherent and stable conceptual and
methodological framework. It appears that psychologists in this area need to develop
further a positive and pluralistic attitude towards the phenomena they are investigating,
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by making sure they steer clear from arguments on whether people should be religious
or not, or what they should believe. They also need to be more organised with their
investigations, and focus on how people process, conceptualise, and use their beliefs,
and how those beliefs affect the development, the solutions, and the outcomes of
psychosocial problems. Moreover, they need to develop a solid theoretical basis for the
psychology of religion that inevitably requires the incorporation ofmore mainstream
psychological concepts, such as personality, identity, and attachment.
Furthermore, when studying religion, psychologists need to attempt to produce rigorous
scientific methodologies that can stand up to academic scrutiny. One should not forget
that measurements are the means to an end and not the end in themselves. As discussed
earlier, methodologies so far appear to have suffered from an inadequacy of
measurement, lack of control for covariates, and inappropriate use of sample sizes and
types. Researchers have repeatedly called for the development or at least the utilisation
of improved, more appropriate, and more sensitive methods and measurements (e.g.
Ellison, 1998; Gorsuch, 1988; Kirkpatrick& Hood, 1990; Loewenthal, 2000; Paloutzian
& Kirkpatrick, 1995). Religion appears to be challenging, in an entertaining way, our
resourcefulness to investigate phenomena and concepts that are not easily studied
scientifically.
Finally, by adopting a more pluralistic approach, the psychology of religion will be able
to attract the interest ofmore mainstream psychologists, pastoral counsellors, as well as
scholars from other disciplines. So far, it appears that research in this area has been
relatively ignored, or widely overlooked. In 1994, Jeffrey Levin came to the following
conclusion, which, ten years later, is to a large extent still valid (see Foskett et al., 2004):
There is no nice way to put it, mainstream scientists and scholars seem
positively oblivious to the presence of the expanding literature base of
empirical data supportive of a salutary role for religion (p. xvi)
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It would be beneficial for all parties, if psychologists of religion tried to increase the
promotion of their field in the general psychological and religious communities, by
encouraging collaborations and constructive dialogues, and by promoting religious-
sensitive training. The time is ripe for the field to reconstruct itself and dynamically
pursue its role as an important psychological area of study.
Chapter synopsis
Bringing together the various findings of this thesis leads to the overall conclusion that
religion is a psychologically important, complex, multidimensional concept amenable
to modelling, and that psychologists need to be more informed about its effects on the
individual's well-being and psychosocial world in general. Should we proceed with
investigating religion through psychology, we should do so responsibly and
meticulously. Further research is needed, and focussed and sophisticated psychological
methodologies and measurements need to be developed that would produce coherent,
interpretive, and reliable models.
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Appendix I: The invitation script for the questionnaire study
All conductees were presented with the following script:
Dear volunteer,
My name is Niko Tiliopoulos and I am a researcher at the Psychology Department ofthe
University ofEdinburgh. Currently I am doing my PhD research on the relation between
faith and well-being. More specifically, I am exploring the circumstances under which
religious beliefs - in particular Christian beliefs - can influence our psychological
stability. Furthermore, I am investigating the importance of various other factors that
may contribute to these influences.
As you will appreciate, this is an important issue, since knowledge in this area can help
Christian counsellors, and counsellors in general, provide better and more effective
services. It can also help Christian individuals gain additional direct insight into their
well-being and into ways of improving it.
The research is based on a questionnaire, which will be sent to you to complete at your
own pace. Unless you voluntarily provide your contact details (for example, requesting
feedback on the results), your participation will be anonymous, and your responses will
only be used for academic purposes, and be treated in the strictest confidence.
I would be grateful if you participated in this study. The only prerequisite is that you
should be a Christian of any denomination. You do not have to be actively practising
your faith, as long as you generally believe in the Christian principles.
Should you decide to take part in the study, please do let me know (my contact details
follow). In addition, if you think that other people in your close environment (family,
friends, etc.) may be interested in it, please let me know of the number of additional
questionnaires you would like to receive.
Thank you for your time
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Appendix II: The introductory questionnaire script
Dear participant,
This study looks at the various attitudes and feelings ofpeople who have Christianbeliefs. The reasons people have for being religiousmay have a significant impacton their well-being. As you will appreciate, this is an important issue, since
knowledge in this area can help Christian counsellors, and counsellors in general,
provide better and more effective services. It can also help Christian individuals gain
additional direct self-insight into their well-being and into ways of developing it.
Therefore, it would be appreciated if you replied to the following questions as honestly
as possible.
The questionnaire is quite long so please take your time when filling it in. It should take
you approximately 30 minutes to complete it. Should you need any clarifications on
certain questions, do feel free to contact the researcher:
Niko Tiliopoulos, BSc, MSc
The University of Edinburgh




The information gained from this study is for research purposes only, and will be treated
in the strictest confidence.
Thank you for your participation
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Appendix III: Allport's Intrinsic / Extrinsic religiosity questionnaire revised (i/E-R)
(for the actual font-size and font-type in which the questionnaires appeard in the
study see chapter V)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each
item below, by writing the number in the space provided, using the following rating
scale:
1 2 3 4 5
I strongly I tend to disagree I'm not sure I tend to agree I strongly agree
disagree
_1 I enjoy reading about my religion
2 1 go to church because it helps me make friends
3 It doesn't much matter what I believe so long as I am good
4 It is important to me to spend time in private thought and prayer
5 I have often had a strong sense ofGod's presence
6 I pray mainly to gain relief and protection
7 I try hard to live all my life according to my religious beliefs
8 What religion offers me most is comfort in times of trouble and sorrow
9 Prayer is for peace and happiness
10 Although I am religious, I don't let it affect my daily life
11 I go to church mostly to spend time with my friends
12 My whole approach to life is based on my religion
13 I go to church mainly because I enjoy seeing people I know there
14 Although I believe in my religion, many other things are more important in life
PLEASE CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
Page 375
Appendices
Appendix IV: Batson's Religious Life Inventory (RLI)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please indicate the extent to which you agree or disagree with each item below, by
writing the number in the space provided, using the following rating scale:
123 45 6 789
Strongly Disagree Tend to Somewhat I'm not Somewhat Tend to Agree Strongly
disagree disagree disagree sure agree agree Agree
1 The church has been very important in my religious development.
2 Worldly events cannot affect the eternal truth ofmy religion.
3 As I grow and change, I expect my religion also to grow and change.
4 My religious development is a natural response to our innate need for devotion to God.
5 I am constantly questioning my religious beliefs.
6 It might be said that I value my religious doubts and uncertainties.
7 My minister (or priest, youth director, camp counsellor, etc.) has had a profound influence on
my personal religious development.
8 I was not very interested in religion until I began to ask questions about the meaning and
purpose ofmy life.
9 God's will should shape my life.
10 On religious issues, I find the opinions of others irrelevant.
11 For me doubting is an important part ofwhat it means to be religious.
12 It is necessary for me to have a religious belief.
13 When it comes to religious questions, I feel driven to know the truth.
14 I find my everyday experiences severely test my religious convictions.
15 A major factor in my religious development has been the importance of religion for my
parents.
16 I do not expect my religious convictions to change in the next few years.
17 I find religious doubts upsetting.
18 Religion is something I have never felt personally compelled to consider.
19 I have been driven to ask religious questions out of a growing awareness of the tensions in my
world and in my relation to my world.
20 My religion serves to satisfy needs for fellowship and security.
21 My religious development has emerged out ofmy growing sense of personal identity.
22 My religion is a personal matter, independent of the influence of organised religion.
23 Whether I turn out to be religious or not, it doesn't make much difference to me.
24 My life experiences have led me to rethink my religious convictions.
25 Certain people have served as "models" for my religious development.
26 There are many religious issues on which my views are still changing.
27 I have found it essential to have faith.
28 It is important for me to learn about religion from those who know more about it than I do.
29 God wasn't very important for me until I began to ask questions about the meaning ofmy own
life.
30 I find it impossible to conceive ofmyself not being religious.
31 The "me" of a few years back would be surprised at my present religious stance.
32 Questions are far more central to my religious experience than are answers.
33 Outside forces (other persons, church, etc.) have been relatively unimportant in my religious
development.
_ 34 For me religion has not been a "must".
please check you have answered all the questions
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Appendix V: Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer each item by checking YES orNO. Answer ALL items
even if unsure of your answer. When you have finished, check over each one to make
sure you have answered them.
1 Do you sometimes feel that things you see on the TV or read in the
newspapers have a special meaning for you?
yes no
2 I sometimes avoid going to places where there will be many people
because I will get anxious.
yes no
3 Have you had experiences with the supernatural? yes no
4 Have you often mistaken objects or shadows for people, or noises for
voices?
yes no
5 Other people see me as slightly eccentric (odd). yes no
6 I have little interest in getting to know other people. yes no
7 People sometimes find it hard to understand what 1 am saying. yes no
8 People sometimes find me aloof and distant. yes no
9 I am sure I am being talked behind my back. yes no
10 I am aware that people notice me when I go out for a meal or to see a
film.
yes no
11 I get very nervous when I have to make polite conversations. yes no
12 Do you believe in telepathy (mind-reading)? yes no
13 Have you ever had the sense that some person or force is around you,
even though you cannot see anyone?
yes no
14 People sometimes comment on my unusual mannerisms and habits. yes no
15 I prefer to keep to myself. yes no
16 I sometimes jump quickly from one topic to another when speaking. yes no
17 I am poor at expressing my true feelings by the way I talk and look. yes no
18 Do you often feel that other people have got it in for you? yes no
19 Do some people drop hints about you or say things with a double
meaning?
yes no
20 Do you ever get nervous when someone is walking behind you? yes no
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21 Are you sometimes sure that other people can tell what you are
thinking?
YES NO
22 When you look at a person, or yourself in a mirror, have you ever seen
the face change right before your eyes?
YES NO
23 Sometimes other people think that I am a little strange. YES NO
24 I am mostly quiet when with other people. YES NO
25 I sometimes forget what I am trying to say. YES NO
26 I rarely laugh and smile. YES NO
27 Do you sometimes get concerned that friends or co-workers are not
really loyal or trustworthy?
YES NO
28 Have you ever noticed a common event or object that seemed to be a
special sign for you?
YES NO
29 I get anxious when meeting people for the first time. YES NO
30 Do you believe in clairvoyancy (psychic forces, fortune telling)? YES NO
31 I often hear a voice speaking my thoughts aloud. YES NO
32 Some people think that I am a very bizarre person. YES NO
33 I find it hard to be emotionally close to other people. YES NO
34 I often ramble on too much when speaking. YES NO
35 My "non-verbal" communication (smiling and nodding during a YES
NO conversation) is poor.
YES NO
36 I feel I have to be on my guard even with friends. YES NO
37 Do you sometimes see special meaning in advertisements, shop
windows, or in the way things are arranged around you?
YES NO
38 Do you often feel nervous when you are in a group of unfamiliar
people?
YES NO
39 Can other people feel your feelings when they are not there? YES NO
40 Have you ever seen things invisible to other people? YES NO
41 Do you feel that there is no one you are really close to, outside of your
immediate family, or people you can confide in or talk to about
personal problems?
YES NO
42 Some people find me a bit vague and elusive during a conversation. YES NO
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43 I am poor at returning social courtesies and gestures. YES NO
44 Do you often pick up hidden threats or put-downs from what people
say or do?
YES NO
45 When shopping do you get the feeling that other people are taking
notice of you?
YES NO
46 I feel very uncomfortable in social situations involving unfamiliar
people.
YES NO
47 Have you had experiences with astrology, seeing the future, UFOs,
ESP or the sixth sense?
YES NO
48 Do everyday things seem unusually large or small? YES NO
49 Writing letters to friends is more trouble than it is worth. YES NO
50 I sometimes use words in unusual ways. YES NO
51 I tend to avoid eye contact when conversing with others. YES NO
52 Have you found that it is best not to let other people know too much
about you?
YES NO
53 When you see people talking to each other, do you often wonder if
they are talking about you?
YES NO
54 1 would feel very anxious if I had to give a speech in front of a large
group of people.
YES NO
55 Have you ever felt that you are communicating with another person
telepathically (by mind-reading)?
YES NO
56 Does your sense of smell sometimes become unusually strong? YES NO
57 I tend to keep in the background on social occasions. YES NO
58 Do you tend to wander off the topic when having a conversation? YES NO
59 I often feel that others have it in for me. YES NO
60 Do you sometimes feel that other people are watching you? YES NO
61 Do you ever suddenly feel distracted by distant sounds that you are
not normally aware of?
YES NO
62 I attach little importance to having close friends. YES NO
63 Do you sometimes feel that people are talking about you? YES NO
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64 Are your thoughts sometimes so strong that you can almost hear
them?
YES NO
65 Do you often have to keep an eye out to stop people from taking
advantage of you?
YES NO
66 Do you feel that you are unable to get "close" to people? YES NO
67 I am an odd, unusual person. YES NO
68 I do not have an expressive and lively way of speaking. YES NO
69 I find it hard to communicate clearly what I want to say to people. YES NO
70 I have some eccentric (odd) habits. YES NO
71 I feel very uneasy talking to people I do not know well. YES NO
72 People occasionally comment that my conversation is confusing. YES NO
73 I tend to keep my feelings to myself. YES NO
74 People sometimes stare at me because ofmy odd appearance. YES NO
PLEASE CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
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Appendix VI: Eysenck's Personality Questionnaire revised, EPQ-R (Short version)
INSTRUCTIONS: Please answer each question by putting a circle around the "YES" or
the "NO" following the question. There are no right or wrong answers, and no trick
questions. Work quickly and do not think too long about the exact meaning of the
questions.
1 Does your mood often go up and down? yes no
2 Do you take much notice of what people think? yes no
3 Are you a talkative person? yes no
4 Do you ever feel "just miserable" for no reason? yes no
5 Would being in debt worry you? yes no
6 Are you rather lively? yes no
7 Are you an irritable person? yes no
8 Would you take drugs which may have strange or dangerous effects? yes no
9 Do you enjoy meeting new people? yes no
10 Are your feeling easily hurt? yes no
11 Do you prefer to go your own way, rather than act by the rules? yes no
12 Can you usually let yourself go and enjoy yourself at a lively party? yes no
13 Do you often feel "fed-up"? yes no
14 Do good manners and cleanliness matter much to you? yes no
15 Do you usually take the initiative in making new friends? yes no
16 Would you call yourself a nervous person? yes no
17 Do you think marriage is old-fashioned and should be done away with? yes no
18 Can you easily get some life into a rather dull party? yes no
19 Are you a worrier? yes no
20 Do you enjoy co-operating with others? yes no
21 Do you tend to keep in the background on social occasions? yes no
22 Does it worry you if you know there are mistakes in your work? yes no
23 Would you call yourself tense or "highly-strung"? yes no





25 Do you like mixing with people? YES NO
26 Do you worry too long after an embarrassing experience? YES NO
27 Do you try not to be rude to people? YES NO
28 Do you like plenty of bustle and excitement around you? YES NO
29 Do you suffer from "nerves"? YES NO
30 Would you like other people to be afraid of you? YES NO
31 Are you mostly quiet when you are with other people? YES NO
32 Do you often feel lonely? YES NO
33 Is it better to follow society's rules than go your own way? YES NO
34 Do other people think of you as being very lively? YES NO
35 Are you often troubled about feeling of guilt? YES NO
36 Can you get a party going? YES NO
PLEASE CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
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Appendix VII: Aspects of Identity Questionnaire (AIQ-IIIx)
INSTRUCTIONS: These items describe different aspects of identity. Please read each item carefully and
consider how it applies to you. Fill in the blank next to each item by choosing a number from the scale
below:
1 = Not important to my sense of who I am.
2 = Slightly important to my sense of who I am.
3 = Somewhat important to my sense of who I am
4 = Very important to my sense of who I am
5 = Extremely important to my sense of who I am
_1 The things I own, my possessions.
2 My personal values and moral standards
3 My popularity with other people
4 Being a part of the many generations ofmy family
5 My dreams and imagination
6 The ways in which other people react to what I say and do
7 My race or ethnic background
8 My personal goals and hopes for the future
9 My physical appearance: my height, my weight, and the shape ofmy body
My religion
11 My emotions and feelings
12 My reputation, what others think
13 Places where I live or where I was raised
14 My thoughts and ideas
15 My attractiveness to other people
16 My age, belonging to my age group or being part ofmy generation
17 The ways I deal with my fears and anxieties
18 My sex, being a male or female
19 My feeling of being a unique person, being distinct from others.
20 My social class, the economic group I belong to, whether lower, middle, or upper class.
21 Knowing that I continue to be essentially the same inside even though life involves many
external changes
22 My gestures and mannerisms, the impression I make on others
23 My feeling of belonging to my community
24 My self-knowledge, my ideas about what kind of person I really am
25 My social behaviour, such as the way I act when meeting people
26 My feeling of pride in my country, being proud to be a citizen
27 My physical abilities, being coordinated and good at athletic activities
28 My personal self-evaluation, the private opinion I have ofmyself
29 Being a sports fan, identifying with a sports team
30 My occupational choice and career plans
31 My commitments on political issues or my political activities
32 My academic ability and performance, such as the grades I earn and comments I get from
teachers
33 My language, such as my regional accent or dialect or a second language that I know
34 My role of being a student in college
35 My sexual orientation, whether heterosexual, homosexual, or bisexual
PLEASE CHECK YOU HAVE ANSWERED ALL THE QUESTIONS
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AppendixVIII: Experience in Close Relationships Questionnaire (ECR)
INSTRUCTIONS: The following statements concern how you feel in romantic relationships. We are
interested in how you generally experience relationships, not just in what is happening in a current
relationship. Respond to each statement by indicating how much you agree or disagree with it. Write the
number in the space provided, using the following rating scale:
1 2 3 4 5
Strongly disagree Disagree Neutral/ Mixed Agree Strongly agree
1 I prefer not to show a partner how I feel deep down.
2 I worry about being abandoned.
3 I am very comfortable being close to romantic partners.
4 I worry a lot about my relationships.
5 Just when my partner starts to get close to me I find myself pulling away.
6 I worry that romantic partners won't care about me as much as I care about them.
7 I get uncomfortable when a romantic partner wants to be very close.
8 I worry a fair amount about losing my partner.
9 I don't feel comfortable opening up to romantic partners.
10 I often wish that my partner's feelings for me were as strong as my feelings for him/her.
11 I want to get close to my partner, but I keep pulling back.
12 I often want to merge completely with romantic partners, and this sometimes scares them
away.
13 I am nervous when partners get too close to me.
14 I worry about being alone.
15 I feel comfortable sharing my private thoughts and feelings with my partner.
16 My desire to be very close sometimes scares people away.
17 I try to avoid getting too close to my partner.
18 I need a lot of reassurance that I am loved by my partner.
19 I find it relatively easy to get close to my partner.
20 Sometimes I feel that I force my partners to show more feeling, more commitment.
_21 I find it difficult to allow myself to depend on romantic partners.
22 I do not often worry about being abandoned.
23 I prefer not to be too close to romantic partners.
24 If I can't get my partner to show interest in me, I get upset or angry.
25 I tell my partner just about everything.
26 I find that my partner(s) don't want to get as close as I would like.
27 1 usually discuss my problems and concerns with my partner.
28 When I'm not involved in a relationship, I feel somewhat anxious and insecure.
29 I feel comfortable depending on romantic partners.
30 I get frustrated when my partner is not around as much as I would like.
31 I don't mind asking romantic partners for comfort, advice, or help.
32 I get frustrated if romantic partners are not available when I need them.
33 It helps to turn to my romantic partner in times of need.
_34 When romantic partners disapprove ofme, I feel really bad about myself.
_35 I turn to my partner for many things, including comfort and reassurance.
36 I resent it when my partner spends time away from me
please check you have answeredall the questions
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Appendix IX: Balanced Inventory of Desirable Responding (BIDR-6)
INSTRUCTIONS: Using the scale below as a guide, please write a number beside each statement to
indicate how much you agree with it
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Not True Rather Fairly Somewhat fairly true rather true Very True
untrue untrue True
1 My first impressions of people usually turn out to be right.
2 It would be hard for me to break any ofmy bad habits.
3 I don't care to know what other people really think ofme.
4 I have not always been honest with myself.
5 I always know why I like things.
6 When my emotions are aroused, it biases my thinking.
7 Once I've made up my mind, other people can seldom change my opinion.
8 I am not a safe driver when I exceed the speed limit.
9 I am fully in control ofmy own fate.
10 It's hard for me to shut off a disturbing thought.
_11 I never regret my decisions.
12 I sometimes lose out on things because I can't make up my mind soon enough.
13 The reason I vote is because my vote can make a difference.
14 My parents were not always fair when they punished me.
15 I am a completely rational person.
16 I rarely appreciate criticism.
17 I am very confident ofmy judgements.
18 I have sometimes doubted my ability as a lover.
19 It's alright with me of some people happen to dislike me.
20 I don't always know the reason why I do the things I do.
21 I sometimes tell lies if I have to.
22 I never cover up my mistakes.
23 There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone.
24 I never swear.
25 I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget.
26 I always obey laws, even if I'm unlikely to get caught.
27 I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.
28 When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.
29 I have received too much change from a salesperson without telling him or her.
30 I always declare everything at customs.
31 When I was young 1 sometimes stole things.
32 I have never dropped litter on the street.
33 I sometimes drive faster than the speed limit.
34 I never read sexy books or magazines.
35 I have done things that I don't tell other people about.
36 I never take things that don't belong to me.
37 I have taken sick-leave from work or school even though I wasn't really sick.
38 I have never damaged a library book or store merchandise without reporting it.
39 I have some pretty awful habits.
40 I don't gossip about other people's business.
please check you have answered all the questions
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Appendix X: SPSS syntax file for nonlinear R comparisons
The following SPSS syntax file was used to compute the significance of the difference







COMPUTE diffr = rxy - rvy.
COMPUTE detR = (1 - rxy **2 - rvy**2 - rxv**2)+ (2*rxy*rxv*rvy).
COMPUTE rbar = (rxy + rvy)/2.
COMPUTE tnum = (diffr) * (sqrt((n-l)*(l + rxv))).
COMPUTE tden = sqrt(2*((n-l)/(n-3))*detR + ((rbar**2) * ((l-rxv)**3))).
COMPUTE t= (tnum/tden).
COMPUTE df = n - 3.
COMPUTE p l tail = 1 - CDF.T(abs(t),df).





Appendix XI: The invitation script for the interview study
Dear participant,
A few months ago you participated in a questionnaire study on religion and well-being
conducted by the university ofEdinburgh. Let me take this opportunity to thank you for
your involvement in this research. The study is still going on, but when it is concluded
you will receive a short description of the main findings as requested.
In the meantime, since in your response you have shown interest in talking to us in
person, I would like to invite you for a short interview, in which you will have the
opportunity to discuss your thoughts on the matter. The interviewwill be rather informal,
it will last for approximately 30 minutes and it will be tape-recorded. It will take place
at your convenience and at an agreed time - it may also be over the phone.
All interview material involving your participation will be strictly confidential and
anonymous, and will only be used by me for academic purposes within the context of
the current research.
Although your participation will be greatly appreciated, you are under no obligation to
either respond to this invitation or take part in the interview. Whatever your decision
may be it will be respected fully.
Should you decide to take part in the interview, please do let me know, so we can
proceed with making the appropriate arrangements.
Do not hesitate to contact me should you need more information.
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Appendix XII: The interview protocol
Thankyoufor agreeing to take part in this interview. Your contribution is highly appreciated.
Before we begin, Iwould like to clarify that Iwill be using some terms, like "church ", in a very
broadway, so pleasefeelfree to adjust them to your specific circumstances. Finally, iffor any
reason there is a question you'd rather not answer, please do let me know and Iwill move to
the next one.
I'd like to start by talking about your sense of...
Being a Christian
1. What does being a Christian mean to you?
la. So, in what way is being a Christian important for you?
2. What role does God play in your life?
3. From your point of view as a Christian, how do you view people belonging to other religions?
3a. How do you feel about non-religious people?
Going back in time, I'd like to address your...
Upbringing and personal development
4. When was it that religion first came into your life?
5. In what way have your parents and other people influenced your religious beliefs?
6. Could you explain why you chose to (continue to be) OR (become) a Christian in your adult life?
6a. In what way have your religious beliefs been changing through your life?
Given what you just described andfocussing on the present, now I'd like to ask about the...
Role of religious beliefs in your life
7. How do you think your religious beliefs have shaped your life and your sense ofwho you are?
7a. In what way do your religious beliefs contribute to what you feel is your purpose in this
world?
8. To what extent are your daily behaviour & activities, including your social life, guided by your
religious beliefs?
9. How important is it for you to be part of a group?
10. To what extend and in what way have you found any kind of support in your church?
11. To what extend and in what way do you feel religion provides guidance and gives you a sense of
well-being?
More specifically, and centring now on your religious practice, I'd like to focus on the issue of...
Prayer
12. Do you usually pray?
[if YES] 12a. What are your prayers about?
[ifNO] 12b. Why is it that you do not pray?
Andjust to finish off, I'd like to address as afinal topic...
The possibility of religion not being part of your life
13. How do you think your life would be without religion?
14. Is there anything that could make you question your religious beliefs?
15. Finally, is there anything else you would like to add about your religious life, why you are
religious, or anything you would like to say a bit differently?
Thankyou very much. Remind them ofthe debriefing. Suggest that if they would like to add or alter
anything they discussed, they are welcome to send a letter or email. Remind them that they will
receive feedback at the end ofthe study.
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